Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIV. If a person who is free, but is held in possession as a slave, is not willing to go into court to establish his true condition, for the reason that he desires to do some wrong to himself or to his family, in this instance, it is but just that permission should be given to certain persons to appear in his behalf, as for example, to a father who alleges that his son is under his control; for if his son refuses to institute proceedings, he can do so for him. This right is granted to his father even if he is not under the control of the latter, for it is always to the interest of a parent that his son should not be reduced to servitude. 1On the other hand, we say that the same power is granted to children in behalf of their parents, even against the consent of the latter, as it is no small disgrace for a son to have his father a slave. 2For the same reason it has been decided that this power is also granted to other blood-relatives,

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIV. I go still further, and hold that this power ought to be granted to natural relatives also, so that if a father has a son in servitude who is afterwards manumitted, he can demand his freedom should he again be reduced to slavery. 1A soldier is also permitted to appear in court in a case where the freedom of any of his near relatives is involved. 2When no one of this kind who can act for the party interested appears in court, then it becomes necessary to authorize his mother, his daughters or his sisters, as well as other women related to him by blood, or even his wife, to appear before the Prætor, and present the case; so that, after proper cause is shown, relief may be granted him even against his consent. 3The same rule applies if I should allege that the party in question is my freedman or freedwoman.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIV. For it is to our interest to preserve our rights over our freedmen and freedwomen. 1When several of the above-mentioned persons appear in court in behalf of a slave, the authority of the Prætor must be interposed to select the one whom he considers to be preferable. This rule should also be observed where several patrons appear for that purpose.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIV. Where men who are free, especially those who are over twenty years of age, have permitted themselves to be sold, or have been reduced to slavery for any other reason, no obstacle will arise to prevent them from demanding their freedom, unless they allowed themselves to be sold in order to share the purchase-money. 1When a minor of twenty years of age permits himself to be sold for the purpose of sharing the purchase-money, this will not prejudice him after he reaches the age of twenty years. If, however, he permitted himself to be sold and obtained a portion of the purchase-money after reaching his twentieth year, freedom can be refused him. 2If anyone should knowingly buy a man who is free, the right to demand his liberty will not be refused to him who was sold, as against the buyer, no matter at what age he was purchased; for the reason that he who bought him is not excusable, even if when he did so he who was the object of the sale well knew that he was free. But if another, without being aware of the fact, should afterwards purchase him from one who did know, freedom should be refused him. 3If two persons should buy a slave together, one of them knowing that he was free, and the other being ignorant of it, let us see whether he who was aware of the alleged slave’s condition will prejudice the one who was not. This, indeed, is the better opinion. For, otherwise, the question would be whether he who was ignorant of the man’s condition will only be entitled to his share in him, or to the entire alleged slave. Will what we have stated with reference to the share of the other apply to the purchaser who had knowledge? He, however, who bought the man, being aware that he was free, is unworthy to have anything. Again, the one who was ignorant of his true condition cannot have a greater portion of the ownership than he purchased. The result therefore will be that the ignorance of one will benefit the other who bought the man knowing that he was free. 4There are other reasons for which the right to demand freedom is refused; as, for example, where a slave is said to be free by the terms of a will, and the Prætor forbids the will to be opened, because the testator is said to have been killed by his slaves; for he who desires to appear in court and who may, perhaps, be liable to punishment, should not be entitled to a judgment giving him his freedom. If, however, the right should be granted because it is uncertain whether he is guilty or innocent, the decision should be deferred until it is established who is responsible for the death of the testator, as it will then appear whether he will be liable to punishment or not. 5Where anyone who is in slavery claims his freedom, he occupies the place of a plaintiff. If, however, being at liberty, he is demanded as a slave, the person who alleges that he is his slave assumes the part of the plaintiff. Hence, when the matter is in doubt, in order that the proceedings may be conducted in their proper order, the question should be argued before the magistrate who has cognizance of cases involving freedom, so that it may be determined whether the alleged slave should be reduced from freedom to servitude; or, on the other hand, whether, being in bondage, he ought to be liberated. If, however, it should appear that he who contends that he is free was in that condition without having been guilty of fraud, he who alleges that he is his owner will take the part of the plaintiff, and will be required to prove that he is his slave. But if it is decided that, at the time when the proceedings were instituted, the alleged slave was not at liberty, or had fraudulently obtained his freedom, he who asserts that he is free must prove that this is the case.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIV. When anyone, to avoid being tortured, alleges that he is free, the Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript that he should not be put to the question before the case brought to decide his freedom has been tried.

The Same, On the Edict, Book LIV. If the Treasury raises a controversy with reference to the condition of anyone, the Advocate of the Treasury should be present. Therefore, if a decision is rendered without the presence of the Advocate of the Treasury, the Divine Marcus stated in a Rescript that the proceedings were void, and therefore it was necessary to begin them over again.