Ulpianus, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book I. It is true that when anyone is imprisoned, he is not held to be either chained or placed in chains unless they are attached to his body.

The Same, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book II. Or if they are related to him by blood (for such relationship is taken into consideration).

Ulpianus, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book II. The judges, when hearing the reasons for manumissions, must remember that these must be based, not on dissoluteness, but on affection; for the Lex Ælia Sentia is understood to grant lawful freedom, not for the purpose of pleasure, but on account of sincere attachment. 1If anyone should transfer a slave to a minor of twenty-one years of age, either in consideration of a price paid, or as a donation, under the condition that he shall liberate him, he can offer this as a just reason for manumission, stating the condition which had been imposed, and can then grant the slave his freedom. He, however, will be required to show that this was the agreement between the parties, so that the matter may be decided in accordance with the condition of the donation, or with the affection of the person who gave the slave to be manumitted.

Ulpianus, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book IV. If anyone should purchase a slave under the condition of manumitting him, and, not having done so, the slave obtains his freedom under the Constitution of the Divine Marcus, let us see whether he can be accused of ingratitude. It may be said that, as the purchaser did not manumit him, he is not entitled to this right of action. 1If my son should manumit my slave with my consent, it may be doubted whether I have the right to accuse him of ingratitude for the reason that I did not manumit him. I should, however, be considered as having manumitted him. 2But if my son manumits a slave forming part of his castrense peculium, there is no doubt that I will not have this right, because I, myself, did not manumit him. It is clear that my son himself can accuse him. 3Anyone can accuse a freedman of ingratitude as long as he remains his patron. 4If, however, several patrons desire to accuse their freedman of ingratitude, let us see whether the consent of all of them will be necessary, or whether only one can do so. The better opinion is that, if the freedman displayed ingratitude against only one of his patrons, he can accuse him; but the consent of all of them will be necessary, if they are all in the same degree. 5If a father should assign a freedman to one of his children, Julianus says he alone can accuse him of ingratitude, for he alone is his patron.