Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. Marcellus says that if you sell a tract of land belonging to another, and afterwards, it having become yours, you bring suit against the purchaser for its recovery, you will very properly be barred by this exception. 1The same rule must be held to apply to the owner of the land, if he becomes the heir of the vendor. 2Where anyone sells property of mine under my direction, and I bring an action to recover the same, I will be barred by this exception; unless it is proved that I directed that the property should not be delivered before the purchase-money was paid. 3Celsus says if anyone should dispose of my property for a smaller sum than I directed it should be sold for, it is held not to be alienated, and if I bring suit to recover it, I cannot be barred by this exception, and this is correct. 4If a slave purchases merchandise with money belonging to his peculium, and his master orders him to become free by his will before he obtains the ownership of the property, and bequeaths to him his peculium, and the vendor brings suit to recover the merchandise from the slave; an exception in factum can be pleaded, on the ground that he was a slave at the time he made the contract. 5Where anyone purchases property which was not delivered to him, but of which he obtained possession without fraud, he will be entitled to an exception against the vendor, unless the latter should have good reason for bringing suit to recover the property; for even if he had delivered possession, and he had just cause of action for recovery, he could avail himself of a reply to the exception.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. Where a person who is entitled to retain the Falcidian portion promises, in compliance with the will of the testator, that he will renounce his claim to it, he will be compelled to carry out his agreement.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVII. And, generally speaking, this question must be considered in making donations, for there is a great deal of difference whether there was a cause for making the donation, and whether a condition upon which it is dependent was imposed. If there was a cause, the property cannot be recovered; if a condition was imposed, there will be ground for its recovery.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. It is our practice where, in public matters, a question arises with reference to a donation, to only ascertain whether the donor made a promise to the city for some just cause, or not; since if he did so in consideration of some office which he received, he will be liable; otherwise, he will not. 1Labeo says that compensation for services of this kind is not included in donations; for example, if they are made conditionally as follows, “If I come to your aid; if I give security for you; if you make use of my services, or influence in the transaction.” 2Ad Dig. 39,5,19,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 365, Note 5.A donation cannot be acquired by anyone who is unwilling to accept it. 3Where a man lends money to Titius to be paid to Seius, to whom he desires it to be donated, and Titius does not pay it to Seius until after the death of the donor; the result will be that it can be said that the money will belong to Seius, whether he who paid it knew that the donor was dead, or was not aware of that fact; because the money still belonged to the latter. If he did not know that the donor was dead, he will be released from his obligation, if he borrowed the money to be paid to Seius. If, however, I should direct you to pay a certain sum of money to Titius, to whom I intend to donate it, and you not being aware that I was dead should do so, you will be entitled to an action on mandate against my heirs; but if you knew it, you will not be entitled to this action. 4Ad Dig. 39,5,19,4ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 82, S. 328: Ersatzanspruch aus der Tilgung bezw. Uebernahme der Schuld eines Andern.If anyone lends money to a slave, and the slave, having afterwards become free, makes a new promise to pay it, this will not be a donation, but the acknowledgment of a debt. The same rule applies to the case of a ward, who becomes indebted without the authority of his guardian, if he afterwards, with the consent of his guardian, contracts a new obligation. 5Stipulations which are entered into for a valid consideration are not held to be donations. 6In conclusion, Pegasus thinks that if I promise you a hundred aurei, under the condition that you swear to bear my name, this will not be a donation, because the promise was made for a consideration, and a consideration was paid.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. A donation made mortis causa is not considered to be perfect until after the death of the donor.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. If anyone is forcibly dispossessed he should be considered to have remained in possession, as he has the power to recover it by means of an interdict on the ground of violence. 1The difference between ownership and possession is that ownership continues to exist, even against the wishes of the owner; but possession is lost as soon as anyone decides that he is unwilling to keep it. Therefore, if a man delivers possession with the intention that the property shall afterwards be returned to him, he ceases to possess it.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. It is clear that this exception was formulated for the same reason that the action on the ground of bad faith was introduced. 1In the next place, let us see in what cases there is ground for this exception, and against whom it may be pleaded. And, indeed, it must be noted, that he whose fraudulent act is complained of must be expressly mentioned, and that the formula in rem, “If any fraudulent act has been committed with reference to the matter,” should not be employed, but the following one, namely, “If no fraud has been committed by you as plaintiff.” Therefore, the party who pleads the exception must prove that the plaintiff has been guilty of fraud, and it will not be sufficient for him to show that fraud has merely been committed with reference to the case; or, if he alleges it has been committed by certain persons, he must specifically enumerate them; provided they are the parties responsible for the act by which he alleges that he has been injured. 2It is evident that the exception is employed in a proceeding in rem if we take into account the person who pleads it, for there is no doubt against whom the fraud was committed, but there is one as to whether or not the plaintiff committed it. 3The following matters may be discussed with reference to the First Section, where the causes giving rise to the exception are enumerated. If anyone stipulates with another without any consideration, and then institutes proceedings by virtue of this agreement, an exception on the ground of fraud can properly be pleaded against him; for although, at the time that the stipulation was entered into, he may not have been guilty of any fraudulent act, still it must be said that he committed fraud when he joined issue in the case, and persisted in asserting his claim under the said stipulation. And even if, at the time that the stipulation was made, he had a just cause of action, still it is held that one did not exist at the time of the joinder of issue. Hence, if anyone about to lend money enters into a stipulation, and the money is not lent, although there was a good consideration for the contract, still, as it was not executed, or was terminated, it must be said that the exception can be properly pleaded. 4The question is also asked, if anyone should stipulate absolutely for the payment of a certain sum of money, for the reason that this was the intention of the parties; but, after the stipulation was entered into, it was agreed that the money should not be demanded until a certain time, will an exception on the ground of fraud operate as a bar. And, indeed, there is no doubt whatever that an exception can be pleaded on the ground of an informal contract, as anyone who wishes to make use of this exception can do so; for it cannot be denied that he who makes a demand in violation of a contract which he entered into is guilty of fraud. 5Generally speaking, it should be noted that, in all cases where exceptions in factum are available, an exception on the ground of fraud can be pleaded in bar, because anyone is guilty of fraud who makes a demand which can be successfully opposed by any exception whatever; for if he did not commit fraud in the beginning, still, by making the claim now he is acting fraudulently, unless he was so ignorant of the facts as not to be guilty of bad faith. 6It has not improperly been asked, if a creditor accepts interest in advance on a loan, and persists in demanding payment of the principal before the time has passed for which he has collected the interest, whether he can be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud. It may be said that he is guilty of fraud, for by accepting the interest he is understood to have deferred collection of the debt until the time had elapsed for which interest was paid, and that he tacitly agreed not to demand payment in the meantime. 7The question also arises, if anyone should buy a slave who was to be free on condition of paying ten aurei, and the purchaser, being ignorant of this fact, stipulated that, in case of the eviction of the slave, he should be entitled to double his price, and then received the ten aurei from the slave, and as the latter had been evicted, and had obtained his freedom, whether the purchaser could bring an action for double the amount by virtue of the stipulation. He would be barred by an exception, unless he deducted the ten aurei which he received for the purpose of complying with the condition. This was also stated by Julianus. If, however, the slave had paid the money out of the property of the purchaser, or out of his peculium which belonged to the latter, it may be said that an exception could not properly be pleaded, because he was not guilty of fraud.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. The question is asked by Celsus, if the creditors of an estate, with a single exception, should direct Titius to enter upon it, and this one did this for the purpose of deceiving him, but would also have directed him to accept if he had known that Titius would not have consented to do so, and he then brings an action, will he be barred by an exception? Celsus says that he will be barred. 1Julianus asks, if a man who is ill promises a hundred aurei to his wife’s cousin, with the understanding that the money shall come into the hands of his wife, and he afterwards recovers, whether he can plead an exception on the ground of bad faith when suit is brought against him. Julianus says that it was held by Labeo that he could interpose an exception on the ground of fraud. 2If we should consent to a compromise, and appoint an arbiter, and I do not appear at the appointed time, on account of bad health, and the penalty becomes due, can I avail myself of an exception on the ground of bad faith? Pomponius says that I will be entitled to the benefit of such an exception. 3It is also asked, what course must be pursued if you compromise with a debtor who owes you the sum of sixty aurei, and through mistake you stipulate for the penalty of a hundred? Labeo holds that it is the duty of the arbiter to order as much to be paid to you as is actually due, and if this is not done, there is no reason why the excess should not be collected. But he also says, that even if the arbiter failed to state the amount which should be collected, and the penalty should be demanded, an exception on the ground of fraud can be pleaded. 4If a debtor pays a ward what he owes him, without the authority of his guardian, and the ward becomes enriched to that extent by this payment, it is very properly held that if he attempts to collect the amount a second time, he will be barred by an exception. For if he was pecuniarily benefited by having loaned money, or by having obtained it by means of some other contract, an exception should be granted. The same rule must be said to apply to all other cases in which payment is illegally made, for if the parties are pecuniarily benefited there will be ground for an exception. 5Ad Dig. 44,4,4,5ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 355: Der Verkäufer ist nicht bloß zur Vertretung heimlicher, sondern schlechthin aller nicht angezeigten und nicht völlig unerheblichen Mängel verpflichtet, sofern er nicht beweisen kann, daß der Käufer sie gekannt hat oder kennen mußte.Labeo also says that if anyone should purchase a slave knowing that he had the habit of running away, and stipulated with the vendor that this was not the case, and he afterwards brings an action based on the stipulation, he cannot be barred by an exception, as this was the agreement, although he will not be entitled to an action on purchase. If, however, such an agreement was not made, he will be barred by an exception. 6A certain man to whom money was due settled the account with his debtor, and sold his claim to Seius, whom the debtor had directed to purchase it, and the purchaser entered into a stipulation with reference to the transaction, and the creditor then retains the money which he had obtained by a judgment. Can the purchaser bring an action under the stipulation? Ofilius holds that if the vendor of the claim was not ready to pay over the entire amount which he received from the purchaser, an exception on the ground of fraud cannot be properly pleaded against him. I think that the opinion of Ofilius is correct. 7Labeo says that where suit has been brought for a slave, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and security given by order of court for the slave to be delivered within a certain time, and a penalty has been stipulated for if he should not be delivered, the plaintiff will be barred by an exception if he claims both the slave and the penalty; for to retain possession of the slave and also to exact the penalty would be unjust. 8If I give you valuable pearls in pledge, and it is agreed between us that they shall be returned when the debt is paid, and the pearls are lost through your negligence, the question arises whether you can collect the money. An opinion of Nerva and Atilicinus is extant, who hold that I am entitled to an exception, as follows, “If no agreement was made between you and myself that the pearls should be returned to me if the money was paid.” The better opinion, however, is that an exception on the ground of fraud can be pleaded in bar. 9If a minor should give me a young slave, and afterwards bring an action to recover him, he can be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud, unless he repays the amount furnished for his support, and any other reasonable expenses incurred on account of said slave. 10Ad Dig. 44,4,4,10Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 564, Note 7.It should, moreover, be noted that if anyone brings suit under a will, against the wishes of the deceased, he can be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud. Hence, an heir can be barred by an exception of this kind, if he acts contrary to the wishes of the deceased. 11Where an heir was appointed to the twelfth of an estate, which might be worth two hundred aurei, but preferred to receive a legacy instead, which was only worth a hundred, and did this to avoid being annoyed by the settlement of the estate, and brings an action to recover the legacy, can he be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud? Julianus says that he cannot. But if he received the amount, or what might be considered equivalent to it, from a substituted heir, in order to avoid accepting the estate, and then brings an action to recover the legacy, Julianus says that he is considered to be guilty of fraud, and can be barred by an exception on this ground. 12Ad Dig. 44,4,4,12Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 215, Note 11.Where I have the usufruct of a tract of land, arid you sell me the land with my consent, the question arises whether I can be opposed by an exception if I bring suit to recover the usufruct? It is our practice that this exception, which is based on bad faith, operates as a bar. 13Marcellus says that a replication on the ground of bad faith should not be granted against an exception on the same ground. Labeo concurs in this opinion, for he says that, as both parties are guilty of bad faith, it would be unjust for an advantage to be obtained by the plaintiff and a penalty imposed upon the defendant, for it is far more equitable that the plaintiff should not reap any benefit from a matter in which he has acted deceitfully. 14There is no doubt that a replication on the ground of bad faith can be granted against the exception of the Macedonian Decree of the Senate, and it is also provided by the Imperial Constitutions and set forth in the opinions of various authorities that such a replication has the effect of a plea in bar. 15Labeo says that, although an action based on a stipulation will lie by virtue of the clause relating to fraud which it contains, still an exception on the ground of fraud may be properly pleaded, if, as he says, anything has been done contrary to the terms of the agreement; for it might be that the plaintiff, before the stipulation was entered into, did not commit any fraudulent act, but did so at the time that he asserted the claim on account of which an exception was necessary. 16Neither an exception on the ground of fraud, nor any other which can unfavorably affect the reputation of a patron or a relative in the ascending line, can be pleaded against them. Still an exception in factum can be pleaded, for instance, if it is alleged that the money forming the basis of the claim was not paid, an exception on this ground may be interposed. It, however, makes no difference whether a patron is sued on his own contract, or on one made by another, for respect must always be shown to him living or dead. If, however, a patron brings an action against the heir of his freedman, I think that the latter can interpose an exception based on the bad faith of the patron. The freedman himself, however, can, by no means, plead an exception based on the bad faith of his patron, even if he is sued by the heir of the latter, for it is proper that honor should be shown by a freedman to his patron not only while he is living, but also after his death. It is clear that a clause relating to fraudulent conduct should not be omitted from the stipulation, because an action on fraud arising from such a clause is not brought, but one is brought by virtue of the stipulation. 17We can make use of this exception both on account of the fraudulent conduct of a slave, or of any other person subject to our authority, as well as of those by whose fraudulent acts we acquire anything. So far as the fraudulent conduct of slaves and children is concerned, if any action is brought having reference to their peculium, this exception should be pleaded in every instance. If, however, the peculium is not involved, an exception on the ground of bad faith should only be interposed with reference to the matter in question, and not where some fraud was committed afterwards; for it would not be just for the fraudulent acts of the slave to injure his master more than where he made use of his services. 18The question arose whether an exception on the ground of bad faith can be pleaded in the case of an agent who has only been appointed to bring the suit. I think that it can be properly maintained that if the said agent was appointed for the purpose of acting in his own behalf (that is to say, if he should commit any fraudulent act before issue was joined), an exception on this ground can be interposed. If, however, he was not acting in his own behalf, an exception can be pleaded only with reference to the fraud committed since proceedings were begun. But when the agent is one to whom the administration of all the business of the principal has been entrusted, Neratius says that an exception can be pleaded on account of any fraudulent act which he may have committed. 19I directed Titius to enter into a stipulation for you, Titius afterwards directed Seius to do so, and Seius stipulated for you, and brought suit. Labeo says that you can effectually interpose an exception based on my fraudulent act as well as on that of Seius. 20It is also asked, if my debtor should swindle you, and appoint you in his place, and I having made a stipulation with you, bring an action to enforce it, will an exception on the ground of fraud operate as a bar? The better opinion is, that you will not be permitted to plead an exception against me on the ground of the bad faith of my debtor, as I did not swindle you, but you can bring an action on that ground against my debtor. 21If, however, a woman should delegate her debtor to her husband, for her dowry, after she had been guilty of fraud, the same rule should be adopted, and the debtor should not be permitted to plead an exception based on the fraudulent conduct of the woman, for fear that she might remain unendowed. 22In a case where the heir of a father-in-law is sued to recover a dowry, and pleads an exception based on the fraud of the husband and wife for whose benefit the money is claimed, the question was asked by Julianus whether the exception will operate as a bar, so far as the woman is personally concerned. Julianus says that if the husband sues the heir of his father-in-law for the dowry, and the latter pleads an exception on the ground of fraud committed by the daughter, by whom the money would be obtained, the exception will be effective as a bar; for he holds that the dowry which the husband demands from the heir of the father-in-law is understood to be acquired by the daughter who, by means of it, will obtain her dowry. He does not state whether the heir can also plead an exception based on the fraudulent conduct of the husband. I think, however, that he was also of the opinion that an exception based on the fraud of the husband would operate as a bar, although in this instance, as he says, it could not be held that a dowry was acquired by the daughter. 23The question whether an exception based on the fraud of a guardian can be effectually pleaded against a ward who brings an action has been discussed by several authorities. I think that even though the interest of wards is favored by such persons, it should still be held that, where anyone fraudulently purchases the property of a ward from his guardian, or makes a fraudulent contract with him concerning the property of his ward, or where the guardian is guilty of any other fraudulent conduct, and the ward is pecuniarily benefited thereby, the latter should be barred by an exception. Nor is it necessary to make any inquiry as to whether security has been given to the ward or not, or whether his guardian is solvent or insolvent, provided he is administering the affairs of the guardianship; for how can he who enters into a contract with a guardian divine these things? If you suggest that someone has entered into collusion with the guardian it is clear that he will be injured by his own act. 24If someone who was not the guardian, but acted as such, is guilty of fraud, let us see whether it will injure the ward. I do not think that it will do so, for when, a person who is transacting the business of a guardian sells any property belonging to the ward, and it is obtained by usucaption, the ward will not be prevented from following his own property by an exception, even if he was furnished security, because the administration of his affairs was not granted to this individual. 24aAccording to this, I think that an exception based on the fraud of the guardian can be pleaded against the ward. 25What we have stated with reference to a guardian can also be said to apply to the curator of an insane person, as well as to the case of a spendthrift, and a minor under the age of twenty-five years. 26An exception based on fraud committed by a minor of twenty-five years of age can also be pleaded, for sometimes such an exception can undoubtedly be interposed if the minor is of an age when he can legally be guilty of a fraudulent act. Julianus very frequently stated that minors who are near the age of puberty are capable of committing fraud. But what if the debtor of a ward pays a creditor of the latter, to whom he had been delegated? He says that it must be supposed that the ward has arrived at puberty, to avoid the debtor being liable to pay the money twice, under the pretext that the ward does not know what fraud is. The same rule should be observed in the case of an insane person, if, when he was presumed to be of sound mind, he should order his debtor to pay one of his creditors, or if he should have in his house the money for a debt which he has collected. 27Ad Dig. 44,4,4,27Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.An exception based on the fraud of the vendor cannot be pleaded against the purchaser. If, however, the latter should avail himself of the addition of the time that the property was in the possession of the vendor, it seems to be perfectly just that he should be responsible for the fraud of the vendor, as he profits by his possession in this way. And, likewise, it is held that an exception which has reference to the property will bar the purchaser, but one which is based upon an offence committed by the person will not do so. 28Ad Dig. 44,4,4,28Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.If the estate of Gaius Seius should come into your hands as the heir at law, and I should be appointed heir, and you fraudulently persuade me not to accept the estate, and I afterwards reject it, and you assign your rights to Sempronius after having been paid by him, and he brings suit against me to recover the estate, an exception on the ground of fraud committed by the person who assigned him his rights cannot be pleaded by me against Sempronius. 29Ad Dig. 44,4,4,29Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.If, however, anyone claims an estate by virtue of a legacy, or he to whom property was given by way of donation does so, can an exception on the ground of fraud committed by the party whom he succeeded be pleaded against him? Pomponius thinks that he would be barred by such an exception. I also think that those should be barred who are pecuniarily benefited by obtaining such rights, for it is one thing to purchase them, and another to succeed to them. 30Ad Dig. 44,4,4,30Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.Pomponius discusses the same question with reference to anyone who receives property in pledge, where the Servian or Hypothecary Action is brought, for he holds that he should be barred because otherwise the property would revert to the person who was guilty of fraud. 31Ad Dig. 44,4,4,31Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 332, Note 5.The bad faith of the vendor, however, as we have already stated, cannot be pleaded against the purchaser. We observe this rule only with reference to purchasers, and to those who have exchanged property, or received it in payment, as well as to such as occupy the position of purchasers. If, however, a slave has been surrendered by way of reparation for damage, Pomponius thinks that the person who demands the slave, as well as the one who gave him up can have the exception pleaded against him. Hence, where anyone is pecuniarily benefited by acquiring property in any way whatever, an exception on the ground of fraud committed by the person to whose rights he succeeds can be pleaded against him. For it is sufficient if he who has paid the price, or something instead of it, and is a bona fide purchaser, should not suffer through the bad faith of the vendor, provided he himself is not guilty of fraud. If, however, he himself is not free from fraud, he will be liable to the exception on that ground, and must suffer for his own fraudulent act. 32If you purchase a tract of land from Titius, which belongs to Sempronius, and it is delivered to you when you pay the price, and Titius afterwards becomes the heir of Sempronius, and sells and delivers the same land to Mævius, Julianus says that the Prætor must protect you in your rights, because if Titius himself should sue you to recover the land, he will be barred by an exception in factum, on the ground of fraud. If Titius himself should be in possession of the land, and you should sue him by the Publician Action, and he should plead an exception against you on the ground that the property is his, you can avail yourself of a replication, as from this it is evident that he, a second time, sold land which did not belong to him. 33Cassius did not introduce an exception on the ground of fear, but was content with that based on fraud, which is one of general application. It, however, seems more proper to establish an exception on the ground of fear as a plea in bar; as this, in some respects, differs from one based on fraud, because the latter includes the person of the party who committed the fraud, for an exception on the ground of fraud is a proceeding in rem; as, for instance, “where no act has been committed through fear,” so that we do not examine whether the party who brings the action did anything to cause fear, but whether anything was done in the transaction by any person whomsoever, and not merely by the plaintiff, for the purpose of intimidating the defendant. And, although an exception on the ground of the fraud of the vendor cannot be pleaded against the purchaser, still, it is our practice to hold that an exception can be pleaded in bar, where fear has been caused not only by the vendor, but by anyone whomsoever. 34It should be noted that this exception on the ground of fear ought not to be pleaded where a son has been intimidated by his father, while under his control. The father, however, is permitted to diminish the amount of the peculium of the son, but if the latter should reject the paternal estate, relief should be granted him, as is ordinarily done.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. Julianus says that if I think that I owe you money, and by your order I promise to pay it to someone to whom you wish to donate it, I can protect myself by an exception on the ground of bad faith; and, in addition to this, I will be entitled to an action against the stipulator to compel him to release me. 1Julianus also says that, if you think that a certain person is your creditor, and by your direction I promise to pay him a sum of money which I believe that I owe you, and he brings suit to recover it, he should be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud; and further, if I institute proceedings against the stipulator, I can compel him to release me from the agreement. This opinion of Julianus is equitable, so that I can make use of an exception, as well as bring a personal action against the person to whom I obligated myself.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. An oath taken in court has the same effect as a judgment, and this is not unreasonable, as where a party tenders an oath to his adversary, he appoints him judge in his own case. 1If a ward tenders an oath without the authority of his guardian, we hold that this exception will not operate as a bar, unless it was tendered in court by the authority of the guardian. 2If a litigant who claims a tract of land tenders the oath to his adversary, and says that if the person from whom he obtained the land is willing to swear that he delivered it to him, he will abandon the case, an exception will be granted to the party in possession of the land. 3If a surety should make oath in court only with reference to himself personally, that is to say, that he is not liable, this will be of no advantage to the principal debtor; and if he should take the oath with reference to the property, an exception will be granted to the principal debtor. 4If I manumit a slave who, while in servitude, was accustomed to transact my business, and I afterwards stipulate with him for the payment of all that he would have been obliged to pay me, if he had been free at the time when he transacted my business, and I bring suit under the stipulation, I will not be barred by an exception, for a freedman cannot complain that he is oppressed, because he was not allowed to profit pecuniarily through the use of the property of his patron. 5If I make a stipulation for the purpose of placing restrictions on freedom, I cannot enforce it against my freedman. Restrictions on freedom have very properly been defined to be such as are imposed in such a way that if a freedman should offend his patron, they can be exacted from him, so that he remains continually under the apprehension that they will be required, and, on account of this apprehension, he will submit to anything that his patron demands. 6In a word, if some obligation is imposed upon a freedman, to take effect the moment he obtains his liberty, it must be said that there will be ground for an exception. If, however, this is done after an interval, the question admits of doubt, for no one could force him to make such a promise. Still, in this instance, the same conclusion must be arrived at if, after an investigation has been made, it is apparent that the freedman subjected himself to his patron in such a manner as to be rendered liable to a penalty under the stipulation either through fear alone, or on account of excessive respect for him. 7If a freedman should form a partnership with his patron in consideration of obtaining his liberty, and his patron should bring an action on partnership against him, will this exception be necessary? I think that the freedman will be released from the exactions of his patron merely by operation of law. 8It must be remembered, that an exception allowed because of oppressive conditions imposed on freedom, just like other exceptions, should not be refused a surety, nor anyone who, at the request of a freedman, has rendered himself liable; nor will it be denied to the freedman himself if he should be appointed the attorney of the principal debtor in order to defend his case, or if he should become his heir. For, as the intention of the Prætor, in obligations of this kind, is to assist the principal debtor, his design would not be effected unless the freedman should defend the surety, or him who had become liable at the request of the freedman against his patron. For it makes little difference whether the freedman is obliged to pay the patron directly, or to do so through the intervention of the surety, or through someone who has become liable on his account. 9Whether the promise has been made for the benefit of the patron himself, or for that of another with the consent of the former, it will be considered to have been made with the design of placing restrictions upon freedom, and therefore there will be ground for this exception. 10If, however, a patron should delegate his freedman to his creditor, let us see whether the former can avail himself of this exception against the creditor to whom, having been delegated, he made a promise which had the effect of placing restrictions upon his freedom. Cassius says it was the opinion of Urseius that the creditor could, by no means, be barred by the exception, because he only received what he was entitled to; but that the freedman could recover from his patron what he had paid, if he had not done this for the purpose of settling the controversy which had arisen with reference to his manumission. 11Again, if a freedman should delegate his own debtor to his patron, the latter cannot be barred by an exception, but the freedman can recover the amount of the debt from his patron by means of a personal action. 12This exception should be granted not only to the freedman himself, but also to his successors; and, on the other hand, it should be noted that the heir of the patron can be barred if he attempts to collect the money.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. When notice is served for the purpose of preventing a sale, this does not render the property in question subject to litigation. 1Where the title to property is in controversy between two persons, and I purchase it from a third, whose claim is not liable to dispute, let us see whether there will be ground for an exception. I think that I will be entitled to relief, because he who sold me the property was not engaged in any lawsuit, and it might happen that two others had agreed with one another to dispute the title to the property for the purpose of injuring him, as they could not involve him in litigation. If, however, proceedings have been instituted against the agent, guardian, or curator of anyone, it can be said that they have been instituted against the principal, and therefore that he will be entitled to an exception.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. The exception relating to the principal debtor, and, indeed, where he is unwilling, as well as all the other advantages attaching to the case, are available by the surety and the other accessories who are liable.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. Anything which still remains under the control of the vendor is not correctly held to have been alienated, but it still may properly be said to have been sold. 1The term “donation,” generally speaking, is understood to include every kind of a gift, whether it was made mortis causa or not.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. It is one thing to sell, and another to consent for the vendor to sell. 1Anything which is done publicly by a majority is considered to have been done by all the parties interested. 2It is absurd that a person to whom a tract of land has been devised should have a better title to the same than the heir, or the testator himself if he were living.