Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Ulp.omn. trib.
De omnibus tribunalibus lib.Ulpiani De omnibus tribunalibus libri

De omnibus tribunalibus libri

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Ex libro I

Dig. 1,14,4Idem li­bro pri­mo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Prae­tor ne­que tu­to­rem ne­que spe­cia­lem iu­di­cem ip­se se da­re pot­est.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book I. A Prætor cannot appoint himself a guardian, or a judge in any special proceeding.

Dig. 1,18,5Idem li­bro pri­mo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Prae­ses pro­vin­ciae non ma­gis tu­to­rem quam spe­cia­lem iu­di­cem ip­se se da­re pot­est.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book I. The Governor of a province cannot appoint himself either a guardian, or a judge in a particular case.

Dig. 26,5,7Idem li­bro pri­mo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Non tan­tum ad do­tem dan­dam nup­tu­rae cu­ra­to­rem da­ri opor­tet, ve­rum et­iam ei quo­que, quae iam nup­ta est. sed et ad do­tem au­gen­dam da­tur et mu­tan­dae quo­que do­tis gra­tia cu­ra­tor da­ri pot­est.

The Same, On All Courts, Book I. Not only must a curator be appointed for a girl about to be married, for the bestowal of her dowry; but one must also be appointed for a minor who is already married. A curator is also appointed for the purpose of increasing the dowry, or in order that some change may be made with reference to it.

Dig. 26,10,2Idem li­bro pri­mo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Li­ber­tus quo­que si frau­du­len­ter ges­sis­se tu­te­lam fi­lio­rum pa­tro­ni pro­be­tur, ad prae­fec­tum ur­bis re­mit­te­tur pu­nien­dus.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book I. A freedman shall also be sent to the Prefect of the City for punishment, if he is proved to have fraudulently administered the guardianship of the children of his patron.

Dig. 26,10,4Idem li­bro pri­mo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Hae enim cau­sae fa­ciunt, ut in­te­gra ex­is­ti­ma­tio­ne tu­te­la vel cu­ra quis ab­eat. 1De­cre­to igi­tur de­be­bit cau­sa re­mo­ven­di sig­ni­fi­ca­ri, ut ap­pa­reat de ex­is­ti­ma­tio­ne. 2Quid er­go si non sig­ni­fi­ca­ve­rit cau­sam re­mo­tio­nis de­cre­to suo? Pa­pi­nia­nus ait de­buis­se di­ci hunc in­te­grae es­se fa­mae, et est ve­rum. 3Si prae­tor sen­ten­tia sua non re­mo­ve­rit tu­te­la, sed ge­re­re pro­hi­buit, di­cen­dum est ma­gis es­se, ut et hic de­si­nat tu­tor es­se. 4Qui ni­hil ges­se­runt, non pos­sunt su­spec­ti pos­tu­la­ri, ve­rum ob igna­viam vel neg­le­gen­tiam vel do­lum, si do­lo fe­ce­runt, pos­sunt re­mo­ve­ri.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book I. There are reasons why anyone may relinquish a guardianship or a curatorship and preserve his reputation. 1Therefore, the cause of his removal should be mentioned in the decree, in order that it may be known that the reputation of the guardian does not suffer. 2But what if the magistrate did not, in his decree, indicate the cause of the removal? Papinianus says that this should not affect the good name of the guardian; which is correct. 3If the Prætor by his decision does not remove the guardian from office, but forbids him to discharge its duties, it must be said that the better opinion is that he ceases to be a guardian. 4Those who have administered none of the affairs of the trust cannot be accused of being suspicious; they can, however, be removed on the ground of idleness, negligence, or fraud, if they have acted dishonestly.

Dig. 26,10,7Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Im­pu­be­ri­bus qui­dem non per­mit­ti­tur su­spec­tos fa­ce­re: ad­ules­cen­ti­bus pla­ne vo­len­ti­bus su­spec­tos fa­ce­re cu­ra­to­res suos per­mit­ti­tur, dum­mo­do ex con­si­lio ne­ces­sa­rio­rum id fa­ciant. 1Si fraus non sit ad­mis­sa, sed la­ta neg­le­gen­tia, quia is­ta pro­pe frau­dem ac­ce­dit, re­mo­ve­ri hunc qua­si su­spec­tum opor­tet. 2Prae­ter­ea ac­ces­se­runt quae­dam spe­cies ex epis­tu­la im­pe­ra­to­ris nos­tri et di­vi Se­ve­ri ad Atrium Clo­nium: nam ad­ver­sus eos, qui, ne ali­men­ta de­cer­nan­tur, sui co­piam per­se­ve­rant non fa­ce­re, ut suis re­bus ca­reant prae­ci­pi­tur rei­que ser­van­dae cau­sa pu­pil­lus in pos­ses­sio­nem mit­ta­tur eius, qui su­spec­tus sen­ten­tia sua fac­tus est quae­que mo­ra de­te­rio­ra fu­tu­ra sunt cu­ra­to­re da­to dis­tra­hi iu­ben­tur. 3Item si quis tu­tor da­tus non com­pa­reat, so­let edic­tis evo­ca­ri, no­vis­si­me­que si co­piam sui non fe­ce­rit, ut su­spec­tus re­mo­ve­ri ob hoc ip­sum, quod co­piam sui non fe­cit. quod et per­ra­ro et di­li­gen­ti ha­bi­ta in­qui­si­tio­ne fa­cien­dum est.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book I. Children under the age of puberty are not permitted to denounce their guardians as suspicious; but it is clear that minors are allowed to denounce their curators in this manner, if they desire to do so; provided that they act under the advice of their near relatives. 1Where not fraud, but gross negligence which very nearly resembles fraud, has been committed by a guardian, he should be removed, as being suspicious. 2In the consideration of this subject, certain additional provisions were made by a Rescript of our Emperor and the Divine Severus, addressed to Atrius Clonius; for they decreed that, where guardians did not appear in cases involving the distribution of supplies to their wards, they should be deprived of their property, and that the ward should be placed in possession of the effects of him who had been pronounced suspicious by the decree, for the purpose of preserving the same, and if it was perishable, or liable to be diminished in value by delay, it was ordered to be sold, after the appointment of a curator. 3Moreover, if a guardian does not appear after having been appointed, it is customary to summon him by several proclamations, and finally, if he does not present himself, he should be removed from office, because of his non-appearance. This proceeding should only be resorted to very rarely, and after a careful investigation has been made.

Dig. 27,2,3Idem li­bro pri­mo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Ius ali­men­to­rum de­cer­nen­do­rum pu­pil­lis prae­to­ri com­pe­tit, ut ip­se mo­de­re­tur, quam sum­mam tu­to­res vel cu­ra­to­res ad ali­men­ta pu­pil­lis vel ad­ules­cen­ti­bus prae­sta­re de­beant. 1Mo­dum au­tem pa­tri­mo­nii spec­ta­re de­bet, cum ali­men­ta de­cer­nit: et de­bet sta­tue­re tam mo­de­ra­te, ut non uni­ver­sum red­itum pa­tri­mo­nii in ali­men­ta de­cer­nat, sed sem­per sit, ut ali­quid ex red­itu su­per­sit. 2An­te ocu­los ha­be­re de­bet in de­cer­nen­do et man­ci­pia, quae pu­pil­lis de­ser­viunt, et mer­ce­des pu­pil­lo­rum et ves­tem et tec­tum pu­pil­li: ae­ta­tem et­iam con­tem­pla­ri, in qua con­sti­tu­tus est cui ali­men­ta de­cer­nun­tur. 3In am­plis ta­men pa­tri­mo­niis po­si­tis non cumu­lus pa­tri­mo­nii, sed quod ex­hi­bitio­ni fru­ga­li­ter suf­fi­cit mo­dum ali­men­tis da­bit. 4Sed si non con­stat, quis mo­dus fa­cul­ta­tium sit, in­ter tu­to­rem et eum, qui ali­men­ta de­cer­ni de­si­de­rat, sus­ci­pe­re de­bet co­gni­tio­nem nec te­me­re ali­men­ta de­cer­ne­re, ne in al­ter­utram par­tem de­lin­quat: prius ta­men ex­ige­re de­bet, ut pro­fi­tea­tur tu­tor, quae sit pe­nes se sum­ma, et com­mi­na­ri gra­vio­res ei usu­ras in­fli­gi eius, quod su­pra pro­fes­sio­nem apud eum fue­rit com­pre­hen­sum. 5Idem ad in­struc­tio­nem quo­que pu­pil­lo­rum vel ad­ules­cen­tium pu­pil­la­rum vel ea­rum, quae in­tra vi­cen­si­mum an­num con­sti­tu­tae sunt, so­let de­cer­ne­re re­spec­tu fa­cul­ta­tium et ae­ta­tis eo­rum qui in­struun­tur. 6Sed si ege­ni sint pu­pil­li, de suo eos ale­re tu­tor non com­pel­li­tur. et si for­te post de­cre­ta ali­men­ta ad eges­ta­tem fue­rit pu­pil­lus per­duc­tus, de­mi­nui de­bent quae de­cre­ta sunt, quem­ad­mo­dum so­lent au­ge­ri, si quid pa­tri­mo­nio ac­ces­se­rit.

The Same, On All Tribunals. The Prætor has the right to determine the amount to be allotted for the maintenance of wards; and he himself must apportion the sum which guardians or curators shall expend for the maintenance of wards or minors. 1When the Prætor renders his decision with reference to maintenance, he must take into consideration the value of the estate, and make the allowance with such a degree of moderation as not to permit the entire income of the estate to be expended for the support of the ward; but the allowance must always be made in such a way that a balance of the income will remain. 2In rendering his decision, he must bear in mind the slaves who are to serve the wards, the income of the latter, as well as the expenses of their clothing and lodging; and the age of those to whom maintenance is granted should also be taken into consideration. 3Still, in the case of large estates, not the entire value of the same, but what will be sufficient to enable the ward to live in an economical manner, should regulate the measure of the allowance. 4Where, however, the guardian, and he who desires an allowance for his support to be made do not agree as to the means of the latter, an inquiry should be instituted, and maintenance should not be rashly granted, lest injustice be done to one or the other of the parties. First, however, the Prætor should require the guardian to disclose how much is in his hands, and warn him that he will be compelled to pay a high rate of interest on all that is in excess of the sum mentioned in this statement. 5The Prætor is also accustomed to allow a certain sum for the education of male and female wards, or minors, who are under twenty years of age; this to be regulated by the amount of their means, and the age of those who are to receive instruction. 6Where, however, the wards are poor, the guardian is not compelled to support them out of his own property, and if a ward should be reduced to want after maintenance has been allowed him, the latter should be diminished, just as it is customary to increase it, when the estate has been enhanced in value.

Dig. 27,10,6Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Ob­ser­va­re prae­to­rem opor­te­bit, ne cui te­me­re ci­tra cau­sae co­gni­tio­nem ple­nis­si­mum cu­ra­to­rem det, quon­iam ple­ri­que vel fu­ro­rem vel demen­tiam fin­gunt, quo ma­gis cu­ra­to­re ac­cep­to one­ra ci­vi­lia de­trec­tent.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book I. The Prætor must be careful not to appoint a curator rashly and without the most thorough investigation of the case, since many persons feign madness or insanity in order that, by the appointment of a curator, they may the more readily evade their civil obligations.

Ex libro II

Dig. 2,1,15Idem li­bro se­cun­do de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Si per er­ro­rem alius pro alio prae­tor fue­rit ad­itus, ni­hil va­le­bit quod ac­tum est. nec enim fe­ren­dus est qui di­cat con­sen­sis­se eos in prae­si­dem, cum, ut Iu­lia­nus scri­bit, non con­sen­tiant qui er­rent: quid enim tam con­tra­rium con­sen­sui est quam er­ror, qui im­pe­ritiam de­te­git?

Ad Dig. 2,1,15ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 328: Voraussetzung der stillschweigenden Prorogation des Gerichtsstandes.The Same, On All Tribunals, Book II. If, through error, anyone appears before one Prætor while intending to appear before another, none of the proceedings which have been instituted will be valid, for no one is permitted to say that they agreed upon the judge; since, as Julianus stated, those who are in error do not agree. For what is so contrary to agreement as error, which always reveals ignorance?

Dig. 23,5,5Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to de­ci­mo di­ges­to­rum scrip­sit ne­que ser­vi­tu­tes fun­do de­bi­tas pos­se ma­ri­tum re­mit­te­re ne­que ei alias im­po­ne­re.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book II. Julianus states in the Sixteenth Book of the Digest that a husband cannot lose any servitude attaching to the land, or impose any new ones upon it.

Dig. 27,9,6Idem li­bro se­cun­do de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Sed si for­te alius pro­prie­ta­tem fun­di ha­beat, alius usum fruc­tum, ma­gis est, ut ces­set haec pars ora­tio­nis, quae de di­vi­sio­ne lo­qui­tur: nul­la enim com­mu­nio est.

The Same, Concerning All Tribunals, Book II. Where one person enjoys the ownership of land, and another the usufruct of the same, the better opinion is that that portion of the decree which relates to the division of property does not apply, for there is no real community of interest.

Dig. 27,9,8Idem li­bro se­cun­do de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Qui ne­que tu­to­res sunt ip­so iu­re ne­que cu­ra­to­res, sed pro tu­to­re neg­otia ge­runt vel pro cu­ra­to­re, eos non pos­se dis­tra­he­re res pu­pil­lo­rum vel ad­ules­cen­tium nul­la du­bi­ta­tio est. 1Sed si cu­ra­tor sit fu­rio­si vel cu­ius al­te­rius non ad­ules­cen­tis, vi­den­dum est, utrum iu­re ve­te­ri va­le­bit ven­di­tio an hanc ora­tio­nem ad­mit­te­mus. et pu­to, quia de pu­pil­lis prin­ceps lo­qui­tur et con­iunc­ti tu­to­ri­bus cu­ra­to­res ac­ci­piunt, per­ti­ne­re: et de ce­te­ris pu­to ex sen­ten­tia ora­tio­nis idem es­se di­cen­dum. 2An ob­li­ga­ri com­mu­nia pos­sint, quae­ri­tur, sed non pu­to si­ne de­cre­to ob­li­gan­da: nam quod ex­ce­pit ora­tio, ad hoc tan­tum per­ti­net, ut per­ema­tur com­mu­nio, non ut au­gea­tur dif­fi­cul­tas com­mu­nio­nis.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book II. There is no doubt that persons who are not legal guardians or curators, but transact business while acting as such, cannot in this capacity dispose of the property of wards or minors. 1It should be considered whether a sale will be valid by the ancient law under these circumstances, or whether this decree is applicable to the case of a curator of an insane person, or of anyone else who is not a minor. Because the Emperor refers to wards, and the duties of curators are understood to be connected with those of guardians, I think that the same rule must be held to apply to all of them, in accordance with the intent of the decree. 2The question arises whether common property, in which the ward has an interest, can be encumbered. And I do not think that this can be done without a judicial decision; for what is excepted in the decree merely has reference to the extinguishment of the common ownership, and not to the increase of its difficulties.

Dig. 42,5,31Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Si cre­di­to­res he­redem su­spec­tum pu­tent, sa­tis­da­tio­nem ex­ige­re pos­sunt pro suo de­bi­to red­den­do. cu­ius rei gra­tia co­gnos­ce­re prae­to­rem opor­tet nec sta­tim eum sa­tis­da­tio­nis ne­ces­si­ta­ti sub­ice­re de­bet, ni­si cau­sa co­gni­ta con­sti­te­rit pro­spi­ci de­be­re his, qui su­spec­tum eum pos­tu­la­ve­runt. 1Sed su­spec­tus he­res non is­dem mo­dis, qui­bus su­spec­tus tu­tor aes­ti­ma­tur: si­qui­dem tu­to­rem non fa­cul­ta­tes, sed frau­du­len­ta in re­bus pu­pil­la­ri­bus et cal­li­da con­ver­sa­tio su­spec­tum com­men­det, he­redem ve­ro so­lae fa­cul­ta­tes. 2Pla­ne in re­cen­ti ad­itae he­redi­ta­tis au­dien­di erunt, qui su­spec­tum pos­tu­lant: ce­te­rum si pro­ben­tur pas­si eum in he­redi­ta­te mo­ra­ri nec quic­quam pos­sint ob­ice­re cri­mi­nis qua­si do­lo­se ver­sa­to eo, non de­be­bit post mul­tum tem­po­ris ad hanc ne­ces­si­ta­tem com­pel­li. 3Quod si su­spec­tus sa­tis­da­re ius­sus de­cre­to prae­to­ris non ob­tem­pe­ra­ve­rit, tunc bo­na he­redi­ta­tis pos­si­de­ri ve­num­que da­ri ex edic­to suo per­mit­te­re iu­be­bit. 4Pla­ne si do­cea­tur ni­hil ex bo­nis alie­nas­se nec sit quod ei ius­te prae­ter pau­per­ta­tem ob­icia­tur, con­ten­tus es­se prae­tor de­bet, ut iu­beat eum ni­hil mi­nue­re. 5Quod si nec in­opia la­bo­ran­tem eum cre­di­to­res os­ten­de­re po­tue­rint, in­iu­ria­rum ac­tio­ne ei te­ne­bun­tur.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book II. If the creditors of an estate consider the heir to be suspicious, they can require him to give security for the payment of what is due to them, and the Prætor should take cognizance of the case. He ought not, however, without proper examination, to subject the heir to the necessity of furnishing security, unless after proper cause has been shown, he should decide to protect the interests of those who consider the heir as liable to suspicion. 1An heir is not considered suspicious in the same sense that a guardian is; for fraudulent acts or deceitful conduct with reference to the affairs of his ward render a guardian liable to suspicion, and not his want of means, while the latter alone will render an heir suspicious. 2It is clear that those who accuse an heir of being suspicious should only be heard within a short time after his acceptance of the estate. If, however, it is proved that they suffered him to remain in possession of the estate for a considerable period, and can accuse him of nothing criminal, as, for example, that he has been guilty of some fraudulent act, he should not, after a long time has elapsed, be reduced to the necessity of giving security. 3If the heir who is ordered to furnish security on the ground of being liable to suspicion does not obey the decree of the Prætor, the latter shall then order possession to be taken of the property of the estate, and permit it to be sold in conformity with the Edict. 4It is evident that if it should be ascertained that nothing belonging to the estate has been sold, and that no other objection can justly be raised against the heir except his poverty, the Prætor must be content to order him to take nothing from the estate. 5If the creditors cannot prove that the heir is suffering from poverty, they will be liable to him in an action on the ground of injury sustained.

Dig. 50,16,198Idem li­bro se­cun­do de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. ‘Ur­ba­na prae­dia’ om­nia ae­di­fi­cia ac­ci­pi­mus, non so­lum ea quae sunt in op­pi­dis, sed et si for­te sta­bu­la sunt vel alia me­ri­to­ria in vil­lis et in vi­cis, vel si prae­to­ria vo­lup­ta­ti tan­tum de­ser­vien­tia: quia ur­ba­num prae­dium non lo­cus fa­cit, sed ma­te­ria. pro­in­de hor­tos quo­que, si qui sunt in ae­di­fi­ciis con­sti­tu­ti, di­cen­dum est ur­ba­no­rum ap­pel­la­tio­ne con­ti­ne­ri. pla­ne si plu­ri­mum hor­ti in red­itu sunt, vi­nea­rii for­te vel et­iam ho­li­to­rii, ma­gis haec non sunt ur­ba­na.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book II. We understand by the term “urban estates” not only all buildings which are situated in towns, but also inns, and such houses as are used for trade in the suburbs, and in villages, as well as palaces intended only for pleasure; but the materials, and not the location, are what constitute an urban estate. Hence, if there are any gardens attached to these buildings, it must be said that they are included under the term “urban estates.” It is clear that if these gardens afford more revenue than they do pleasure, that is to say, if they contain vines or olive trees, they should not be designated “urban estates.”

Ex libro III

Dig. 1,21,2Ul­pia­nus li­bro ter­tio de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Man­da­ta iu­ris­dic­tio­ne a prae­si­de con­si­lium non pot­est ex­er­ce­re is, cui man­da­tur. 1Si tu­to­res vel cu­ra­to­res ve­lint prae­dia ven­de­re, cau­sa co­gni­ta id prae­tor vel prae­ses per­mit­tat: quod si man­da­ve­rit iu­ris­dic­tio­nem, ne­qua­quam pot­erit man­da­ta iu­ris­dic­tio­ne eam quaes­tio­nem trans­fer­re.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book III. Where jurisdiction has been delegated by a Governor, he to whom it is delegated cannot assemble a Council. 1Where guardians or curators desire to sell land, the Prætor or Governor can permit this to be done after hearing the case; but if he delegates his jurisdiction he can, under no circumstances, transfer with it the right to conduct the inquiry instituted for this purpose.

Dig. 2,1,16Idem li­bro ter­tio de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. So­let prae­tor iu­ris­dic­tio­nem man­da­re: et aut om­nem man­dat aut spe­ciem unam: et is cui man­da­ta iu­ris­dic­tio est fun­ge­tur vi­ce eius qui man­da­vit, non sua.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book III. The Prætor is accustomed to delegate his jurisdiction, and either delegate all or a portion of the same; while he to whom the right of dispensing justice has been delegated, exercises it in the name of him who appointed him, and not in his own.

Dig. 47,10,35Ul­pia­nus li­bro ter­tio de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Si quis in­iu­riam atro­cem fe­ce­rit, qui con­tem­ne­re in­iu­ria­rum iu­di­cium pos­sit ob in­fa­miam suam et eges­ta­tem, prae­tor acri­ter ex­equi hanc rem de­bet et eos, qui in­iu­riam fe­ce­runt, co­er­ce­re.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book III. Where anyone commits an atrocious act who can, on account of his infamous character and poverty, disregard a judgment rendered against him in an action for injury, the Prætor should exercise all his severity in the prosecution of the case, and the punishment of those who committed the injury.

Dig. 49,1,11Idem li­bro ter­tio de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Cum ex cau­sa iu­di­ca­ti so­lu­ta es­set pe­cu­nia ex ne­ces­si­ta­te iu­di­cis ab eo, qui ap­pel­la­tio­ne in­ter­po­si­ta me­rue­rit me­lio­rem sen­ten­tiam, re­ci­pe­re eum pe­cu­niam quam sol­vit opor­tet.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book III. When money was paid on the execution of a judgment, and on appeal a more favorable decision was rendered, the party can recover the money which he paid.

Ex libro IV

Dig. 2,12,1Ul­pia­nus li­bro quar­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Ne quis mes­sium vin­de­mia­rum­que tem­po­re ad­ver­sa­rium co­gat ad iu­di­cium venire, ora­tio­ne di­vi Mar­ci ex­pri­mi­tur, quia oc­cu­pa­ti cir­ca rem rus­ti­cam in fo­rum con­pel­len­di non sunt. 1Sed si prae­tor aut per igno­ran­tiam vel so­cor­diam evo­ca­re eos per­se­ve­ra­ve­rit hi­que spon­te ve­ne­rint: si qui­dem sen­ten­tiam di­xe­rit prae­sen­ti­bus il­lis et spon­te li­ti­gan­ti­bus, sen­ten­tia va­le­bit, tam­et­si non rec­te fe­ce­rit qui eos evo­ca­ve­rit: sin ve­ro, cum ab­es­se per­se­ve­ra­ve­rint, sen­ten­tiam pro­tu­le­rit et­iam ab­sen­ti­bus il­lis, con­se­quens erit di­ce­re sen­ten­tiam nul­lius es­se mo­men­ti (ne­que enim prae­to­ris fac­tum iu­ri de­ro­ga­re opor­tet): et ci­tra ap­pel­la­tio­nem igi­tur sen­ten­tia in­fir­ma­bi­tur. 2Sed ex­ci­piun­tur cer­tae cau­sae, ex qui­bus co­gi pot­eri­mus et per id tem­po­ris, cum mes­ses vin­de­miae­que sunt, ad prae­to­rem venire: sci­li­cet si res tem­po­re peritu­ra sit, hoc est si di­la­tio ac­tio­nem sit per­emp­tu­ra. sa­ne quo­tiens res ur­guet, co­gen­di qui­dem su­mus ad prae­to­rem venire, ve­rum ad hoc tan­tum co­gi ae­quum est ut lis con­tes­te­tur, et ita ip­sis ver­bis ora­tio­nis ex­pri­mi­tur: de­ni­que al­ter­utro re­cu­san­te post li­tem con­tes­ta­tam li­ti­ga­re di­la­tio­nem ora­tio con­ces­sit.

Ulpianus, On all Tribunals, Book IV. It is stated in an Address of the Divine Marcus that no one can compel another to go to trial in the seasons of harvest and vintage; because being occupied in agricultural pursuits, he should not be compelled to appear in court. 1If, however, the Prætor, either through ignorance or neglect, should continue to summon the parties, and they should voluntarily appear, and he should render judgment in the presence of the litigants, who are here of their own accord, the judgment will be valid, even though he who summoned them acted improperly; but if he should render judgment in their absence, and while they continued to remain away, it follows that it must be held that his judgment is of no effect; for the act of the Prætor can not abrogate the law. The judgment therefore becomes void without appeal. 2There are, however, certain cases which must be excepted, and in which we may be compelled to appear before the Prætor during the seasons of harvest and vintage, namely, where the property in question will be lost by lapse of time; that is to say, where delay will deprive the party of his right of action. And, in fact, when the matter is urgent, we can be forced to appear before the Prætor, but this only can be done in order that issue may be joined; and it is so stated in the words of the aforesaid Address, for, after issue has been joined, if either of the parties refuses to proceed, the Address grants him delay.

Dig. 5,1,69Idem li­bro quar­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. per in­ter­val­lum non mi­nus de­cem die­rum

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book IV. After an interval of not less than ten days;

Dig. 5,1,71Idem li­bro quar­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. In per­emp­to­rio au­tem com­mi­na­tur is qui edic­tum de­dit et­iam ab­sen­te di­ver­sa par­te co­gni­tu­rum se et pro­nun­tia­tu­rum.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book IV. In the peremptory citation the magistrate who issues it gives notice that he will hear and decide the case even should the other party be absent.

Dig. 5,1,73Idem li­bro quar­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Et post edic­tum per­emp­to­rium im­pe­tra­tum, cum dies eius su­per­ve­ne­rit, tunc ab­sens ci­ta­ri de­bet: et si­ve re­spon­de­rit si­ve non re­spon­de­rit, age­tur cau­sa et pro­nun­tia­bi­tur, non uti­que se­cun­dum prae­sen­tem, sed in­ter­dum vel ab­sens, si bo­nam cau­sam ha­buit, vin­cet. 1Quod si is qui edic­tum per­emp­to­rium im­pe­tra­vit ab­sit die co­gni­tio­nis, is ve­ro ad­ver­sus quem im­pe­tra­tum est ad­sit, tum cir­cum­du­cen­dum erit edic­tum per­emp­to­rium ne­que cau­sa co­gnos­ce­tur nec se­cun­dum prae­sen­tem pro­nun­tia­bi­tur. 2Cir­cum­duc­to edic­to vi­dea­mus an am­plius reus con­ve­ni­ri pos­sit, an ve­ro sal­va qui­dem lis est, ve­rum in­stan­tia tan­tum edic­ti per­iit: et ma­gis est ut in­stan­tia tan­tum per­ie­rit, ex in­te­gro au­tem li­ti­ga­ri pos­sit. 3Scien­dum est ex per­emp­to­rio ab­sen­tem con­dem­na­tum si ap­pel­let non es­se au­dien­dum, si mo­do per con­tu­ma­ciam de­fuit: si mi­nus, au­die­tur.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book IV. After a peremptory citation has been obtained, and as soon as the day mentioned therein arrives, the absent party must be called; and whether he answers, or not, the case must proceed and decision be rendered, but not always in favor of the party who is present; for sometimes the absent party may prevail if he has a good case. 1But if the party who obtained the peremptory citation is absent on the day appointed for the hearing, and he against whom it was obtained is present, the peremptory citation must be annulled, and the cause shall not be heard, nor shall a decision be rendered in favor of the party who is present. 2If the citation is annulled, let us consider whether the defendant can be sued again, and whether the right of action still remains, or whether merely the proceeding relating to this citation is annulled? The better opinion is, that it only is annulled, and that the parties can litigate again. 3It should be borne in mind that where an absent party has a judgment rendered against him on account of a peremptory citation, and appeals, he shall not be heard; that is, if he was absent through contumacy; but if he was not, he should be heard.

Dig. 42,1,59Idem li­bro quar­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. In sum­ma suf­fi­ciet, si ex­pres­se­rit iu­dex sum­mam in sen­ten­tia sol­vi­que ius­se­rit vel prae­sta­ri vel quo alio ver­bo hoc sig­ni­fi­ca­ve­rit. 1Am­plius est re­scrip­tum, et­si in sen­ten­tia non sit sum­ma ad­iec­ta, si ta­men is qui pe­tit sum­mam ex­pres­se­rit et iu­dex ait: ‘sol­ve, quod pe­ti­tum est’ vel ‘quan­tum pe­ti­tum est’, va­le­re sen­ten­tiam. 2Qui sor­tis qui­dem con­dem­na­tio­nem fa­ciunt, de usu­ris au­tem ita pro­nun­tiant ‘usu­rae si quae com­pe­tunt’ vel ‘quae com­pe­tunt, ut prae­sten­tur’, non rec­te pro­nun­tiant: de­bent enim de usu­ris quo­que co­gnos­ce­re et cer­tam fa­ce­re con­dem­na­tio­nem. 3Si quis ex edic­to per­emp­to­rio post mor­tem sit con­dem­na­tus, non va­let sen­ten­tia, quia mor­te rei per­emp­to­rium sol­vi­tur. id­eo­que, ut in re in­te­gra, de cau­sa no­tio prae­sta­bi­tur et quod op­ti­mum pa­tue­rit, sta­tue­tur.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book IV. In rendering judgment, it is sufficient if the judge mentions the amount, and orders it to be paid or furnished, or makes use of any other term which has this signification. 1It is, moreover, set forth in a rescript, that even if the amount is not stated in the decision, but the party who brought suit mentioned it, and the judge says, “Pay what is claimed,” or “As much as is claimed,” the decision will be yalid. 2When magistrates render a judgment for the principal, and with reference to the interest add, “If any interest is due, let it be paid,” “Or let what interest is due be paid,” their judgment is not valid; for they ought to ascertain the amount of interest and establish it by their decision. 3If anyone, having received a peremptory summons, has judgment rendered against him after his death, it will not be valid, because a peremptory summons is of no effect after the death of the defendant; and hence the judge must take cognizance of the case, just as if matters remained unchanged, and decide as seems to him best.

Ex libro V

Dig. 2,15,8Idem li­bro quin­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Cum hi, qui­bus ali­men­ta re­lic­ta erant, fa­ci­le trans­ige­rent con­ten­ti mo­di­co prae­sen­ti: di­vus Mar­cus ora­tio­ne in se­na­tu re­ci­ta­ta ef­fe­cit, ne ali­ter ali­men­to­rum trans­ac­tio ra­ta es­set, quam si auc­to­re prae­to­re fac­ta. so­let igi­tur prae­tor in­ter­ve­ni­re et in­ter con­sen­tien­tes ar­bi­tra­ri, an trans­ac­tio vel quae ad­mit­ti de­beat. 1Eius­dem prae­to­ris no­tio ob trans­ac­tio­nem erit, si­ve ha­bi­ta­tio si­ve ves­tia­rium si­ve de prae­diis ali­men­tum le­ga­bi­tur. 2Haec ora­tio per­ti­net ad ali­men­ta, quae tes­ta­men­to vel co­di­cil­lis fue­rint re­lic­ta si­ve ad tes­ta­men­tum fac­tis si­ve ab in­tes­ta­to. idem erit di­cen­dum et si mor­tis cau­sa do­na­ta fue­rint re­lic­ta vel ab eo, cui mor­tis cau­sa do­na­ta sunt, re­lic­ta. sed et si con­di­cio­nis im­plen­dae gra­tia re­lic­ta sunt, ad­huc idem di­ce­mus. pla­ne de ali­men­tis, quae non mor­tis cau­sa do­na­ta sunt, li­ce­bit et si­ne prae­to­re auc­to­re trans­igi. 3Si­ve igi­tur in men­ses sin­gu­los si­ve in dies si­ve in an­nos fue­rint re­lic­ta, ora­tio lo­cum ha­bet. sed et si non fue­rint per­pe­tuo re­lic­ta, sed us­que ad an­nos cer­tos, idem est. 4Si in­te­gra quan­ti­tas ali­cui fue­rit le­ga­ta, ut ex usu­ris eius se alat et mor­tis tem­po­re pe­cu­nias re­sti­tuat: non ces­sa­bit ora­tio, li­cet non in an­nos sin­gu­los vi­dea­tur id re­lic­tum. 5Sed et si sit cer­ta quan­ti­tas re­lic­ta Ti­tio vel res ita, ut in­de ali­men­ta Se­io prae­sten­tur: ma­gis est ut trans­ige­re Ti­tius pos­sit, nec enim trans­ac­tio­ne Ti­tii mi­nuun­tur ali­men­ta Se­ii. idem­que est et si per fi­dei­com­mis­sum ali­men­ta ad hoc le­ga­ta­rio fue­rint re­lic­ta. 6Eam trans­ac­tio­nem ora­tio im­pro­bat, quae id­cir­co fit, ut quis re­prae­sen­ta­tam pe­cu­niam con­su­mat. quid er­go si quis ci­tra prae­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­tem trans­ege­rit, ut quod per sin­gu­los an­nos erat ei re­lic­tum, con­se­que­re­tur per sin­gu­los men­ses? aut quid si, quod per sin­gu­los men­ses ei re­lic­tum erat, con­se­que­re­tur per sin­gu­los dies? quid de­in­de si, quod con­sum­ma­to an­no ut ac­ci­pe­ret, in­itio an­ni con­se­qua­tur? et pu­to eam trans­ac­tio­nem va­le­re, quia me­lio­rem con­di­cio­nem suam ali­men­ta­rius ta­li trans­ac­tio­ne fa­cit: no­luit enim ora­tio ali­men­ta per trans­ac­tio­nem in­ter­ci­pi. 7Ni­hil au­tem in­ter­est, utrum li­ber­ti­ni sint qui­bus ali­men­ta re­lic­ta sunt an in­ge­nui, sa­tis lo­cu­ple­tes an mi­nus. 8Vult igi­tur ora­tio apud prae­to­rem de is­tis quae­ri: in pri­mis de cau­sa trans­ac­tio­nis, de­in de mo­do, ter­tio de per­so­na trans­igen­tium. 9In cau­sa hoc erit re­qui­ren­dum, quae cau­sa sit trans­igen­di: si­ne cau­sa enim ne­mi­nem trans­igen­tem au­diet prae­tor. cau­sae fe­re hu­ius­mo­di so­lent al­le­ga­ri: si ali­bi do­mi­ci­lium he­res, ali­bi ali­men­ta­rius ha­beat: aut si de­sti­net do­mi­ci­lium trans­fer­re al­ter11Die Großausgabe liest al­ter­uter statt al­ter. eo­rum: aut si cau­sa ali­qua ur­gueat prae­sen­tis pe­cu­niae: aut si a plu­ri­bus ei ali­men­ta re­lic­ta sint et mi­nu­ta­tim sin­gu­los con­ve­ni­re dif­fi­ci­le ei sit: aut si qua alia cau­sa fuit, ut plu­res so­lent in­ci­de­re, quae prae­to­ri sua­deant trans­ac­tio­nem ad­mit­te­re. 10Mo­dus quo­que pe­cu­niae, quae in trans­ac­tio­nem venit, aes­ti­man­dus est: ut pu­ta quan­ti­tas trans­ac­tio­nis. nam et­iam ex mo­do fi­des trans­ac­tio­nis aes­ti­ma­bi­tur. mo­dus au­tem pro ae­ta­te eius, qui trans­igit, ar­bi­tran­dus est et va­le­tu­di­ne: nam alias cum pue­ro, alias cum iu­ve­ne, alias cum se­ne trans­igi pa­lam est: con­stat enim ali­men­ta cum vi­ta fi­ni­ri. 11Sed et per­so­na­rum con­tem­pla­tio ha­ben­da est, hoc est, cu­ius vi­tae sint hi, qui­bus ali­men­ta re­lic­ta sunt: utrum fru­gi vi­tae hi sint, qui alias suf­fi­ce­re si­bi pos­sint, an se­quio­ris, qui de ali­men­tis pen­deant. in per­so­na eius, a quo ali­men­ta re­lic­ta sunt, haec erunt spe­cien­da: in qui­bus sunt fa­cul­ta­ti­bus, cu­ius pro­pos­i­ti, cu­ius opi­nio­nis. tunc enim ap­pa­re­bit, num­quid cir­cum­ve­ni­re ve­lit eum, cum quo trans­igit. 12Qui trans­igit de ali­men­tis, non vi­de­bi­tur ne­que de ha­bi­ta­tio­ne ne­que de ves­tia­rio trans­egis­se, cum di­vus Mar­cus spe­cia­li­ter et­iam de is­tis trans­igi vo­lue­rit. 13Sed et si quis de ali­men­tis trans­ege­rit, non ha­be­bit ne­ces­se et­iam de ha­bi­ta­tio­ne vel ce­te­ris in­vi­tus trans­ige­re: pot­erit igi­tur vel de om­ni­bus si­mul vel de qui­bus­dam fa­ce­re trans­ac­tio­nem. 14De cal­cia­rio quo­que ar­bi­trio prae­to­ris trans­igen­dum est. 15Si uni plu­ri­bus­ve fun­dus ad ali­men­ta fue­rit re­lic­tus ve­lint­que eum dis­tra­he­re: ne­ces­se est prae­to­rem de dis­trac­tio­ne eius et trans­ac­tio­ne ar­bi­tra­ri. sed si plu­ri­bus fun­dus ad ali­men­ta fue­rit re­lic­tus et hi in­ter se trans­igant: si­ne prae­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te fac­ta trans­ac­tio ra­ta es­se non de­bet. idem est et si ager fue­rit in ali­men­ta ob­li­ga­tus: nam nec pig­nus ad hoc da­tum in­con­sul­to prae­to­re pot­erit li­be­ra­ri. 16Ar­bi­tra­tu prae­to­ris vel de uni­ver­sis ali­men­tis vel de par­te eo­rum trans­igi opor­te­re plus quam ma­ni­fes­tum est. 17Si prae­tor ad­itus ci­tra cau­sae co­gni­tio­nem trans­igi per­mi­se­rit, trans­ac­tio nul­lius erit mo­men­ti: prae­to­ri enim ea res quae­ren­da com­mis­sa est, non neg­le­gen­da nec do­nan­da. sed et si non de om­ni­bus in­qui­sie­rit, quae ora­tio man­dat, hoc est de cau­sa de mo­do de per­so­nis trans­igen­tium, di­cen­dum est, quam­vis de qui­bus­dam quae­sie­rit, trans­ac­tio­nem es­se ir­ri­tam. 18Sed nec man­da­re ex hac cau­sa iu­ris­dic­tio­nem vel prae­ses pro­vin­ciae vel prae­tor pot­erit. 19Trans­ac­tio­nes ali­men­to­rum et­iam apud pro­cu­ra­to­rem Cae­sa­ris fie­ri pos­sunt: sci­li­cet si a fis­co pe­tan­tur ali­men­ta. se­cun­dum quae et apud prae­fec­tos ae­ra­rii trans­igi pot­erit. 20Si cum lis qui­dem es­set de ali­men­tis, trans­ac­tum au­tem de li­te fuis­set: trans­ac­tio va­le­re in­con­sul­to prae­to­re non pot­est, ne cir­cum­ve­nia­tur ora­tio. fin­gi enim li­tes pot­erunt, ut trans­ac­tio et­iam ci­tra prae­to­ris fiat auc­to­ri­ta­tem. 21Si ei­dem ali­men­ta et prae­ter­ea le­ga­tum prae­sen­ti die da­tum sit, et trans­ac­tum fue­rit ci­tra prae­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­tem: id quod da­tum est im­pu­ta­bi­tur prius in le­ga­tum quod prae­sen­ti die da­tum est, su­per­fluum in ali­men­ta­riam cau­sam. 22Si quis de ali­men­tis trans­ege­rit si­ne prae­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te, id quod da­tum est in prae­ter­ita ali­men­ta ce­det. nec in­ter­est tan­tum in quan­ti­ta­te sit de­bi­ta, quan­tum da­tum est, an mi­nus, an plus: nam et si mi­nus sit, ad­huc ta­men id quod in so­lu­tum da­tum est in prae­ter­ita ali­men­ta im­pu­ta­bi­tur. sa­ne si is, qui de ali­men­tis trans­egit, lo­cu­ple­tior fac­tus sit ea so­lu­tio­ne: in quod fac­tus sit lo­cu­ple­tior ae­quis­si­mum erit in eum da­ri re­pe­ti­tio­nem: nec enim de­bet ex alie­no dam­no es­se lo­cu­ples. 23Si in an­nos sin­gu­los cer­ta quan­ti­tas ali­cui fue­rit re­lic­ta ho­mi­ni ho­nes­tio­ris lo­ci vel­uti sa­la­rium an­nuum vel usus fruc­tus, trans­ac­tio et si­ne prae­to­re fie­ri pot­erit: ce­te­rum si usus fruc­tus mo­di­cus ali­men­to­rum vi­ce sit re­lic­tus, di­co trans­ac­tio­nem ci­tra prae­to­rem fac­tam nul­lius es­se mo­men­ti. 24Si cui non num­mus ad ali­men­ta, sed fru­men­tum at­que oleum et ce­te­ra, quae ad vic­tum ne­ces­sa­ria sunt, fue­rint re­lic­ta: non pot­erit de his trans­ige­re, si­ve an­nua si­ve mens­trua ei re­lin­quan­tur. si ta­men ita si­ne prae­to­re trans­ege­rit, ut in vi­cem eo­rum num­mum quot­an­nis vel quot­men­si­bus ac­ci­pe­ret et ne­que diem ne­que mo­dum per­mu­ta­vit, sed tan­tum ge­nus: vel ex con­tra­rio si pac­tus fue­rit, ut in ge­ne­ri­bus ali­men­ta ac­ci­pe­ret, quae in num­mis ei re­lic­ta fuis­sent: vel si vi­num pro oleo vel oleum pro vi­no vel quid aliud com­mu­ta­vit: vel lo­cum per­mu­ta­vit, ut quae erant ei Ro­mae ali­men­ta re­lic­ta, in mu­ni­ci­pio vel in pro­vin­cia ac­ci­pe­ret vel con­tra: vel per­so­nam com­mu­ta­vit, ut quod a plu­ri­bus erat ac­cep­tu­rus, ab uno ac­ci­pe­ret: vel alium pro alio de­bi­to­rem ac­ce­pe­rit: haec om­nia ha­bent dis­cep­ta­tio­nem prae­to­ris et pro uti­li­ta­te ali­men­ta­rii re­ci­pien­da sunt. 25Si ad ha­bi­ta­tio­nem cer­ta quan­ti­tas sit an­nua re­lic­ta et ita sit trans­ac­tum si­ne prae­to­re, ut ha­bi­ta­tio prae­ste­tur, va­let trans­ac­tio, quia fruc­tus ha­bi­ta­tio­nis prae­sta­tur, li­cet rui­nae vel in­cen­dio sub­iec­ta trans­ac­tio est. per con­tra­rium quo­que si pro ha­bi­ta­tio­ne, quae erat re­lic­ta, plac­ue­rit cer­tam quan­ti­ta­tem prae­sta­ri, trans­ac­tio ra­ta est et ci­tra prae­to­rem.

The Same, On all Tribunals, Book V. When those to whom provision for maintenance has been left, were ready to make a compromise, and were satisfied with a moderate sum to be paid to them at once; the Divine Marcus stated in an Address delivered in the Senate: “That no compromise with reference to maintenance should stand, unless it was made under the authority of the Prætor.” Therefore the Prætor is accustomed to intervene and decide between the contracting parties whether the compromise is one which should be admitted. 1Whether provision for a house, or for clothing, or for maintenance dependent on real-estate is bequeathed, the inquiry of the same Prætor with reference to the compromise must be held. 2The above-mentioned Address relates to provision for maintenance left either by will or codicil, whether it was added to the will, or the party died intestate. The same rule is applicable where the provision was made by a donation mortis causa or where a charge was imposed upon anyone. Where bequests are made for the purpose of fulfilling a condition, we say that the rule is the same. It is evident that a compromise can be entered into without the authority of the Prætor when provision for maintenance is not made mortis causa. 3The Address applies to sums to be paid monthly or daily or annually, and the same rule is applicable where they are not left for life, but only for a certain term of years. 4Where a certain sum is bequeathed to anyone in order that he may support himself with the interest of the same and restore the entire amount at the time of his death; the Address will still apply, although the amount cannot be held to be paid annually. 5Where, however, a certain sum of money, or a certain amount of property is left to Titius, in order to provide for the support of Seius, the better opinion is that Titius can compromise; for by this act of Titius the maintenance of Seius is not diminished. The same rule applies where property was left to the legatee under a trust in order to provide for maintenance. 6The Address forbids a compromise which is made in such a way that anyone can spend at once the amount which is given him. What would be the case then, if a party made a compromise without the authority of the Prætor, to the effect that whatever was payable to him annually by the bequest, he should receive each month? Or what should be done if he received every day what had been left to him to be paid every month? Or how would it be if what he had a right to receive at the end of a year, should be received by him at the beginning? I am of the opinion that an arrangement of this kind is valid, because the party to be supported improves his condition by such a transaction; and that the Address of the Emperor did not intend that the maintenance of persons should be cut off by a compromise. 7It makes no difference whether the parties for whom provision for maintenance is made are freedmen, or freeborn, rich, or poor. 8The Address also directs inquiry to be made before the Prætor with reference to the following matters; in the first place, concerning the cause of the compromise; second, concerning its terms; third, concerning the personal characters of the parties to the transaction. 9With reference to the cause, it must be ascertained what reason exists for making the compromise for the Prætor will hear no one who desires to make a compromise without sufficient cause. The reasons which are usually alleged are the following, namely: where the heir and the party to be supported reside in different places; or where either of them intends to change his residence; or where there is some urgent reason for a sum of money to be paid at the time; or where provision for maintenance has been charged upon several heirs, and it is difficult for them to distribute small sums of money among different persons; or where any other reason exists among those which usually arise, and which may induce the Prætor to sanction the compromise. 10The amount of money involved in the transaction must also be considered, for the good faith of the parties is to be determined in this way. The amount must also be estimated according to the age and condition of health of the person who is making the compromise, as it is clear that it must vary in the cases of a boy, a young man, or one who is old; and it is evident that a provision for maintenance will end with the life of the party for whose benefit it was made. 11The character of the persons must also be taken into consideration; that is to say, what are the habits of life of those for whom provision is made, whether they are frugal and have sufficient for their maintenance from other sources; or whether they are of an inferior class, who will be compelled to depend entirely upon the provision made for them. With regard to the person who is charged with furnishing maintenance, these things must be investigated namely, what his means are, as well as his intentions and his opinions, for it will then be apparent whether he desires to ever reach the party with whom he makes the compromise or not. 12A compromise made with respect to maintenance, does not apply to lodging or clothing; as the Divine Marcus ordered that special arrangements should be made with reference to these matters. 13Where, however, anyone makes a compromise with respect to maintenance, it will not be considered necessary for him, against his will, to make any arrangement concerning lodgings, or other matters; he can, therefore, enter into an agreement with reference to all things at once, or only concerning a few. 14A compromise with respect to a provision for shoes must also be made under the authority of the Prætor. 15Where real-estate charged with maintenance has been left to one or several persons, and they desire to alienate it, it is necessary for the Prætor to decide concerning both the alienation and the compromise. Where real-estate charged with maintenance is left to several persons, and these make a compromise among themselves without the consent of the Prætor, the compromise should not be sustained. The same rule applies where land is given as security for maintenance, for, where a pledge is given for this purpose, it cannot be released without the authority of the Prætor. 16It is perfectly manifest that the consent of the Prætor is necessary where a compromise is made for the entire amount of the maintenance, or only for a portion of the same. 17If, when application is made to the Prætor, he permits a compromise to be made without an investigation of the case, the transaction will be void; for the matter is referred to the Prætor to be examined, and not to be neglected, or given up. If, however, he does not make inquiry about everything which he is directed to do by the Address; that is to say, about the cause, the amount, and the character of the parties to the transaction, it must be held that even though he investigates some matters, the compromise is void. 18Neither the Governor of the province, nor the Prætor can delegate his jurisdiction in a matter of this kind. 19Compromises with respect to maintenance can also be made in the presence of the Imperial Procurator; for example, where maintenance is claimed from the Treasury, and hence this can be done in the presence of the Prefect of the Treasury. 20Where an action is pending with reference to provision for maintenance, and a compromise is made, it will not be valid without the authority of the Prætor; as otherwise the Address of the Emperor might be evaded; for pretended suits could be brought, in order that a compromise might be arranged without the consent of the Prætor. 21Where provision for maintenance is left to anyone, and in addition to this a legacy which is to be paid immediately, and a compromise is made without the authority of the Prætor; whatever may be paid is first credited on the legacy which was made payable without delay, and the remainder on the provision for maintenance. 22Where anyone makes a compromise with reference to maintenance, without the authority of the Prætor, whatever is paid will be applied to the settlement of what is due on the maintenance; for it makes no difference how much the arrears were, or whether they were more or less than the amount paid; for if they are less, still the payment must be credited on the arrears of the provision for maintenance. And it is clear that if he who made the compromise with respect to maintenance, became more wealthy by the payment, it will be perfectly just that the other party should have an action to recover the amount by which he became more wealthy, for no one ought to profit by the loss of another. 23Where a certain sum to be paid annually, as, for instance, an annual pension or an usufruct has been left by anyone to a man of superior rank, a compromise can be made without the authority of the Prætor. But, if a moderate usufruct has been left, instead of a provision for maintenance, I say that a compromise made without the authority of the Prætor is of no force or effect. 24Where provision has been made for the maintenance of a person, not in money but in grain, oil, and other articles which are necessary for subsistence, a compromise cannot be arranged with respect to them, whether the payments are to be made to him annually, or monthly. Where, however, the compromise made without the Prætor’s authority was, that he should, instead of the articles, receive a certain sum of money payable either annually, or monthly, and neither the date nor the amount was changed, but only the nature of the article; or if, on the other hand, he agreed to receive subsistence in kind, which had been left to him in money; as where he changed wine for oil, or oil for wine, or anything else of this description; or changed the place so as to receive the provision left to him at Rome, in some town, or in some province, or vice versa; or if he changed the person, so as to receive from one what he should have received from several; or accepts one debtor instead of another; all these things must be submitted to the decision of the Prætor, and be determined for the benefit of the party entitled to maintenance. 25Where a certain sum, payable annually for lodging, has been left, any transaction which is entered into for the furnishing of lodging without the authority of the Prætor is valid; since the party obtains the benefit of the lodging, although the compromise may afford a lodging liable to demolition, or fire. On the other hand also, if he agrees that a stated sum shall be paid him instead of the lodging which was bequeathed, the transaction is valid, even without the Prætor’s authority.

Dig. 34,1,1Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Si ali­men­ta fue­rint le­ga­ta, di­ci pot­est et­iam aquam le­ga­to in­es­se, si in ea re­gio­ne fue­rint le­ga­ta, ubi ve­num­da­ri aqua so­let.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book V. Where maintenance is bequeathed, it can be said that water is also included in the legacy, if the bequest is made in the region where water is ordinarily sold.

Dig. 41,2,35Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Ex­itus con­tro­ver­siae pos­ses­sio­nis hic est tan­tum, ut prius pro­nun­tiet iu­dex, uter pos­si­deat: ita enim fiet, ut is, qui vic­tus est de pos­ses­sio­ne, pe­ti­to­ris par­ti­bus fun­ga­tur et tunc de do­mi­nio quae­ra­tur.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book V. A controversy for possession is terminated as soon as the judge decides which party is in possession. This is done in such a way that he who loses possession can take the position of plaintiff, and then bring an action against the owner.

Dig. 42,2,6Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Cer­tum con­fes­sus pro iu­di­ca­to erit, in­cer­tum non erit. 1Si quis in­cer­tum con­fi­tea­tur vel cor­pus sit con­fes­sus Sti­chum vel fun­dum da­re se opor­te­re, ur­gue­ri de­bet, ut cer­tum con­fi­tea­tur: item eum, qui rem con­fes­sus est, ut cer­tam quan­ti­ta­tem fa­tea­tur. 2Sed et si fun­dum vin­di­cem meum es­se tu­que con­fes­sus sis, per­in­de ha­be­be­ris, at­que si do­mi­nii mei fun­dum es­se pro­nun­tia­tum es­set. et si alia qua­cum­que ac­tio­ne ci­vi­li vel ho­no­ra­ria vel in­ter­dic­to ex­hi­bi­to­rio vel re­sti­tu­to­rio vel pro­hi­bi­to­rio dum quis con­ve­ni­tur, con­fi­tea­tur, di­ci pot­est in his om­ni­bus sub­se­qui prae­to­rem vo­lun­ta­tem ora­tio­nis di­vi Mar­ci de­be­re et om­ne om­ni­no, quod quis con­fes­sus est, pro iu­di­ca­to ha­be­re. da­bi­tur igi­tur ex his ac­tio­ni­bus, ex qui­bus dies da­tur ad re­sti­tuen­dam rem, con­fes­so tem­pus ad re­sti­tu­tio­nem et, si non re­sti­tua­tur, lis aes­ti­ma­bi­tur. 3Si quis ab­sen­te ad­ver­sa­rio con­fes­sus sit, vi­den­dum, num­quid non de­beat pro iu­di­ca­to ha­be­ri, quia nec qui iu­rat de ope­ris, ob­li­ga­tur nec so­leat quis ab­sen­ti con­dem­na­ri. cer­te pro­cu­ra­to­rem, tu­to­rem cu­ra­to­rem­ve prae­sen­tem es­se suf­fi­cit. 4Sed an et ip­sos pro­cu­ra­to­res vel tu­to­res vel cu­ra­to­res fa­te­ri suf­fi­ciat, vi­dea­mus: et non pu­to suf­fi­ce­re. 5In pu­pil­lo tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­tem ex­igi­mus. 6Mi­no­rem a con­fes­sio­ne sua re­sti­tue­mus. 7Con­fes­si uti­que post con­fes­sio­nem tem­po­ra qua­si ex cau­sa iu­di­ca­ti ha­be­bunt.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book V. He who confesses that he owes a specified sum of money is considered as having had judgment rendered against him; but this rule does not apply where the amount is uncertain. 1When anyone admits that he owes an uncertain amount of money, or something which is not specifically designated, as, for instance, if he says that he is obliged to deliver either Stichus or a tract of land, he must be urged to make his allegations more definite. The same rule applies to him who admits that he owes some property, to compel him to state the amount. 2If I bring an action to recover a tract of land which is mine, and you admit that it is mine, you will occtipy the same position as if a judgment had been rendered declaring the land to belong to me. And, in any other kind of civil or honorary actions, and in all interdicts for the production of property, or its restitution, including prohibitory interdicts, if the party who is sued admits the indebtedness, it may be said that the Prætor must follow the provision of the Rescript of the Divine Marcus, and everything which he confesses to be due is held to have been judicially decided. Therefore, in actions in which time is granted for the restitution of property, it will also be granted for restitution to the party who confesses judgment; and if restitution should not be made, the value of the property shall be appraised in court. 3If anyone admits that a claim is valid in the absence of his adversary, let us see whether he should not be considered to have had judgment rendered against him; because he who makes oath with reference to his services is not liable, and it is not customary to condemn anyone in his absence. It is certain that it is sufficient for the confession to be made in the presence of an agent, a guardian, or a curator. 4Let us see whether it will be sufficient for an agent, a guardian, or a curator, to make the confession. I do not think that it will be sufficient. 5In the case of a confession by a ward, we require the authority of his guardian, 6we grant complete restitution to a minor against his confession. 7Those who have confessed judgment are entitled to time for payment after making their confession, just as parties are after judgment has been rendered.

Ex libro VIII

Dig. 26,5,6Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. nec non igno­ran­ti et in­vi­to.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book VIII. Even though the ward should be ignorant of the fact, and unwilling.

Dig. 26,5,8Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Nec man­dan­te prae­si­de alius tu­to­rem da­re pot­erit. 1Si prae­tor vel prae­ses pro­vin­ciae in fu­ro­re aut demen­tia con­sti­tu­tus de­de­rit tu­to­rem, non pu­to va­le­re: quam­vis enim prae­tor vel prae­ses sit nec fu­ror ei ma­gis­tra­tum ab­ro­get, at­ta­men da­tio nul­lius erit mo­men­ti. 2Da­ri tu­tor om­ni die pot­erit. 3Fu­rio­so et fu­rio­sae et mu­to et sur­do tu­tor vel cu­ra­tor a prae­to­re vel prae­si­de da­ri pot­erit.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book VIII. Another person cannot appoint a guardian, even under the direction of a Governor. 1Where the Prætor or the Governor of a province appoints a guardian while he is insane or demented, I do not think that the appointment will be valid; for, even though he may still continue to be Prætor or Governor, and his insanity does not deprive him of his magistracy, still, the appointment made by him will be of no force or effect. 2A guardian can be appointed upon any day whatsoever. 3A guardian or a curator can be appointed by a Prætor or a Governor for a person of either sex who may have become insane, and for one who is dumb and deaf.

Dig. 50,13,1Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Prae­ses pro­vin­ciae de mer­ce­di­bus ius di­ce­re so­let, sed prae­cep­to­ri­bus tan­tum stu­dio­rum li­be­ra­lium. li­be­ra­lia au­tem stu­dia ac­ci­pi­mus, quae Grae­ci ἐλευθέρια ap­pel­lant: rhe­to­res con­ti­ne­bun­tur, gram­ma­ti­ci, geo­me­trae. 1Me­di­co­rum quo­que ea­dem cau­sa est quae pro­fes­so­rum, ni­si quod ius­tior, cum hi sa­lu­tis ho­mi­num, il­li stu­dio­rum cu­ram agant: et id­eo his quo­que ex­tra or­di­nem ius di­ci de­bet. 2Sed et ob­ste­tri­cem au­diant, quae uti­que me­di­ci­nam ex­hi­be­re vi­de­tur. 3Me­di­cos for­tas­sis quis ac­ci­piet et­iam eos, qui ali­cu­ius par­tis cor­po­ris vel cer­ti do­lo­ris sa­ni­ta­tem pol­li­cen­tur: ut pu­ta si au­ri­cu­la­rius, si fis­tu­lae vel den­tium. non ta­men si in­can­ta­vit, si in­pre­ca­tus est, si, ut vul­ga­ri ver­bo im­pos­to­rum utar, si exor­ci­za­vit: non sunt is­ta me­di­ci­nae ge­ne­ra, tam­et­si sint, qui hos si­bi pro­fuis­se cum prae­di­ca­tio­ne ad­fir­ment. 4An et phi­lo­so­phi pro­fes­so­rum nu­me­ro sint? et non pu­tem, non quia non re­li­gio­sa res est, sed quia hoc pri­mum pro­fi­te­ri eos opor­tet mer­cen­na­riam ope­ram sper­ne­re. 5Pro­in­de ne iu­ris qui­dem ci­vi­lis pro­fes­so­ri­bus ius di­cent: est qui­dem res sanc­tis­si­ma ci­vi­lis sa­pien­tia, sed quae pre­tio num­ma­rio non sit aes­ti­man­da nec de­ho­nes­tan­da, dum in iu­di­cio ho­nor pe­ti­tur, qui in in­gres­su sa­cra­men­ti of­fer­ri de­buit. quae­dam enim tam­et­si ho­nes­te ac­ci­pian­tur, in­ho­nes­te ta­men pe­tun­tur. 6Lu­di quo­que lit­te­ra­rii ma­gis­tris li­cet non sint pro­fes­so­res, ta­men usur­pa­tum est, ut his quo­que ius di­ca­tur: iam et li­bra­riis et no­ta­riis et cal­cu­la­to­ri­bus si­ve ta­bu­la­riis. 7Sed ce­te­ra­rum ar­tium opi­fi­ci­bus si­ve ar­ti­fi­ci­bus, quae sunt ex­tra lit­te­ras vel no­tas po­si­tae, ne­qua­quam ex­tra or­di­nem ius di­ce­re prae­ses de­be­bit. 8Sed et si com­ites sa­la­rium pe­tant, idem iu­ris est, quod in pro­fes­so­ri­bus pla­cet. 9Sed et ad­ver­sus ip­sos om­nes co­gnos­ce­re prae­ses de­bet, quia ut ad­ver­sus ad­vo­ca­tos ad­ean­tur, di­vi fra­tres re­scrip­se­runt. 10In ho­no­ra­riis ad­vo­ca­to­rum ita ver­sa­ri iu­dex de­bet, ut pro mo­do li­tis pro­que ad­vo­ca­ti fa­cun­dia et fo­ri con­sue­tu­di­ne et iu­di­cii, in quo erat ac­tu­rus, aes­ti­ma­tio­nem ad­hi­beat, dum­mo­do li­ci­tum ho­no­ra­rium quan­ti­tas non egre­dia­tur: ita enim re­scrip­to im­pe­ra­to­ris nos­tri et pa­tris eius con­ti­ne­tur. ver­ba re­scrip­ti ita se ha­bent: ‘Si Iu­lius Ma­ter­nus, quem pa­tro­num cau­sae tuae es­se vo­luis­ti, fi­dem sus­cep­tam ex­hi­be­re pa­ra­tus est, eam dum­ta­xat pe­cu­niam, quae mo­dum le­gi­ti­mum egres­sa est, re­pe­te­re de­bes’. 11Ad­vo­ca­tos ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus om­nes om­ni­no, qui cau­sis agen­dis quo­quo stu­dio ope­ran­tur: non ta­men qui pro trac­ta­tu, non ad­fu­tu­ri cau­sis, ac­ci­pe­re quid so­lent, ad­vo­ca­to­rum nu­me­ro erunt. 12Si cui cau­tum est ho­no­ra­rium vel si quis de li­te pac­tus est, vi­dea­mus, an pe­te­re pos­sit. et qui­dem de pac­tis ita est re­scrip­tum ab im­pe­ra­to­re nos­tro et di­vo pa­tre eius: ‘Li­tis cau­sa ma­lo mo­re pe­cu­niam ti­bi pro­mis­sam ip­se quo­que pro­fi­te­ris. sed hoc ita11Die Großausgabe fügt ius ein. est, si sus­pen­sa li­te so­cie­ta­tem fu­tu­ri emo­lu­men­ti cau­tio pol­li­ce­tur. si ve­ro post cau­sam ac­tam cau­ta est ho­no­ra­ria sum­ma, pe­ti pot­erit us­que ad pro­ba­bi­lem quan­ti­ta­tem, et­si no­mi­ne pal­ma­rii cau­tum sit: sic ta­men, ut com­pu­te­tur id quod da­tum est cum eo quod de­be­tur ne­utrum­que com­po­si­tum li­ci­tam quan­ti­ta­tem ex­ce­dat.’ li­ci­ta au­tem quan­ti­tas in­tel­le­gi­tur pro sin­gu­lis cau­sis us­que ad cen­tum au­reos. 13Di­vus Se­ve­rus ab he­redi­bus ad­vo­ca­ti mor­tuo eo pro­hi­buit mer­ce­dem re­pe­ti, quia per ip­sum non ste­te­rat, quo mi­nus cau­sam age­ret. 14Ad nu­tri­cia quo­que of­fi­cium prae­si­dis vel prae­to­ris de­ve­nit: nam­que nu­tri­ces ob ali­mo­niam in­fan­tium apud prae­si­des quod si­bi de­be­tur pe­tunt. sed nu­tri­cia eo us­que pro­du­ce­mus, quo­ad in­fan­tes ube­ri­bus alun­tur: ce­te­rum post haec ces­sant par­tes prae­to­ris vel prae­si­dis. 15Haec om­nia si apud prae­si­des pe­tan­tur, vi­dea­mus an de mu­tuis pe­ti­tio­ni­bus pos­sunt prae­si­des co­gnos­ce­re. et pu­tem de­be­re ad­mit­ti.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book VIII. The Governor of a province usually decided with reference to salaries, but only concerning those to which instructors in liberal studies are entitled. We understand liberal studies to be those which the Greeks designate eleuveria, and they include such as are taught by professors of rhetoric, grammar, and geometry. 1For the same reason, nothing is more just than also to include professors of medicine, for the latter give their attention to the health of men, and the former to their studies; and therefore with reference to them also, the Governor of the province should expound the law arbitrarily. 2Governors hear midwives, who are also considered to practice medicine. 3Anyone understands a physician to be one who promises a cure for any part of the body, or relief from pain, as, for example, an affection of the ear, a fistula, or a toothache; provided he does not employ incantations, imprecations, or exorcisms (to make use of the ordinary term applied to charlatans), for such things as this do not properly belong to the practice of medicine, although there are persons who commend such expedients, and affirm that they have been benefited by them. 4Are philosophers to be included in the number of professors? I do not think that they are, not because philosophy is irreligious, but because those who practice it should, first of all, scorn any mercenary labor. 5Hence, the Governor of a province does not decide with reference to the remuneration of professors of the Civil Law, for their wisdom is considered to be something extremely sacred; but it should not be estimated by its value in money, or be dishonored where compensation is claimed by a person who ought to promise under oath to dispense instruction gratuitously. Still, contributions when tendered may honorably be accepted, which, however, would be dishonorable if demanded. 6Governors of provinces have also assumed the right to decide with reference to school teachers, although they are not classed as professors, as well as in the case of copyists, makers of notes, accountants, and notaries. 7The Governor should, by no means, arbitrarily decide with reference to the master-workmen of other arts, or artisans who are not included in the literary professions, or are not mentioned above. 8When assistants demand their salaries, it has been decided that the same rule applies as in the case of professors. 9The Governor should take cognizance of all claims against these persons, for the Divine Brothers stated in a Rescript that this could even be done against advocates. 10With reference to the fees of advocates, the judge should decide according to the importance of the case, the skill of the advocate, and the custom of the bar, and should make an estimate of the fees to which the advocate was entitled, provided the amount does not exceed the compensation fixed by law; for this was set forth in a Rescript of Our Emperor and his Father in the following terms: “If Julius Maternus, who has wished you to appear in his case, is ready to pay you what he agreed to do, you can only claim an amount which does not exceed that prescribed by law.” 11We should understand advocates to be all those who devote their energies to the purpose of conducting litigation. Those, however, are not included in the number of advocates who ordinarily appear in court to conduct cases in behalf of parties who are absent. 12If a fee has been agreed upon with an advocate, or if anyone has made a contract with him, having reference to the conduct of a case, let us see whether he can demand it. And, indeed, the following was stated by our Emperor and his Divine Father with reference to agreements of this kind, namely: “It is the observance of a bad custom where you exact from your client a promise for the payment of money for conducting his case. It is the law that if, while the case is pending, an agreement is made for future remuneration it will be void; but if it is made after the case has been tried, the sum promised as a fee can be collected up to a reasonable amount, even though the agreement was made with reference to what might be recovered, provided what has been paid shall be reckoned with what is due, and the entire amount does not exceed the legal fee.” The proper fee is understood to be no more than a hundred aurei in any one case. 13The Divine Severus prohibited a fee from being recovered from the heirs of an advocate after his death, because it was not his fault that he did not conduct the suit. 14It is also the duty of a Governor or a Prætor to take cognizance of the claims of nurses for the support of children to which they are entitled, when brought before their magistrates. Such claims, however, should only be considered where infants are nourished by the breast, but when this is not the case, neither the Prætor nor the Governor will have jurisdiction. 15If all these things should be demanded before the Governors of provinces, let us see whether they can have jurisdiction of reciprocal claims. I think that they should be permitted to do so.

Dig. 50,14,3Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. De pro­xe­ne­ti­co, quod et sor­di­dum, so­lent prae­si­des co­gnos­ce­re: sic ta­men, ut et in his mo­dus es­se de­beat et quan­ti­ta­tis et neg­otii, in quo ope­ru­la is­ta de­func­ti sunt et mi­nis­te­rium qua­le­qua­le ac­com­mo­da­ve­runt. fa­ci­lius quod Grae­ci ἑρμηνευτικὸν ap­pel­lant, pe­ti apud eos pot­erit, si quis for­te con­di­cio­nis vel ami­ci­tiae vel ad­ses­su­rae vel cu­ius al­te­rius hu­ius­ce­mo­di pro­xe­ne­ta fuit: sunt enim hu­ius­mo­di ho­mi­num (ut in tam mag­na ci­vi­ta­te) of­fi­ci­nae. est enim pro­xe­ne­ta­rum mo­dus, qui emp­tio­ni­bus ven­di­tio­ni­bus, com­mer­ciis, con­trac­ti­bus li­ci­tis uti­les non ad­eo im­pro­ba­bi­li mo­re se ex­hi­bent.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book VIII. Governors are accustomed to take cognizance of the cases of brokers, and although it is considered a degrading occupation, still, in order to regulate the amount of their commissions and the business in which they are engaged, they, to some extent, supervise their calling. The Greeks designate their compensation by the term the “fee of an intermediary,” and it can easily be collected by them where, for instance, anyone acts as an agent for the purpose of contracting a bond of friendship, or to obtain an assistant for a judge, or anything else of this kind. For such occupations are pursued by certain men in large cities. The term “broker” applies to those who give their services and make themselves useful by negotiating purchases, sales, commercial matters, and lawful contracts in a way which is not objectionable.

Dig. 50,16,199Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. ‘Ab­sen­tem’ ac­ci­pe­re de­be­mus eum, qui non est eo lo­ci, in quo lo­co pe­ti­tur: non enim trans ma­re ab­sen­tem de­si­de­ra­mus: et si for­te ex­tra con­ti­nen­tia ur­bis sit, ab­est. ce­te­rum us­que ad con­ti­nen­tia non ab­es­se vi­de­bi­tur, si non la­ti­tet. 1Ab­es­se non vi­de­tur, qui ab hos­ti­bus cap­tus est, sed qui a la­tro­ni­bus de­ti­ne­tur.

The Same, On All Tribunals, Book VIII. We should consider a person to be absent who is not in the place where his presence is demanded; for we do not require that he be beyond seas, since he is absent if he happens to be outside the suburbs of the city; but if he is within the suburbs, he is not held to be absent if he does not conceal himself. 1Anyone who has been captured by the enemy is not considered to be absent, but he who is detained by robbers is.

Ex libro IX

Dig. 10,4,17Ul­pia­nus li­bro no­no de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Si quis ho­mi­nem de­bi­li­ta­tum ex­hi­beat vel elus­ca­tum, ad ex­hi­ben­dum qui­dem ab­sol­vi de­bet: ex­hi­buit enim et ni­hil im­pe­dit di­rec­tam ac­tio­nem ta­lis ex­hi­bitio, pot­erit ta­men age­re ac­tor ex le­ge Aqui­lia de hoc dam­no.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book IX. Where a party produces a slave who is disabled or blind, he should be discharged from liability under this action, for he has produced him, and a production of this kind is no impediment to a direct action, for the plaintiff can still bring suit under the Lex Aquilia for the damage sustained.

Dig. 11,7,38Ul­pia­nus li­bro no­no de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Ne cor­po­ra aut os­sa mor­tuo­rum de­ti­ne­ren­tur aut ve­xa­ren­tur ne­ve pro­hi­be­ren­tur quo mi­nus via pu­bli­ca trans­fer­ren­tur aut quo­mi­nus se­pe­li­ren­tur, prae­si­dis pro­vin­ciae of­fi­cium est.

Ulpianus, On All Tribunals, Book IX. It is the duty of the Governor of a province to see that the bodies or bones of deceased persons are not detained, or maltreated, or prevented from being transported on the public highway, or buried.