De officio consulis libri
Ex libro II
Dig. 1,10,1Ulpianus libro secundo de officio consulis. Officium consulis est consilium praebere manumittere volentibus. 1Consules et seorsum singuli manumittunt: sed non potest is, qui apud alterum nomina ediderit, apud alterum manumittere: separatae enim sunt manumissiones. sane si qua ex causa collega manumittere non poterit infirmitate vel aliqua iusta causa impeditus, collegam posse manumissionem expedire senatus censuit. 2Consules apud se servos suos manumittere posse nulla dubitatio est. sed si evenerit, ut minor viginti annis consul sit, apud se manumittere non poterit, cum ipse sit, qui ex senatus consulto consilii causam examinat: apud collegam vero causa probata potest.
Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. It is the duty of the Consul to appoint a council for those who desire to manumit slaves. 1Consuls can manumit together, or alone, but he who has left names with one Consul cannot manumit before another for then the manumissions are separate; and if, for any reason, either through sickness, or through being prevented by any other just cause, one of them cannot manumit, the Senate has decided that his colleague can proceed with the manumission. 2There is no doubt that Consuls can manumit their own slaves before themselves, but if it should happen that a Consul is under twenty years of age, he has not the power of manumission in his own tribunal, as he himself is the one who, according to a decree of the Senate, must determine the ground for the appointment of a council. He can, however, do this before his colleague where proper cause has been established.
Dig. 22,3,14Ulpianus libro secundo de officio consulis. Circa eum, qui se ex libertinitate ingenuum dicat, referendum est, quis actoris partibus fungatur. et si quidem in possessionem libertinitatis fuit, sine dubio ipsum oportebit ingenuitatis causam agere docereque se ingenuum esse: sin vero in possessione ingenuitatis sit et libertinus esse dicatur, scilicet eius qui ei controversiam movet, hoc probare debet qui eum dicit libertum suum: quid enim interest, servum suum quis an libertum contendat? si quis autem fiducia ingenuitatis suae ultro in se suscipiat probationes ad hoc, ut sententiam ferat pro ingenuitate facientem, hoc est, ingenuum se esse ut pronuntietur, an obtemperare ei debeat, tractari potest. et non ab re esse opinor morem ei geri probandi se ingenuum et sententiam secundum se dandam, cum nulla captio intercedat iuris.
Ulpianus, On the Office of the Consul, Book II. Inquiries should be made with reference to a person who, having passed as a freedman, now alleges that he is freeborn and desires to proceed as plaintiff. If, indeed, he occupies the position of a freedman, there is no doubt that he must bring an action to have himself declared freeborn, and establish that this is the case. But if he enjoys the reputation of having been born free, and he is alleged to be a freedman (of course by him who is responsible for the controversy), he who says that he is his freedman must prove it. For what difference does it make whether anyone asserts that he is his slave or his freedman? Where, however, a party has sufficient confidence in his claim of freedom of birth as voluntarily to undertake to produce proofs of it for the purpose of obtaining a decision declaring him freeborn (that is to say that he was born free as he alleges), it may be asked whether he should be permitted to do so. I am of the opinion that this should be done, and that he should have an opportunity to prove that he is freeborn, and have a decision rendered in his favor, as no one can be taken at a disadvantage by such a judgment.
Dig. 25,3,5Ulpianus libro secundo de officio consulis. Si quis a liberis ali desideret vel si liberi, ut a parente exhibeantur, iudex de ea re cognoscet. 1Sed utrum eos tantum liberos qui sunt in potestate cogatur quis exhibere, an vero etiam emancipatos vel ex alia causa sui iuris constitutos, videndum est. et magis puto, etiamsi non sunt liberi in potestate, alendos a parentibus et vice mutua alere parentes debere. 2Utrum autem tantum patrem avumve paternum proavumve paterni avi patrem ceterosque virilis sexus parentes alere cogamur, an vero etiam matrem ceterosque parentes et per illum sexum contingentes cogamur alere, videndum. et magis est, ut utrubique se iudex interponat, quorundam necessitatibus facilius succursurus, quorundam aegritudini: et cum ex aequitate haec res descendat caritateque sanguinis, singulorum desideria perpendere iudicem oportet. 3Idem in liberis quoque exhibendis a parentibus dicendum est. 4Ergo et matrem cogemus praesertim volgo quaesitos liberos alere nec non ipsos eam. 5Item divus Pius significat, quasi avus quoque maternus alere compellatur. 6Idem rescripsit, ut filiam suam pater exhibeat, si constiterit apud iudicium iuste eam procreatam. 7Sed si filius possit se exhibere, aestimare iudices debent, ne non debeant ei alimenta decernere. denique idem Pius ita rescripsit: ‘Aditi a te competentes iudices ali te a patre tuo iubebunt pro modo facultatium eius, si modo, cum opificem te esse dicas, in ea valetudine es, ut operis sufficere non possis’. 8Si vel parens neget filium idcircoque alere se non debere contendat, vel filius neget parentem, summatim iudices oportet super ea re cognoscere. si constiterit filium vel parentem esse, tunc ali iubebunt: ceterum si non constiterit, nec decernent alimenta. 9Meminisse autem oportet, etsi pronuntiaverint ali oportere, attamen eam rem praeiudicium non facere veritati: nec enim hoc pronuntiatur filium esse, sed ali debere: et ita divus Marcus rescripsit. 10Si quis ex his alere detrectet, pro modo facultatium alimenta constituentur: quod si non praestentur, pignoribus captis et distractis cogetur sententiae satisfacere. 11Idem iudex aestimare debet, num habeat aliquid parens vel an pater quod merito filios suos nolit alere: Trebatio denique Marino rescriptum est merito patrem eum nolle alere, quod eum detulerat. 12Non tantum alimenta, verum etiam cetera quoque onera liberorum patrem ab iudice cogi praebere rescriptis continetur. 13Si impubes sit filius emancipatus, patrem inopem alere cogetur: iniquissimum enim quis merito dixerit patrem egere, cum filius sit in facultatibus. 14Si mater alimenta, quae fecit in filium, a patre repetat, cum modo eam audiendam. ita divus Marcus rescripsit Antoniae montanae in haec verba: ‘Sed et quantum tibi alimentorum nomine, quibus necessario filiam tuam exhibuisti, a patre eius praestari oporteat, iudices aestimabunt, nec impetrare debes ea, quae exigente materno affectu in filiam tuam erogatura esses, etiamsi a patre suo educaretur’. 15A milite quoque filio, qui in facultatibus sit, exhibendos parentes esse pietatis exigit ratio. 16Parens quamvis ali a filio ratione naturali debeat, tamen aes alienum eius non esse cogendum exsolvere filium rescriptum est. 17Item rescriptum est heredes filii ad ea praestanda, quae vivus filius ex officio pietatis suae dabit, invitos cogi non oportere, nisi in summam egestatem pater deductus est. 18Solent iudices cognoscere et inter patronos et libertos, si alendis his agatur: itaque si negent se esse libertos, cognoscere eos oportebit: quod si libertos constiterit, tunc demum decernere, ut alant: nec tamen alimentorum decretum tollet liberto facultatem, quo minus praeiudicio certare possit, si libertum se neget. 19Alimenta autem pro modo facultatium erunt praebenda, egentibus scilicet patronis: ceterum si sit unde se exhibeant, cessabunt partes iudicis. 20Utrum autem tantum patroni alendi sint an etiam patronorum liberi, tractari potest. et puto causa cognita iudices et liberos quoque patronorum alendos decernere, non quidem tam facile ut patronos, sed nonnumquam et ipsos: nam et obsequium non solum patronis, verum etiam liberis eorum debere praestari. 21Sed et libertus maternus alere cogitur. 22Si quis a liberti liberto ali se desideret vel ab eo, quem ex causa fideicommissi manumisit quemque suis nummis redemit, non debet audiri, ut et Marcellus scribit, exaequatque eum, qui mercedes exigendo ius libertorum amisit. 23Sed et patroni filium, qui capitis accusavit libertum paternum, negat exhibendum. 24Sed et liberta cogitur patronum alere. 25De alimentis patroni arbiter solet dari arbitraturus, quantum sit in facultatibus, ut perinde possint alimenta moderari, quae tamdiu praestabuntur, quamdiu liberto supersit, patrono desit. 26Patrem et matrem patroni, cum patronus et filii eius minime supersint, alere egentes, ipsi si idonei facultatibus sunt, coguntur.
Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. Where anyone asks support of his children, or where children can be supported by their father, a judge should take cognizance of the matter. 1Should a father be compelled to support only such children as are under his control, or should he support those who are already emancipated, or who, for any other reason, have become independent, is a question for consideration. I think the better opinion is that even where the children are not under paternal control, they must be supported by their parents, and that, on the other hand, their parents should also be supported by them. 2Let us see whether we are obliged to support only our fathers, our paternal grandfathers, our paternal great-grandfathers and other relatives of the male sex; or whether we are obliged to support our mothers, and our other ascendants in the maternal line. The better opinion is, that in every instance, the judge should interpose for the purpose of giving relief to the necessities of some and the infirmities of others; and since this obligation is derived from justice, and from the attachment due to blood, the judge should carefully weigh the claims of each of the parties. 3It must be said that the same rule applies to the maintenance of children by their parents. 4Therefore we compel a mother to support her illegitimate children, and them to support her. 5The Divine Pius also intimates that a maternal grandfather is obliged to support his grandchildren. 6He also stated in a Rescript that a father must support his daughter, if it should be proved in court that he had actually begotten her. 7Where a son can support himself, the court should decide not to compel maintenance to be furnished him. Hence the Emperor Pius stated in a Rescript: “The competent judges and before whom you will appear, must order that you shall be supported by your father in proportion to his means; provided that you allege that you are an artisan, and that by reason of ill health, you cannot maintain yourself by your own labor.” 8Where a father denies that a party asking for support is his son, and therefore contends that he should not furnish it; or where a son denies that an applicant for maintenance is his father, the judges must decide the case summarily, and if it is established that the petitioner is a son, or a father, they must then order him to be supported. If, however, this should not be proved, they shall not decide that maintenance shall be furnished. 9But it must be remembered that if the judges hold that support should be furnished, still, this does not prejudice the truth, for they do not decide that the party is a son, but merely that he should be supported. This the Divine Marcus also stated in a Rescript. 10If anyone should refuse to provide support, the judges must determine the amount to be furnished in proportion to his means, and if he still fails to provide it, he can be compelled to comply with the judgment by taking his property in execution and selling the same. 11The judge must also determine whether a relative or a father has any good reason for refusing to support his children. There is a rescript addressed to Trebatius Marinus which states that a father can properly refuse to support his son if the latter has informed against him. 12It is stated in certain rescripts that a father can be compelled by a judge not only to furnish provisions, but also all other necessaries to his children. 13Where a son has been emancipated before arriving at puberty, he can be compelled to support his father, if the latter is in poverty; for anyone would say with reason that it is most unjust for a father to remain in want, while his son was in prosperous circumstances. 14Where a mother who furnished provisions to her child, brings suit against its father, she should be heard under certain conditions; for the Divine Marcus stated in a Rescript addressed to Antonia Montana: “The judges will estimate how much shall be paid to you by the father of your daughter in proportion to the amount of necessary provisions which you have furnished her for her support; but you cannot obtain as much as you would have expended for your daughter through maternal affection, even if she had been driven away by her father.” 15Filial affection requires that parents should be supported by a son who is in the military service, provided he has the means to do so. 16It is stated in a rescript that, although a parent should, according to the dictates of nature, be supported by his son, still the latter ought not to be required to pay his debts. 17Ad Dig. 25,3,5,17Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 475, Note 13.There is also a rescript which states that the heirs of the son, if unwilling, are not compelled to furnish such assistance to their father that a son while living would provide him with through motives of filial duty, unless the father is in the greatest poverty. 18Judges are also accustomed to decide between patrons and freedmen, where the question of their maintenance arises. Therefore, if the patrons deny that the claimants are their freedmen, the judges must make inquiry, and if it is proved that they are their freedmen, then they must order them to be supported. The decree for support does not, however, prevent the freedman (if he denies that he is such) from contending for his rights against his patron. 19Support must be furnished by freedmen to their patrons who are in poverty in proportion to their means. If, however, the latter are able to support themselves, the authority of the judge need not be interposed. 20The question may be asked whether only patrons are to be supported, or whether their children must also be maintained. I think that, upon proper cause being shown, judges should decree that the children of patrons should also be supported, not indeed as readily as patrons, but sometimes; for freedmen should show reverence not only to their patrons but also to the children of the latter. 21The freedman of a woman is compelled to support her children. 22If anyone should desire to be supported by a freedman of his freedman, or by a slave whom he has manumitted by reason of a trust, or by one whom he has redeemed from slavery with his own money, he should not be heard. For, as Marcellus says, he should be compared with one who, by exacting a reward, loses thereby the rights he has in a freedman. 23If the son of his patron has accused the freedman of his father of a capital crime, he denies that the latter is required to support him. 24A freedwoman is also obliged to support her patron. 25An arbiter is usually appointed to decide with reference to the support of a patron, and he must ascertain the value of the resources of the freedman, in order that the amount of the maintenance may be determined, and this must be provided as long as the freedman is able to do so, and the patron requires it. 26Freedmen are compelled to furnish support for the father and mother of their patron, where the patron and his children are no longer living, if they are in need, and the freedmen have the means to do so.
Dig. 34,1,3Ulpianus libro secundo de officio consulis. Solent iudices ex causa alimentorum libertos dividere, quotiens plures sunt heredes, ne a singulis heredibus minutatim alimenta petentes distringantur: quam divisionem perinde tueri oportet atque si pater familias ipse libertos divisisset. solent et unum eligere, per quem alimenta praestentur, aut ex voluntate defuncti aut arbitrio suo, ut rescripta subiecta ostendunt: ‘Exemplum libelli dati mihi a libertis silii misi vobis, sciens ad exemplum istam rem pertinere, quia multi testamentis suis praestari libertis iubent necessaria, quae quia minimi aeris sunt, ad nihilum perducuntur, cum plures heredes coeperunt per successiones existere. qua de causa puto vos recte facturos, si convocatis Favillae heredibus procuratoribusve eorum constitueritis, cui a ceteris dari debeat pecunia, ex cuius usuris alimenta praestentur. debebit autem is qui accipiet cavere eis qui dabunt redditurum se, ut quisque ex libertis decesserit aliove quo modo in civitate esse desierit, tantum ex sorte, quantum efficiet pro portione computatio’. divus Pius Rubrio cuidam Telesphoro rescripsit: ‘Consules vocatis his, a quibus vobis alimenta deberi ex causa fideicommissi constiterit, vel omnes ab uno vel facta pro rata distributione quis et a quibus percipiatis, decernent. fiscus enim, si eo nomine quid ab eo vobis deberetur, exemplum sequetur. iam nunc sciatis partes eorum, qui solvendo esse desierint, non pertinere ad onus reliquorum heredum’.
Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. When bequests for maintenance are made to freedmen judges are accustomed to divide with the latter in proportion to the number of heirs, in order that they may not be compelled to obtain their means of support in small quantities from each of them; and this division should be sustained, just as if the head of the household himself had divided the freedmen. They have adopted the practice of selecting one heir, by whom the means of support shall be provided, either in compliance with the wishes of the deceased, or according to their own judgment, as the following Rescripts show: “I send you a copy of the petition presented to me by the freedmen of Favilla, for the reason that many persons, in their wills, order necessaries to be furnished to their freedmen, which, as they are of small amounts, are reduced to almost nothing where there are several heirs to an estate. Hence, I think that you will act properly, if, after having called together the heirs of Favilla, or their representatives, you decide to which one of them a sum of money shall be given, out of the interest of which the maintenance of the said freedman may be paid for. He who receives this money must furnish security to those who contribute it, that, in case any one of said freedmen should die, or should, in any other way, cease to be a citizen, he will refund as much of the principal as the computation pro rata may amount to.” The Divine Pius stated, as follows in a Rescript addressed to a certain Rubrius Telesphorus: “The Consuls, after having called together all those who have been charged with furnishing you with maintenance under the terms of the trust, shall determine whether all of the legatees shall receive what is due them from one of the heirs, or whether the distribution shall be made pro rata, and who shall be notified, and by whom this shall be done. If anything should be due from the testator to you on this ground, the Treasury also shall pursue the same course; and know now that the shares of those who are insolvent will not cause the burden of the remaining heirs to be increased.”
Dig. 40,2,20Ulpianus libro secundo de officio consulis. Si rogatus sit minor viginti quinque annis manumittere per fideicommissum, incunctanter debet ei permitti, nisi si proprium servum rogatus fuit manumittere: hic enim conferenda erit quantitas emolumenti, quae ad eum pervenit ex iudicio eius qui rogavit, cum pretio eorum quos rogatus est manumittere. 1Sed et si hac lege ei servus fuerit donatus, ut manumittatur, permittendum erit manumittere, ne constitutio divi Marci superveniens cunctationem consulis dirimat. 2Matrimonii causa manumittere si quis velit et is sit, qui non indigne huiusmodi condicionis uxore sortiturus sit, erit ei concedendum. 3Mulieri quoque volenti suum filium naturalem vel quem ex supra scriptis manumittere permittendum esse Marcellus scribit. 4Consul apud se potest manumittere, etiamsi evenerit, ut minor annis viginti sit.
Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. If a minor of twenty-five years of age is charged by the terms of a trust to manumit a slave, he should be permitted to do so immediately, unless he was charged to manumit his own slave. For, in this instance, the amount of the benefit, which he will obtain from the will of the person who made the request, must be compared with the value of the slave whom he was requested to manumit. 1Where, however, a slave was donated to the minor under the condition that he should be manumitted, he ought to be allowed to manumit him, in order to prevent the Constitution of the Divine Marcus from becoming applicable during the delay granted by the Consul. 2Where anyone wishes to manumit a female slave in order to marry her, and he can, without dishonor to his rank, marry a woman of this kind, he should be permitted to do so. 3Marcellus also says that if a woman desires to emancipate her natural son, or any of the other persons previously mentioned, she should be allowed to do so. 4A Consul can manumit a slave before himself, if he should happen to be a minor of twenty years of age.
Dig. 40,12,27Ulpianus libro secundo de officio consulis. Divi fratres Proculo et Munatio rescripserunt: ‘Cum Romulus, de cuius statu quaeritur, pupillaris aetatis sit, an exigente Varia Hedone matre et consentiente Vario Hermete tutore ad tempus pubertatis causa differenda sit, vestrae gravitatis est ex fide personarum quod utile est pupillo, constituere’. 1Si ea persona desit cognitioni, quae alicui status controversiam faciebat, in eadem causa est qui de libertate sua litigat, qua fuit, priusquam de libertate controversiam patiatur: sane hoc lucratur, quod is qui eam status controversiam faciebat amittit suam causam. nec ea res ingenuum facit eum qui non fuit: nec enim penuria adversarii ingenuitatem solet tribuere. recte atque ordine iudices puto facturos, si hanc formam fuerint consecuti, ut, ubi deest is qui in servitutem petit, electionem adversario deferant, utrum malit cognitionem circumduci an audita causa sententiam proferri. et si cognoverint, pronuntiare debebunt servum illius non videri: neque haec res captionem ullam habet, cum non ingenuus pronuntietur, sed servus non videri. quod si ex servitute in ingenuitatem se allegat, melius fecerint, si cognitionem circumduxerint, ne sine adversario pronuntient ingenuum videri, nisi magna causa suadeat et evidentes probationes suggerant secundum libertatem pronuntiandum: ut etiam rescripto Hadriani continetur. 2Quod si is, qui pro sua libertate litigat, desit, contradictor vero praesens sit, melius erit inaugeri causam eius sententiamque proferri: si enim liquebit, contra libertatem dabit: evenire autem potest, ut etiam absens vincat: nam potest sententia etiam secundum libertatem ferri.
Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. The Divine Brothers, in a Rescript addressed to Proculus and Munatius, stated as follows: “As Romulus, whose condition is disputed, is near the age of puberty, and at the request of his mother, Varia Hado, and with the consent of Varius Hermes, his guardian, judgment in the case was postponed until the child should reach the age of puberty, it is left to your discretion to determine what will be advantageous to the minor, the position of the parties interested being taken into account.” 1If the person who raised the question concerning the condition of another fails to appear at the trial, he who demands his freedom is in the same condition as he was before the controversy arose with reference to it. He, however, is benefited to this extent, namely, that he who disputed his status will lose his case. This fact, however, does not render him freeborn who previously was not so, for the failure of an adversary to appear does not confer the right of freedom. I think that judges will act lawfully and regularly if they pursue the regular order; so that where the party claiming the man as his slave fails to appear, his adversaries shall be given the choice either of having the case continued, or of having it heard and determined. If the judges should hear the case, they must decide that the party in question does not appear to be the slave of So-and-So. This decision does not take undue advantage of anyone, as the person whose estate is in controversy is not found to be freeborn, but is merely held not to be a slave. Where, however, one who is in slavery claims his freedom, the better course for the judges to pursue will be to continue the case, in order to avoid deciding that the said person appears to be born free, when no adversary appears, unless there should be good reason to cause them to hold that it is clear that judgment should be rendered in favor of liberty; as is also stated in a Rescript of Hadrian. 2If, however, he who demands his freedom fails to appear, and his opponent is present, it will be better to proceed with the case and have judgment rendered. If the adversary offers sufficient evidence, the judge shall decide against freedom. It may, however, happen that the absent party will be successful, for the decision may be rendered in favor of freedom.
Dig. 40,16,2Ulpianus libro secundo de officio consulis. Conlusionem detegere ingenuitatis post sententiam intra quinquennium posse divus Marcus constitit. 1Quinquennium autem continuum utique accipiemus. 2Sicubi plane aetas eius, cuius retractatur conlusio, differendam retractationem in tempus pubertatis vel alterius rei suadeat, quinquennium non currere dicendum est. 3Quinquennium autem non ad perficiendam retractationem, sed ad inchoandam puto praefinitum: aliter atque circa eum, qui ex libertinitate se in ingenuitatem petit. 4Oratione divi Marci cavetur, ut etiam extraneis, qui pro altero postulandi ius haberent, liceret detegere collusionem.
Ulpianus, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. The Emperor Marcus decided that collusion could be detected within five years after a decision declaring a person entitled to the privilege of free birth. 1We understand that the five years must be continuous. 2If it is clear that if the age of him who is accused of collusion renders it necessary that the investigation should be deferred until the age of puberty, or to some other time, it must be held that the term of five years will not run. 3Moreover, I think that the term of five years has been prescribed not to terminate the inquiry, but to begin it. It is, however, different with respect to him who, being a liberated slave, demands that he be given the rights of a person who is freeborn. 4It is provided by a Rescript of the Divine Marcus that even strangers, who have the right to assert claims for others, shall be permitted to expose collusion.
Dig. 48,2,16Idem libro secundo de officio consulis. Si plures existant, qui eum in publicis iudiciis accusare volunt, iudex eligere debet eum qui accuset, causa scilicet cognita aestimatis accusatorum personis vel de dignitate, vel ex eo quod interest, vel aetate vel moribus vel alia iusta de causa.
The Same, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book II. Where several persons appear who desire to accuse the same man of a crime, the judge should select one of them to bring the accusation; that is to say, after proper cause has been shown by investigating the character, rank, interest, age, morals, or any other proper attributes of the accusers.
Dig. 50,16,100Idem libro secundo de officio consulis. ‘Speciosas personas’ accipere debemus clarissimas personas utriusque sexus, item eorum, quae ornamentis senatoriis utuntur.
The Same, On the Duties of Consul, Book II. We should understand distinguished persons to mean those of both sexes who are illustrious, as well as those who are entitled to Senatorial honors.