Tryphoninus, Disputations, Book XVII. A son is not prevented from attacking the testament of his mother as inofficious, where his father has received a legacy by the will of the mother, or has entered upon the estate, even though the said son was still under his father’s control; and I have stated that the father is not forbidden to attack the will in behalf of his son, for the indignity is inflicted upon the latter. 1It was also asked if the son failed in his attack on the will, whether what was left to the father would be forfeited to the State? For, as he would not be benefited by his success, and in this instance the duty of the father was not in any way concerned, but everything depended upon the merit of the son, we must incline to the opinion that the father does not lose what was left to him, if a decision is rendered in favor of the will. 2Much more is this the fact where a testator left me a legacy, and his son, after instituting proceedings on the ground that the will was inofficious, died, leaving me his heir, and I still proceed with the action against the estate, and I am defeated, I do not lose what was left me by the will; if, of course, the deceased had already begun suit. 3Moreover, if I adopt a person after he has already brought an action to declare the will inofficious, by which will a legacy had been bequeathed to me, and I conduct the case in behalf of my adopted son, and do not succeed; I should not lose my legacy because I have been guilty of anything for which I ought to be deprived by the Treasury of what was bequeathed to me; for I did not bring the suit in my own name, but on account of a certain kind of legal succession.

Tryphoninus, Disputations, Book XVII. A father has no right to place any obligation upon his emancipated son, in consideration of having granted him his freedom, for the reason that nothing of this kind can be imposed upon children. Nor can anyone say that a son is bound by an oath to his father, who manumits him, in the same way as a freedman is to his patron, as children owe their parents affection and not menial services.

Tryphonimis, Disputations, Book XVII. The same rule applies where the crime which was proved against the freedman carries with it capital punishment, but the freedman was subjected to a lower penalty; as, for instance, he was only banished, for the Prætor only takes cognizance of a patron who brings a false accusation.

Tryphoninus, Disputations, Book XVII. It makes no difference whether the patron, having been appointed heir, accepts a smaller share of the estate of his freedman than the one he is entitled to by law, or whether he orders his own slave, who was appointed heir, to enter upon the estate, and he retains the same, as he will, in either instance, be excluded from prætorian possession of the estate of his freedman in opposition to the terms of the will. 1If, however, he should sell the slave before ordering him to enter upon the estate of the freedman, or manumit him, so that the new freedman himself or the purchaser will become the heir, the patron is not prohibited by the terms of the Edict from accepting prætorian possession of the estate of the freedman contrary to the provisions of the will. 2But ought the Prætor to refuse him the action to obtain possession, because he attempted to evade the Edict for the purpose of acquiring prætorian possession contrary to the provisions of the will either by receiving a larger price from the purchaser, or by making a tacit agreement with the slave to gain an undue advantage from his appointment as heir to the estate? The suspicion is still greater where the patron himself acquires the estate of the freedman through the acceptance of his son, who was appointed heir, even though he was emancipated, as everything which we have we wish to go to our children. 3If, however, while the will remains unopened, and the patron is still ignorant of the intentions of his freedman, he commits any of the above-mentioned acts, having reference to the heir who was appointed while under his control, and there is no suspicion of fraud, he can avail himself of his right to obtain prætorian possession of the estate in opposition to the terms of the will. 4Where a patron, who is appointed by his freedman heir to the share of his estate to which he is legally entitled, and is charged to transfer the estate to another, alleges that he considers it to be insolvent, and, having been compelled to accept it, although he could retain the share to which he was entitled, transfers the same, he cannot obtain prætorian possession contrary to the testamentary provisions, both because he accepted the will of the freedman, and despised, and, as it were, rejected his right to the possession of his legal share of the estate. 5The case of the son of a patron, whom a freedman has arrogated and appointed heir to a smaller share of his estate than that to which he was entitled, is very different from this, where there is no one else belonging to the family of the patron. For, although he is, by operation of law, the proper heir of the freedman, if he did not interfere with the estate of the latter as belonging to his father, but abstained from doing so in order to retain his right as patron, the son will, nevertheless, be permitted to obtain prætorian possession of the estate contrary to the testamentary provisions. 6If a freedman should leave to his patron, who owed him a certain sum of money, a release from liability, and he should avail himself of an exception on the ground of bad faith against an heir demanding payment of the debt, or he is released on account of the legacy, it must be said that he cannot obtain prætorian possession of the estate in opposition to the provisions of the will.