Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. “If a person maliciously destroys a notice which has been entered in the register of an official, or written on papyrus, or any other substance, and which has reference to the general jurisdiction of the said official and not to any special matter; judgment should be rendered against him for fifty aurei, and anyone may bring suit for the same.” 1Slaves and sons of families also are affected by the terms of this edict; and the Prætor includes both sexes. 2If anyone should cause this damage before the notice has been published or while it is being published, the words of the Edict will be without effect; but Pomponius holds that the principle of the Edict is applicable to such a case. 3If the offence has been committed by slaves who are not defended by their masters, or by persons who are in poverty, corporeal punishment shall be inflicted. 4Malice is mentioned in the words of the Edict, because if anyone should commit such an act through ignorance or stupidity, or by the order of the Prætor himself, or through accident, he will not be liable. 5He who removes the document, even though he may not destroy it, is also liable under this Edict which includes both him who performs the act himself and him who orders another to perform it; but if anyone performs it without malice by the direction of another who was actuated by malice, the latter will be liable; and if both of them act maliciously both will be liable; and if several persons commit the act, whether they destroy documents, or order this to be done, all will be liable.

Ad Dig. 2,1,10ROHGE, Bd. 21 (1877), Nr. 31, S. 86: Rechtsweg gegen einen Beschluß der Gesellschafter über Ausschließung eines Socius.Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. He who presides over the administration of justice ought not to render judgment in his own case, or in that of his wife or children, or of his freedmen, or of any others whom he has with him.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. The Edict is characterized by the greatest equity and is without just cause of complaint by anyone, for who will refuse to be judged by the same law which he himself applied, or caused to be applied to others? 1“If anyone invested with magistracy, or other authority has established a new rule against any party, he must himself be judged by the same, when his adversary demands it. Where anyone has obtained the application of a new law before an official invested with magistracy, or other authority, and subsequently some adversary of his demands it, he shall have his case decided against him by the same law; that is to say, that whatever anyone thinks to be just with reference to another party he must suffer to prevail against himself as well.” 2Moreover, these words, “What he who administers justice has established”, we must accept according to the effect, and not according to the words; and therefore if anyone wishes to render a decision and is prevented from doing so, and his decision should not have any effect, the Edict does not apply, for the word “established” denotes something which has been perfected, a wrong which has been consummated and not merely begun; and therefore if anyone administers justice between parties over whom he has no jurisdiction, since the proceedings are void and his judgment has no force, We think that the Edict does not apply; for what does an attempt amount to when no injury resulted?

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. When anyone has obtained an unjust decision against another, the same rule shall be applied to the party alone, where this took place on his own motion; but if he did not ask for it, it cannot be enforced against him. But where he obtained it, whether he made use of any rule or merely had permission to avail himself of it, but did not do so, he will be punished under this Edict. 1If my procurator made this unjust demand, the question arises to whom this same rule should be applied. Pomponius thinks to me alone, that is if I delegated my authority to him for an especial purpose, or ratified it. Where, however, the guardian or curator of an insane person or of a minor makes such a demand, he himself shall be punished by this Edict. The same rule shall be observed against the procurator if he was appointed in a matter in which he was interested. 2This penalty is incurred by all who are included in the provisions of the Edict, not only by the petitioner who was injured by him, but by every one whomsoever who institutes proceedings at any time. 3If anyone for whom you are surety has obtained an order of court prohibiting any debtor from filing an exception against him, and you wish to file one in the matter in which you become surety; neither he nor you should obtain the same; although in the meantime you may suffer injury if your debtor is not solvent. But if you yourself come under the terms of the Edict, the principal debtor may plead the exception, but you cannot do so; and the penalty to which you are liable will not affect him, and hence you will have no right of action on mandate against him. 4If my son, while a magistrate, should come within the terms of this Edict, will the Edict be applicable in any actions which I may bring in his behalf? I do not think so, as otherwise my condition will become worse on his account. 5When the Prætor says: “He must be judged by the same rule”, is this penalty transmitted to the heir? Julianus stated that the action should not only be refused to him, but also to his heir. 6He also stated, and not without reason, that he was liable to the penalty of the Edict, not only with reference to rights of action in which he was involved when he came within the terms of the Edict, but also with reference to all those which were acquired for him subsequently. 7Julianus thinks that money already paid under such circumstances cannot be recovered, as there was still ground for payment under natural law, which prohibits recovery.

The Same, On the Edict, Book III. Ad Dig. 5,1,2 pr.ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 328: Voraussetzung der stillschweigenden Prorogation des Gerichtsstandes.To “agree” is considered to mean that parties who are aware that they are not subject to the jurisdiction of a certain judge, nevertheless consent that he shall preside. If, however, they think that he has jurisdiction, he will not, merely for that reason, have it; for, (as Julianus says in the First Book of the Digest) the mistake of litigants does not constitute an agreement; or, where they think that a person is a Prætor who is not one, this error does not also confer jurisdiction, nor does any jurisdiction exist where one of the litigants refuses to comply with the decision of the Prætor and is forcibly compelled to do so. 1Is it sufficient for private parties to agree with one another, or is the consent of the Prætor also necessary? The Lex Julia on Trials says, “In order to prevent private persons from coming to an agreement”. Hence, if private persons do agree, and the Prætor is not aware that they have done so, and he thinks that he has jurisdiction, should it not be considered whether the requirements of the law have been complied with, or not? And I think it may be held that he has jurisdiction. 2Where anyone is appointed judge for a certain time, and all the litigants agree that the time which he ordered to hear the case may be extended, this may be done; unless an extension of time was especially prohibited by order of the Emperor. 3The right is granted deputies to have a case transferred to the place of their residence, where some contract was entered into by them before they were appointed; and similar privileges are conceded to those who were summoned to give evidence, or have been sent for or appointed to go to some province to preside as judges. Where a party has himself appealed, he is not required to answer in proceedings instituted by others during the time of his appeal at Rome, or elsewhere; for Celsus states that, in this instance, the case may be transferred to the place of his residence, since he came to Rome for some other purpose. This opinion of Celsus is a reasonable one. For the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript to Plotius Celsianus, that a party whom he had summoned to Rome for the purpose of rendering the account of a guardianship could not be compelled to join issue in a case involving another guardianship in which he had not been summoned. He also stated in the Rescript to Claudius Flavianus that a minor under twenty-five years of age who petitioned for complete restitution against one Asinianus who had come to Rome on some other business, had no right to be heard there. 4All these persons can have their cases transferred to the places of their own domicile, if they did not contract where suit was brought against them. If, however, they made the contract there, they have not the right of removal; except envoys who, although they may have contracted at Rome, provided they did so before their mission, are not compelled to defend themselves in that city, so long as they remain there as envoys. This Julianus also held, and the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript. It is evident that if they remained at Rome after their mission was concluded, then, as the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript, suit can be brought against them there. 5Moreover, if they entered into a contract outside of their own province, but not in Italy, the question arises, can they be sued at Rome? Marcellus states that they can only use the privilege of having a case transferred to the place of their residence, when they entered into the contract in their own city, or, at all events, in their own province; which is true. But if they themselves bring an action, they must defend themselves against all others; but not, however, where they bring suit for injury done to them, or for theft, or for damages which they have sustained during their absence from home; otherwise, as Julianus very properly says, they would have to endure insult and loss without being able to obtain redress; or anyone, by attacking them would have the power to subject them to jurisdiction as soon as they claim reparation. 6If, however, any doubt should arise whether anyone in a case of this kind can have it transferred to the place of his residence or not, the Prætor should decide the question after investigation. If he should determine that the party had a right to have the case transferred to the place of his residence, the latter must make arrangements to appear in court for trial, after the Prætor has fixed the day of his appearance. Marcellus doubts whether he should merely execute a mere undertaking to appear, or give security to do so, and it seems to me that his promise alone would be sufficient, and this Mela also stated; otherwise, he would be compelled to join issue instead of finding persons to give security for him. 7In all cases in which time is extended, this should be done without causing any loss to creditors by lapse of time. 8The right of imposing a fine is conferred upon those who hold the position of public judges, and to no others, unless this is specially granted to them.

The Same, On the Edict, Book III. In all noxal actions where the knowledge of the owner is required, this must be understood to mean that the owner could have been able to prevent the wrong but did not do so; for it is one thing to cause a slave to commit an offence, and another to suffer him to do so.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book V. Where a slave belonging to several persons commits an offence of which they are all ignorant, a noxal action will be granted against any one of them. But if they were all aware of it, any one of them will be liable without consideration of the surrender of the slave by way of reparation, just as if they had all committed the offence; nor will one of them be liberated if the other should be sued. Still, where one of the owners knew and the other was ignorant of the fact, the one who knew will be sued without the surrender of the slave being considered, and the one who did not know will be sued with the right to surrender him. 1The difference between these two proceedings is not merely that the owner who knows is liable for the entire amount, but also that if he who knows should sell the slave or manumit him, and the slave should die, the said owner will be liable; but if the owner himself should die, his heir will not be liable.

The Same, On the Edict, Book III. A noxal action, however, is not granted unless the slave is under my control, and if he is, although he was not under my control at the time he committed the offence, I will be liable, and my heir will be liable, if the offending slave was living. 1Pomponius says that if a purchaser of the slave is sued in a noxal action, the vendor who had knowledge of the act can no longer be sued.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. No one suffers a penalty for merely thinking.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book III. The terms “claim” and “property” refer to all contracts and obligations. 1The expression, “According to the laws,” must be understood to mean the spirit as well as the letter of the law.