Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book VIII. If certain heirs should be appointed as follows: “If they remain partners in my property until they reach the age of sixteen years, let them be my heirs”, Marcellus says that an appointment made in language of this kind is void. Julianus, however, holds that such an appointment is valid, since the partnership can be formed for some future purpose, before the estate is entered upon. This is correct. 1Ad Dig. 28,7,4,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 554, Note 8.Julianus also says, where anyone appoints an heir under the condition: “If he does not alienate a certain slave belonging to the estate”, that the condition is fulfilled when the heir furnishes his coheir with security. However, where only one heir is mentioned, he is held to have been appointed under an impossible condition, which opinion is correct.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book VIII. When a slave belonging to another, who is serving me in good faith, enters upon an estate by my order, he will commit an act which is void, and he will not acquire the said estate for me, nor will such an act be valid if performed by a slave of whom I am the usufructuary. 1A slave belonging to a municipality, corporation, or a decuria, who is appointed an heir, can enter upon the estate after having been manumitted or alienated. 2If the said slave belongs to the Treasury, he can enter upon the estate by order of the Imperial Steward, as has been frequently stated in rescripts. 3Where it is evident that someone has become a penal slave, by having been condemned to fight with gladiators, or wild beasts, or to work in the mines, and he is appointed an heir, his appointment will be considered as not having been made, as the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript. 4The order of a man who has another under his control does not resemble the authority of a guardian which can be interposed after the transaction has been completed, but should precede the acceptance; as Gaius Cassius says in the Second Book of the Civil Law. He also thinks that this order can be communicated by means of a messenger, or by a letter. 5Ad Dig. 29,2,25,5Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 596, Note 12.Should the order, however, be given generally, as follows: “Whatever estates may pass to you”, or specifically? The better opinion is (as Gaius Cassius holds) that it should be given specifically. 6The question also arises whether the order can be given expressly with reference to the estate of a man still living. I think that where it is given with reference to the estate of a person who is still living, it should not be obeyed. It is evident that if the report was current that Lucius Titius was dead, or if the will was not yet opened, and it was still uncertain whether the son was designated the heir, the party appointed heir could be ordered to enter upon the estate. 7But what if the order should be given to “acquire the estate”? Would it be held that the party had been directed to enter upon it? What if he should be ordered to “apply for prætorian possession of the estate”, or “to sell the property belonging to it”? Or what if the son should enter upon the estate, after the father had ratified his demand for prætorian possession of the same? Or what if the son should enter upon the estate, after having been ordered to act in the capacity of heir? Can it be doubted that he would be held to have entered upon it by order of his father? Indeed, the better opinion is, that in all these cases, attention should be called to the entry upon the estate. 8A father wrote to his son as follows: “I know, my son, that you will watch with prudence over the estate of Lucius Titius, which has been conferred upon you.” I think that the son enters upon the estate by order of his father. 9What if he ordered, as follows: “Enter upon the estate, if it is expedient for you to do so”; “If you think it is expedient to enter upon the estate, do so”? The entry upon the estate will be by order of the father. 10If a father should order his son to enter upon the estate, “In the presence of Titius”, or with the consent of Lucius Titius, I think that the order is given in accordance with law. 11Where, however, the order is given to a son as heir to the entire estate, and it should be ascertained that he is heir only to a portion of the same; I do not think that he can enter upon it under such an order. But, if his father orders him to accept only a portion of the estate, he can accept the whole of it. The case is different where he orders him to enter upon it as ab intestato, and he does so by virtue of a will, for I think that then his act is not valid; but if the order was to enter upon the estate by virtue of a will, the son can likewise do so ab intestato; since he does not make the condition of his father any worse. The same rule applies where the father directs the son to enter upon the estate as an appointed heir, and it is ascertained that he is a substitute, or vice versa. 12Where, however, a father directs his son to enter upon an estate, he being a substitute of a child under the age of puberty, the order will not be sufficient. 13It is clear that if the order was as follows: “If any estate passes to you by the will of Lucius Titius”, it can be maintained that he can enter upon it under an order of this kind. 14But if after he has given the order, he should change his mind before the son has entered upon the estate, and he does so, his act will be void. 15Likewise, if he should give his son to be arrogated before the latter enters upon the estate, the estate will not be acquired by him.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book VIII. Aristo thinks that the Prætor should give the heir who is deliberating with reference to his acceptance of the estate the right to enter upon the same, in order to demand the papers of the deceased from the party with whom they have been deposited.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book VIII. Ad Dig. 29,2,30 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 601, Note 3.Where a man absent on an embassy is not able to order his son who was appointed an heir, and is in a province, to enter upon the estate; the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript addressed to the Consuls that relief should be granted him when his son died, for the reason that he was absent on business for the State. 1Where it is said that: “The next of kin to a posthumous child cannot enter upon the estate so long as the woman is pregnant, or is thought to be so, but if he knows that she is not pregnant, he can enter upon it”; it is understood that this is applicable to the next of kin to the unborn child, who, when born, will be the proper heir of the deceased. These words not only have reference to persons dying testate, but also to intestates. And the same must be understood to apply to an unborn child who will be either the proper heir, or a blood relative; since the former at the time of the death is considered as already born, so far as deferring the succession of more remote heirs and making a place for itself therein if it should be brought forth, is concerned. The same rule applies to the possession of property granted by the Prætorian Edict. Finally, the Prætor places the unborn child in possession of the estate. 2Therefore, if I think that the woman is pregnant, or if she actually is pregnant, and the child which she is to bring forth will be the proper heir of the deceased, I cannot enter upon the estate, as the will is liable to be broken by the birth of the heir, unless you suppose the case that the unborn child is either appointed an heir, or disinherited. 3The statement, “If he thinks that she is pregnant”, must be understood to mean if she asserts she is in that condition. But what if she should not say that she is pregnant, but denies it, and others say that she is in that condition? The estate cannot then be entered upon, even though you may suppose midwives to confirm the existence of her pregnancy. What if the heir alone thinks that the woman is pregnant? If he has good reason for thinking so, he cannot enter upon the estate; but if his opinion agrees with that of many others he can do so. 4But what if the woman was pregnant, and the heir thought that she was not, and entered upon the estate, and afterwards an abortion was produced? There is no doubt whatever that his act will be void. Hence this opinion will benefit the heir as often as it agrees with the truth. 5Where, however, the woman herself is appointed heir, and pretends to be pregnant, she will acquire the estate by entering upon it. On the other hand, she will not acquire it, if she thinks she is pregnant and this is not the case. 6Ad Dig. 29,2,30,6Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 87, Note 2.It is certain that a proper heir is entitled to the entire estate, even though he thinks that the woman is pregnant, when this is not true. What course must be pursued if she is pregnant of one child? Will it be heir to half of the estate, whether you suppose the case of the appointment of a posthumous child, or that the father died intestate? This opinion which Tertullianus states in the Fourth Book of Questions, was held by Sextus Pomponius; for he thought that when the woman was not pregnant the proper heir was entitled to the whole estate; as when she is only pregnant of one child, a second cannot be formed in accordance with the nature of the human race, for this only happens a certain time after conception, and the heir already born, even though he was not aware of the fact, will be entitled to half, and not to a fourth of the estate, as is held by Julianus. 7When a son under paternal control or a slave is appointed an heir, shall the knowledge or opinion of the master or the father as to the pregnancy be adopted? Suppose the father thinks that the woman is pregnant, and the son is certain that she is not, and, in accordance with his belief, he enters upon the estate, will he obtain it? I think that he will, but in the opposite case I hold that he will not do so. 8If I am certain that a will is not forged, void, or broken, although it is said to be, I can enter upon the estate.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book VIII. An appointed heir cannot enter upon the estate if he thinks that the testator is living, even though he may already be dead. 1But even if he knows that he has been appointed an heir, but is ignorant as to whether his appointment was absolute or conditional, he cannot enter upon the estate, even though he may have been appointed heir absolutely, or if he was appointed under a condition, even though he may have complied with it. 2Where, however, the heir is uncertain as to the condition of the testator, namely, as to whether he was the head of a household or a son under paternal control, he cannot enter upon the estate, even though his condition was in fact such as to enable him to make a will.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book VIII. Where anyone is in doubt as to his own condition and whether he is a son under paternal control, it has already been stated that he can acquire an estate. But why can he enter upon an estate if he is ignorant of his own condition, but if he is ignorant of that of the testator he cannot do so? The reason is that he who is ignorant of the condition of the testator does not know whether his will is valid or not; but he who is aware of his own is certain of the validity of the will. 1If an heir was appointed absolutely, but thinks that he was appointed under a condition, and, after complying with it, enters upon the estate, can he acquire it? It follows that he can legally enter upon it, especially when the opinion which he entertains places no obstacle in his way, nor causes him any risk. This would be more readily admitted, where someone who was absolutely appointed thought that he was appointed under a condition, and that the condition which depended upon some event had been fulfilled; for this opinion presented no obstacle to his acceptance of the estate.

Ulpiamis, On Sabinus, Book VIII. Prætorian possession of an estate can be demanded on the ground of intestacy, when it is certain that the will has not been signed by at least seven witnesses.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book VIII. Neither the interdict Unde vi nor any other interdict implies infamy.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book VIII. A judgment for this offence does not brand anyone with infamy, but it is followed by extraordinary punishment.

Ulpianus, On Massurius Sabinus, Book VIII. When a municipal envoy abandons his office, he is generally subjected to an ordinary penalty, and dismissed from his order.