Ad edictum praetoris libri
Ex libro LVIII
Dig. 2,6,4Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo octavo ad edictum. Qui duos homines in iudicio sisti promisit, si alterum exhibet, alterum non, ex promissione non videtur eos stetisse, cum alter eorum non sit exhibitus.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVIII. Where anyone promises to produce two persons in court, and he produces one and not the other, he is held not to have kept his promise, as one of them has not been produced.
Dig. 39,5,17Idem libro quinquagensimo octavo ad edictum. Si in stipulatum iudicatum novationis causa deductum sit et stipulatio donationis causa accepto lata, dicendum est locum liberationem habere.
The Same, On the Edict, Book LVIII. Where property awarded by a judicial decision has been included in a new stipulation, and a release had been made of the latter for the purpose of making a donation, it must be said that the release will be valid.
Dig. 42,1,4Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo octavo ad edictum. Si se non optulit procurator, iudicati actio in eum denegabitur et in dominum dabitur: si se optulit, in ipsum dabitur. optulisse autem se liti videtur non is, qui in rem suam procurator datus sit: nam hic alia ratione recusare iudicati actionem non potest, quia hic non in alienam, sed in suam rem procurator factus est. 1Tutor quoque vel curator in ea condicione sunt, ut non debeant videri se liti optulisse, idcircoque debet denegari in eos iudicati actio. 2Actor municipum potest rem iudicatam recusare: in municipes enim iudicati actio dabitur. 3Ait praetor: ‘condemnatus ut pecuniam solvat’. a iudicato ergo hoc exigitur, ut pecuniam solvat. quid ergo, si solvere quidem paratus non sit, satisfacere autem paratus sit, quid dicimus? et ait Labeo debuisse hoc quoque adici ‘neque eo nomine satisfaciat’: fieri enim posse, ut idoneum expromissorem habeat. sed ratio pecuniae exigendae haec fuit, quod noluerit praetor obligationes ex obligationibus fieri: idcirco ait ‘ut pecunia solvatur’. ex magna tamen et idoneo causa accedendum erit ad Labeonis sententiam. 4Si ex conventione litigantium cautum sit post rem iudicatam ei, cui quis condemnatus est, eveniet, ut hic et retendatur, si modo novatio intercessit: ceterum si non novandi causa id factum est, manebit ordo exsecutionis. sed et si pignora accepta sint vel fideiussores in rem iudicatam, consequens erit dicere non cessare exsecutionem, quippe cum accesserit aliquid rei iudicatae, non sit a re iudicata recessum. idem observandum est in eo, cuius procurator condemnatus est. 5Si quis condemnatus sit, ut intra certos dies solvat, unde ei tempus iudicati actionis computamus, utrum ex quo sententia prolata est an vero ex eo, ex quo dies statutus praeteriit? sed si quidem minorem diem statuerit iudex tempore legitimo, repletur ex lege, quod sententiae iudicis deest: sin autem ampliorem numerum dierum sua definitione iudex amplexus est, computabitur reo et legitimum tempus et quod supra id iudex praestitit. 6Condemnatum accipere debemus eum, qui rite condemnatus est, ut sententia valeat: ceterum si aliqua ratione sententia nullius momenti sit, dicendum est condemnationis verbum non tenere. 7Solvisse accipere debemus non tantum eum, qui solvit, verum omnem omnino, qui ea obligatione liberatus est, quae ex causa iudicati descendit. 8Celsus scribit, si noxali condemnatus eum servum, in quo usus fructus alienus est, noxae dedisti, posse tecum adhuc agi iudicati: sed si usus fructus interierit, liberari ait.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVIII. If an agent does not appear, an action to enforce judgment against him will be refused, and will be granted against his principal; but if he does appear, it will be granted against him. In this instance, however, he is not held to have appeared in court who has been appointed agent in a case in which he is interested; for there is another reason why he cannot refuse to plead in an action to enforce judgment, and that is because he has become an agent in his own behalf, and not in that of another. 1A guardian and a curator are in such a position that they are not considered to have appeared in court, and therefore, an action to enforce judgment should not be granted against them. 2The agent of a municipality can avoid execution in a case where judgment has been rendered, for an action to enforce judgment should be granted against the citizens. 3The Prætor says: “I will grant an action to compel the party against whom a decision has been rendered to pay the money.” Hence the party who has lost his case is required to make payment. But what should be done, and what shall we say, if he is not prepared to make payment, but is ready to satisfy the claim in some other way? Labeo says that it should be added, “If the party who had lost his case should not satisfy the claim,” for it may happen that he has a solvent person to offer in his stead. The reason, however, for requiring payment is that the Prætor was unwilling that a new obligation should be created out of the former one; and therefore he provides that the money shall be paid. The opinion of Labeo should be adopted for good and sufficient reasons. 4If, after the decision and by agreement of the litigants, security is furnished by the party who lost his case, the rule will be relaxed with reference to him if a new contract is made; but if this is not done for the purpose of entering into a new contract, the order of execution will stand. If, however, pledges are accepted, or securities are furnished to provide for the execution of the judgment, the result will be that we must hold that the execution will remain just as if something had been added to the decision in the case, and nothing had been withdrawn from it. The same rule should be gbserved in the case of a party whose agent had judgment rendered against him. 5When a decision is rendered against anyone requiring him to make payment within a certain time, from what date must we compute the time for the action to enforce judgment? Shall we do so from the day when the decision was rendered, or from the day when the time prescribed in cases of this kind has elapsed? If the judge fixed a shorter time than that prescribed by law, what is lacking through his decision must be supplied by the law. If, however, the judge, in fixing the period, included a greater number of days than those legally allowed, the unsuccessful party will be granted not only the time prescribed by law, but also that which the judge granted in addition. 6We must understand a person who has been condemned to be one who has had a judgment legally rendered against him in such a way that it will stand. If, however, for any reason, the judgment should prove to be of no effect, it must be said that the term “condemnation” will not be applicable. 7We should understand a discharge from liability to mean not only that the party pays the claim, but that he is entirely released from the obligation upon which the judgment was founded. 8Celsus says that if you had a decision rendered against you in a noxal action, and by way of reparation you gave up a slave in whom another had the usufruct, you will still be liable to the action to enforce judgment; but if the usufruct should be extinguished, he states that you will be released.
Dig. 42,2,2Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo octavo ad edictum. Non fatetur qui errat, nisi ius ignoravit.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVIII. He who makes a mistake does not confess unless he is ignorant of the law.
Dig. 42,3,3Idem libro quinquagensimo octavo ad edictum. Is, qui bonis cessit, ante rerum venditionem utique bonis suis non caret: quare si paratus fuerit se defendere, bona eius non veneunt.
The Same, On the Edict, Book LVIII. He who has made an assignment of his property is not deprived of it before the sale; and therefore, if he is ready to set up a defence, his property will not be sold.
Dig. 50,16,43Idem libro quinquagensimo octavo ad edictum. Verbo ‘victus’ continentur, quae esui potuique cultuique corporis quaeque ad vivendum homini necessaria sunt. vestem quoque victus habere vicem Labeo ait:
The Same, On the Edict, Book LVIII. Food, drink, the care of the body, and everything necessary to human life is embraced in the term “maintenance.” Labeo says that maintenance also includes clothing.
Dig. 50,16,45Ulpianus libro quinquagensimo octavo ad edictum. In ‘stratu’ omne vestimentum contineri quod iniciatur Labeo ait: neque enim dubium est, quin stragula vestis sit omne pallium, περίστρωμα. in victu ergo vestem accipiemus non stragulam, in stratu omnem stragulam vestem.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVIII. Labeo says that under the term “covering,” all clothing which anyone puts on is included; for there is no doubt that the term applies to cloaks and every kind of garments. Therefore, when we include clothing under the term “maintenance,” we do not mean bedclothes used at night, but all articles intended for dress.