Valens, Trusts, Book I. “Let Stichus be free, and I request my heir to teach him a trade, in order that he may be able to support himself.” Pegasus says that the trust is void, because the kind of trade was not stated. But the Prætor or the Judge must determine, in accordance with the intention of the deceased, and the age, position, character, and talents of the slave to whom the bequest was made, what trade it would be best for the heir to teach him at his own expense.

Valens, Trusts, Book I. Where maintenance is left by the terms of a trust, and the amount is not stated, what the deceased was accustomed to furnish the legatee must be learned before anything else is done, and then what he left to others of the same rank must be ascertained. If neither of these things can be found out, the amount must then be determined according to the means of the deceased, and the affection which he entertained toward the party for whose benefit the trust was created. 1A testator, who was already under obligations to provide support for the freedmen of his brother, bequeathed to them certain vineyards by his will, with the following addition: “That they may have them in order to provide themselves with food.” If he left them these vineyards instead of the support which he was obliged to provide, they should not be transferred under the terms of the trust, unless the heirs are freed from the obligations imposed by the will; for if this should fail to be done, and he should afterwards bring suit under the will, the heir could protect himself by an exception on the ground of fraud; that is to say, if the vineyards were not worth less than the amount furnished for support. The addition, “That they may have them in order to provide themselves with food,” rather shows the reason for making the bequest, than an intention to establish an usufruct.

Valens, Trusts, Book I. The following rule which has been handed down, namely, that where several conditions have been imposed with reference to grants of freedom, the one which is the most easily complied with, and, in the case of legacies, the last one, shall be considered.

Valens, Trusts, Book I. This has reference not only to provisions which are often dependent upon different conditions, but also to dispositions which are at first absolutely made, and have afterwards become conditional. Therefore, where the heir is ordered to pay something absolutely, or where the bequest is absolute, and the same property is subsequently bequeathed under a condition, the last bequest will be valid. If the property is first left under a condition and afterwards absolutely, it will be payable immediately. If, however, the legacy is bequeathed absolutely and the heir is charged or requested to pay it at once under a certain condition, it is the same as if the bequest had been made in two places, so that, if the legatee desires, he can bring suit for its recovery immediately, or it can be claimed by the heir when the condition has been fulfilled, unless the legacy has only been mentioned the second time by way of calling attention to the first, for example, “Let my heir give Stichus to the party to whom I have bequeathed him, if he does such-and-such a thing,” for, in this instance, the testator is not considered to have made this provision for the purpose of revoking the bequest, and changing it to a conditional one, and if the legatee should bring suit to recover the property before the condition was complied with, an exception on the ground of bad faith will be a bar to further proceedings.

Valens, Trusts, Book I. “I charge my heir to pay to Titius ten aurei at some time or other.” There is no doubt that the heir owes ten aurei, but it is uncertain when he owes them. It seems that the legacy will take effect, and can be demanded of the heir as soon as he is able to pay it.