Scævola, Questions Publicly Treated. This action can be brought by the wife even during marriage.

The Same, Questions Publicly Treated. We own a slave in common; he is appointed an heir; and Mævius is substituted for him in case he should not be the heir. The slave accepts the estate by the direction of only one of his masters, and the question arises whether there is ground for the admission of the substitute, or not. The better opinion is that there is ground for his admission. 1“Let Titius be my heir. I give and bequeath Stichus to Mævius. Let Stichus be my heir, if Stichus should not become my heir, let Stichus be free and my heir.” In this instance, inquiry must first be made whether there is one degree or two, and whether the condition of the substitution is changed, or remains the same. And, indeed, the question frequently arises whether a party can be substituted for himself, and the answer is that where the condition of the appointment is changed he can be substituted. Therefore, if Titius is appointed heir, and if he should not accept he is ordered to become the heir, the substitution is of no force or effect. Where, however, a party is appointed an heir under a condition, but is substituted absolutely, the case is changed, since the condition upon which the appointment depends may not be fulfilled, and the substitution may be productive of some advantage to the heir. But if the condition should be fulfilled, there are two absolute appointments, and the substitution will have no force or effect. On the other hand, if anyone appoints an heir absolutely, and then substitutes him for himself under some condition, this conditional substitution is inoperative, nor is anything understood to be changed, since, if the condition had been fulfilled, there would be two absolute appointments of the same individual. According to this, the question stated is as follows: “Let Titius be my heir, I give and bequeath Stichus to Mævius; let Stichus be my heir, if Stichus should not be my heir, let him be free and be my heir”. We know that since Stichus was bequeathed and received his freedom by virtue of the same will, his freedom will take precedence, and if it does, the legacy will not be due, and he cannot enter upon the estate by order of the legatee, and therefore Stichus is not an heir and by virtue of the words which follow he is entitled to freedom; as it is held that there is but one degree of appointment. But what if Titius should not accept the estate? Stichus would begin to be free and an heir by virtue of the substitution. Hence, as long as he does not enter upon the estate by order of the legatee, it is understood that he does not become the property of the legatee on account of the legacy, and therefore it is certain that he is not an heir; but he becomes free and an heir by virtue of the following words: “If he should not be my heir, let Stichus be free and be my heir.” Julianus also approves of our opinion in his works. 2If a minor alienates a slave who has been substituted for himself, and the purchaser of said slave appoints him his heir with the grant of his freedom, will the substituted slave be entitled to the entire estate of the minor by reason of the substitution? If the minor should reach the age of puberty, the slave will become the necessary heir of the purchaser by virtue of his will, but if the minor should die before attaining that age, the slave will become free and his heir on account of the substitution, and also will become the necessary heir of the father of the minor, but he will be the voluntary heir of the purchaser.

The Same, Questions Publicly Discussed. Ad Dig. 32,103 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 559, Note 29.Where a father substituted a foreign heir for his disinherited son, and the said foreign heir afterwards appointed the son his heir, and the latter died under the age of puberty, I think that the legacies with which the substitute for the sum was charged will not be due, for the reason that the estate of the father did not come into the hands of the son directly, but through indirect succession. 1I have ascertained, besides, that in the case of a brother who was the heir of his father and appointed his own disinherited brother his heir, that his substitute will not be obliged to pay the legacy, even if he should succeed his brother, where the latter died intestate; because the property did not come into his hands directly, but through succession to his brother. 2Where a son was appointed heir to a twelfth of his father’s estate, and was charged with a legacy, and a substitute was appointed for him, and, afterwards, his other brother came within the scope of the Edict, and he obtained prætorian possession of half of the estate; the question arose whether his substitute would be required to pay the legacies in proportion to a twelfth, or in proportion to half of the estate. The better opinion is that he would be obliged to pay in proportion to half, but if he paid in proportion to a twelfth, it must be paid to all, and payment should be made to the children and other relatives in proportion to the balance. 3On the other hand, if the son was appointed heir to three-fourths of the estate, and having come within the scope of the Edict, he should obtain prætorian possession of half of the property, the substitute would only owe the legacies proportionally; for just as they are increased where prætorian possession of the estate is greater, so also they are reduced, where it is less.

The Same, Questions, Publicly Discussed. If a civilian executed a will before he becomes a soldier, and then executes a codicil during his time of military service, the Falcidian Law does not apply to the codicil, but it does apply to the will.

The Same, Questions Discussed in Public. If a minor child becomes the heir of his father, and transfers part of the estate which was left in trust, and afterwards rejects the estate, the beneficiary of the trust has the right to decide whether he will keep the part delivered to him by the minor, as well as the share of the latter; or reject all; or permit the entire property of the estate to be sold, in order that any amount over and above the indebtedness may be preserved for the minor. If the property cannot be disposed of as a whole, all actions at law should be refused the beneficiary of the trust; for it was in his power to take the entire estate, and to keep for the minor anything remaining after payment of the indebtedness.

Ad Dig. 42,8,24Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 463, Note 31.The Same, Questions Discussed in Public. A minor became the heir of his father, paid one of the creditors, and afterwards rejected his father’s estate. The property of his father was sold. Should what the creditor received be returned, to prevent him from enjoying a greater advantage than the other creditors; or shall we make a distinction if he received this as a favor, so that if he was treated with partiality by the guardians, his share may be reduced in proportion to those of the other creditors? If, however, he collected his claim legally, and the other creditors neglected to collect theirs, and, in the meantime, the property became deteriorated either by death, by the theft of chattels, or by the depreciation in value of the land; that which the said creditor received can, by no means, be recovered, as the other creditors should pay the penalty for their negligence. But what if matters were in such a condition that the property of my debtor being about to be sold, he should pay me my debt; can the money be recovered from me by an action? Should a distinction be made where he tendered me the money, and where I compelled him to pay me against his consent? And if I forced him to make payment involuntarily, can it be recovered, but if not, will this be done? But I have watched over my interests; I have improved my condition; the Civil Law was made for those who are diligent in protecting their own rights; and hence what I received cannot be recovered.

Scævola, Questions Publicly Discussed, Book II. Ad Dig. 44,3,14 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 181, Note 10.We cannot lay down any rules of general or perpetual application with reference to the union of one possession to another, for this depends upon equity alone. 1Ad Dig. 44,3,14,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 181, Note 5.It is clear that such a union is granted to those who succeed to us, even by virtue of a contract, or under a will. The addition of the time when the property was possessed by a testator is granted to the heirs, and to those who occupy the place of his successors. 2Ad Dig. 44,3,14,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 181, Note 10.Therefore, if you sell me a slave, I can add the time during which he was in your possession. 3If you have given me an article in pledge, and I myself pledge it to someone else, my creditor will be entitled to the addition of the time during which you had possession of it, not only against a third party, but also against you yourself, so long as you did not pay me; for when anyone has the preference over me, as I have over you, there is much more reason to hold that he should be preferred to you. If, however, you should pay me the money, he cannot, under such circumstances, benefit by the time that the property remained in your hands. 4Ad Dig. 44,3,14,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 181, Note 10.Likewise, if, during your absence, someone who is considered to have charge of your business should sell me a slave, and you ratify his act after your return, I can certainly profit by the time during which he was in your possession. 5Ad Dig. 44,3,14,5Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 181, Note 10.Again, if you give me property in pledge, and it is agreed between us that, if you do not pay the money, I can sell the pledge under the contract, and I do sell it, the purchaser will be entitled to the addition of the time that the property was in your possession, even though the pledge was sold without your permission, for when you made the contract it is held that you consented to the sale, if you should not pay the money.

Scævola, Questions Publicly Discussed. Where there are two joint-stipulators, and one of them appoints the other his heir, let us see whether the obligation will not be merged. It has been decided that it will not be merged. What was the advantage of this decision? If the heir brings suit to compel the property to be delivered to him, it must be given to him either because he is the heir, or because he is entitled to it in his own name. A great difference, however, exists in this case, for if one of the stipulators can be barred by a temporary exception arising from the contract, it is important to know whether the heir brings the action in his own name, or as the heir, so that in this way you can ascertain whether there will be ground for an exception, or not. 1Again, where there are two joint-promisors, and one of them appoints the other his heir, the obligation will not be merged. 2If, however, a principal debtor should make the heir his surety, the obligation will be merged. And it may be considered a general rule that, where a principal obligation is joined to one which is accessory, the two are merged, but where there are two principal obligations, one of them is added to the other rather for the purpose of strengthening the action rather than to produce a merger. 3What is the rule where a surety appoints the principal debtor his heir? The obligation will be merged, according to the opinion of Sabinus, although Proculus dissents from it.

The Same, Questions Publicly Discussed. Where one of several sureties is sued for not having defended a case, and it is afterwards defended, the other surety can be proceeded against to compel the execution of the judgment. If the principal promisor should die, leaving two heirs, and one does not defend the case and the other does, the former can be sued for not having done so, and the latter can be proceeded against to compel the execution of the judgment; as it is held that these two clauses cannot become operative against one and the same person. We say that the clause relating to the judgment would always take precedence over the others, and that it alone takes effect.