Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Since the use of money cannot be lost in any other way than by the said occurrences. 1Where only the use of money is bequeathed, since it must be understood, in this particular instance, that the term “use” also includes the profits, a stipulation must be entered into. Certain authorities hold that a stipulation should not be entered into before the money has been paid; but I am of the opinion that the stipulation will be valid whether it is made before, or after the money has been paid.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XCVII. Where the usufruct of anything is bequeathed, it seemed to the Prætor to be perfectly just that the legatee should give security with reference to two things; one, that will use the property as a good citizen should, and the other, that when the usufruct ceases to belong to him, he will restore what remains of it. 1This stipulation must be entered into, whether the property is movable, or consists of land. 2It must be borne in mind that this proceeding must also be employed in the case of trusts; for it is evident that if an usufruct is created by a donatio mortis causa, this security must be furnished in the case of legacies. Moreover, if the usufruct is created in any other manner, the same rule will apply. 3The party must give security that “the usufruct will be enjoyed as a good citizen would enjoy it”; that is to say, that the quality of the usufruct will not be deteriorated, and that he will do everything else which he would do, if the property belonged to him. 4The heir and the legatee will do well, as soon as the legatee begins to enjoy his right, to have it established by witnesses what the condition of the property is at the time, so that, by this means it may be apparent whether, and to what extent, the legatee has diminished the value of the property. 5It was considered more advisable that security should be given under these circumstances by means of a stipulation, so that if anyone should make use of the property in a way that a good citizen would not do, suit might be at once brought on the stipulation; and hence we do not have to wait until the usufruct terminates. 6This kind of a stipulation has reference to two cases; one where the party uses the property in a way which a good citizen would not do, and another where the usufruct must be restored; the first of these becomes operative as soon as an improper use of the property is made, and it may occur many times; the other takes effect when the usufruct expires. 7With reference to what we have stated, however, namely, that “he will restore what remains of it”; the owner does not stipulate for the thing itself, (as he would be considered to uselessly stipulate for his own property) he merely stipulates that whatever remains shall be restored. Sometimes, however, the provision for an appraisement of the property is inserted; for example, where an usufructuary who can prevent usucaption neglects to do so; as he undertakes to exercise every care over the property:

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. All cases in which the usufruct can be lost are included in this stipulation. 1We understand the usufruct to “cease to belong” to the usufructuary even if it has not commenced to belong to him at all, although it may have been bequeathed to him, and the stipulation will, nevertheless, become operative on the principle that property ceases to belong to a party in whom the ownership has not yet begun to vest. 2Where an usufruct is renewed by a legacy “every time that it is lost”, this stipulation will become operative, unless the bond is properly drawn up, but an exception will be required. 3Where, however, anyone leaves you an usufruct and the ownership of the property as well, on the condition that you have children, and the usufruct should be lost; and action can be brought on the stipulation, but an exception will be available. 4Where an heir alienates the property, and the usufruct afterwards is lost, let us consider whether he can bring suit on the stipulation. It may more forcibly be stated that, in accordance with the strict principles of law, the stipulation does not become operative because the property cannot be delivered to the heir or his successor; and the individual to whom it can be delivered—that is he in whom the ownership vests—was not a party to the stipulation. The latter, however, must provide for the protection of his own rights by means of another bond, at the time when he obtains the ownership; but if he should not do this, he will, nevertheless, be entitled to an action in rem.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. The provision, “That no fraud has been committed”, or will be committed, is contained in this stipulation; and as this mention of fraud always relates to matters in rem, it is held to include the bad faith of any of the parties, whether he be one of the successors or an adoptive father. 1Where the use without the enjoyment is bequeathed, the Prætor orders security to be given, with the enjoyment of the produce omitted. This is reasonable, since security is given solely with reference to the use, and not to the usufruct. 2Therefore the stipulation will be operative if the enjoyment is obtained without the use. 3Where the right of residence, or of the services of a slave or those of any other animal, are left, the stipulation will become necessary, although these things are not copied from the usufruct.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Where property was delivered on account of an usufruct, and security was not given, Proculus says that the heir can bring an action for recovery, and if an exception is interposed on the ground that the property was delivered because of an usufruct, he will be entitled to a replication. This opinion is reasonable; but a personal action can be brought to compel the execution of a bond by the usufructuary. 1When the usufruct of a sum of money is bequeathed, the following two instances must be set forth in the stipulation, “Shall be paid when you die, or lose your civil rights”; and therefore these two instances alone are given, because the use of money cannot be lost in any other way than under such circumstances.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. When, the Falcidian Law is operative, it includes all payments. Sometimes, however, it can only be determined subsequently whether it is applicable or not, as for example, where a legacy is left payable annually, as long as the Falcidian Law does not apply, the payments will be made every year without deduction. If, however, a year should come when it does apply, and what is payable exceeds three-fourths of the value of the estate, the result will be that all the payments previously made every year will be diminished. 1Neither the legatee nor the beneficiary of a trust can enjoy the benefit of the Falcidian Law, even though the estate may be delivered to him under the terms of the Trebellian Decree of the Senate.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Where more property is bequeathed to anyone than is permitted by law, and there is good reason to doubt whether the Falcidian Law is applicable or not, the Prætor will come to the relief of the heir, and compel the legatee to furnish him with security that, if it should become apparent that he has received a larger legacy than he is entitled to under the Falcidian Law, he will refund to him an amount equal to the excess, and that no attempt will be made to defraud him. 1It makes no difference whether this occurs in the first will, in the pupillary substitution, or in both, for it has already been decided that the Falcidian Law applies but once, even where there are two wills, and that all the legacies will be subject to contribution, not only those with which the minor himself is charged, but also those which his substitute is obliged to pay. 2Where no stipulation has been entered into with reference to the ward, the heir will be entitled to an action on guardianship against the guardian of the former. But, as Pomponius says, the stipulation can take effect with reference to both the ward himself and his heir, in which case the Falcidian Law will begin to become operative during his lifetime. He also lays down the same rule with reference to the action on guardianship. 3Marcellus says that a man whose estate amounted to four hundred aurei appointed as his heir his son, who had not yet reached the age of puberty, substituted Titius and Seius for him, and did not charge the minor with any legacy, but charged Titius with the payment of three hundred aurei. Marcellus asks whether two hundred or a hundred and fifty aurei should be paid by the substitute, as, under no circumstances, he should be compelled to pay three hundred. It seems to me to be the better opinion that he ought not to be obliged to pay the legatees more than his share, and certainly he ought not to pay them less. It follows, according to this, that the stipulation does not take effect, so far as he alone is concerned, but it should be carried out for the benefit of all the heirs, since the Falcidian Law becomes applicable after proper cause has been shown, and is determined by the amount of the legacies and the debts of the estate. 4If the indebtedness of the estate is evident, or certain, the calculation is easily made. If, however, the indebtedness is still uncertain, either because it is dependent upon some condition, or the creditor has brought an action to collect his claim, and the litigation has not yet been terminated, it will be doubtful how much is payable to the legatee on account of the uncertainty. 5At the present day something very similar to this occurs with reference to trusts. 6When it is said that the Falcidian Law is applicable, an arbiter is usually appointed to appraise the amount of the estate, even though there may be only one person demanding the execution of a very moderate trust. An appraisement of this kind should not prejudice others who have not been summoned before the arbiter. Still, it is usual for the other beneficiaries of the trust to be notified by the heir to appear before the arbiter and state their cases there. The creditors, frequently, are also notified to prove their claims before the arbiter. It is but reasonable that the heir should be heard against the claims of the legatees and beneficiaries of the trust, if he should offer to pay all that is left, and desires to protect himself by a stipulation of this kind. 7Where certain legacies are bequeathed that are payable immediately, and others that are payable under a condition, this stipulation should be entered into with reference to the conditional legacies, provided those which are immediately due are fully paid. Finally, Julianus says that where legacies are bequeathed absolutely and conditionally, in order to prevent the Falcidian Law from taking effect if the condition is complied with, an action will not be granted for the collection of the legacies which have been absolutely bequeathed, unless security is given to the heir to refund anything which has been received in excess of what is permitted by the Falcidian Law. 8Julianus also says that where a fourth of an estate is left to a person under a condition, and three-fourths of it is bequeathed absolutely, security must be given to refund all that has been received above the amount authorized by the Falcidian Law. 9Hence this stipulation also can be exacted, because, although the heir can recover any excess which he has paid, still, the party to whom payment was made may not prove to be solvent, and for this reason what has been paid will be lost. 10It can be said that this stipulation should also be entered into with reference to donations mortis causa. 11These words of the stipulation, “What you may have received as legacies in excess of what is authorized by the Falcidian Law,” not only refer to one who has received more than is permitted by the Falcidian Law, and who must refund a part, and can retain a part of the same, but they also have reference to a person who is obliged to refund his entire legacy, for it should be understood that sometimes the Falcidian Law revokes a portion of the legacy which has been paid, and sometimes revokes all of it. For, as the calculation of the Falcidian portion is made after an account of the indebtedness has been taken, it frequently happens that other indebtedness is discovered, or a condition is fulfilled upon which the payment of a debt depended, and the entire amount of the legacy is exhausted; sometimes, however, a condition is fulfilled upon which the freedom of slaves depends, which renders a legacy not due under any circumstances, since the calculation of the amount of the legacies is not made until that of the slave has been completed, and their value deducted from the assets of the estate. 12Moreover, the Falcidian Law does not apply to certain wills; still, with reference to them, the rule is observed that although the heir may not be entitled to reserve his fourth, yet the legacies would only be payable in case the assets of the estate should be sufficient, of course, after deducting the indebtedness, as well as the value of the slaves who have received their freedom by the will either directly, or under the terms of a trust. 13Security should also be given by the beneficiary of a trust to the legatee who is charged with the execution of the same. 14Sometimes, the agreement set forth in this stipulation has reference not to the Falcidian, but to some other law; as, for instance, where a patron is appointed heir to an entire estate, and is charged absolutely with a legacy of five-twelfths of the same, and is afterwards charged conditionally with another bequest in excess of the amount to which he is entitled as patron; for in this instance recourse must be had to that law which provides for patrons, and not to the Falcidian Law. 15Where property which has been bequeathed is lost while in the hands of the legatee, the better opinion is that relief should be granted, by means of an exception, to the party who made the promise,

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Unless some fraudulent act was committed by the legatee himself, for then he will also be liable under the clause relating to bad faith, which is included in this stipulation, and can be opposed by a reply. 1This bond, which is executed on account of the Falcidian Law, has reference to the furnishing of sureties. 2Where legacies are bequeathed which are payable at different times, as it is certain that the Falcidian Law will be applicable, Pedius says that there is no ground for a stipulation, but there is one for a calculation, and that an estimate should be made of the sum payable at different times, and in this way the total amount of the legacies will be established. The result of the estimate is that the amount due under the Falcidian Law will be fixed in proportion to what is to be deducted from all the legacies. 3Whenever it is clear that a legacy will be due and payable even before the time the Falcidian Law will begin to apply, the calculation of the legacy must be made. If, however, fulfillment of the condition upon which it depends is delayed, we must wait until it is complied with. But where the time for its fulfillment has not yet arrived, in this instance, an account should be taken of the profits received during the intermediate time, and an estimate made, so that we can determine the amount under the Falcidian Law, and can say that the stipulation has become operative. 4Although all legatees and beneficiaries of a trust may by means of this stipulation be obliged to give security, still, the Divine Brothers stated in a Rescript that some of them are excused from doing so, as, for instance, those to whom small allowances for support have been bequeathed. For they stated in a Rescript, addressed to Pompeius Faustina: “The bequest of the ten aurei payable annually under the will of Pompeia Crispiana, your patroness, which you allege have been left to you, is different from that by which food and clothing were left to her other freedwomen, for which reason we think that a bond should not be required.” 5Moreover, it should be noted that the Treasury ought not to be required to furnish security, but an action can be brought against it, just as if it had done so. Still, the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript that others, no matter what their rank, and though they may have already received their legacies, should be compelled to give security. We also learn from this Rescript that the Emperor intended that a stipulation should be entered into, even after the legacies have been paid. 6When a legatee has given security to an heir with reference to the return of the legacy which has been paid to him, and the heir is already involved in a controversy on account of the estate, or expects to be, and the estate is evicted, either on account of the negligence or fraud of him who paid the legacy, we hold that the stipulation will not take effect, so far as the judgment of a good citizen is concerned, because it contains the element of good faith. 7Likewise, if he who paid the legacy should, for some other reason, deprive himself of the estate (for instance, because he is appointed heir by a second will, under which the said legatee did not receive the legacy), we say that, in accordance with the judgment of a good citizen, the stipulation will become operative. 8And, generally speaking, where he who provided for himself by a stipulation of this kind, and has transferred an estate, or a sum of money, or some advantage, it must be said that the stipulation will take effect; provided he who entered into it was not guilty of bad faith. 9The question arose whether the stipulation can take effect more than once. And it is established that it can take effect repeatedly, if the heir is deprived of different parts of the estate at different times. 10If the legacy should be paid before the stipulation is entered into, and legal proceedings are instituted to compel security to be furnished, this suggests the point that proceedings can be instituted where anything has been omitted, or paid through mistake. Therefore, in this instance, as no security was given, more is considered to have been paid than is due. Pomponius says that an action to compel security to be furnished will lie, and I think that his opinion should be adopted on account of the benefit to be derived from it.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. The Prætor has decided that security must be furnished for the payment of legacies, so that the heir may be responsible for any fraud committed against those to whom the testator desired the payment of money to be made, or some act performed for their benefit; in order that the money may be paid, or the act performed at the time prescribed. 1The heir is always compelled to give security, no matter what his rank or fortune may be. 2This rule was not established by the Prætor without good reason. For, as the heir has possession of the estate, the legatees should not be deprived of the property of the deceased, and they must either be given security, or, if this is not done, the Prætor shall authorize them to take possession of the property bequeathed. 3Security must not only be given to all the legatees, but also to their successors, as has been already decided, although the latter are admitted to take possession of the property, not on account of the will of the deceased, but because of the requirements of the succession, just as occurs in the case of a debt. 4Security must also be given to the agents of the legatees, which is our practice at present. 5It is clear that if a legacy is bequeathed to anyone who is under the control of another, security must be given to him to whose authority he is subject. 6Moreover, not only the heirs must furnish security for the payment of legacies, but their successors must do so likewise. 7He also to whom an estate has been transferred under the Decree of the Senate is compelled to give security. 8Those who become heirs through the agency of other persons, as well as prætorian heirs, are obliged to furnish security. 9It is clear that if the terms of the stipulation are not complied with, and suit is brought to recover the legacy, it must be said that the stipulation ceases to exist. 10The same rule also applies in the case of trusts, 11Where a legacy or a trust is bequeathed to anyone, with the understanding that it shall be renewed if the property is lost, let us see whether security can be required for the payment or execution of the second legacy, or trust. The question arises whether this trust or legacy is due, and how many times it is due, and whether the legatee himself should give security that he will not lose the property. There is extant a Rescript of the Divine Pius, addressed to Junius Mauritius, with reference to all these matters, which is as follows, “In accordance with the contracts of your letter, legacies or trusts should be paid or delivered to Clodius Fructulus under the will of Clodius Felix, without requiring a bond that none of said legacies or trusts will be lost by him. For, as the heir is charged by said testator that, if Fructulus should lose any of the property left to him by said will, the heir must make it up to him, this does not have the effect of requiring Fructulus to give security against the loss of the first legacies, or that the heir should be rendered liable indefinitely; so that, as often as the legatee may lose any property the former will be required to restore it, but as, by the terms of the trust, it would seem that after the legacy has been paid a second time, the heir will no longer be liable if the legatee afterwards loses any of the property, the trust having been fully executed by the last payment.” It therefore appears by this Rescript that the legatee is not required to give security to the heir against the loss of the property. On the other hand, the question arises whether the heir should give security with reference to the second legacy, or trust. I think that it is not necessary for him to do so, as it is in the power of the legatee to avoid losing what has been left to him. However, if anyone should ascertain that the second legacy was left under some condition, it must be said that security should be required. 12It is evident that where anyone is charged with the payment of a legacy, either wholly or in part, he must furnish security, whether he is an appointed or a substituted heir. 13The question is very seriously asked whether this stipulation involves the increase derived from profits or interest. It has been decided, and very properly, that the stipulation has reference to any increase which has taken place after the heir has been in default, as it includes whatever should be paid. 14Where anyone has stipulated for the payment of a legacy under a condition, and, while the condition is pending, he dies, the stipulation becomes of no effect, because the legacy is not transmitted to the heir. It must also be noted that the same circumstances and conditions are embraced in this stipulation that are involved in the legacy. Hence, if there is an exception which can be filed in opposition to the person claiming the legacy, it is established that the same exception can be pleaded against anyone bringing an action based on the stipulation. 15Ofilius says that if the heir is asked to give security with reference to the legacy by the agent of the legatee, who is alleged to be absent, he should furnish it on condition that the person for whose benefit he does so is living, so that he will not be held liable if the legatee should have previously died. 16The question also arises whether the property itself, which is bequeathed, is included in this stipulation, or whether it has reference merely to its value. The better opinion is that either the property itself, or its value, comes within the terms of the stipulation. 17If ten aurei, which were in a certain chest, are bequeathed to me, and the usufruct of the same is bequeathed to you, and each bequest is absolute, he to whom the ownership is left can claim the ten aurei by law. Still, it is settled that the usufructuary can bring an action under the Decree of the Senate and demand the usufruct of five aurei. However, if the owner should claim the entire ten, he can be barred by an exception on the ground of bad faith, after the usufructuary, having received five aurei, has given security for their return. Marcellus says it is clear that if the legatee should obtain possession of the ten aurei, an equitable action should be granted to the heir or the usufructuary, against the legatee, provided security is given to him. Where, however, the ten aurei were left under a condition, the usufructuary can, in the meantime, hold them if a bond is furnished; and the legatee to whom the ownership was bequeathed can stipulate for the payment of his legacy. But if he should fail to demand the stipulation, and the condition should be fulfilled, Marcellus says that he can bring an action for the production of the property. If, however, the heir has paid the ten aurei to the usufructuary through mistake, it is evident that he will not be required to produce the property in court, and Marcellus holds that relief should be granted to the legatee against the usufructuary. 18If a part of the estate should come into possession of the Treasury, the stipulation above mentioned will be of no force or effect, because it is not customary for the Treasury to give security. 19Where anyone is in possession of a small portion of the estate, although he may be heir to a larger share of the same, if a part of the estate is diminished by operation of law, the heir will become more secure, nor will he be liable under the stipulation for any more of the estate than that to which he is the heir. If, however, the capacity of the heir with reference to the interest of the legatees should remain unimpaired, still, in fact, he will be entitled to less of the estate and he will appear to be burdened if he has given security to indemnify the legatees, because, by operation of law, the legacies are due in proportion to the share of the estate to which he is the heir. It is perfectly just that he should not pay the legatees any more than is in proportion to the share of the estate from which he derives an income. This is also the case where an estate is proportionally transferred under the Trebellian Decree of the Senate, for the heir is released from liability to pay the legacy, so far as his share, the profit of which has been lost, is concerned. 20If a bequest should be made payable at an indefinite time to someone who is under the control of another, security shall be given to him who has control of the legatee, not absolutely but conditionally; that is, provided he is subject to his authority when the time for the payment of the legacy arrives. If, however, the legatee should be ascertained to be his own master, it would seem to be unjust that security should be given to the father, when the legacy is payable to another. And even if security has been furnished without this addition, we can, nevertheless, bar the father or the master by an exception, if they have neither the son nor the slave under their control at the time when the condition is complied with. Still, according to this, the result will be that there is an instance in which security given with reference to a legacy does not take effect, for it will be void if the person in question is his own master at the time when the condition is fulfilled.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Security must also be given to those who are under the control of another, just as it is customary for this to be done where the same property is left to two persons under different conditions, for security is given to two legatees, but in both instances the same persons become sureties.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. This stipulation also applies to trusts, where the trust is left either absolutely or to take effect after a certain day, or under a condition, or where certain property, or the entire estate, or any right dependent thereon, is bequeathed. 1The Divine Pius also stated in a Rescript that, whenever it is clear and certain that there is no ground for the execution of the trust under any circumstances, it would be unjust for the heir to be required to furnish a bond when there is no necessity for it.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Moreover, if it is certain that the estate has not yet been accepted, there will be no ground for demanding security, or prætorian possession of the property.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Where anyone has a son who is his own master, and by him a grandson who is under his control, it must be said that if the grandson receives prætorian possession of the estate of his emancipated father, he must give security to place his property in collation, and he is like one who has adopted the son of another; for the Divine Brothers stated in a Rescript that the grandfather was compelled to place his property in the mass of the estate. It is true that the following is added in the same Rescript: “Unless the grandfather does not desire to obtain any benefit from his property, and is ready to release his grandson from his authority, so that all the benefit of prætorian possession of the estate may be enjoyed by him after his emancipation.” Hence a daughter, who was born after the emancipation of her father, and who became his heir, cannot justly complain of being excluded from the benefit of the collation by what has been done; as after her grandfather dies, she can, along with her brother, succeed to the estate. This reason cannot be advanced in the case of an adoptive father, and, still we adopt the same rule with reference to him, if he emancipated the son without committing any fraud. 1The stipulation referring to collation takes effect when the person called upon does not act within the time when he ought to have placed his property in the mass of the estate; especially as it is inserted in the Edict of the Prætor that collation should be made in accordance with the judgment of a good citizen. 2Therefore, if collation does not take place in accordance with the terms prescribed, or if it is only partially carried out, the stipulation will become operative. 3And, whether the son does make collation or not, according to the terms of the stipulation, or whether he avoids doing it by means of some fraudulent act, judgment shall be rendered against him for a sum equal to the value of the property.

Ad Dig. 45,1,86ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 44, S. 155: Mehrheit von Gegenständen. Mehrheit von Rechtsgeschäften.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. When it is said that there are as many stipulations as there are things, this only applies where the things are mentioned in the stipulation, but if they are not enumerated, there is but one stipulation.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Generally speaking, in all prætorian stipulations security is furnished, even to agents.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. If a minor is absent, or cannot speak for himself, his slave can stipulate for him. If he has no slave, one should be bought for him. When, however, there is nothing with which to buy one, or it is not I expedient to do so, we hold that a public slave can certainly stipulate in the presence of the Prætor.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXIX. Such a slave does not acquire for the minor by operation of law, for he does not acquire; but a prætorian action based on the stipulation may be granted to the minor. 1A guarantee, however, is given to the minor under this stipulation, by means of the security. 2It should be remembered that not only the guardian is bound by this stipulation, but also he who transacts the business in the place of the guardian, as well as their sureties. 3He, however, who has not transacted the business will not be liable, for an action on guardianship cannot be brought against one who has not administered it; but he should be sued in a prætorian action, because he withdrew at his own risk, and still, neither he himself nor his sureties, will be liable in a suit based on the stipulation. Therefore, he should be compelled to undertake the management of the trust, in order that he may be rendered liable under the stipulation. 4It is decided that this stipulation becomes operative when the guardianship terminates, and that then the sureties begin to be liable. The rule is different with reference to a curator. It is also different where someone has transacted the business in the place of a guardian. Therefore, stipulations of this kind, where there is a guardian, become operative when the guardianship comes to an end, but where anyone acting as a guardian has administered the trust, it is proper to hold that as soon as the estate begins to be insecure the stipulation will become operative. 5When a guardian is captured by the enemy, let us see whether the stipulation will become operative. A difficulty arises in this case, because the guardianship is terminated, although there is a prospect that it may be renewed. I think that the action can be brought. 6Generally speaking, it should be remembered that, for whatever reasons we have stated that an action on guardianship cannot be brought, it can be said for the same reasons that one can be brought under the terms of the stipulation, in order to preserve the property of the ward. 7If anyone, who has been appointed curator, should not administer the curatorship, the result will be that it must be said that the stipulation does not take effect; but, in this instance, what we stated with reference to a guardian should be repeated, with this difference, however, that the stipulation will take effect as soon as any of the property ceases to be secure, and the sureties will become liable, and the right of action will be revived. 8This stipulation has reference to all curators, whether they are appointed for children arrived at puberty, or for such as have not reached that age, or whether they have been appointed for spendthrifts, insane persons, or any others for whom this is ordinarily done.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXX. It is one thing to take property, and another to receive it. Anything is taken when it is acquired as the result of some act which has been performed. To receive something is for a person to obtain it, but not in order to hold it; and, therefore, no one is considered to take an article which he must surrender; as the expression “comes into his hands” is correctly said of property which will remain in his possession. 1The following words, “To legally indemnify me with reference to these matters,” mean that the stipulator shall not be liable for any risk or damage resulting from the transaction.