Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book L. If, where a slave is wounded, an action is brought under the Lex Aquilia, and the slave afterwards dies of the wound, an action can still be brought under the Lex Aquilia.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book L. As the legatee cannot select Stichus.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book L. It is clear that no doubt can arise where anyone stipulates for payment on the Kalends of January, and adds on “the first” or “the next.” And, also, if he mentions the second or the third, or any other, he also fixes the date beyond dispute. If, however, he does not mention what January, he introduces a question of fact as to his intention; that is to say, what was agreed upon between the parties; for we examine what was the intention, and decide accordingly. Where the intention is not evident, we must adopt the opinion of Sabinus, and hold that the first Kalends of January were meant. But if anyone makes a stipulation on the very day of the kalends, what rule shall we follow? I think that the intention should be considered to refer to the following kalends. 1Whenever the day is not stated in an obligation, the money is considered to be due at once; unless a place is mentioned which requires a certain time to arrive there. Where, however, a day is fixed, the effect is that the money will not immediately be due, from which it is clear that the mention of the time is in favor of the promisor, and not of the stipulator. 2This rule also applies to the ides, and the nones, and, generally speaking, to all dates.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book L. If anyone should stipulate that restitution shall be made to him, for instance, by the arbitration of Lucius Titius, and then the stipulator himself should cause Titius to delay in rendering his award, the promisor will not be liable for being in default. But what if he who is to decide the matter should cause delay? It will be better to hold that the case should not be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of him to whose arbitration it was submitted.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XL. Whatever one person stipulates in favor of another who has control over him will be considered as if the latter himself had made the stipulation. 1Just as anyone can stipulate for something “when he dies,” so, also, those who are subject to the authority of others can stipulate in such away that what they provide will take effect at the time of their death. 2Where anyone stipulates as follows, “Do you promise to pay my daughter after my death?” or, “Do you promise to pay me after my daughter’s death?” the stipulation will be valid; but, in the first case, the daughter will be entitled to an equitable action, although she may not be her father’s heir. 3We can stipulate not only, “When you die,” but also, “If you die,” for as there is no difference between “When you come,” or, “If you come,” likewise there is no difference between, “If you die,” and “When you die.” 4A son is understood to stipulate for payment to his father, even if he does not say so.

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XL. Anyone who stipulates as follows, “Do you promise to pay what you ought to pay on these kalends” is understood to be stipulated not for to-day, but for the time agreed upon, that is to say, for the kalends.

The Same, On Sabinus, Book L. It is certain that a release can be made as follows, “Do you acknowledge the receipt of ten aurei?” and the other party answers “I do.”

Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book L. It is better to say that the obligation for services promised by the oath of a freedman can be extinguished by a release. 1If what is the object of a stipulation is not susceptible of division, the release of a portion of it will be of no force or effect; as, for instance, where it is a servitude attaching to a rustic or an urban estate. It is clear that if an usufruct, for instance, of the Titian Estate, is the object of the stipulation, a release can be made for a part of it, and the usufruct of the remaining portion of the land will continue to exist. If, however, anyone should stipulate for a right of way, and a stipulation is granted for a right of passage, or a driveway, it will be of no effect. This opinion should also be adopted if a release is made for a driveway. But where a release is granted for both a passage and a driveway, the result will be that he who promised the right of way will be released. 2It is certain that anyone who stipulates for a tract of land, and consents to the release of the usufruct, or of a right of way through said land, commits an act which renders the release void; for he who grants a release must do so for the entire right, or that part of it which is included in the stipulation. These things, however, are not parts of the land, any more than if someone, having stipulated for a house, should give a release for the stones or windows, or for a wall, or a room. 3Ad Dig. 46,4,13,3Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 202, Note 1.Where anyone having stipulated for an usufruct gives a release for the use, and does so believing that only the use was due, there will be no release. If, however, he did this in order to deduct it from the usufruct, when the use can be established without the usufruct, it must be held that the release is valid. 4Where anyone who stipulated for a slave gives a receipt for Stichus, Julianus, in the Fifty-fourth Book of the Digest, says that the release has an effect, and that is to extinguish the entire obligation; for what the promisor can pay to the stipulator, even against his consent, being the object of the release, discharges the former from liability. 5Where anyone stipulates for a tract of land, it is decided that the clause having reference to fraud cannot be included in the release, for this does not constitute a part of the debt, as what is due is one thing, and what is released is another. 6If anyone stipulates for Stichus, or ten aurei, under a condition, and receipts for Stichus, or ten aurei, and while the condition is pending, Stichus dies, the ten aurei will remain in the obligation, just as if a release had not been given. 7If a release is granted to a surety, where the principal debtor was liable on account of the property, but not by words, will he also be released? It is our practice that, although the principal debtor may not be bound by words, still he will be discharged from liability on account of the release granted to his surety. 8When a surety is given for a legacy payable under a condition, and a release is given him, the legacy will be due as soon as the condition upon which its payment is dependent is complied with. 9Where anyone stipulates with a surety as follows, “Do you promise to be responsible for what I shall lend to Titius?” and then, before he lends him the money, he gives a release to the surety, the principal debtor will not be discharged, but when the money is lent to him he will be liable. For, although we think that the surety is not released before the money is lent to the principal debtor, still the latter cannot be discharged by a release which precedes his obligation. 10The guardian or curator of an insane person cannot consent to a release, nor can an agent do so, but all these persons must make novations; for, in this way, they can grant releases. Nor can a release be made for their benefit, but if a novation is made first, they can be discharged by means of a release. We are accustomed to apply this remedy with reference to an absent person, when we stipulate with someone for the purpose of making a novation of what the former owes us, and in this way we release him with whom we have stipulated. The result is that the absent person is released by the novation, and the one who is present is freed from liability by a release. 11An heir, as well as prætorian successors, can release others, and be released in this manner. 12Where one of several joint-stipulators grants a release, it will apply to the entire amount which is due.