Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. Sacred places are those which are dedicated to the public, either in the city or in the country. 1It should be understood that a public place can only become sacred when the Emperor has dedicated it, or granted permission for this to be done. 2It must be remarked that a sacred place is one thing and a sacrarium is another; for a sacred place is one which has been consecrated, and a sacrarium is one in which sacred things are deposited, which also may exist in a private house; and when persons desire to divest such a place of its religious character they usually withdraw the sacred things therefrom. 3We properly call those things holy which are neither sacred nor profane, but which have been confirmed by some sanction, hence the laws are holy, for the reason that they are based upon a certain sanction; and anything that is supported by a certain sanction also is holy, even though it may not be consecrated to God; and it is even sometimes added in the sanction itself that anyone who is guilty of an offence in that place shall be punished with death. 4Moreover, it is not permitted to repair the walls of cities, or to add anything to them, or place anything upon them, without the authority of the Emperor or the Governor. 5Anything that is sacred is not susceptible of appraisement.

Ad Dig. 6,1,45Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 193, Note 13.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. Where a slave is restored to the plaintiff after an action has been brought for his recovery, and this was done by a bona fide possessor, I think that he should give security against malice alone, but other possessors should give security against negligence as well; and a bona fide possessor must be included among them, after issue has been joined.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. Where a man was formerly heir, but the estate was subsequently taken from him as being unworthy; the better opinion is that the right of sepulture still remains with him.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “Whither or howsoever anyone has a right to transport a dead body without your consent, I forbid force to be employed to prevent him from taking the said dead body thither and burying it there.” 1Where anyone has the right to bury a corpse, he must not be prevented from doing so, and he is held to be prevented if he is hindered from conveying the body to the place or is interfered with on the way. 2The mere owner of the premises can make use of this interdict with reference to the transport of a dead body; and, indeed, it is applicable in the case of land which is not religious. 3Moreover, if I have a right of way to a tract of land to which I desire to take a corpse for burial, and I am prevented from using the said right of way, it has been held that I can proceed by means of this interdict; because, having been prevented from using the right of way, I am also prevented from transporting the corpse; and the same rule must be adopted where I am entitled to any other servitude. 4It is evident that this interdict is a prohibitory one. 5The Prætor says: “Wherever anyone has a right to take a dead body without your consent, I forbid force to be employed to prevent him from building a sepulchre on the land, if he does this without malicious intent.” 6This Edict was promulgated because it is to the interest of religion that monuments should be erected and adorned. 7No one shall be prevented from building a sepulchre or a monument in a place where he has a right to do so. 8A person is held to be prevented when he is hindered in having material transported which is necessary for erecting a building; and hence if anyone prevents the workmen who are necessary from coming, there will be ground for an interdict; and if anyone prevents the placing of machinery the interdict will also be available, provided he does this in a place which is subject to the servitude; but if you try to set up your machinery on my land, I will not be liable to an interdict, if I have the right to prevent you from doing so. 9A person must be understood to “build” not only when he begins a new work, but also where he wishes to make repairs. 10When a man does something in such a way that a sepulchre falls down, he is liable to this interdict.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. It is not customary for penal sums which have been paid to be recovered by an action.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. Where anyone is awarded possession for the protection of a trust, and is not admitted, he should be placed in possession by the authority of him who granted it to him. If he wishes to avail himself of the interdict, it must be said that it will be applicable. It would, however, be better for the judge to have his decree executed by extraordinary process, derived from the power of his office, and sometimes even to accomplish this by armed force. 1It was decided by Antoninus that a person may, under certain circumstances, be permitted to take possession of the property of the heir himself. Therefore, if anyone is not permitted to take possession of such property, it must be held that this equitable proceeding will lie. He can also make use of extraordinary execution. 2The Prætor places an unborn child in possession. This interdict is both prohibitory and restitutory. If the mother prefers to bring an action in factum, it must be remembered that she can do so (as in the case of creditors), rather than avail herself of the interdict. 3If the woman is alleged to have obtained possession for the purpose of causing annoyance, or because she is not pregnant, or is not pregnant by the man whose property is in question, or where anything is alleged with reference to her status, the Prætor promises possession to the unborn child, under a Rescript of the Divine Hadrian, in conformity with the presumption of the Carbonian Edict.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “If you have in your possession any documents which Lucius Titius is alleged to have left, and which have reference to his will; or if you have committed some fraudulent act to avoid having them in your possession, you must produce them for So-and-So. I shall include in my decree all memoranda, or anything else which he is said to have left.” 1If anyone acknowledges that the will is in his possession, he should be ordered to produce it, and time should be granted him to do so, if he cannot produce it immediately. If he states that he cannot produce it, or denies that this ought to be done, the interdict will lie. 2This interdict not only has reference to the will itself, but also to everything relating to it, as, for instance, a codicil. 3It must be said that the interdict will be applicable whether the will is valid or not (whether it was void originally, or has been broken, or is defective in any other respect, or even if it is alleged to be forged, or to have been made by one who did not have testamentary capacity to make a will). 4It must be held that this interdict will apply whether the will in question was the last or the first one executed. 5Therefore, it should be said that this interdict has reference to every written will, whether it is perfect or imperfect. 6Hence, if there are several wills, made at different times, it must be held that this interdict will apply; for all instruments having reference to the will which have been drawn” up at different times should be produced. 7If a discussion arises with reference to the condition of the testator, and a son under paternal control, or a slave is alleged to have drawn up the will, it shall be produced. 8Moreover, there will be ground for this interdict where a son under paternal control makes a will disposing of his castrense peculium. 9The same rule will apply if he who executed the will dies while in the hands of the enemy. 10This interdict does not refer to the will of a person who is living, because the Prætor employs the term “left.” 11If the will has been erased without fraudulent intent,

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. This interdict will be applicable. 1If the will is written upon several sheets, they are all included under this interdict, because they constitute but a single will. 2If the will is deposited with anyone by Titius, proceedings can be instituted by virtue of this interdict, both against the person who has the will, and against him who deposited it with him. 3Hence, if the guardian of a temple or a notary has the will as a depositary, it must be said that he will be liable under this interdict. 4When the will is in the hands of a slave, his master will be liable under the interdict. 5If the testator himself says that the will is his, and wishes it to be produced, this interdict will not lie; but an action for its production must be brought to enable him to claim the will after it has been produced. This rule should be adopted in all cases where persons claim the ownership of documents. 6If anyone commits fraud in order to avoid having a will in his possession, he will still be liable under this interdict. Proceedings under the Cornelian Law relating to testaments will not, however, be prevented; as, for instance, if the party in question is alleged to have fraudulently suppressed the will. For no one can retain a will with impunity under the pretext that he has committed a more serious crime, and by the production of it, the crime, which is admitted, will be the more readily proved. Anyone may be guilty of fraud and yet not come within the provisions of this law, as for example, if he did not steal or hide the will, but delivered it to another to avoid being compelled to produce it for the inspection of the party making use of the interdict; that is to say, if he did this, not with the intention of suppressing the will, but in order to avoid producing it. 7This interdict is exhibitory. 8Let us see what it is to produce anything. It is to place it in such a position as to afford an opportunity for it to be taken hold of. 9Production must be made before the magistrate in such a way that by his authority the witnesses may be notified to appear and acknowledge their seals. If they do not obey, Labeo says that they should be compelled to do so by the magistrate. 10All persons to whom anything has been left by a will can demand its production. 11In a case of this kind the amount of the judgment should be in proportion to the interest of him for whose inspection the person having the will in his possession refuses to produce it. 12Therefore, if the appointed heir makes use of this interdict, the estimate of the damages must be in proportion to the value of the estate. 13If a legacy is in dispute, the amount of the damages must be in proportion to the value of the legacy. 14If the legacy was bequeathed under a condition, the estimate will be made just as if the condition had been complied with; nor shall the legatee be compelled to give security to restore whatever he obtains, if the condition should not be fulfilled; because the decree imposes the penalty for contumacy incurred by the heir for not producing the will. 15Hence, if the legatee, having received the value of his legacy in this way, afterwards claims the legacy itself, the question arises whether he should be heard. I think that if the heir paid the amount, the legatee will be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud; but if anyone else paid it, he will not be barred. Therefore, the same distinction should be made if the heir obtained the value of the legacy, after having availed himself of the interdict. 16It is established that this interdict can be employed even after the year has elapsed. It will lie in favor of the heir and other successors.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “I forbid any labor to be performed in a sacred place, or anything to be carried there.” 1This interdict has reference to sacred places, and not to one where holy objects are kept. 2Where the Prætor says that no labor shall be performed in a sacred place, this does not refer to anything which is done to adorn it, but to acts committed for the purpose of defacing it, or rendering it inconvenient. 3The care of temples and of other sacred places is entrusted to those who have charge of them.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “Nothing shall be done in a public place, or brought there, which will cause any damage to it; except what is permitted by some law, decree of the Senate, Edict, or Rescript of the Emperors, and if anything of this kind is done, I will grant an interdict.” 1This interdict is prohibitory. 2By means of it, the public as well as the private welfare is protected. For public places are intended for the use of private persons, that is to say, as the property of the State, and not as belonging to any individual; and we have only as much right to their enjoyment as anyone of the people has to prevent their being interfered with. For which reason, if any work is done in a public place which tends to the injury of a private individual, the person responsible for it can be proceeded against under the prohibitory interdict which has been introduced for this purpose. 3Labeo defines the term, “public place,” as applying to such localities, houses, fields, highways, and roads as belong to the community at large. 4I do not think that this interdict has reference to places which belong to the Treasury, for no one can do anything in such places, nor can any private person prevent anything from being done there. Property of the Treasury, to a certain extent, belongs to the Emperor as his own. Therefore, if anyone builds anything on said property, there will be no ground for the application of this interdict. If any controversy arises on this point, the Imperial Prefects will be the judges. 5Hence, this interdict relates to places which are intended for the use of the public, and if anything is done there which may injure a private individual, the Prætor can intervene by means of this interdict. 6If anyone has an awning suspended over his portico, which shuts off the light from his neighbor, the interdict will be issued in the following terms: “Do not place anything in the public street which may interfere with the light of Gaius Seius.” 7If anyone wishes to repair anything in a public place, Aristo says that there will be ground for the application of this interdict, in order to prevent him from doing so. 8This interdict is available against anyone who builds a foundation in the sea, by a person who may be injured by it; but if no one sustains any damage, he who builds upon the shore, or constructs a foundation in the sea, should be protected. 9Where anyone is prevented from fishing in, or sailing upon the sea, he will not be entitled to this interdict, just as in the case of a person who is prevented from taking part in games in a public field, or bathing in a public bath, or being present in a theater; but in all these cases an action for reparation of injury must be employed. 10The Prætor very properly says, “where any injury is sustained by the party on this account.” For where anything is allowed to be done in a public place permission should be granted, for it to be done without causing injury to anyone, and the Emperor is accustomed to grant permission when a request is made for the construction of any new work. 11Moreover, injury is considered to be sustained when any benefit of any description whatever, which is derived from a public place, is lost. 12Hence, if the view enjoyed by anyone, or his approach to a public place is interfered with, and diminished, or restricted, this interdict should be employed. 13Labeo thinks if I erect a building in a public place, so as to prevent the water from flowing from my premises upon yours, which they formerly did without any right enjoyed by me, that I will not be liable under the interdict. 14It is clear that if the building which I erected should intercept the light of your house, this interdict will lie. 15He also says that if I erect a building in a public place, and it interferes with one which you have already erected in the same place, this interdict will not apply, as you also have built contrary to law, unless you have done so by virtue of some special privilege which has been granted to you. 16If anyone obtains from the Emperor general permission to build in a public place, it must not be believed that he can erect the building in such a way as to cause inconvenience to anyone; for such a concession is not understood to be granted unless this was expressly stated. 17If anyone constructs a house in a public place without anyone preventing it, he cannot be compelled to remove it, for fear that the city may be marred by its demolition; and because the interdict is prohibitory and not restitutory. If, however, the said building interferes with public use, it should be demolished on the application of the officer in charge of public works; but if it does not interfere with anything, a land tax can be imposed upon it, for the tax receives this name because it is paid on account of the ground. 18But if no work has yet been done, it is the duty of the judge having jurisdiction to require security that it will not be done, and the bond must be drawn up in such a way as to render the heir and other successors liable. 19The rule with reference to sacred places is different, for we not only forbid any work to be done in a sacred place, but where any has been done, we order everything to be restored to its former condition. This rule has been adopted for the sake of religion. 20The Prætor says: “I forbid anything to be built on a public highway or road, or to be placed there, by which the said highway or road is, or may be damaged.” 21By a public highway we mean one whose soil belongs to the people, for we do not understand a private road to mean the same as a public one. In the case of a private road, the soil belongs to another, and we have only the right of walking and driving over it; but the soil of a public highway is owned by the community, and has been established with reference to direction, and within certain limits, by him who had the right to render it public, in order that everyone might travel upon it, and traverse it. 22Some roads are public, some are private, and others are local, belonging to the neighborhood. We call roads public which the Greeks designated as royal, and we name prætorian or consular roads. Private roads are such as some persons style agrarian. Local, or neighborhood roads are those which are situated in villages, or lead to towns; certain authorities also call these public roads. This, however, is only true where they have not been established by the contribution of land by private persons; but it is otherwise if they are repaired at the expense of individuals, for a road is not private on this account. The repairs of the same are common, because such a road is for the common use and benefit. 23Private roads are understood to be of two kinds, some of them are through land upon which a servitude to furnish a right of way to the land of another has been imposed, others give access to certain tracts of land, and anyone can make use of them, after leaving a consular road, when a lane; a path, or a road for driving is found leading to a farm. I think that roads which lead from a consular highway to farms or villages are also public. 24This interdict only applies to roads in the country and not to those in cities, for the magistrates are charged with the care of the latter. 25If traffic is intercepted on a public highway, or it is closed, the magistrates shall intervene. 26If anyone conducts a sewer across a public highway, and, for that reason, it becomes less fit for use, Labeo says that he who placed it there will be liable. 27Hence, if anyone digs a ditch on his own land, and the water collected by it runs over the highway, he will be liable under this interdict, for he will be considered to have obstructed it. 28Labeo also says that if anyone builds a house on his own ground, and the water then collects upon the highway, he will not be liable under the interdict, because he did not cause the water to flow upon the highway, but he merely did not take care of it. Nerva, however, says, more properly, that he will be liable in both instances, as it is clear that if the land adjoins the public highway, the water flowing from it injures the latter; for if the water flows from the land of a neighbor upon yours, and you are compelled to take care of that water, there will be ground for an interdict against your neighbor. If, however, it is not necessary for you to take care of it, your neighbor will not be liable, but you will be; for he who had the use of the water is considered to have committed the act which damaged the highway. Nerva also says that if proceedings under the interdict are instituted against you, you will not be obliged to do anything more, or bring an action against your neighbor to force him to do what will satisfy the person who has sued you. If it should be decided otherwise, you will be considered responsible, even if you have brought a bona fide action against your neighbor, and it is not your fault that the person who sued you is not content with what you have done. 29Ad Dig. 43,8,2,29Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 169, Note 20.He also says that if the place where the road is situated becomes unhealthy on account of a bad odor, an interdict cannot be employed on this account. 30This interdict also applies where animals are pastured on a public highway, or road, and injured. 31The Prætor also says, “by which the said highway or road is, or may be damaged.” Therefore this applies, whether the road is immediately damaged, or whether this takes place afterwards, for this is the meaning of the words, “is, or may be.” For there are certain things which injure a road immediately, and others which do not do so at once, but will in the future. 32Moreover, a road is understood to be damaged if it is rendered less available for travel, that is to say, for walking or driving; as, for instance, if, having been level, it becomes hilly; or, having been smooth, it becomes rough; or, having been wide, it becomes narrow; or, having been dry, it becomes muddy. 33I know that the point has been discussed whether an arch or a bridge can be constructed across a public highway. Many authorities hold that the person who does this will be liable under the interdict, because a highway must not be rendered less available for use. 34This interdict is perpetual, and popular, and judgment should be rendered to the extent of the interest of the plaintiff. 35The Prætor says: “You shall restore everything to its former condition, if you have done any work, or placed anything upon the public highway by means of which the said highway or road is, or may be damaged.” 36This interdict is founded upon the same reason as the former one, and the only difference between them is that this is restitutory, and the other prohibitory. 37He is not liable under this interdict who builds anything on the public highway, but he who is in possession of what has been built. Hence, if one person should erect something, and another should hold it, the latter will be liable; and this is more fitting, for he who has control of the obstruction can restore the highway to its original condition. 38We consider him to have possession of the building who holds or enjoys it by the right of possession, whether he himself constructed it or acquired it by purchase, lease, bequest, inheritance, or in any other way. 39Hence Ofilius thinks that if anyone abandons an obstruction which he has raised upon the highway, by which it is injured, he will not be liable under this interdict; for he does not have possession of what he constructed. But let us see whether an action can be granted against him. I think that an interdict will be available to compel him to remove whatever he built upon the public highway, and restore the latter to its former condition. 40If a tree falls from your land upon the public highway, in such a way as to obstruct it, and you consider the tree as abandoned, Labeo says that you will not be liable. He adds that if the complainant is ready to remove the tree at his own expense, he can properly proceed against you under the interdict relating to the repair of highways. If, however, you do not consider the tree as abandoned, he can properly proceed against you under this interdict. 41Labeo also says that if my neighbor obstructs the public highway by some work which he does, that is as advantageous to me as to himself, but did this only for the benefit of his own land, I can not be sued under the interdict; but if we caused this work to be performed in common, both of us will be liable. 42This interdict also applies against a person who has fraudulently avoided having possession of, or holding the structure which injures the highway; for he who is in possession of, or holds it, and he who has acted fraudulently to avoid doing so, must be subject to the same restrictions. The opinion of Labeo seems to me to be correct. 43When the Prætor says, “you shall restore it to its former condition,” he is understood to mean that it shall be placed in its original state, which is accomplished either by removing what has been built, or by replacing what has been taken away, and this sometimes at his own expense. For if the party who is sued under the interdict did the work, or someone else did it by his order, or he ratified what the latter had done, he must restore everything to its original condition at his own expense. If, however, nothing of this kind took place, but he merely holds possession of what has been constructed, we, in this instance, say that he must only suffer the work to be removed. 44It must be remembered that this interdict is not a temporary one, for it has reference to the public welfare. Judgment is rendered under it to the extent of the interest of the plaintiff in having the work which has been constructed demolished. 45The Prætor says: “I forbid violence to be employed to prevent anyone from freely passing and driving over a public highway, or road.”

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “I forbid force to be employed to prevent anyone who has leased public property, or his partner, from enjoying it in accordance with the terms of the lease.” 1It is evident that this interdict was established for the general welfare, for it protects the public revenue when it forbids violence to be employed against anyone who has leased public land for the purpose of enjoying it. 2If a lessee and his partner both apply to have the interdict issued, the lessee himself will be entitled to the preference. 3The Prætor says, “In accordance with the terms of the lease,” and this is reasonable, for a tenant who desires to enjoy the property beyond, or contrary to the terms of his lease, should not be heard.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “I forbid force to be employed to prevent anyone from opening up or repairing a public street or highway who has the right to do so, unless the condition of the street or highway may be rendered worse thereby.” 1To open up a street is to restore it to its former height and breadth; and it is a part of the repair of streets to clean them. Properly speaking, however, to clean a street means to reduce it to its proper level by removing whatever has been deposited on it. For he who repairs a street, as well as he who opens up and cleans it, are persons who restore it to its former condition. 2If anyone, under the pretext of repairing a street, makes it worse, force can be employed against him with impunity, because he who avails himself of the interdict under the pretext of reparation cannot make the street wider, longer, higher, or lower, nor can he throw sand into it, or pave it with stone, if it is merely composed of earth; or, on the other hand, where it has been paved with stone, can he remove it, leaving only the soil. 3This interdict is perpetual, is granted for and against everyone, and judgment is rendered under it to the extent of the interest of the plaintiff.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “Nothing shall be thrown into a public river or deposited on its banks, by means of which the landing of merchandise, traffic, or the movement of shipping may be interfered with.” 1A river is distinguished from a small stream by its superior size, or by the opinion of the people who live in the neighborhood. 2Some rivers have a continuous flow, and others are torrential. Those which have a continuous flow run always; those which are torrential only flow during the winter. If, however, a river, which at other times continues to flow, should dry up in the summer, it will not, on this account, be removed from the former class. 3Some rivers are public, and some are not. Cassius defines a public river to be one which flows uninterruptedly. This opinion of Cassius, which is approved by Celsus, seems to be plausible. 4This interdict has reference to public rivers, but it does not apply to one which is private, because a private river does not differ from other places which belong to individuals. 5A bank is properly defined to be what contains a river when it pursues its natural course, for it does not change its banks on account of rain, the tide, or for any other reason. No one says that the Nile, which covers Egypt with its overflow, changes or enlarges its banks; for when it returns to its ordinary dimensions, the sides of its channel should be repaired. If, however, a river should naturally increase in size in such a way as to acquire a permanent enlargement, either through the addition of the water of another stream, or for some other cause, it undoubtedly must be held that it has changed its banks, just as if, having changed its bed, it begins to flow elsewhere. 6If an island is formed in a public river, and anything is built upon it, it will not be considered to have been constructed in a public place, for the island becomes the property of the first occupant if the neighboring fields have regular boundaries; or belongs to him to whose bank it is contiguous; or if formed in the middle of the channel, it will belong to those who own land on both banks of the stream. 7In like manner, if a river leaves its bed and begins to flow elsewhere, anything which was built in the old bed will not come under the terms of this interdict, for what belongs to the neighbors on both sides is not constructed in a public stream; or, if the land has boundaries, the bed of the river will belong to the first occupant, and it certainly ceases to be public property. Moreover, although the new bed which the river has made for itself was previously private property, it at once becomes public; because it is impossible for the bed of a public stream not to be public. 8A canal, made by human hands, through which a public river flows is, nevertheless, public property to such an extent that if anything is built there, it is considered to have been built in a public stream. 9It is otherwise if a river overflows the land of another, and does not make a new bed for itself; for then what the water covered does not become public property. 10Again, if a river surrounds land, it must be noted that the land still remains the property of the original owner. Therefore, if anything is built in it, it is not built in a public stream. Whatever is done on private land does not come within the scope of this interdict, any more than what is done in a private stream; for anything which is done in a private stream is just the same as if it was done in any other place belonging to a private individual. 11We understand anything to have been built in a public stream where this was done in the water itself; for if anything is built outside of the water, it is not considered to have been done in the stream, so that any structure erected upon the bank is not held to have been built in the stream. 12The Prætor does not absolutely prohibit any work being done in a public river, or on the bank of the same, but only whatever may interfere with the landing of goods, or navigation. Therefore, this interdict only applies to public rivers which are navigable, and not to any others. Labeo, however, says that even if anything is done to a river that is not navigable, which may cause it to dry up, or which obstructs the course of the water, it will not be unjust to grant an available interdict to prevent any violence from being employed against removing or demolishing a structure which has been built in the bed of the stream, or on its bank, that interferes with the passage or current of the river, and to compel everything to be re-established in good condition, in accordance with the judgment of a reliable citizen. 13The word statio, a landing-place for ships, is derived from the verb statuo. By it, therefore, the place is indicated where ships can remain in safety. 14The Prætor says, “or the movement of shipping may be interfered with.” This is used instead of the word navigation, and, indeed, we are accustomed to employ the terms shipping and navigation, instead of the vessel itself. Hence, by the term “shipping” may also be understood the course of the vessel. Boats are also included in this term, for their use is frequently necessary. If the approach for pedestrians is obstructed, the movement of shipping is also interfered with. 15The anchorage and the course of navigation are also considered to be interfered with where the use of the same is interrupted, or rendered more difficult, or diminished, or made less frequent, or entirely destroyed. Hence, if the water is drawn away, and the river, having become smaller, is rendered less navigable; or if its width is increased, or the water being more widely distributed becomes shallower; or if, on the other hand, the stream is rendered more narrow, and runs very rapidly; or if anything is done to inconvenience navigation, make it more difficult, or entirely prevent it; there will be cause for the interdict. 16Labeo says that an exception on the ground that the work was only performed for the purpose of preserving the bank should not be granted to him who is sued under the interdict; but that it should be on the ground that nothing has been done except what was authorized by law. 17Where anything has been built in the sea, Labeo says that the following interdict will lie. “Nothing shall be constructed in the sea, or on the shore of the same, by which a harbor, anchorage, or the course of navigation may be obstructed.” 18He also thinks that the same rule will apply to any public stream which is not navigable. 19The Prætor further says, “If you have placed anything in a public river or done any work therein, or on the bank thereof, by which the anchorage of vessels or the course of navigation has been, or may be interfered with, you shall restore everything to its former condition.” 20The interdict above mentioned is prohibitory; the one which has reference to the same case is restitutory. 21He who has done any work, or placed anything in a river or upon its bank which may obstruct navigation, is obliged to restore everything to its former condition, if what he has done may interfere with the anchorage of vessels or their movements. 22The following words, “has done or placed,” indicate that he who built or deposited the obstruction is not liable, but that he who has possession of it after this has been done is liable. Finally, Labeo says that if your agent has diverted the course of the stream, you will be liable under this interdict, if you use the water.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “I forbid anything to be built in a public river or upon its banks, or anything to be placed in such a river or on its banks, by means of which the water may be caused to flow in a different direction than it did during the previous summer.” 1By means of this interdict, the Prætor makes provision against the drying up of a river, due to improper concessions for drawing off the water; and to prevent the beds of streams from changing and injuring the neighbors. 2This refers to public rivers, whether they are navigable or not. 3The Prætor says, “by which the water may be caused to flow in a different direction than it did during the previous summer.” Hence, not everyone who built or placed an obstruction in the river will be liable, but only he who, by building or placing it there, caused the water to take a different course than it had done during the previous summer. However, where he says, “a different direction,” this does not have reference to the amount of the water, but to the power, manner, and course of its current. And, generally speaking, it must be said that a person will only be liable under the interdict, if the channel is changed by what he has done, provided it is rendered lower or more narrow, and, in consequence, the current becomes more rapid, and causes inconvenience to those residing in the neighborhood. If the neighbors suffer any annoyance from the act of the party in question, there will be ground for the interdict. 4If anyone who formerly conducted water from a river by means of a covered aqueduct now desires to conduct it by an open aqueduct or vice versa, it has been settled that he will be liable under the interdict, provided that by doing so he causes any inconvenience to persons living near the river. 5In like manner, if he conducts it by means of a ditch, or does so in any other place, or changes the bed of the river, he will be liable under this interdict. 6There are some authorities who hold that an exception to this interdict can be pleaded on the ground that the work was only done for the purpose of repairing the banks, so that if anyone causes the water to flow in a different direction for the purpose of repairing the banks, there will be no ground for the interdict. This opinion is not accepted by other authorities, for the banks should not be repaired if it causes inconvenience to those living in the neighborhood. We are, however, accustomed to have the Prætor decide, after investigation, whether he ought to grant this exception, for very frequently it is advantageous to permit this to be done. 7If, however, any other advantage is obtained by the person who did something to a public stream (suppose, for instance, that the water usually caused him a great deal of damage, and that his land was overflowed), and he raised levees, or took other measures to repair the banks, so as to protect his land, and this, to some extent, altered the course of the river; why should not his interest be consulted? I know that several persons, with a view to the protection of their land, have absolutely diverted the course of streams, and changed their beds, for it is necessary in cases of this kind to take into consideration the benefit and safety of the party interested, if no injury is sustained by other persons in the neighborhood. 8He also is liable under this interdict who causes a river to flow in a different direction from that in which it flowed during the previous summer. Therefore, the authorities say, the Prætor included the previous summer, because the natural course of a river is more certain in summer than in winter. This interdict has reference to the past, and not to the present summer; because the course of the river during the past summer is less subject to doubt. The summer extends to the autumnal equinox. If recourse is had to the interdict, during the summer, the previous season should be considered; and if this is done during the winter, not the summer which will follow the winter, but the past one must be taken into account. 9This interdict will lie for the benefit of any of the people, but it cannot be employed against everyone, but only against him who has caused the water to flow in a different direction, when he had no right to do so. 10This interdict is also available against heirs. 11The Prætor finally says: “You will restore everything to its former condition, if you have anything in your possession which has been built or placed in a public river, or on the bank of the same, by means of which the water is caused to flow in a different direction from that in which it flowed during the previous summer.” 12The interdict in question is restitutory; the former one is prohibitory and has reference to work not yet performed. Hence, if anything has already been done, restoration to its former condition can be obtained by means of this interdict; and if it is desired that nothing shall be done, the former interdict must be employed; and if anything is done after the interdict has been granted, the person responsible shall be punished. 13It is not unjust, as Labeo says, to include in this restitutory interdict whatever was done to avoid remaining in possession of the structure with reference to which the interdict was issued.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “I forbid violence to be used to prevent anyone from conducting a vessel or a boat upon a public river, or to hinder him from loading or unloading the same, on the bank of said river. I also forbid any interference with navigation on any lake, canal, or public body of water.” 1It is provided by this interdict that no one shall be prevented from using a public stream for the purpose of navigation. For, just as an interdict was promulgated in the case of a person prevented from making use of the public highways; so, also, the Prætor thought that this interdict should be published. 2If the above-mentioned places belong to private individuals, the interdict will not be applicable. 3A lake is a body of water which has a perpetual supply. 4A pond is a body of water which, for a time, is stagnant, and which ordinarily increases in size during the winter. 5A ditch is a receptacle for water made by human hands. 6All of these may be public. 7Sabinus, as well as Labeo, is of the opinion that an interdict will lie where anyone is forbidden to fish in a lake or pond, which he has leased from a farmer of the revenue. Therefore, if he has leased it from a municipality, it will be perfectly just for his rights to be protected by an interdict on account of the revenue to be obtained. 8Where anyone desires to make use of an interdict of this description for the purpose of lowering ground to water his cattle, he should not be heard; and this was stated by Mela. 9He also says that this interdict will lie to prevent anyone from employing force to keep the cattle of another from approaching a public river, or the bank of the same.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The Prætor says: “I forbid force to be employed to prevent anyone from doing any work in any public river, or on the bank of the same, which he has a right to do for the purpose of strengthening the said bank, or protecting his land which adjoins it; provided that, by so doing, no interference is made with navigation, and security against threatened injury is furnished for ten years, in accordance with the judgment of a good citizen; or where it is not the fault of the party in question that a bond or sureties have not been given for this purpose.” 1It is very advantageous to repair and strengthen the banks of public streams. Therefore, as there is an interdict which has reference to the repair of public highways, so also there is one which relates to the strengthening of the banks of rivers. 2The Prætor with good reason adds, “provided that, by so doing, no interference is made with navigation,” for only such repairs shquld be permitted which offer no impediment to navigation. 3He who wishes to repair his bank should provide against threatened injury either by giving a bond, or sureties, dependent upon the rank of the parties interested. It is expressly stated in this interdict that security shall be given, either by bond or surety, for any injury which may be caused within ten years, in accordance with the judgment of a good citizen. 4Security should not only be given to the neighbors, but also to persons owning land on the other side of the stream. 5Care should be taken that security is furnished to these persons before the work has been performed; for, after this has been done, no one can be proceeded against under this interdict; even if any damage should afterwards result, but suit can be brought under the Aquilian Law. 6It should be noted that the Prætor makes no provision for repairing the banks of a lake, a canal, or a pond. The same rule, however, must be observed which applies to the repairs of the banks of a stream.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. He who fraudulently prevents the free administration of justice, or prevents the judges from deciding as they should do; or he who, being invested with power or authority, acts in any other way than the law decrees and requires that he should; and anyone who unjustly compels a person to promise, either publicly or privately, to furnish slaves, or pay money; and also anyone who, with malicious intent, appears armed in an assembly, or in a place where justice is publicly administered, with the exception of him who collects men in order to hunt wild beasts, and who is permitted to keep people for this purpose, will be liable under this law. 1He, also, is liable under this law, who, where men have been assembled, uses force for the purpose of striking or beating someone, even though he may not be killed. 2He who is convicted of having employed public violence is interdicted the use of water and fire.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. Anyone who perforates the wall of a temple, or steals anything by this means, is liable to the action for peculation.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. An enclosed place into which merchandise is taken, and afterwards exported, is called a harbor. A place of this kind is not only enclosed, but also fortified: and therefore it is styled a by-way (angi-portus).

The Same, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The legal position of him who has committed fraud in order to obtain possession of, or to hold property, and that of him who has committed it to avoid having possession of or holding property, is necessarily the same.