Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Ulp.ed. XV
Ad edictum praetoris lib.Ulpiani Ad edictum praetoris libri

Ad edictum praetoris libri

Ex libro XV

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Dig. 1,1De iustitia et iure (Concerning Justice and Law.)Dig. 1,2De origine iuris et omnium magistratuum et successione prudentium (Concerning the Origin of Law and of All Magistrates, Together With a Succession of Jurists.)Dig. 1,3De legibus senatusque consultis et longa consuetudine (Concerning Statutes, Decrees of the Senate, and Long Established Customs.)Dig. 1,4De constitutionibus principum (Concerning the Constitutions of the Emperors.)Dig. 1,5De statu hominum (Concerning the Condition of Men.)Dig. 1,6De his qui sui vel alieni iuris sunt (Concerning Those Who Are Their Own Masters, and Those That Are Under the Control of Others.)Dig. 1,7De adoptionibus et emancipationibus et aliis modis quibus potestas solvitur (Concerning Adoptions and Emancipations, and Other Methods by Which Paternal Authority is Dissolved.)Dig. 1,8De divisione rerum et qualitate (Concerning the Division and Nature of Things.)Dig. 1,9De senatoribus (Concerning Senators.)Dig. 1,10De officio consulis (Concerning the Office of Consul.)Dig. 1,11De officio praefecti praetorio (Concerning the Office of Prætorian Prefect.)Dig. 1,12De officio praefecti urbi (Concerning the Office of Prefect of the City.)Dig. 1,13De officio quaestoris (Concerning the Office of Quæstor.)Dig. 1,14De officio praetorum (Concerning the Office of the Prætors.)Dig. 1,15De officio praefecti vigilum (Concerning the Office of Prefect of the Night Watch.)Dig. 1,16De officio proconsulis et legati (Concerning the Office of Proconsul, and his Deputy.)Dig. 1,17 (100,0 %)De officio praefecti Augustalis (Concerning the Office of Augustal Prefect.)Dig. 1,18De officio praesidis (Concerning the Office of Governor.)Dig. 1,19De officio procuratoris Caesaris vel rationalis (Concerning the Office of the Imperial Steward or Accountant.)Dig. 1,20De officio iuridici (Concerning the Office of Juridicus.)Dig. 1,21De officio eius, cui mandata est iurisdictio (Concerning the Office of Him to Whom Jurisdiction is Delegated.)Dig. 1,22De officio adsessorum (Concerning the Office of Assessors.)
Dig. 2,1De iurisdictione (Concerning Jurisdiction.)Dig. 2,2Quod quisque iuris in alterum statuerit, ut ipse eodem iure utatur (Each One Must Himself Use the Law Which He Has Established for Others.)Dig. 2,3Si quis ius dicenti non obtemperaverit (Where Anyone Refuses Obedience to a Magistrate Rendering Judgment.)Dig. 2,4De in ius vocando (Concerning Citations Before a Court of Justice.)Dig. 2,5Si quis in ius vocatus non ierit sive quis eum vocaverit, quem ex edicto non debuerit (Where Anyone Who is Summoned Does Not Appear, and Where Anyone Summoned a Person Whom, According to the Edict, He Should Not Have Summoned.)Dig. 2,6In ius vocati ut eant aut satis vel cautum dent (Persons Who Are Summoned Must Either Appear, or Give Bond or Security to Do So.)Dig. 2,7Ne quis eum qui in ius vocabitur vi eximat (No One Can Forcibly Remove a Person Who Has Been Summoned to Court.)Dig. 2,8Qui satisdare cogantur vel iurato promittant vel suae promissioni committantur (What Persons Are Compelled to Give a Surety, and Who Can Make a Promise Under Oath, or Be Bound by a Mere Promise.)Dig. 2,9Si ex noxali causa agatur, quemadmodum caveatur (In What Way Security Must Be Given in a Noxal Action.)Dig. 2,10De eo per quem factum erit quominus quis in iudicio sistat (Concerning One Who Prevents a Person From Appearing in Court.)Dig. 2,11Si quis cautionibus in iudicio sistendi causa factis non obtemperaverit (Where a Party Who Has Given a Bond to Appear in Court Does Not Do So.)Dig. 2,12De feriis et dilationibus et diversis temporibus (Concerning Festivals, Delays, and Different Seasons.)Dig. 2,13De edendo (Concerning the Statement of a Case.)Dig. 2,14De pactis (Concerning Agreements.)Dig. 2,15De transactionibus (Concerning Compromises.)
Dig. 27,1De excusationibus (Concerning the Excuses of Guardians and Curators.)Dig. 27,2Ubi pupillus educari vel morari debeat et de alimentis ei praestandis (Where a Ward Should Be Brought Up, or Reside, and Concerning the Support Which Should Be Furnished Him.)Dig. 27,3De tutelae et rationibus distrahendis et utili curationis causa actione (Concerning the Action to Compel an Accounting for Guardianship, and the Equitable Action Based on Curatorship.)Dig. 27,4De contraria tutelae et utili actione (Concerning the Counter-action on Guardianship and the Prætorian Action.)Dig. 27,5De eo qui pro tutore prove curatore negotia gessit (Concerning One Who Transacts Business as Acting Guardian or Curator.)Dig. 27,6Quod falso tutore auctore gestum esse dicatur (Concerning Business Transacted Under the Authority of a False Guardian.)Dig. 27,7De fideiussoribus et nominatoribus et heredibus tutorum et curatorum (Concerning the Sureties of Guardians and Curators and Those Who Have Offered Them, and the Heirs of the Former.)Dig. 27,8De magistratibus conveniendis (Concerning Suits Against Magistrates.)Dig. 27,9De rebus eorum, qui sub tutela vel cura sunt, sine decreto non alienandis vel supponendis (Concerning the Property of Those Who Are Under Guardianship or Curatorship, and With Reference To The Alienation or Encumbrance of Their Property Without a Decree.)Dig. 27,10De curatoribus furioso et aliis extra minores dandis (Concerning the Appointment of Curators for Insane Persons and Others Who Are Not Minors.)
Dig. 37,1De bonorum possessionibus (Concerning the Prætorian Possession of Property.)Dig. 37,2Si tabulae testamenti extabunt (Concerning Prætorian Possession Where There is a Will.)Dig. 37,3De bonorum possessione furioso infanti muto surdo caeco competente (Concerning the Prætorian Possession of Property Granted to an Insane Person, an Infant, or One Who is Dumb, Deaf, or Blind.)Dig. 37,4De bonorum possessione contra tabulas (Concerning the Prætorian Possession of Property Contrary to the Provisions of the Will.)Dig. 37,5De legatis praestandis contra tabulas bonorum possessione petita (Concerning the Payment of Legacies Where Prætorian Possession of an Estate is Obtained Contrary to the Provisions of the Will.)Dig. 37,6De collatione bonorum (Concerning the Collation of Property.)Dig. 37,7De dotis collatione (Concerning Collation of the Dowry.)Dig. 37,8De coniungendis cum emancipato liberis eius (Concerning the Contribution to be Made Between an Emancipated Son and His Children.)Dig. 37,9De ventre in possessionem mittendo et curatore eius (Concerning the Placing of an Unborn Child in Possession of an Estate, and his Curator.)Dig. 37,10De Carboniano edicto (Concerning the Carbonian Edict.)Dig. 37,11De bonorum possessione secundum tabulas (Concerning Prætorian Possession of an Estate in Accordance with the Provisions of the Will.)Dig. 37,12Si a parente quis manumissus sit (Concerning Prætorian Possession Where a Son Has Been Manumitted by His Father.)Dig. 37,13De bonorum possessione ex testamento militis (Concerning Prætorian Possession of an Estate in the Case of the Will of a Soldier.)Dig. 37,14De iure patronatus (Concerning the Right of Patronage.)Dig. 37,15De obsequiis parentibus et patronis praestandis (Concerning the Respect Which Should be Shown to Parents and Patrons.)
Dig. 38,1De operis libertorum (Concerning the Services of Freedmen.)Dig. 38,2De bonis libertorum (Concerning the Property of Freedmen.)Dig. 38,3De libertis universitatium (Concerning the Freedmen of Municipalities.)Dig. 38,4De adsignandis libertis (Concerning the Assignment of Freedmen.)Dig. 38,5Si quid in fraudem patroni factum sit (Where Anything is Done to Defraud the Patron.)Dig. 38,6Si tabulae testamenti nullae extabunt, unde liberi (Where no Will is in Existence by Which Children May be Benefited.)Dig. 38,7Unde legitimi (Concerning Prætorian Possession by Agnates.)Dig. 38,8Unde cognati (Concerning the Prætorian Possession Granted to Cognates.)Dig. 38,9De successorio edicto (Concerning the Successory Edict.)Dig. 38,10De gradibus et adfinibus et nominibus eorum (Concerning the Degrees of Relationship and Affinity and Their Different Names.)Dig. 38,11Unde vir et uxor (Concerning Prætorian Possession With Reference to Husband and Wife.)Dig. 38,12De veteranorum et militum successione (Concerning the Succession of Veterans and Soldiers.)Dig. 38,13Quibus non competit bonorum possessio (Concerning Those Who are Not Entitled to Prætorian Possession of an Estate.)Dig. 38,14Ut ex legibus senatusve consultis bonorum possessio detur (Concerning Prætorian Possession of Property Granted by Special Laws or Decrees of the Senate.)Dig. 38,15Quis ordo in possessionibus servetur (What Order is to be Observed in Granting Prætorian Possession.)Dig. 38,16De suis et legitimis heredibus (Concerning Proper Heirs and Heirs at Law.)Dig. 38,17Ad senatus consultum Tertullianum et Orphitianum (On the Tertullian and Orphitian Decrees of the Senate.)
Dig. 40,1De manumissionibus (Concerning Manumissions.)Dig. 40,2De manumissis vindicta (Concerning Manumissions Before a Magistrate.)Dig. 40,3De manumissionibus quae servis ad universitatem pertinentibus imponuntur (Concerning the Manumission of Slaves Belonging to a Community.)Dig. 40,4De manumissis testamento (Concerning Testamentary Manumissions.)Dig. 40,5De fideicommissariis libertatibus (Concerning Freedom Granted Under the Terms of a Trust.)Dig. 40,6De ademptione libertatis (Concerning the Deprivation of Freedom.)Dig. 40,7De statuliberis (Concerning Slaves Who are to be Free Under a Certain Condition.)Dig. 40,8Qui sine manumissione ad libertatem perveniunt (Concerning Slaves Who Obtain Their Freedom Without Manumission.)Dig. 40,9Qui et a quibus manumissi liberi non fiunt et ad legem Aeliam Sentiam (What Slaves, Having Been Manumitted, do not Become Free, by Whom This is Done; and on the Law of Ælia Sentia.)Dig. 40,10De iure aureorum anulorum (Concerning the Right to Wear a Gold Ring.)Dig. 40,11De natalibus restituendis (Concerning the Restitution of the Rights of Birth.)Dig. 40,12De liberali causa (Concerning Actions Relating to Freedom.)Dig. 40,13Quibus ad libertatem proclamare non licet (Concerning Those Who are Not Permitted to Demand Their Freedom.)Dig. 40,14Si ingenuus esse dicetur (Where Anyone is Decided to be Freeborn.)Dig. 40,15Ne de statu defunctorum post quinquennium quaeratur (No Question as to the Condition of Deceased Persons Shall be Raised After Five Years Have Elapsed After Their Death.)Dig. 40,16De collusione detegenda (Concerning the Detection of Collusion.)
Dig. 43,1De interdictis sive extraordinariis actionibus, quae pro his competunt (Concerning Interdicts or the Extraordinary Proceedings to Which They Give Rise.)Dig. 43,2Quorum bonorum (Concerning the Interdict Quorum Bonorum.)Dig. 43,3Quod legatorum (Concerning the Interdict Quod Legatorum.)Dig. 43,4Ne vis fiat ei, qui in possessionem missus erit (Concerning the Interdict Which Prohibits Violence Being Employed Against a Person Placed in Possession.)Dig. 43,5De tabulis exhibendis (Concerning the Production of Papers Relating to a Will.)Dig. 43,6Ne quid in loco sacro fiat (Concerning the Interdict for the Purpose of Preventing Anything Being Done in a Sacred Place.)Dig. 43,7De locis et itineribus publicis (Concerning the Interdict Relating to Public Places and Highways.)Dig. 43,8Ne quid in loco publico vel itinere fiat (Concerning the Interdict Forbidding Anything to be Done in a Public Place or on a Highway.)Dig. 43,9De loco publico fruendo (Concerning the Edict Relating to the Enjoyment of a Public Place.)Dig. 43,10De via publica et si quid in ea factum esse dicatur (Concerning the Edict Which Has Reference to Public Streets and Anything Done Therein.)Dig. 43,11De via publica et itinere publico reficiendo (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to Repairs of Public Streets and Highways.)Dig. 43,12De fluminibus. ne quid in flumine publico ripave eius fiat, quo peius navigetur (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to Rivers and the Prevention of Anything Being Done in Them or on Their Banks Which May Interfere With Navigation.)Dig. 43,13Ne quid in flumine publico fiat, quo aliter aqua fluat, atque uti priore aestate fluxit (Concerning the Interdict to Prevent Anything From Being Built in a Public River or on Its Bank Which Might Cause the Water to Flow in a Different Direction Than it did During the Preceding Summer.)Dig. 43,14Ut in flumine publico navigare liceat (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to the Use of a Public River for Navigation.)Dig. 43,15De ripa munienda (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to Raising the Banks of Streams.)Dig. 43,16De vi et de vi armata (Concerning the Interdict Against Violence and Armed Force.)Dig. 43,17Uti possidetis (Concerning the Interdict Uti Possidetis.)Dig. 43,18De superficiebus (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to the Surface of the Land.)Dig. 43,19De itinere actuque privato (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to Private Rights of Way.)Dig. 43,20De aqua cottidiana et aestiva (Concerning the Edict Which Has Reference to Water Used Every Day and to Such as is Only Used During the Summer.)Dig. 43,21De rivis (Concerning the Interdict Having Reference to Conduits.)Dig. 43,22De fonte (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to Springs.)Dig. 43,23De cloacis (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to Sewers.)Dig. 43,24Quod vi aut clam (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to Works Undertaken by Violence or Clandestinely.)Dig. 43,25De remissionibus (Concerning the Withdrawal of Opposition.)Dig. 43,26De precario (Concerning Precarious Tenures.)Dig. 43,27De arboribus caedendis (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to the Cutting of Trees.)Dig. 43,28De glande legenda (Concerning the Interdict Having Reference to the Gathering of Fruit Which Has Fallen From the Premises of One Person Upon Those of Another.)Dig. 43,29De homine libero exhibendo (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to the Production of a Person Who Is Free.)Dig. 43,30De liberis exhibendis, item ducendis (Concerning the Interdict Which Has Reference to the Production of Children and Their Recovery.)Dig. 43,31Utrubi (Concerning the Interdict Utrubi.)Dig. 43,32De migrando (Concerning the Interdict Having Reference to the Removal of Tenants.)Dig. 43,33De Salviano interdicto (Concerning the Salvian Interdict.)
Dig. 47,1De privatis delictis (Concerning Private Offences.)Dig. 47,2De furtis (Concerning Thefts.)Dig. 47,3De tigno iuncto (Concerning the Theft of Timbers Joined to a Building.)Dig. 47,4Si is, qui testamento liber esse iussus erit, post mortem domini ante aditam hereditatem subripuisse aut corrupisse quid dicetur (Where Anyone Who is Ordered to be Free by the Terms of a Will, After the Death of His Master and Before the Estate is Entered Upon, is Said to Have Stolen or Spoiled Something.)Dig. 47,5Furti adversus nautas caupones stabularios (Concerning Theft Committed Against Captains of Vessels, Innkeepers, and Landlords.)Dig. 47,6Si familia furtum fecisse dicetur (Concerning Thefts Alleged to Have Been Made by an Entire Body of Slaves.)Dig. 47,7Arborum furtim caesarum (Concerning Trees Cut Down by Stealth.)Dig. 47,8Vi bonorum raptorum et de turba (Concerning the Robbery of Property by Violence, and Disorderly Assemblages.)Dig. 47,9De incendio ruina naufragio rate nave expugnata (Concerning Fire, Destruction, and Shipwreck, Where a Boat or a Ship is Taken by Force.)Dig. 47,10 (0,2 %)De iniuriis et famosis libellis (Concerning Injuries and Infamous Libels.)Dig. 47,11De extraordinariis criminibus (Concerning the Arbitrary Punishment of Crime.)Dig. 47,12De sepulchro violato (Concerning the Violation of Sepulchres.)Dig. 47,13De concussione (Concerning Extortion.)Dig. 47,14De abigeis (Concerning Those Who Steal Cattle.)Dig. 47,15De praevaricatione (Concerning Prevarication.)Dig. 47,16De receptatoribus (Concerning Those Who Harbor Criminals.)Dig. 47,17De furibus balneariis (Concerning Thieves Who Steal in Baths.)Dig. 47,18De effractoribus et expilatoribus (Concerning Those Who Break Out of Prison, and Plunderers.)Dig. 47,19Expilatae hereditatis (Concerning the Spoliation of Estates.)Dig. 47,20Stellionatus (Concerning Stellionatus.)Dig. 47,21De termino moto (Concerning the Removal of Boundaries.)Dig. 47,22De collegiis et corporibus (Concerning Associations and Corporations.)Dig. 47,23De popularibus actionibus (Concerning Popular Actions.)
Dig. 48,1De publicis iudiciis (On Criminal Prosecutions.)Dig. 48,2De accusationibus et inscriptionibus (Concerning Accusations and Inscriptions.)Dig. 48,3De custodia et exhibitione reorum (Concerning the Custody and Appearance of Defendants in Criminal Cases.)Dig. 48,4Ad legem Iuliam maiestatis (On the Julian Law Relating to the Crime of Lese Majesty.)Dig. 48,5Ad legem Iuliam de adulteriis coercendis (Concerning the Julian Law for the Punishment of Adultery.)Dig. 48,6Ad legem Iuliam de vi publica (Concerning the Julian Law on Public Violence.)Dig. 48,7Ad legem Iuliam de vi privata (Concerning the Julian Law Relating to Private Violence.)Dig. 48,8Ad legem Corneliam de siccariis et veneficis (Concerning the Cornelian Law Relating to Assassins and Poisoners.)Dig. 48,9De lege Pompeia de parricidiis (Concerning the Pompeian Law on Parricides.)Dig. 48,10De lege Cornelia de falsis et de senatus consulto Liboniano (Concerning the Cornelian Law on Deceit and the Libonian Decree of the Senate.)Dig. 48,11De lege Iulia repetundarum (Concerning the Julian Law on Extortion.)Dig. 48,12De lege Iulia de annona (Concerning the Julian Law on Provisions.)Dig. 48,13Ad legem Iuliam peculatus et de sacrilegis et de residuis (Concerning the Julian Law Relating to Peculation, Sacrilege, and Balances.)Dig. 48,14De lege Iulia ambitus (Concerning the Julian Law With Reference to the Unlawful Seeking of Office.)Dig. 48,15De lege Fabia de plagiariis (Concerning the Favian Law With Reference to Kidnappers.)Dig. 48,16Ad senatus consultum Turpillianum et de abolitionibus criminum (Concerning the Turpillian Decree of the Senate and the Dismissal of Charges.)Dig. 48,17De requirendis vel absentibus damnandis (Concerning the Conviction of Persons Who Are Sought For or Are Absent.)Dig. 48,18De quaestionibus (Concerning Torture.)Dig. 48,19De poenis (Concerning Punishments.)Dig. 48,20De bonis damnatorum (Concerning the Property of Persons Who Have Been Convicted.)Dig. 48,21De bonis eorum, qui ante sententiam vel mortem sibi consciverunt vel accusatorem corruperunt (Concerning the Property of Those Who Have Either Killed Themselves or Corrupted Their Accusers Before Judgment Has Been Rendered.)Dig. 48,22De interdictis et relegatis et deportatis (Concerning Persons Who Are Interdicted, Relegated, and Deported.)Dig. 48,23De sententiam passis et restitutis (Concerning Persons Upon Whom Sentence Has Been Passed and Who Have Been Restored to Their Rights.)Dig. 48,24De cadaveribus punitorum (Concerning the Corpses of Persons Who Are Punished.)
Dig. 49,1De appellationibus et relegationibus (On Appeals and Reports.)Dig. 49,2A quibus appellari non licet (From What Persons It Is Not Permitted to Appeal.)Dig. 49,3Quis a quo appelletur (To Whom and From Whom an Appeal Can be Taken.)Dig. 49,4Quando appellandum sit et intra quae tempora (When an Appeal Should be Taken, and Within What Time.)Dig. 49,5De appellationibus recipiendis vel non (Concerning the Acceptance or Rejection of Appeals.)Dig. 49,6De libellis dimissoriis, qui apostoli dicuntur (Concerning Notices of Appeal Called Dispatches.)Dig. 49,7Nihil innovari appellatione interposita (No Change Shall be Made After the Appeal Has Been Interposed.)Dig. 49,8Quae sententiae sine appellatione rescindantur (What Decisions Can be Rescinded Without an Appeal.)Dig. 49,9An per alium causae appellationum reddi possunt (Whether the Reasons for an Appeal Can be Presented by Another.)Dig. 49,10Si tutor vel curator magistratusve creatus appellaverit (Where a Guardian, a Curator, or a Magistrate Having Been Appointed, Appeals.)Dig. 49,11Eum qui appellaverit in provincia defendi (He Who Appeals Should Be Defended in His Own Province.)Dig. 49,12Apud eum, a quo appellatur, aliam causam agere compellendum (Where a Party Litigant is Compelled to Bring Another Action Before the Judge From Whose Decision He Has Already Appealed.)Dig. 49,13Si pendente appellatione mors intervenerit (If Death Should Occur While an Appeal is Pending.)Dig. 49,14De iure fisci (Concerning the Rights of the Treasury.)Dig. 49,15De captivis et de postliminio et redemptis ab hostibus (Concerning Captives, the Right of Postliminium, and Persons Ransomed From the Enemy.)Dig. 49,16De re militari (Concerning Military Affairs.)Dig. 49,17De castrensi peculio (Concerning Castrense Peculium.)Dig. 49,18De veteranis (Concerning Veterans.)
Dig. 1,17,1Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Prae­fec­tus Ae­gyp­ti non prius de­po­nit prae­fec­tu­ram et im­pe­rium, quod ad si­mi­li­tu­di­nem pro­con­su­lis le­ge sub Au­gus­to ei da­tum est, quam Ale­xan­driam in­gres­sus sit suc­ces­sor eius, li­cet in pro­vin­ciam ve­ne­rit: et ita man­da­tis eius con­ti­ne­tur.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. The Prefect of Egypt does not lay aside his prefectship and the authority granted to him by law under Augustus, as Proconsuls do, before his successor enters the City of Alexandria; even though he may have already reached the province; and it is so stated in his commission.

Dig. 5,3,2Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. (si­ve suo no­mi­ne si­ve per se si­ve per alios ef­fec­ti su­mus,

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. Whether we become heirs directly by our own acts, or by those of others;

Dig. 5,3,9Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Re­gu­la­ri­ter de­fi­nien­dum est eum de­mum te­ne­ri pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis, qui vel ius pro he­rede vel pro pos­ses­so­re pos­si­det vel rem he­redi­ta­riam

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. It should be laid down as a regular rule that, “The only person liable to an action for the recovery of an estate is he who has a right either as heir or as possessor to a portion of the same.”

Dig. 5,3,11Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Pro he­rede pos­si­det, qui pu­tat se he­redem es­se. sed an et is, qui scit se he­redem non es­se, pro he­rede pos­si­deat, quae­ri­tur: et Ar­ria­nus li­bro se­cun­do de in­ter­dic­tis pu­tat te­ne­ri, quo iu­re nos uti Pro­cu­lus scri­bit. sed enim et bo­no­rum pos­ses­sor pro he­rede vi­de­tur pos­si­de­re. 1Pro pos­ses­so­re ve­ro pos­si­det prae­do,

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. A person is in possession “as an heir” when he thinks himself to be the heir. But, it may be asked, how is it with him who knows that he is not the heir, and yet holds possession in that capacity? Arrianus, in the Second Book On Interdicts, is of the opinion that he is liable; and Proculus states that this is our practice, for it is held that a possessor of the property of an estate is held to possess the same in the capacity of heir. 1A depredator, in fact, holds the estate “as possessor”,

Dig. 5,3,13Idem li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. nec ul­lam cau­sam pos­ses­sio­nis pos­sit di­ce­re: et id­eo fur et rap­tor pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis te­nen­tur. 1Om­ni­bus et­iam ti­tu­lis hic pro pos­ses­so­re hae­ret et qua­si in­iunc­tus est. de­ni­que et pro emp­to­re ti­tu­lo hae­ret: nam si a fu­rio­so eme­ro sciens, pro pos­ses­so­re pos­si­deo. item in ti­tu­lo pro do­na­to quae­ri­tur, an quis pro pos­ses­so­re pos­si­deat, ut pu­ta uxor vel ma­ri­tus: et pla­cet no­bis Iu­lia­ni sen­ten­tia pro pos­ses­so­re pos­si­de­re eum, et id­eo pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis te­ne­bi­tur. item pro do­te ti­tu­lus re­ci­pit pro pos­ses­so­re pos­ses­sio­nem, ut pu­ta si a mi­no­re duo­de­cim an­nis nup­ta mi­hi qua­si do­tem sciens ac­ce­pi. et si le­ga­tum mi­hi so­lu­tum est ex fal­sa cau­sa scien­ti, uti­que pro pos­ses­so­re pos­si­de­bo. 2Is au­tem qui re­sti­tuit he­redi­ta­tem te­ne­ri he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­ne non pot­est, ni­si do­lo fe­cit, id est si scit et re­sti­tuit: nam et do­lus prae­ter­itus venit in he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­ne, qua­si do­lo de­sie­rit pos­si­de­re. 3Ne­ra­tius li­bro sex­to mem­bra­na­rum scri­bit ab he­rede pe­ti he­redi­ta­tem pos­se, et­iam si igno­ret pro he­rede vel pro pos­ses­so­re de­func­tum pos­se­dis­se. idem es­se li­bro sep­ti­mo ait et­iam si pu­ta­vit he­res eas res ex hac he­redi­ta­te es­se quae si­bi de­la­ta est. 4Quid si quis he­redi­ta­tem eme­rit, an uti­lis in eum pe­ti­tio he­redi­ta­tis de­be­ret da­ri, ne sin­gu­lis iu­di­ciis ve­xa­re­tur? ven­di­to­rem enim te­ne­ri cer­tum est: sed fin­ge non ex­ta­re ven­di­to­rem vel mo­di­co ven­di­dis­se et bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­so­rem fuis­se: an por­ri­gi ma­nus ad emp­to­rem de­beant? et pu­tat Gaius Cas­sius dan­dam uti­lem ac­tio­nem. 5Idem erit di­cen­dum et si par­vo pre­tio ius­sus ven­de­re he­res Ti­tio he­redi­ta­tem ven­di­dit: nam pu­tat di­cen­dum Pa­pi­nia­nus ad­ver­sus fi­dei­com­mis­sa­rium da­ri ac­tio­nem: ab he­rede enim pe­ti non ex­pe­dit per­ex­iguum pre­tium ha­ben­te. 6Sed et si re­ten­ta cer­ta quan­ti­ta­te re­sti­tue­re ro­ga­tus sit, idem erit di­cen­dum. pla­ne si ac­cep­ta cer­ta quan­ti­ta­te re­sti­tue­re ro­ga­tus est, non pu­tat Pa­pi­nia­nus ab he­rede pe­ten­dam he­redi­ta­tem, quon­iam pro he­rede, quod con­di­cio­nis im­plen­dae gra­tia ac­ce­pit, non pos­si­de­tur. sed Sa­b­inus in sta­tu­li­be­ro con­tra: et id ve­rius est, quia pe­cu­nia he­redi­ta­ria est. 7Idem et in eo qui so­los fruc­tus ex he­redi­ta­te re­ti­net, di­cen­dum erit: te­ne­tur enim et is he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­ne. 8Si quis sciens alie­nam emit he­redi­ta­tem, qua­si pro pos­ses­so­re pos­si­det: et sic pe­ti ab eo he­redi­ta­tem qui­dam pu­tant. quam sen­ten­tiam non pu­to ve­ram: ne­mo enim prae­do est qui pre­tium nu­me­ra­vit: sed ut emp­tor uni­ver­si­ta­tis uti­li te­ne­tur. 9Item si quis a fis­co he­redi­ta­tem qua­si va­can­tem eme­rit, ae­quis­si­mum erit uti­lem ac­tio­nem ad­ver­sus eum da­ri. 10Apud Mar­cel­lum li­bro quar­to di­ges­to­rum re­la­tum est, si mu­lier he­redi­ta­tem in do­tem de­dit, ma­ri­tum pro do­te qui­dem pos­si­de­re he­redi­ta­tem, sed pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis uti­li te­ne­ri: sed et ip­sam mu­lie­rem di­rec­ta te­ne­ri Mar­cel­lus scri­bit, ma­xi­me si iam fac­tum di­vor­tium est. 11He­redem au­tem et­iam ea­rum re­rum no­mi­ne, quas de­func­tus pro emp­to­re pos­se­dit, he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­ne te­ne­ri con­stat, qua­si pro he­rede pos­si­deat: quam­vis et­iam ea­rum re­rum no­mi­ne, quas pro he­rede vel pro pos­ses­so­re de­func­tus pos­se­dit, uti­que te­n­ea­tur. 12Si quis ab­sen­tis no­mi­ne pos­si­deat he­redi­ta­tem, cum sit in­cer­tum an il­le ra­tum ha­beat, pu­to ab­sen­tis no­mi­ne pe­ten­dam he­redi­ta­tem, ip­sius ve­ro ne­qua­quam, quia non vi­de­tur pro he­rede vel pro pos­ses­so­re pos­si­de­re, qui con­tem­pla­tio­ne al­te­rius pos­si­det: ni­si for­te quis di­xe­rit, cum ra­tum non ha­bet, iam pro­cu­ra­to­rem qua­si prae­do­nem es­se: tunc enim suo no­mi­ne te­ne­ri pot­est. 13Non so­lum au­tem ab eo pe­ti he­redi­tas pot­est, qui cor­pus he­redi­ta­rium pos­si­det, sed et si ni­hil. et vi­den­dum, si non pos­si­dens op­tu­le­rit ta­men se pe­ti­tio­ni, an te­n­ea­tur. et Cel­sus li­bro quar­to di­ges­to­rum scri­bit ex do­lo eum te­ne­ri: do­lo enim fa­ce­re eum qui se of­fert pe­ti­tio­ni. quam sen­ten­tiam ge­ne­ra­li­ter Mar­cel­lus apud Iu­lia­num pro­bat: om­nem, qui se of­fert pe­ti­tio­ni, qua­si pos­si­den­tem te­ne­ri. 14Item si quis do­lo fe­ce­rit, quo mi­nus pos­si­deat, he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­ne te­ne­bi­tur. sed si alius nanc­tus pos­ses­sio­nem, quam ego do­lo ma­lo amis­e­ram, pa­ra­tus sit iu­di­cium pa­ti, Mar­cel­lus li­bro quar­to di­ges­to­rum trac­tat, ne for­te eva­nes­cat ad­ver­sus eum qui de­siit li­tis aes­ti­ma­tio: et ma­gis eva­nes­ce­re ait, ni­si pe­ten­tis in­ter­est: cer­te, in­quit, si rem pa­ra­tus sit re­sti­tue­re, in­du­bi­ta­tum erit eva­nes­ce­re. sed si is qui do­lo de­siit an­te con­ve­nia­tur, eum qui pos­si­det non li­be­ra­bit. 15Item a de­bi­to­re he­redi­ta­rio qua­si a iu­ris pos­ses­so­re: nam et a iu­ris pos­ses­so­ri­bus pos­se he­redi­ta­tem pe­ti con­stat.

The Same, On the Edict, Book XV. Or anyone who cannot allege any right to possession; and therefore thieves and robbers are liable to an action for the recovery of an estate. 1Again, this title “as possessor” is attached and, as it were, joined to all other Titles. Hence it may be attached to the title of “as purchaser”; for if I purchase from an insane person, knowing him to be such, I hold the property “as possessor”. Also with reference to the title “as donee”, the question arises whether the party holds as possessor, for example, a wife or a husband; and we adopt the opinion of Julianus that either of them holds the property in the capacity of possessor, therefore he or she would be liable in a suit for the recovery of the estate. Again, title “by right of dower” takes the form of possession; as for instance, where I marry a girl under twenty years of age and accept property as dowry, being aware of her age. Moreover, if a legacy is paid to me on grounds which I know to be false, it is certain that I hold the property “as possessor”. 2But he who delivers an estate under a trust cannot be held liable in a suit for the recovery of the same, unless he acted fraudulently; that is to say, if he knew that it ought not to be delivered, and, nevertheless, surrendered it; for even fraud previously committed is to be considered in a suit for the recovery of an estate, since the party fraudulently relinquished possession. 3Neratius, in the Sixth Book of Parchments, says that a suit for the recovery of an estate can be brought against an heir, even where he did not know that the deceased held the estate in the capacity of either heir or possessor. He states in the Seventh Book that the same rule applies even where the heir thought that the property claimed belonged to some estate to which he was entitled. 4Ad Dig. 5,3,13,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 186, Note 16.How would it be if a person had purchased an estate? Should a prætorian action for the recovery of the estate be granted against him to prevent him being annoyed by separate suits? It is certain that the vendor is liable. But suppose no vendor appears, or he disposes of the property for a small amount of money, and was a bona fide possessor; can recourse be had to the purchaser? Gaius Cassius thinks that a prætorian action should be granted. 5The same rule must be considered to apply where an heir, having been directed to sell the estate for a small sum, disposed of it to Titius. Papinianus thinks that it should be held that an action could be granted against the beneficiary of the trust, as it is not expedient for suit to be brought against the heir where he has received an insignificant sum. 6The same rule will apply where the heir was asked to surrender the estate after retaining a certain amount. It is evident that if, after having received a certain amount, he was asked to surrender the remainder, that suit for recovery cannot be brought against him; (and this is the opinion held by Papinianus) since what the heir received in order to fulfill a condition is not possessed by him. Sabinus, however, holds differently in the case of a slave who is to be free conditionally, and this is the better opinion, because the money belongs to the estate. 7This rule is applicable where a party only retains the profits of the estate, and he also is liable to an action for recovery of the estate. 8Where anyone knowingly purchases an estate which belongs to another, he holds the same as possessor, some authorities think that an action for recovery may be brought against him; but I do not believe that this opinion is correct, for no one is a depredator who pays a price, still, being a purchaser of the entire estate, he is liable to a prætorian action. 9Ad Dig. 5,3,13,9Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 186, Note 16.Moreover, where anyone purchases an estate from the Treasury with the understanding that it has no owner; it is perfectly right that a prætorian action should be granted against him. 10It is stated by Marcellus in the Fourth Book of the Digest, that where a woman gives an estate by way of dowry, the husband is in possession of the same by right of dowry, but is liable to a prætorian action for its recovery. Marcellus, however, says that the woman herself is liable to a direct action, especially if a divorce has already taken place. 11It is also established that the heir to property which the deceased possessed as purchaser is liable to an action for the recovery of the same, for the reason that the heir holds possession “as heir”, although he is also liable to a suit for property which the deceased possessed, either in the capacity of heir or in that of possessor. 12Where anyone is in possession of an estate in behalf of a person who is absent, and it is uncertain whether the latter will ratify his acts or not; I think that suit for recovery can be brought in behalf of the party who is absent, but certainly not on his own account; because a man is not deemed to be in possession “as heir”, or merely “as possessor”, who holds property as the representative of another; unless someone should say that, as the principal did not ratify his acts, the agent is, to a certain extent, a depredator, for then he can be held liable on his own account. 13The action for the recovery of an estate can be brought not only against the person who possesses property which belongs to the estate, but even if he possesses nothing; and it should be considered if where he possesses nothing, and offers to defend the suit himself, whether he does not render himself liable. Celsus states in the Fourth Book of the Digest, that he is liable on the ground of fraud; for anyone who, himself, offers to defend a suit of this kind acts fraudulently. This opinion is generally approved by Marcellus in his comments on Julianus, for he says that every one who volunteers to defend a suit for the recovery of an estate is liable just as if he were in possession of the same. 14Moreover, when anyone is guilty of fraud to avoid being in possession, he will be liable to an action for the recovery of an estate. Where, however, I lose possession through fraud, and another obtains it and is ready to defend an action, Marcellus in the Fourth Book of the Digest discusses the point as to whether the right to damages is not extinguished as against a party who has ceased to be in possession; and he also says that it is extinguished unless the plaintiff has an interest in a contrary decision. He states positively that if the party is prepared to surrender the property, the right of action for damages is undoubtedly extinguished; but if he who relinquishes possession fraudulently is sued before the other, the possessor will not be released from liability. 15The action for the recovery of an estate can also be brought against a debtor to the same, on the principle that he is the possessor of a right; and it is established that suit can be brought for the recovery of an estate against the possessor of a right.

Dig. 5,3,16Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Quod si in diem sit de­bi­tor vel sub con­di­cio­ne, a quo pe­ti­ta est he­redi­tas, non de­be­re eum dam­na­ri. rei pla­ne iu­di­ca­tae tem­pus spec­tan­dum es­se se­cun­dum Oc­ta­ve­ni sen­ten­tiam, ut apud Pom­po­nium scrip­tum est, an dies ve­ne­rit: quod et in sti­pu­la­tio­ne con­di­cio­na­li erit di­cen­dum. si au­tem non ve­ne­rit, ca­ve­re of­fi­cio iu­di­cis de­beat de re­sti­tuen­do hoc de­bi­to, cum dies ve­ne­rit vel con­di­cio ex­ti­te­rit. 1Sed et is qui pre­tia re­rum he­redi­ta­ria­rum pos­si­det, item qui a de­bi­to­re he­redi­ta­rio ex­egit, pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis te­ne­tur. 2Un­de Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to di­ges­to­rum ait ab eo, qui pe­tit he­redi­ta­tem et li­tis aes­ti­ma­tio­nem con­se­cu­tus est, he­redi­ta­tem pe­ti pos­se. 3Non so­lum au­tem a de­bi­to­re de­func­ti, sed et­iam a de­bi­to­re he­redi­ta­rio pe­ti he­redi­tas pot­est: de­ni­que ab eo, qui neg­otia he­redi­ta­ria ges­sit, et Cel­so et Iu­lia­no vi­de­tur pe­ti he­redi­ta­tem pos­se, sed si he­redis neg­otium ges­sit, ne­qua­quam: ab he­redis enim de­bi­to­re pe­ti he­redi­tas non pot­est. 4Iu­lia­nus scri­bit, si is, qui pro he­rede pos­si­de­bat, vi fue­rit de­iec­tus, pe­ti ab eo he­redi­ta­tem pos­se qua­si a iu­ris pos­ses­so­re, quia ha­bet in­ter­dic­tum un­de vi, quo vic­tus ce­de­re de­bet: sed et eum qui de­ie­cit pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis te­ne­ri, quia res he­redi­ta­rias pro pos­ses­so­re pos­si­det. 5Idem Iu­lia­nus ait, si­ve quis pos­si­dens si­ve non rem ven­di­de­rit, pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis eum te­ne­ri, si­ve iam pre­tium re­ce­pit si­ve pe­te­re pos­sit, ut et hic ac­tio­ni­bus ce­dat. 6Idem scri­bit pa­tro­num he­redi­ta­tem pe­te­re non pos­se ab eo, cui li­ber­tus in frau­dem alie­na­vit, quia Cal­vi­sia­na ac­tio­ne ei te­ne­tur: pa­tro­ni enim is­te de­bi­tor est, non he­redi­ta­rius. er­go nec ab eo, cui mor­tis cau­sa do­na­tum est, pe­ti he­redi­tas pot­est. 7Idem Iu­lia­nus scri­bit, si quis ex cau­sa fi­dei­com­mis­si re­sti­tue­rit he­redi­ta­tem vel sin­gu­las res prae­sti­te­rit, pe­ti ab eo he­redi­ta­tem pos­se, quia ha­bet con­dic­tio­nem ea­rum, quae sunt ex ea cau­sa so­lu­tae, et vel­uti iu­ris pos­ses­sor est. 8Sed et si pre­tia re­rum, quas dis­tra­xit, ex cau­sa fi­dei­com­mis­si sol­vit, pe­ti he­redi­ta­tem ab eo pos­se, quia re­pe­te­re pot­est. sed his ca­si­bus ac­tio­nes suas dum­ta­xat eum prae­sta­tu­rum, cum et res ex­stant et pot­est pe­ti­tor et­iam per in rem ac­tio­nem eas vin­di­ca­re.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. Where, however, the person against whom suit is brought for recovery of the estate is a debtor for a sum to be paid within a certain time, and under some condition, judgment should not be rendered against him. It is clear that the time when judgment is rendered should be considered by the court in determining whether the day for payment has arrived, according to the opinion of Octavenus as stated by Pomponius; which would also be the case in a conditional stipulation. If, however, the day of payment has not arrived, the defendant should by order of the judge make provision for the payment of the debt at the proper time, or when the condition is fulfilled. 1He also who is in possession of the price of property belonging to the estate, or who has collected a claim from a debtor to the estate, is liable in an action for the recovery of the estate. 2Wherefore, Julianus states in the Sixth Book of the Digest, an action for the recovery of an estate can be brought against a party who also claims it, and who has collected damages in a suit. 3An action for the recovery of an estate can be brought not only against a debtor of the deceased, but also against a debtor to the estate. It is held by both Celsus and Julianus that it can be brought by anyone who transacted the business of the estate; but where the party transacted business for the heir, this cannot be done, for no action for the recovery of an estate can be brought by anyone indebted to the heir. 4Julianus states that if a person who is in possession as heir is forcibly ejected, suit can be brought by him as the possessor of a right against the estate; for the reason that he is entitled to the interdict Unde vi, which he must assign if he is defeated; but the party who ejected him is also liable to a suit for recovery, because he is in possession “as possessor” of the property belonging to the estate. 5Julianus further says that where anyone sells property belonging to an estate, whether he is in possession, or whether he has received the purchase money or not, or has a right to bring suit for the same, he is, in this case also, required to assign his rights of action. 6He also says that a patron cannot bring suit for an estate against a party to whom his freedman fraudulently made a transfer, because he is liable to the Calvisian Action, at the instance of the said patron, as he is the debtor of the latter, and not the debtor of the estate. Therefore, no suit for the recovery of an estate will lie against one to whom a donation was made mortis causa. 7Ad Dig. 5,3,16,7Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 186, Note 16.Julianus always says that where anyone transfers an estate, or delivers certain articles belonging to the same, in compliance with a trust, suit can be brought against him for recovery; because he has a right to bring a personal action to recover property transferred for that reason, and he is, as it were, the possessor of a right. 8He also states that where he has paid out the purchase-money of articles which he sold in pursuance of the trust, suit for recovery of the estate can be brought against him, because he himself can recover the money. In such instances, however, the heir must only assign his rights of action; since the property is in existence, and the claimant can also recover it by an action in rem.

Dig. 5,3,18Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Item vi­den­dum, si pos­ses­sor he­redi­ta­tis ven­di­tio­ne per ar­gen­ta­rium fac­ta pe­cu­niam apud eum per­di­de­rit, an pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis te­n­ea­tur, quia ni­hil ha­bet nec con­se­qui pot­est. sed La­beo pu­tat eum te­ne­ri, quia suo pe­ri­cu­lo ma­le ar­gen­ta­rio cre­di­dit: sed Oc­ta­ve­nus ait ni­hil eum prae­ter ac­tio­nes prae­sta­tu­rum, ob has igi­tur ac­tio­nes pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis te­ne­ri. mi­hi au­tem in eo, qui ma­la fi­de pos­se­dit, La­beo­nis sen­ten­tia pla­cet: in al­te­ro ve­ro, qui bo­na fi­de pos­ses­sor est, Oc­ta­ve­ni sen­ten­tia se­quen­da es­se vi­de­tur. 1Si quis, cum pe­te­re­tur ab eo he­redi­tas, ne­que rei ne­que iu­ris vel­ut pos­ses­sor erat, ve­rum post­ea ali­quid ad­ep­tus est, an pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis vi­dea­tur te­ne­ri? et Cel­sus li­bro quar­to di­ges­to­rum rec­te scri­bit hunc con­dem­nan­dum, li­cet in­itio ni­hil pos­se­dit. 2Nunc vi­dea­mus, quae ve­niant in he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­ne. et pla­cuit uni­ver­sas res he­redi­ta­rias in hoc iu­di­cium venire, si­ve iu­ra si­ve cor­po­ra sint,

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. It should also be considered, when the possessor of an estate makes a sale through a broker, and the latter loses the money, whether he is liable to a suit for recovery, since he has nothing and can obtain nothing? Labeo thinks that he is liable, becauses he injudiciously trusted the broker at his own risk. Octavenus, however, says that he must assign nothing but his rights of action, for he is liable to a suit to recover these rights. It seems to me that the opinion of Labeo is correct in the case of a party who holds possession in bad faith, but that that of Octavenus is the one to be adopted where the possessor is a bona fide one. 1Where an action is brought against a party for the recovery of an estate, who is not at the time the possessor of either the property, or of any right, but who subsequently obtained possession of either, can he be held liable to such an action? Celsus, in the Fourth Book of the Digest, states very properly that a decision should be rendered against him, even though in the beginning he had nothing in his possession. 2Now let us consider what things are included in the suit for the recovery of an estate. It is held that a suit of this kind includes all the assets belonging to an estate, whether they consist of rights or tangible property.

Dig. 5,3,20Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Item ve­niunt in he­redi­ta­tem et­iam ea, quae he­redi­ta­tis cau­sa com­pa­ra­ta sunt, ut pu­ta man­ci­pia pe­co­ra­que et si qua alia, quae ne­ces­sa­rio he­redi­ta­ti sunt com­pa­ra­ta. et si qui­dem pe­cu­nia he­redi­ta­ria sint com­pa­ra­ta, si­ne du­bio ve­nient: si ve­ro non pe­cu­nia he­redi­ta­ria, vi­den­dum erit: et pu­to et­iam haec venire, si mag­na uti­li­tas he­redi­ta­tis ver­se­tur, pre­tium sci­li­cet re­sti­tu­tu­ro he­rede. 1Sed non om­nia, quae ex he­redi­ta­ria pe­cu­nia com­pa­ra­ta sunt, in he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­nem ve­niunt. de­ni­que scri­bit Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to di­ges­to­rum, si pos­ses­sor ex pe­cu­nia he­redi­ta­ria ho­mi­nem eme­rit et ab eo pe­ta­tur he­redi­tas, ita venire in he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­nem, si he­redi­ta­tis in­ter­fuit eum emi: at si sui cau­sa emit, pre­tium venire. 2Si­mi­li mo­do et si fun­dum he­redi­ta­rium dis­tra­xe­rit, si qui­dem si­ne cau­sa, et ip­sum fun­dum et fruc­tus in he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­nem venire: quod si ae­ris ex­sol­ven­di gra­tia he­redi­ta­rii id fe­cit, non am­plius venire quam pre­tium. 3Item non so­lum ea quae mor­tis tem­po­re fue­runt, sed si qua post­ea aug­men­ta he­redi­ta­ti ac­ces­se­runt, venire in he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­nem: nam he­redi­tas et aug­men­tum re­ci­pit et de­mi­nutio­nem. sed ea, quae post ad­itam he­redi­ta­tem ac­ce­dunt, si qui­dem ex ip­sa he­redi­ta­te, pu­to he­redi­ta­ti ac­ce­de­re: si ex­trin­se­cus, non, quia per­so­nae pos­ses­so­ris ac­ce­dunt. fruc­tus au­tem om­nes au­gent he­redi­ta­tem, si­ve an­te ad­itam si­ve post ad­itam he­redi­ta­tem ac­ces­se­rint. sed et par­tus an­cil­la­rum si­ne du­bio au­gent he­redi­ta­tem. 4Cum prae­di­xi­mus om­nes he­redi­ta­rias ac­tio­nes in he­redi­ta­tis pe­ti­tio­nem venire, quae­ri­tur, utrum cum sua na­tu­ra ve­niant an con­tra. ut pu­ta est quae­dam ac­tio, quae in­fi­tia­tio­ne cres­cit: utrum cum suo in­cre­men­to an ve­ro in sim­plum venit, ut le­gis Aqui­liae? et Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to di­ges­to­rum scri­bit sim­plum so­lu­tu­rum. 5Idem rec­te ait, si noxa­li iu­di­cio con­dem­na­tus sit pos­ses­sor de­func­to, non pos­se eum de­den­tem no­xae of­fi­cio iu­di­cis li­be­ra­ri: quia tam­diu quis ha­bet no­xae de­den­dae fa­cul­ta­tem, quam­diu iu­di­ca­ti con­ve­nia­tur, post sus­cep­tum iu­di­cium non pot­est no­xae de­den­do se li­be­ra­re: sus­ce­pit au­tem per pe­ti­tio­nem he­redi­ta­tis. 6Prae­ter haec mul­ta rep­peri­mus trac­ta­ta et de pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis, de dis­trac­tis re­bus he­redi­ta­riis, de do­lo prae­terito et de fruc­ti­bus. de qui­bus cum for­ma se­na­tus con­sul­to sit da­ta, op­ti­mum est ip­sius se­na­tus con­sul­ti in­ter­pre­ta­tio­nem fa­ce­re ver­bis eius re­la­tis. ‘pri­die idus Mar­tias Quin­tus Iu­lius Bal­bus et Pu­blius Iu­ven­tius Cel­sus Ti­tius Au­fi­dius Oe­nus Se­ve­ria­nus con­su­les ver­ba fe­ce­runt de his, quae im­pe­ra­tor Cae­sar Tra­ia­ni Par­thi­ci fi­lius di­vi Ner­vae ne­pos Ha­d­ria­nus Au­gus­tus im­pe­ra­tor ma­xi­mus­que prin­ceps pro­pos­uit quin­to no­nas Mar­tias quae pro­xi­mae fue­runt li­bel­lo com­ple­xus es­set, quid fie­ri pla­ceat, de qua re ita cen­sue­runt. 6aCum, an­te­quam par­tes ca­du­cae ex bo­nis Rus­ti­ci fis­co pe­te­ren­tur, hi, qui se he­redes es­se ex­is­ti­mant, he­redi­ta­tem dis­tra­xe­rint, pla­ce­re red­ac­tae ex pre­tio re­rum ven­di­ta­rum pe­cu­niae usu­ras non es­se ex­igen­das idem­que in si­mi­li­bus cau­sis ser­van­dum. 6bItem pla­ce­re, a qui­bus he­redi­tas pe­ti­ta fuis­set, si ad­ver­sus eos iu­di­ca­tum es­set, pre­tia, quae ad eos re­rum ex he­redi­ta­te ven­di­ta­rum per­ve­nis­sent, et­si eae an­te pe­ti­tam he­redi­ta­tem de­per­is­sent de­mi­nu­tiae­ve fuis­sent, re­sti­tue­re de­be­re. 6cItem eos qui bo­na in­va­sis­sent, cum sci­rent ad se non per­ti­ne­re, et­iam­si an­te li­tem con­tes­ta­tam fe­ce­rint, quo mi­nus pos­si­de­rent, per­in­de con­dem­nan­dos, qua­si pos­si­de­rent: eos au­tem, qui ius­tas cau­sas ha­buis­sent, qua­re bo­na ad se per­ti­ne­re ex­is­ti­mas­sent, us­que eo dum­ta­xat, quo lo­cu­ple­tio­res ex ea re fac­ti es­sent. 6dPe­ti­tam au­tem fis­co he­redi­ta­tem ex eo tem­po­re ex­is­ti­man­dum es­se, quo pri­mum scie­rit quis­que eam a se pe­ti, id est cum pri­mum aut de­nun­tia­tum es­set ei aut lit­te­ris vel edic­to evo­ca­tus es­set. cen­sue­runt’. ap­tan­da est igi­tur no­bis sin­gu­lis ver­bis se­na­tus con­sul­ti con­gruens in­ter­pre­ta­tio. 7Ait se­na­tus: ‘cum an­te­quam par­tes ca­du­cae fis­co pe­te­ren­tur’. hoc eve­ne­rat, ut par­tes ca­du­cae fis­co pe­te­ren­tur: sed et si ex as­se fiat, se­na­tus con­sul­tum lo­cum ha­be­bit: idem, et si va­can­tia bo­na fis­co vin­di­cen­tur vel si ex alia qua­cum­que cau­sa bo­na ad eum per­ve­ne­runt, se­na­tus con­sul­tum hoc lo­cum ha­be­bit: 8et si ci­vi­ta­ti pe­te­re­tur. 9In pri­va­to­rum quo­que pe­ti­tio­ni­bus se­na­tus con­sul­tum lo­cum ha­be­re ne­mo est qui amb­igit, li­cet in pu­bli­ca cau­sa fac­tum sit. 10Non so­lum au­tem in he­redi­ta­te uti­mur se­na­tus con­sul­to, sed et in pe­cu­lio cas­tren­si vel alia uni­ver­si­ta­te. 11‘Pe­ti­tam au­tem he­redi­ta­tem’ et ce­te­ra: id est ex quo quis scit a se pe­ti: nam ubi scit, in­ci­pit es­se ma­lae fi­dei pos­ses­sor. ‘id est cum pri­mum aut de­nun­tia­tum es­set’: quid er­go si scit qui­dem, ne­mo au­tem ei de­nun­tia­vit, an in­ci­piat usu­ras de­be­re pe­cu­niae red­ac­tae? et pu­to de­be­re: coe­pit enim ma­lae fi­dei pos­ses­sor es­se. sed po­na­mus de­nun­tia­tum es­se, non ta­men scit, quia non ip­si, sed pro­cu­ra­to­ri eius de­nun­tia­tum est: se­na­tus ip­si de­nun­tia­ri ex­igit et id­eo non no­ce­bit, ni­si for­te is cui de­nun­tia­tum est eum cer­tio­ra­ve­rit, sed non si cer­tio­ra­re po­tuit nec fe­cit. a quo de­nun­tia­tum est se­na­tus non ex­igit: qui­cum­que er­go fuit qui de­nun­tia­vit, no­ce­bit. 12Haec ad­ver­sus bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­so­res, nam ita se­na­tus lo­cu­tus est: ‘eos qui se he­redes ex­is­ti­mas­sent’. ce­te­rum si quis sciens ad se he­redi­ta­tem non per­ti­ne­re dis­tra­xit, si­ne du­bio non pre­tia re­rum, sed ip­sae res ve­niunt in pe­ti­tio­nem he­redi­ta­tis et fruc­tus ea­rum. sed im­pe­ra­tor Se­ve­rus epis­tu­la ad ce­le­rem idem vi­de­tur fe­cis­se et in ma­lae fi­dei pos­ses­so­ri­bus: at­quin se­na­tus de his est lo­cu­tus qui se he­redes ex­is­ti­mant. ni­si for­te ad eas res re­fe­re­mus, quas dis­tra­hi ex­pe­die­rat, quae one­ra­bant ma­gis he­redi­ta­tem quam fruc­tui erant: ut sit in ar­bi­trio pe­ti­to­ris, qua­lem com­pu­ta­tio­nem fa­ciat ad­ver­sus ma­lae fi­dei pos­ses­so­rem, utrum ip­sius rei et fruc­tuum an pre­tii et usu­ra­rum post mo­tam con­tro­ver­siam. 13Li­cet au­tem se­na­tus de his lo­cu­tus sit, qui se he­redes ex­is­ti­ment, ta­men et si bo­no­rum pos­ses­so­res se ex­is­ti­ment vel alios suc­ces­so­res ius­tos vel si­bi re­sti­tu­tam he­redi­ta­tem, in ea­dem erunt con­di­cio­ne. 14Pa­pi­nia­nus au­tem li­bro ter­tio quaes­tio­num, si pos­ses­sor he­redi­ta­tis pe­cu­niam in­ven­tam in he­redi­ta­te non at­tin­gat, ne­gat eum om­ni­no in usu­ras con­ve­nien­dum. 15‘Red­ac­tae’, in­quit, ‘pe­cu­niae ex pre­tio re­rum ven­di­ta­rum.’ red­ac­tam sic ac­ci­pie­mus, non so­lum iam ex­ac­tam, ve­rum et si ex­igi po­tuit nec ex­ac­ta est. 16Quid si post pe­ti­tam he­redi­ta­tem res dis­tra­xe­rit? hic ip­sae res ve­nient fruc­tus­que ea­rum. sed si for­te ta­les fue­runt, quae vel ste­ri­les erant vel tem­po­re peritu­rae, et hae dis­trac­tae sunt ve­ro pre­tio, for­tas­sis pos­sit pe­ti­tor eli­ge­re, ut si­bi pre­tia et usu­rae prae­sten­tur. 17Ait se­na­tus: ‘pla­ce­re, a qui­bus pe­ti­ta he­redi­tas fuis­set, si ad­ver­sus eos iu­di­ca­tum es­set, pre­tia, quae ad eos re­rum ex he­redi­ta­te ven­di­ta­rum per­ve­nis­sent, et­si an­te pe­ti­tam he­redi­ta­tem de­per­is­sent de­mi­nu­tae­ve es­sent, re­sti­tue­re de­be­re.’ bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­sor si ven­di­de­rit res he­redi­ta­rias, si­ve ex­egit pre­tium si­ve non, quia ha­bet ac­tio­nem, de­be­bit pre­tium prae­sta­re: sed ubi ha­bet ac­tio­nem, suf­fi­ciet eum ac­tio­nes prae­sta­re. 18Sed si ven­di­dit et evic­ta re re­sti­tuit quod ac­ce­pit, non vi­de­bi­tur ad eum per­ve­nis­se: quam­quam pos­sit di­ci nec ab in­itio pre­tium venire, quia non fuit res he­redi­ta­ria quae dis­trac­ta est: sed et­si se­na­tus re­rum ex he­redi­ta­te dis­trac­ta­rum, non he­redi­ta­ria­rum fe­cit men­tio­nem, re­sti­tui ta­men non de­bet, quia ni­hil apud eum re­ma­net. nam et Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to di­ges­to­rum scri­bit quod in­de­bi­tum ex­egit re­sti­tue­re eum non de­be­re nec im­pu­ta­tu­rum quod non de­bi­tum sol­vit. 19Sed si res sit red­hi­bi­ta, hic uti­que et he­redi­ta­ria est et pre­tium non ve­niet quod re­fu­sum est. 20Sed et si ob ven­di­tio­nem ob­stric­tus sit emp­to­ri pos­ses­sor he­redi­ta­tis, di­cen­dum erit pro­spi­ci ei cau­tio­ne. 21Re­sti­tue­re au­tem pre­tia de­be­bit pos­ses­sor, et­si de­per­di­tae sunt res vel de­mi­nu­tae. sed utrum ita de­mum re­sti­tuat, si bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­sor est, an et si ma­lae fi­dei? et si qui­dem res apud emp­to­rem ex­stent nec de­per­di­tae nec de­mi­nu­tae sunt, si­ne du­bio ip­sas res de­bet prae­sta­re ma­lae fi­dei pos­ses­sor aut, si re­ci­pe­re eas ab emp­to­re nul­lo mo­do pos­sit, tan­tum quan­tum in li­tem es­set iu­ra­tum. at ubi de­per­di­tae sunt et de­mi­nu­tae, ve­rum pre­tium de­bet prae­sta­ri, quia si pe­ti­tor rem con­se­cu­tus es­set, dis­tra­xis­set et ve­rum pre­tium rei non per­de­ret.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. Those things also which were acquired on account of the estate are also embraced in a suit for its recovery; as for instance, slaves, cattle, and anything else which was necessarily obtained for the benefit of the estate. Where, indeed, these were purchased with money belonging to the estate, they are undoubtedly included therein. But if the money was not a part of the estate, it should be considered whether this is the case; and I think that they ought to be included if they were of great advantage to the estate, and the heir must by all means return the price paid for them. 1Everything purchased with money belonging to an estate is not, however, to be included in an action for its recovery. For Julianus says in the Sixth Book of the Digest, that if the possessor purchased a slave with money belonging to the estate, and suit is brought against him for its recovery, the slave will only be included in the assets of the estate if it was to the interest of the same that he should be purchased; but if the possessor bought him for his own use, then the price paid for him must be included. 2Ad Dig. 5,3,20,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 612, Note 18.In like manner, if the possessor sold land belonging to the estate without any good reason, not only the land, but its crops as well, shall be included in a suit to recover the estate; but if he did this for the purpose of paying a debt due from the estate, nothing else shall be included but the price which was paid. 3Again, not only the property which was in existence at the time of death, but also that which was afterwards added to the estate, are to be included in the action for its recovery; for an estate admits of both the increase and diminution of its assets. I am of the opinion that whatever is added to an estate after it has been entered upon,—if, in fact, it is derived from the estate itself—should form part of the same; but if it is derived from some other source it does not, because such property belonged to the possessor in person. All crops also constitute an increase of the estate, whether they have been obtained before, or after entry upon the same, and the offspring of female slaves unquestionably increases the amount of an estate. 4As we have previously mentioned that all rights of action belonging to an estate can be included in a suit brought for its recovery, the question arises whether they bring their proper character with them or not; for example, where the amount of damages in an action is increased by the denial of the defendant, does such an action include the said increase, or is it only brought for simple damages, as under the Lex Aquilia? Julianus says in the Sixth Book of the Digest, that liability exists only for simple damages. 5The same authority very properly holds that where the possessor has had judgment rendered against him in a noxal action in favor of the deceased, he cannot be released by a surrender of whatever caused the damage; because a defendant only has the right of surrendering the property for that purpose, until suit has been brought against him to enforce the judgment; but after it has been brought, he cannot liberate himself by a surrender of this kind; and, indeed, such a proceeding has been brought against him in this instance by filing a petition for the recovery of the estate. 6In addition to these points, we find many others discussed with reference to suits for the recovery of estates; to the sale of property belonging to deceased persons; to fraud which has been committed; and to profits. As, however, a rule was established by a decree of the Senate, the best course will be to give the contents of the decree itself in its own words and then interpret it: “On the day before the Ides of March Quintus Julius Balbus and Publius Juventius Celsus, Titius Aufidius and Oenus Severianus, being Consuls, made statements with reference to those questions which the Emperor Cæsar, the son of Trajanus Parthicus, grandson of the Divine Nerva, Hadrianus Augustus, the greatest of sovereigns, proposed and included in a written communication on the fifth day of the Nones of March what he wished to be done, and thereupon they passed the following resolutions: 6aWhereas, before suit was brought by the Treasury for a certain part of the property of Rusticus forfeited to the State, those who thinking that they were heirs of said estate sold the same; We decree that interest ought not to be charged on the price of the property sold, and the same rule must be observed in similar cases. 6bMoreover, We decree that where judgment is rendered against parties who have been sued for the recovery of an estate, the price of any property belonging to said estate must be refunded by them, even if such property was destroyed or depreciated in value before the action for recovery was brought. 6cMoreover, if any parties have taken possession of the property of an estate when they knew that it did not belong to them, even though this was done before issue was joined, in order to avoid being in possession of the same, judgment shall be rendered against them just as if they had been in possession of said property; but where they had good reason to believe that they were entitled to the said property, they shall only be liable to the extent to which they profited by their act. 6d“It was the opinion of the Senate that the action for recovery of the estate must be considered to have been brought by the Treasury as soon as the party knew that he had been sued; that is to say, as soon as he was notified or summoned either by a letter or by a citation.” We must now give the proper interpretation of the separate terms of the decree of the Senate. 7The Senate says, “Before suit was brought by the Treasury for a certain part of the property forfeited to the State”. What occurred was that the Treasury brought suit for a certain forfeited portion of an estate, but if the whole of it had been claimed, the Decree of the Senate would likewise be applicable; and where an action was brought by the Treasury for unclaimed property or goods to which it was entitled for any other good reason, the same rule would apply. 8The same decree of the Senate will apply where an action is brought by a municipality. 9Where a private party brings an action, no one doubts that the decree of the Senate will also apply, although it is made on account of a public matter. 10Not only do we make use of this decree of the Senate in questions relating to estates, but also in those having reference to the peculium castrense, or any other aggregate of property. 11With reference to the clause, “The action for the recovery of the estate must be considered to have been brought as soon as,” etc., this signifies as soon as the party knows that the estate is demanded of him, because as soon as he learns of this he immediately becomes a possessor in bad faith, that is “As soon as he was notified”. What would be the case, however, if he was aware of the fact, and still nobody notified him? Will he become liable to refund the interest on money received for the sale of property? I think that he will, for he then becomes a possessor in bad faith. But let us suppose that he has been notified, but was not aware of it, because the notice was served, not on himself but on his agent? The Senate requires that he himself should be notified; and therefore he will not be affected unless the party to whom notice was given informs him; but where the agent was able to do so, and did not, he will not be liable. The Senate did not state by whom the party must be notified, and therefore whoever does it will render him whom he notified liable. 12These things have reference to bona fide possessors, for the Senate mentioned those, “Who, thinking that they were heirs”; but where a party sells an estate which he knows does not belong to him, then, beyond question, not only the purchase-money of the property but also the property itself and the profits of the same, are included in the suit for recovery. However, the Emperor Severus in an Epistle to Celer seems to have applied this rule to possessors in bad faith also; although the Senate only mentioned those who thought themselves to be heirs; unless we refer the words to such articles as it was expedient to sell because they were a burden, rather than a benefit to the estate, so that it might be in the discretion of the plaintiff to select what account he could render against the possessor in bad faith; whether he would demand of him the property and the profits thereof, or the purchase-money and interest, after proceedings had been instituted. 13Although the Senate mentions those who think that they are heirs, still, if they consider themselves to be the possessors of the property or any other lawful possessors, or the estate has been delivered to them, they will occupy the same position. 14Papinianus states in the Third Book of Questions, that if the possessor of an estate does not handle money found among the assets of the same, a suit for interest can, under no circumstances, be brought against him. 15The decree of the Senate says, “On the purchase money received for the property sold”. We must understand by “purchase-money received”, not only that which was already obtained, but also that which might have been obtained, but was not. 16What must be done if the possessor sold property after a suit for recovery of the estate had been brought? Then the property itself and the profits of the same will be included. If, however, the property should be of such a nature as to be unproductive, or liable to be destroyed by lapse of time, and it was sold at its true value, perhaps the plaintiff may choose to have the purchase-money and the interest of the same. 17The Senate says it is decreed that, “Where suit is brought against any persons for the recovery of an estate, and judgment is rendered against them, the purchase-money which they received for the sale of property belonging to said estate must be surrendered by them; even though such property may have been destroyed, or diminished in value before the suit was brought”. Where a bona fide possessor sells the property of an estate, whether he received the purchase-money or not, he must return the price, because he has a right of action; but where he has a right of action, it will be sufficient if he assigns that right. 18But where he sold property, and paid over what he received for it to the true owner on a judgment for the same, it is not held to have come into his hands; even if it might be said that, in the beginning, the purchase-money was not included in the suit, because what was sold did not form part of the estate. But although the Senate made mention not of property which belonged to the estate but of articles included in it, he will not be compelled to make restitution, since nothing remains in his hands. Julianus states in the Sixth Book of the Digest, that a party will not be required to make restitution of what he collected which he actually does not owe; nor will he be entitled to credit for money which he paid which was not due. 19But where property has been returned, then it is certainly a part of the estate, and the price of the same which was refunded will not be included in a suit for recovery of the estate. 20Where the possessor of an estate is liable to the purchaser by reason of the sale, it must be held that he is protected by the security. 21Ad Dig. 5,3,20,21Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 612, Note 19.The possessor must pay over the purchase-money, whether the property is destroyed, or diminished in value. But, is he bound to refund it without distinction, if he is the possessor in good faith, or even in bad faith? If the property is still in existence and in the possession of the purchaser, and is not destroyed or deteriorated; then, undoubtedly a possessor in bad faith must deliver the actual property, or, if he is absolutely unable to recover it from the purchaser, he must pay as much as the property is sworn to be worth in court. Where, however, the property is lost or deteriorated, the real value must be paid, because if the plaintiff had secured the property, he might have sold it, and could not have lost its real value.

Dig. 5,3,23Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Utrum au­tem om­ne pre­tium re­sti­tue­re de­be­bit bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­sor an ve­ro ita de­mum, si fac­tus sit lo­cu­ple­tior, vi­den­dum: fin­ge pre­tium ac­cep­tum vel per­di­dis­se vel con­sump­sis­se vel do­nas­se. et ver­bum qui­dem per­ve­nis­se amb­iguum est, so­lum­ne hoc con­ti­ne­ret, quod pri­ma ra­tio­ne fue­rit, an ve­ro et id quod du­rat. et pu­to se­quen­tem clau­su­lam se­na­tus con­sul­ti, et­si haec sit amb­igua, ut ita de­mum com­pe­tat, si fac­tus sit lo­cu­ple­tior. 1Pro­in­de si non so­lum pre­tium, sed et­iam poe­na tar­dius pre­tio so­lu­to per­ve­ne­rit, pot­erit di­ci, quia lo­cu­ple­tior in to­tum fac­tus est, de­be­re venire, li­cet de pre­tio so­lum­mo­do se­na­tus sit lo­cu­tus.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. It should be considered whether a bona fide possessor is required to surrender all the purchase-money, or whether he must do so only in cases where he was enriched by it; suppose, for example, that after having received it he either lost it, expended it, or gave it away. The clause, “Came into his hands”, is one of doubtful significance, whether it only applies to what there was in the beginning, or to what remains; and I think that the next clause in the decree of the Senate is also ambiguous, and that no claim can be made except where the party is pecuniarily benefited. 1Hence, if what comes into his hands is not only the purchase-money, but also a penalty incurred on account of delayed payment; it may be held that this also was included, because the party was enriched to that entire amount, although the Senate only mentioned the purchase-money.

Dig. 5,3,25Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Sed et si le­ge com­mis­so­ria ven­di­dit, idem erit di­cen­dum lu­crum, quod sen­sit le­ge com­mis­so­ria, prae­sta­tu­rum. 1Item si rem dis­tra­xit et ex pre­tio aliam rem com­pa­ra­vit, ve­niet pre­tium in pe­ti­tio­nem he­redi­ta­tis, non res quam in pa­tri­mo­nium suum con­ver­tit. sed si res mi­no­ris va­let quam com­pa­ra­ta est, hac­te­nus lo­cu­ple­tior fac­tus vi­de­bi­tur, qua­te­nus res va­let: quem­ad­mo­dum si con­sump­sis­set, in to­tum lo­cu­ple­tior fac­tus non vi­de­bi­tur. 2Quod ait se­na­tus: ‘eos qui bo­na in­va­sis­sent, quae sci­rent ad se non per­ti­ne­re, et­iam si an­te li­tem con­tes­ta­tam fe­ce­rint quo mi­nus pos­si­de­rent, per­in­de con­dem­nan­dos qua­si pos­si­de­rent’, ita in­tel­le­gen­dum est, ut et do­lus prae­ter­itus in pe­ti­tio­nem he­redi­ta­tis de­du­ce­re­tur: sed et cul­pa. et id­eo ab eo qui ab alio non ex­egit vel a se­met ip­so, si tem­po­re es­set li­be­ra­tus, pe­ti he­redi­ta­tem pos­se: hoc uti­que si ex­ige­re po­tuit. 3Quod au­tem ait se­na­tus ‘eos qui bo­na in­va­sis­sent’, lo­qui­tur de prae­do­ni­bus, id est de his qui, cum sci­rent ad se non per­ti­ne­re he­redi­ta­tem, in­va­se­runt bo­na, sci­li­cet cum nul­lam cau­sam ha­be­rent pos­si­den­di. 4Sed et fruc­tus non quos per­ce­pe­runt, in­quit, sed quos per­ci­pe­re de­bue­runt, eos prae­sta­tu­ros. 5De eo au­tem lo­qui­tur se­na­tus, qui ab in­itio men­te prae­do­nis res he­redi­ta­rias ad­pre­hen­dit. quod si ab in­itio qui­dem ius­tam cau­sam ha­buit ad­ipis­cen­dae pos­ses­sio­nis, post­ea ve­ro con­scius ad se ni­hil he­redi­ta­tem per­ti­ne­re prae­do­nio mo­re ver­sa­ri coe­pit, ni­hil se­na­tus lo­qui vi­de­tur: pu­to ta­men et ad eum men­tem se­na­tus con­sul­ti per­ti­ne­re: par­vi et­enim re­fert, ab in­itio quis do­lo­se in he­redi­ta­te sit ver­sa­tus an post­ea hoc fa­ce­re coe­pit. 6Sci­re ad se non per­ti­ne­re utrum is tan­tum­mo­do vi­de­tur, qui fac­tum scit, an et is qui in iu­re er­ra­vit? pu­ta­vit enim rec­te fac­tum tes­ta­men­tum, cum in­uti­le erat: vel cum eum alius prae­ce­de­ret ad­gna­tus, si­bi po­tius de­fer­ri. et non pu­to hunc es­se prae­do­nem qui do­lo ca­ret, quam­vis in iu­re er­ret. 7‘Si an­te li­tem con­tes­ta­tam’, in­quit, ‘fe­ce­rit’: hoc id­eo ad­iec­tum, quon­iam post li­tem con­tes­ta­tam om­nes in­ci­piunt ma­lae fi­dei pos­ses­so­res es­se, quin im­mo post con­tro­ver­siam mo­tam. quam­quam enim li­tis con­tes­ta­tae men­tio fiat in se­na­tus con­sul­to, ta­men et post mo­tam con­tro­ver­siam om­nes pos­ses­so­res pa­res fiunt et qua­si prae­do­nes te­nen­tur. et hoc iu­re ho­die uti­mur: coe­pit enim sci­re rem ad se non per­ti­nen­tem pos­si­de­re se is qui in­ter­pel­la­tur. qui ve­ro prae­do est, et an­te li­tem con­tes­ta­tam do­li no­mi­ne te­ne­bi­tur: hic est enim do­lus prae­ter­itus. 8‘Per­in­de’, in­quit, ‘con­dem­nan­dos qua­si pos­si­de­rent’: me­ri­to: nam is qui do­lo fe­cit quo mi­nus pos­si­de­ret, ut pos­ses­sor con­dem­na­tur. ac­ci­pies, si­ve do­lo de­sie­rit pos­si­de­re si­ve do­lo pos­ses­sio­nem no­lue­rit ad­mit­te­re. si­ve au­tem ab alio res pos­si­dea­tur si­ve in to­tum non ex­tet, lo­cum ha­be­bit haec clau­su­la. un­de si sit alius pos­ses­sor, ab utro­que he­redi­tas pe­ti pos­sit: et si per mul­tos am­bu­la­ve­rit pos­ses­sio, om­nes te­ne­bun­tur. 9Sed utrum is so­lus qui pos­si­det fruc­tus prae­sta­bit an et­iam is qui do­lo fe­cit quo mi­nus pos­si­de­ret? et di­cen­dum erit post se­na­tus con­sul­tum am­bo te­ne­ri. 10Haec ver­ba se­na­tus con­sul­ti et­iam ad­ver­sus eum qui non pos­si­det ius­iu­ran­dum in­du­cunt: tam enim ad­ver­sus eum qui do­lo fe­cit quo mi­nus pos­si­deat quam ad­ver­sus pos­si­den­tem in li­tem iu­ra­tur. 11Con­su­luit se­na­tus bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­so­ri­bus, ne in to­tum dam­no ad­fi­cian­tur, sed in id dum­ta­xat te­nean­tur, in quo lo­cu­ple­tio­res fac­ti sunt. quem­cum­que igi­tur sump­tum fe­ce­rint ex he­redi­ta­te, si quid di­la­pi­da­ve­runt per­di­de­runt, dum re sua se ab­uti pu­tant, non prae­sta­bunt. nec si do­na­ve­rint, lo­cu­ple­tio­res fac­ti vi­de­bun­tur, quam­vis ad re­mu­ne­ran­dum si­bi ali­quem na­tu­ra­li­ter ob­li­ga­ve­runt. pla­ne si ἀντίδωρα ac­ce­pe­runt, di­cen­dum est ea­te­nus lo­cu­ple­tio­res fac­tos, qua­te­nus ac­ce­pe­runt: vel­ut ge­nus quod­dam hoc es­set per­mu­ta­tio­nis. 12Si quis re sua lau­tius usus sit con­tem­pla­tio­ne de­la­tae si­bi he­redi­ta­tis, Mar­cel­lus li­bro quin­to di­ges­to­rum pu­tat ni­hil eum ex he­redi­ta­te de­duc­tu­rum, si eam non atti­git. 13Si­mi­li mo­do et si mu­tuam pe­cu­niam ac­ce­pit, qua­si di­ves se de­ce­pe­rit. 14Si ta­men pig­no­ri res he­redi­ta­rias de­dit, vi­den­dum, an vel sic at­tin­ga­tur he­redi­tas: quod est dif­fi­ci­le, cum ip­se sit ob­li­ga­tus. 15Ad­eo au­tem qui lo­cu­ple­tior fac­tus non est non te­ne­tur, ut si quis pu­tans se ex as­se he­redem par­tem di­mi­diam he­redi­ta­tis si­ne do­lo ma­lo con­sump­se­rit, Mar­cel­lus li­bro quar­to di­ges­to­rum trac­tat, num non te­n­ea­tur, qua­si id quod ero­ga­ve­rit ex eo fue­rit, quod ad eum non per­ti­ne­bat, sed ad co­he­redes: nam et si is qui he­res non erat to­tum, quid­quid apud se fuit, con­sump­sis­set, si­ne du­bio non te­ne­tur, qua­si lo­cu­ple­tior non fac­tus. sed in pro­pos­i­ta quaes­tio­ne tri­bus vi­sio­ni­bus re­la­tis, una pri­ma: de­in­de alia pos­se di­ci to­tum quod su­per­est re­sti­tue­re eum de­be­re, qua­si suam par­tem con­sump­se­rit: ter­tia utri­que quod con­sump­tum est de­ce­de­re: ait uti­que non­ni­hil re­sti­tuen­dum, de il­lo du­bi­tat, utrum to­tum an par­tem re­sti­tuen­dam di­cat: pu­to ta­men re­si­duum in­te­grum non es­se re­sti­tuen­dum, sed par­tem eius di­mi­diam. 16Quod au­tem quis ex he­redi­ta­te ero­ga­vit, utrum to­tum de­ce­dat an ve­ro pro ra­ta pa­tri­mo­nii eius? ut pu­ta pe­num he­redi­ta­rium ebi­bit: utrum to­tum he­redi­ta­ti ex­pen­sum fe­ra­tur an ali­quid et pa­tri­mo­nio eius? ut in id fac­tus lo­cu­ple­tior vi­dea­tur, quod so­le­bat ip­se ero­ga­re an­te de­la­tam he­redi­ta­tem: ut si quid lau­tius con­tem­pla­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis im­pen­dit, in hoc non vi­dea­tur fac­tus lo­cu­ple­tior, in sta­tu­tis ve­ro suis sump­ti­bus vi­dea­tur fac­tus lo­cu­ple­tior: uti­que enim et­si non tam lau­te ero­gas­set, ali­quid ta­men ad vic­tum cot­ti­dia­num ero­gas­set. nam et di­vus Mar­cus in cau­sa Py­tho­do­ri, qui ro­ga­tus erat quod si­bi su­per­fuis­set ex he­redi­ta­te red­de­re, de­cre­vit ea, quae alie­na­ta erant non mi­nuen­di fi­dei­com­mis­si nec pre­tium in cor­pus pa­tri­mo­nii Py­tho­do­ri red­is­se, et ex pro­prio Py­tho­do­ri pa­tri­mo­nio et ex he­redi­ta­te de­ce­de­re, non tan­tum ex he­redi­ta­te. et nunc igi­tur sta­tu­ti sump­tus utrum ex he­redi­ta­te de­ce­dent ex­em­plo re­scrip­ti di­vi Mar­ci an ex so­lo pa­tri­mo­nio, vi­den­dum erit: et ve­rius est, ut ex suo pa­tri­mo­nio de­ce­dant ea quae et si non he­res fuis­set ero­gas­set. 17Item si rem dis­tra­xit bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­sor nec pre­tio fac­tus sit lo­cu­ple­tior, an sin­gu­las res, si non­dum usu­cap­tae sint, vin­di­ca­re pe­ti­tor ab emp­to­re pos­sit? et si vin­di­cet, an ex­cep­tio­ne non re­pel­la­tur ‘quod prae­iu­di­cium he­redi­ta­ti non fiat in­ter ac­to­rem et eum qui ve­num de­dit’, quia non vi­de­tur venire in pe­ti­tio­nem he­redi­ta­tis pre­tium ea­rum, quam­quam vic­ti emp­to­res re­ver­su­ri sunt ad eum qui dis­tra­xit? et pu­to pos­se res vin­di­ca­ri, ni­si emp­to­res re­gres­sum ad bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­so­rem ha­bent. Quid ta­men si is qui ven­di­dit pa­ra­tus sit ita de­fen­de­re he­redi­ta­tem, ut per­in­de at­que si pos­si­de­ret con­ve­nia­tur? in­ci­pit ex­cep­tio lo­cum ha­be­re ex per­so­na emp­to­rum. cer­te si mi­no­ri pre­tio res ven­ie­rint et pre­tium quod­cum­que il­lud ac­tor sit con­se­cu­tus, mul­to ma­gis pot­erit di­ci ex­cep­tio­ne eum sum­mo­ve­ri. nam et si id quod a de­bi­to­ri­bus ex­egit pos­ses­sor pe­ti­to­ri he­redi­ta­tis sol­vit, li­be­ra­ri de­bi­to­res Iu­lia­nus li­bro quar­to di­ges­to­rum scri­bit, si­ve bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­sor si­ve prae­do fuit qui de­bi­tum ab his ex­ege­rat, et ip­so iu­re eos li­be­ra­ri. 18Pe­ti­tio he­redi­ta­tis, et­si in rem ac­tio sit, ha­bet ta­men prae­sta­tio­nes quas­dam per­so­na­les, ut pu­ta eo­rum quae a de­bi­to­ri­bus sunt ex­ac­ta, item pre­tio­rum. 19Hoc se­na­tus con­sul­tum ad pe­ti­tio­nem he­redi­ta­tis fac­tum et­iam in fa­mi­liae her­cis­cun­dae iu­di­cio lo­cum ha­be­re pla­cet, ne res ab­sur­da sit, ut quae pe­ti pos­sint di­vi­di non pos­sint. 20Au­gent he­redi­ta­tem gre­gum et pe­co­rum par­tus.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. Moreover, if he sold part of the estate under a conditional agreement it must be stated that the same rule applies, and he must surrender the profit which he obtained under such conditions. 1Again, if he sold property and bought other property with the purchase-money, the latter will be included in a suit for the recovery of the estate; but not the property which he added to his own possessions. But, where the property purchased was of less value than what is paid for it, he will be considered to have become enriched to the amount only of the value of said property, just as, if he had used it up, he would not be considered to have been enriched to its full value. 2Ad Dig. 5,3,25,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 193, Note 13.When the Senate says: “Where parties have taken possession of property which they know does not belong to them, even though they did this before issue was joined, in order to avoid being in possession of the same; judgment shall be rendered against them, just as if they were in possession”; this is to be understood to mean that fraud which has been committed, as well as negligence, may be alleged in the action for the recovery of the estate; and therefore suit can be brought against a party who did not collect a debt of the estate from another, or even from himself, if he was released by lapse of time, that is, if he was able to collect the debt. 3As to what the Senate says, namely, “Where they have taken possession of property”, reference is here made to plunderers, that is to say, those who know that the estate does not belong to them and appropriate its assets; at all events, where they have no good reason for taking possession of the same. 4So far as profits are concerned, however, the Decree states that they will have to surrender not only what they obtained, but also what they ought to have obtained. 5In this instance the Senate refers to a party who has appropriated property belonging to an estate for the purpose of plundering it. Where, however, in the beginning, he had good cause for taking possession, and afterwards having become aware that none of the estate belonged to him, acted in a predatory manner, the Senate does not seem to refer to him; still, I am of the opinion that the intention of the Decree also has reference to him; for it makes little difference whether a man conducted himself fraudulently in connection with an estate in the beginning, or began to do so subsequently. 6With regard to the clause, “Who knows that the property does not belong to them”; shall this be considered to apply to one who is aware of the facts, or to one who made a mistake with reference to the law? For he may have thought that a will was properly executed, when it was void; or that he was entitled to the estate rather than some other agnate who had preceded him. I do not think that anyone should be classed as a plunderer who lacks fraudulent intent, even though he may be mistaken with reference to the law. 7The Decree says, “Even though they should do this before issue was joined”; and this has been added for the reason that, after issue has been joined, all possessors are held to be liable for bad faith; and, indeed, this is the case after proceedings have been instituted. Although mention is made of joinder of issue in the Decree of the Senate, still, as soon as proceedings have been begun, all possessors are on the same footing, and are liable as plunderers, and we make use of this rule at the present time. Hence, as soon as the party is called to account, he becomes aware that the property of which he is in possession does not belong to him; and, indeed, where a man is a plunderer, he will be held liable on the ground of fraud before issue is joined, for this would be a species of fraud which has already been committed. 8“Therefore”, it is further stated in the Decree, “judgment should be rendered against them just as if they were in possession”. This is reasonable, for a party who acts fraudulently in order to avoid being in possession should have judgment rendered against him, just as if he were the actual possessor; which is to be understood to mean whether he fraudulently relinquishes possession, or with fraudulent intent refuses to take possession. This clause will apply whether the property is in possession of another or has absolutely ceased to exist; wherefore, if some one else is the possessor, suit for the recovery of the estate can be brought against either party, and where possession has passed through several persons all of them will be liable. 9Shall he alone who is in possession be liable for the profits, or will he also be liable who acted fraudulently to avoid being in possession? It must be said, after the Decree of the Senate, that both are liable. 10These words of the Decree permit an oath to be administered, even against the party who is not in possession; as he who acted fraudulently to avoid being in possession may swear to the amount in court, just as the defendant can do who is in possession. 11The Senate attempted to favor bona fide possessors, in order to prevent them from being subjected to loss of the full amount, and only to be held liable to the extent to which they became enriched; therefore, whatever expense they caused the estate, either by wasting or losing any of the property, if they thought that they were squandering what belonged to themselves, they will not be compelled to make restitution; nor where they have given anything away, will they be considered to have become more wealthy, although they may have placed some one under a natural obligation to remunerate them. It is clear that if they have accepted any recompense in return, it must be held that they are enriched to the amount of what they received; as this would be a certain kind of exchange. 12Where anyone makes use of his property in a more lavish manner on account of his being entitled to an estate, Marcellus thinks, in the Fifth Book of the Digest, that he will not be entitled to any deduction from the estate if he has not used any of it. 13In like manner, if he borrowed money as though he were rich and deceived himself, the same principle will apply. 14Where, however, he pledged some of the assets of the estate, should it be considered whether he has used any of said assets? This is a difficult question to answer, as he himself is liable. 15To such an extent is it true that a person is not held liable who is not enriched, that if anyone, being under the impression that he is the sole heir, wastes half of an estate without fraudulent intent, Marcellus, in treating this point in the Fourth Book of the Digest, asks whether he is liable; since what he appropriated was derived from property that did not belong to him, but to his co-heirs; for if a man who is not an heir wastes everything under his control, he will undoubtedly not be liable, since he was not enriched. In the question proposed, however, there are three opinions involved; one the first mentioned; next, the second, namely, that it might be said that he is obliged to surrender all the assets that remain, since he had squandered his own share; and third, that what was wasted should be charged to both; and he says that something should certainly be given up, but he doubts whether restitution for all or only a part should be made. It is my opinion, however, that the entire balance should not be given up, but only half of the same. 16Where anyone has expended part of an estate must it lose all, or will a proportion of the loss be taken out of his patrimony? As, for example, where he drank up the entire supply of wine belonging to the estate; must the estate bear all the expense, or will some of it be charged to his patrimony? This would be on the supposition that he Was deemed to be more wealthy to the amount that he was in the habit of expending for wine before he received the inheritance; so that, if he was more lavish in his expenditure on account of the inheritance, he would not be considered to become more wealthy to the amount of the excess, but he would be held to have become enriched so far as his regular outlay was concerned; since, if that were true, he would not have incurred such great expense; nevertheless, he would have spent something for his daily subsistence. The Divine Marcus, in the case of a certain Pythodorus, who had been asked to give up as much of the estate as remained under his control, decreed that what had been alienated without the intention of diminishing the trust, and the price of which had not increased the private property of Pythodorus, should be returned, and should be charged to the private property of Pythodorus and the estate, and not the estate alone. Therefore, it must be considered whether, in accordance with the Rescript of the Divine Marcus, the ordinary expenses should be taken out of the estate, or out of the private property of the aforesaid party; and the better opinion is that the expenses which he would have incurred, if he had not been the heir, must be paid out of his own estate. 17Ad Dig. 5,3,25,17Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 186, Note 16; Bd. III, § 612, Note 15; Bd. III, § 616, Note 1.Moreover, if the bona fide possessor sold property of the estate and did not become more wealthy by the purchase-money, has the plaintiff a right to recover certain articles from the purchaser, if he has not yet acquired the title to them through usucaption? And, if he brings suit for their recovery, may he not be barred by this exception; (“As the estate should not be prejudiced by any question arising between the plaintiff and the party who made the sale, on the ground that the price of said property is not held to be included in the action brought for the recovery of an estate”), and even if the purchaser loses his case, has he a right for reimbursement from the party who made the sale? I am of the opinion that the property can be recovered, unless the purchaser can have recourse to the bona fide possessor. But what if the party who made the sale is prepared to set up a defence, in order to permit himself to be sued, just as if he were in possession? In this instance an exception would apply on the part of the purchaser. It is certain that if the property was sold for a low price and the plaintiff recovers it, no matter what the amount was, then much more may it be said that he will be barred by an exception. For if the possessor collects anything from the debtors of the estate, and pays the money to the plaintiff, Julianus says in the Fourth Book of the Digest, that the said debtors are released from liability, whether the party who collected the debts from them was a bona fide possessor or a plunderer, and that they are discharged by operation of law. 18A suit for the recovery of an estate, although it is in an action in rem, still includes some personal obligations; as, for example, the payment of funds received from debtors, as well as the purchase money of property which has been sold. 19This Decree of the Senate though it was passed to facilitate proceedings for the recovery of an estate, it is well settled also applies to a suit in partition; otherwise, the absurd principle would be established that an action might be brought for the recovery of property, but not for the purpose of its division. 20The young of flocks and cattle form part of the increase of an estate.

Dig. 5,3,27Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. An­cil­la­rum et­iam par­tus et par­tuum par­tus quam­quam fruc­tus es­se non ex­is­ti­man­tur, quia non te­me­re an­cil­lae eius rei cau­sa com­pa­ran­tur ut pa­riant, au­gent ta­men he­redi­ta­tem: quip­pe cum ea om­nia fiunt he­redi­ta­ria, du­bium non est, quin ea pos­ses­sor, si aut pos­si­deat aut post pe­ti­tam he­redi­ta­tem do­lo ma­lo fe­cit quo mi­nus pos­si­de­ret, de­beat re­sti­tue­re. 1Sed et pen­sio­nes, quae ex lo­ca­tio­ni­bus prae­dio­rum ur­ba­no­rum per­cep­tae sunt, ve­nient, li­cet a lu­pa­na­rio per­cep­tae sint: nam et in mul­to­rum ho­nes­to­rum vi­ro­rum prae­diis lu­pa­na­ria ex­er­cen­tur.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. The issue of female slaves and the offspring of their female children are not considered to be profits, because it is not customary for female slaves to be acquired for breeding purposes; their offspring are, nevertheless, an increase of the estate; and since all these form part of the estate, there is no doubt that the possessor should surrender them, whether he is the actual possessor, or, after suit was brought, he acted fraudulently to avoid being in possession. 1Moreover, rents which have been collected from persons who leased buildings, are included in the action; even though they may have been collected from a brothel, for brothels are kept on the premises of many reputable persons.

Dig. 5,3,29Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Mer­ce­des pla­ne a co­lo­nis ac­cep­tae lo­co sunt fruc­tuum. ope­rae quo­que ser­vo­rum in ea­dem erunt cau­sa, qua sunt pen­sio­nes: item vec­tu­rae na­vium et iu­men­to­rum.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. It is evident that any payments received from testaments are to be considered as profits. Compensation for the labor of slaves is in the same class as rents, as well as payment made for transportation by ships and beasts of burden.

Dig. 5,3,31Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Si quid pos­ses­sor sol­vit cre­di­to­ri­bus, re­pu­ta­bit, quam­quam ip­so iu­re non li­be­ra­ve­rit pe­ti­to­rem he­redi­ta­tis: nam quod quis suo no­mi­ne sol­vit, non de­bi­to­ris, de­bi­to­rem non li­be­rat. et id­eo Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to di­ges­to­rum scri­bit ita id im­pu­ta­tu­rum pos­ses­so­rem, si ca­ve­rit se pe­ti­to­rem de­fen­sum iri. sed an et bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­sor de­beat de­fen­den­dum ca­ve­re, vi­den­dum erit, quia in eo quod sol­vit non vi­de­tur lo­cu­ple­tior fac­tus: ni­si for­te ha­beat con­dic­tio­nem et hoc no­mi­ne vi­de­tur lo­cu­ple­tior, quia pot­est re­pe­te­re: fin­ge enim eum, dum se he­redem pu­tat, sol­vis­se suo no­mi­ne. et vi­de­tur mi­hi Iu­lia­nus de so­lo prae­do­ne ut ca­veat sen­sis­se, non et­iam de bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­so­re: con­dic­tio­nem ta­men prae­sta­re de­be­bit. sed et pe­ti­tor si a cre­di­to­ri­bus con­ve­nia­tur, ex­cep­tio­ne uti de­be­bit. 1Sed si ip­si ali­quid prae­do­ni de­be­ba­tur, hoc de­du­ce­re non de­be­bit: ma­xi­me si id fuit de­bi­tum, quod na­tu­ra de­be­ba­tur. quid ta­men si ex­pe­die­bat pe­ti­to­ri id de­bi­tum es­se dis­so­lu­tum prop­ter poe­nam vel aliam cau­sam? pot­est di­ci ip­sum si­bi vel sol­vis­se vel de­buis­se sol­ve­re. 2Ius­tus au­tem pos­ses­sor du­bio pro­cul de­be­bit de­du­ce­re, quod si­bi de­be­tur. 3Sic­ut au­tem sump­tum quem fe­cit de­du­cit, ita si fa­ce­re de­buit nec fe­cit, cul­pae hu­ius red­dat ra­tio­nem, ni­si bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­sor est: tunc enim, quia qua­si suam rem neg­le­xit, nul­li que­rel­lae sub­iec­tus est an­te pe­ti­tam he­redi­ta­tem: post­ea ve­ro et ip­se prae­do est. 4Il­lud pla­ne prae­do­ni im­pu­ta­ri non pot­est, cur pas­sus est de­bi­to­res li­be­ra­ri et pau­pe­rio­res fie­ri et non eos con­ve­nit, cum ac­tio­nem non ha­bue­rit. 5Quod au­tem pos­ses­so­ri so­lu­tum est an re­sti­tue­re de­beat, vi­dea­mus: et si bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­sor fuit si­ve non, de­be­re re­sti­tue­re pla­cet, et qui­dem si re­sti­tue­rit, ut Cas­sius scri­bit et Iu­lia­nus li­bro sex­to, li­be­ra­ri ip­so iu­re de­bi­to­res.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. If the possessor has paid any creditors, he will have a right to include these payments, even though he did not actually release the party who brought the action for recovery; for where anyone makes a payment in his own name, and not in behalf of the debtor, he does not release the debtor. Hence, Julianus says in the Sixth Book of the Digest, that the possessor can, under such circumstances, only be credited where he gives security that he will defend the plaintiff against the creditors. But whether a bona fide possessor is obliged to give security that the plaintiff shall be defended, should be considered, because he does not seem to have been enriched by the payments which he made; unless he may have had a right of action to recover them, and in this respect he appears to be enriched, because he can bring suit to recover the money; for example, where he thinks that he is the heir, and paid what was due on his own account. Julianus appears to me to have been thinking only of a plunderer who ought to give security, and not of a bona fide possessor; the latter, however, must assign his right of action. Where the plaintiff is sued by the creditors, he should make use of an exception. 1Where anything was owing to the plunderer himself, he should not deduct it; especially if it was a debt due through a natural obligation. But what if the plaintiff was benefited by the debt being paid, because it was incurred with a penalty, or for some other reason? In this instance it may be stated that he has paid himself, or should have done so. 2A lawful possessor undoubtedly ought to deduct what is due to him. 3Ad Dig. 5,3,31,3Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 193, Note 13.Just as he can deduct expenses which he has incurred, so, if he ought to have incurred expenses and did not do so, he must answer for his negligence, unless he is a bona fide possessor; and then as he neglected his own business, as it were, no suit can be brought against him before that for the recovery of the estate; but after that time he himself is a plunderer. 4It is evident that a plunderer cannot be called to account for permitting debtors to be released from liability, or to become poor, instead of suing them immediately, since he had no right of action. 5Let us see whether a possessor is required to refund what has been paid him. Whether he was a bona fide possessor or not, it is established that he must make restitution, and if he does do so, (as Cassius states, and Julianus also in the Sixth Book) the debtors are released by operation of law.

Dig. 5,3,33Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. ni­si ex re he­redis scrip­ti sti­pu­la­tus sit. 1Iu­lia­nus scri­bit, si ho­mi­nem pos­ses­sor dis­tra­xe­rit, si qui­dem non ne­ces­sa­rium he­redi­ta­ti, pe­ti­tio­ne he­redi­ta­tis pre­tium prae­sta­tu­rum: im­pu­ta­re­tur enim ei, si non dis­tra­xis­set: quod si ne­ces­sa­rium he­redi­ta­ti, si qui­dem vi­vit, ip­sum prae­stan­dum, si de­ces­se­rit, for­tas­sis nec pre­tium: sed non pas­su­rum iu­di­cem qui co­gnos­cit pos­ses­so­rem pre­tium lu­cra­ri scri­bit, et ve­rius est.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. Unless the slave entered into a stipulation based on the property of said heir. 1Ad Dig. 5,3,33,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 612, Note 18.Julianus says that where a possessor sold a slave, if the latter was not required by the estate, he can be asked in the action for recovery to pay over the purchase-money, as he would have been charged with it if he had not sold him; but where the slave was required by the estate, he himself must be delivered, if he is living, but if he is dead, perhaps not even the price paid for him should be surrendered; but he says that the judge who has jurisdiction of the case will not permit the possessor to appropriate the purchase-money, and this is the better opinion.

Dig. 5,3,37Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Quod si sump­tus qui­dem fe­cit, ni­hil au­tem fruc­tuum per­ce­pe­rit, ae­quis­si­mum erit ra­tio­nem ho­rum quo­que in bo­nae fi­dei pos­ses­so­ri­bus ha­be­ri.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. Where a person has incurred expense and realized no profit, it is perfectly just that the expense should be taken into account in the case of bona fide possessors.

Dig. 5,4,4Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. et si pau­cio­res fue­rint na­ti, re­si­duum ei pro ra­ta ad­cres­ce­re, si plu­res quam tres, de­cres­ce­re de ea par­te ex qua he­res fac­tus est.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. And where a less number are born, his share will increase in proportion; and if more than three are born, there will be a decrease in the share to which he became the heir.

Dig. 5,5,1Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Or­di­na­rium fuit post ci­vi­les ac­tio­nes he­redi­bus pro­pos­i­tas ra­tio­nem ha­be­re prae­to­rem et­iam eo­rum quos ip­se vel­ut he­redes fa­cit, hoc est eo­rum qui­bus bo­no­rum pos­ses­sio da­ta est.

Ulpiamis, On the Edict, Book XV. It is customary for the Prætor to consider those parties whom he constitutes actual heirs; that is to say, to whom the possession of the estate is granted, after civil actions have been proposed to the heirs:

Dig. 20,1,17Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Pig­no­ris per­se­cu­tio in rem pa­rit ac­tio­nem cre­di­to­ri.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. The right to avail himself of his pledge gives the creditor an action in rem.

Dig. 22,1,34Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Usu­rae vi­cem fruc­tuum op­ti­nent et me­ri­to non de­bent a fruc­ti­bus se­pa­ra­ri: et ita in le­ga­tis et fi­dei­com­mis­sis et in tu­te­lae ac­tio­ne et in ce­te­ris iu­di­ciis bo­nae fi­dei ser­va­tur. hoc idem igi­tur in ce­te­ris ob­ven­tio­ni­bus di­ce­mus.

The Same, On the Edict, Book XV. Interest takes the place of produce, and therefore should not be separated from it; hence in legacies and trusts, in actions on guardianship, and in all other bona fide actions, this rule is observed. Wherefore we say that the same principle applies to all other accessions.

Dig. 36,3,4Idem li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Si ex cau­sa fi­dei­com­mis­si sit apud ali­quem he­redi­tas nec le­ga­to­rum sa­tis­dat, in pos­ses­sio­nem ad­ver­sus eum le­ga­ta­rius mit­ti­tur.

The Same, On the Edict, Book XV. Where an estate is in the hands of anyone under the terms of a trust, and he does not give security for the payment of the legacies, the legatee is placed in possession of the property as against him.

Dig. 41,10,1Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Pro suo pos­ses­sio ta­lis est. cum do­mi­nium no­bis ad­quiri pu­ta­mus, et ex ea cau­sa pos­si­de­mus, ex qua ad­quiri­tur, et prae­ter­ea pro suo: ut pu­ta ex cau­sa emp­tio­nis et pro emp­to­re et pro suo pos­si­deo, item do­na­ta vel le­ga­ta vel pro do­na­to vel pro le­ga­to et­iam pro suo pos­si­deo. 1Sed si res mi­hi ex cau­sa ius­ta pu­ta emp­tio­nis tra­di­ta sit et usu­ca­piam, in­ci­pio qui­dem et an­te usu­ca­pio­nem pro meo pos­si­de­re. sed an de­si­nam ex cau­sa emp­tio­nis post usu­ca­pio­nem, du­bi­ta­tur: et Mau­ri­cia­nus di­ci­tur ex­is­ti­mas­se non de­si­ne­re.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. Possession on the ground of ownership exists where we think we acquire property for ourselves, and have possession of it under the title by which it was obtained, as well as because of ownership; as, for instance, when, by virtue of a purchase I hold possession both as purchaser and as owner. Moreover, I hold possession both as legatee and donee, and also on the ground of ownership, where property has been donated or bequeathed to me. 1Where, however, property has been delivered to me under some good title, for example, by that of purchase, and I acquire it by usucaption, I begin to hold possession of it as mine, even before acquiring it by usucaption. But can any doubt arise as to whether I cease to hold it, as purchaser, after usucaption has taken place? Mauricianus says that he thinks that I do not cease to hold it.

Dig. 44,2,3Idem li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Iu­lia­nus li­bro ter­tio di­ges­to­rum re­spon­dit ex­cep­tio­nem rei iu­di­ca­tae ob­sta­re, quo­tiens ea­dem quaes­tio in­ter eas­dem per­so­nas re­vo­ca­tur: et id­eo et si sin­gu­lis re­bus pe­ti­tis he­redi­ta­tem pe­tat vel con­tra, ex­cep­tio­ne sum­mo­ve­bi­tur.

The Same, On the Edict, Book XV. Julianus, in the Third Book of the Digest, states that an exception on the ground of res judicata can be opposed whenever the same question again arises in court between the same parties. Therefore, if anyone brings an action for the entire estate, after having lost one, brought to recover a portion of the same, or vice versa, he will be barred by an exception.

Dig. 47,10,24Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum prae­to­ris. Si quis pro­prium ser­vum dis­tra­he­re pro­hi­be­tur a quo­li­bet, in­iu­ria­rum ex­per­i­ri pot­est.

Ulpianus, On the Edict of the Prætor, Book XV. Where anyone is prevented by another from selling his own slave, he can bring an action for injury sustained.

Dig. 50,17,126Ul­pia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Ne­mo prae­do est, qui pre­tium nu­me­ra­vit. 1Lo­cu­ple­tior non est fac­tus, qui li­ber­tum ad­quisie­rit. 2Cum de lu­cro duo­rum quae­ra­tur, me­lior est cau­sa pos­si­den­tis.

Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. No one is a depredator who pays the price of what he obtains. 1He who acquires a freedman does not become any more wealthy on this account. 2When a question arises with reference to the claims of two persons, the position of the possessor is preferable.