Scævola, Questions, Book II. Where anyone wishes to have a will declared inofficious, although it may be denied that he is the son of the deceased, he is not entitled to the Carbonian possession of property, for this is only permitted where, if the party were actually the son he would be the heir, or the legal possessor of the estate; so that if, in the meantime, he should obtain possession, and be supported, his rights would not be prejudiced by any actions which might be brought by him. Where a party makes a claim of inofficiousness, he cannot bring any actions except one to obtain the estate, and he has no right to support. This is done to prevent him from being in a better position than if his adversary had acknowledged him to be the son of the testator.

Scævola, Questions, Book II. Where a man had several tracts of land and bequeathed the usufruct of all of them separately, he can be buried in any one of them, and the heir shall have the right of selection, and the opportunity to favor the others. A prætorian action will, however, be granted the usufructuary against the heir, to enable him to recover damages to the amount that the value of his usufruct is diminished by the selection. 1Where the heir of a woman buries her body on land belonging to her estate, he can recover from her husband the amount which he should contribute towards the expense of the funeral, which depends upon the value of the land. 2Where clothing is bequeathed to anyone, and he sells it for the purpose of paying the funeral expenses, it is held that a prætorian action based on a prior claim should be granted against the heir.

Scævola, Questions, Book II. For what is commonly stated, namely: that it is not lawful to lend to a son under paternal control, does not relate to the terms of the transaction, but to the payment of the money.

Scævola, Questions, Book II. On the other hand, it is very properly stated that, if you have entered into a stipulation with the head of a family, and afterwards lend the money to him when he has become a son under paternal control, the power of the Decree of the Senate should be exercised, because the substantial part of the obligation was completed by the payment of the money.

Scævola, Questions, Book II. With reference to what is due to a slave from strangers, the master should, by no means, have judgment rendered against him for the amount of the debt, where anyone brings suit on the peculium; since both the expense incurred in bringing the action and the result of the execution may be uncertain, and the delay of time granted to those who have been held judicially liable, or that consumed in the sale of the property, should be considered, if this is the better thing to do; therefore, if the party is ready to assign his rights of action he will be discharged. What is said where an action is brought against one of several partners, namely: that the entire peculium must be computed, because the proceeding is against the partner, will have the same result if the party is ready to assign his rights of action; and, in the case of all those whom we say are liable on this account since they have a right of action, the substitution takes the place of legal payment.

Scævola, Questions, Book II. If you owe anyone ten thousand sesterces or a slave, whichever he may choose, set-off of the debt will be admitted, if he states openly which he prefers.

Scævola, Questions, Book II. Where the vendor reserves the question of freedom in the sale of a slave, he will not be liable on the ground of eviction, if at the time that the slave was delivered he should become free, or should obtain his liberty when a condition prescribed by will is fulfilled. 1Where a vendor, in delivering a slave, states that he is to be free on a certain condition, it is understood that only the kind of freedom is referred to which can result from the fulfillment of a condition already prescribed by a will, and therefore if freedom was conferred at once by the will, and the vendor says that the slave will be liberated under a condition, he will be liable in case of eviction. 2On the other hand, where anyone sells a slave who has the prospect of freedom, and states the condition under which he will be entitled to be free, and in doing so causes his condition to be considered worse, because he would not be held to have excepted every condition under which the slave would be free, but only that which he indicated; as, for instance, if anyone should say that the slave was ordered to pay ten aurei to become free, and he should obtain his liberty after the lapse of a year, because his freedom had been granted in the following terms: “Let Stichus be free after a year,” the vendor will be liable in case of eviction. 3But what if a slave whom the vendor had declared would be free on the payment of twenty aurei had been, in fact, ordered to pay ten; would the vendor be considered to have told a falsehood with reference to the condition? It is true that he made a false statement with reference to the condition, and therefore certain jurists have held that, in this instance also, the stipulation would become operative in case of eviction. The authority of Servius, however, prevailed, who thought that under these circumstances an action on purchase would lie; because it was his opinion that he who stated that the slave had been ordered to pay twenty aurei had excepted the condition which depended upon the payment. 4A slave was ordered to be free after his accounts had been rendered; the heir sold and delivered him, and stated that he had been directed to pay a hundred aurei for his freedom. If nothing remained which the slave was obliged to pay when he rendered his accounts, he therefore became free as soon as the estate was entered upon, and liability for eviction was contracted for the reason that a man who was free was sold as one whose liberty was dependent on a condition. If the slave was a defaulter to the amount of a hundred aurei, it may be held that the heir did not tell a falsehood; and as the slave was ordered to render his accounts, it is understood that he was directed to make good the amount of money collected which remained unpaid. The result of this is, that, if he was in default for less than a hundred aurei, for example, only fifty, so that he would obtain his freedom when he paid this sum, the purchaser will be entitled to an action on sale to recover the remaining fifty aurei. 5Where anyone, at the time of the sale, states indefinitely that a slave will be conditionally free, but conceals the condition of his freedom, he will be liable to an action on sale if the purchaser is not aware of the fact; for, in this instance, it is settled that he who says that a slave has a prospect of freedom, and does not mention any condition, will indeed not be liable on the ground of eviction, if the condition is fulfilled, and the slave obtains his freedom; but he will be liable to an action on sale provided he concealed the condition which he knew had been prescribed; just as where a party sells a tract of land, and being aware that a certain servitude was due from it, stated indefinitely, “that all rights of way of every description would continue to be enjoyed by those entitled to them,” is properly held to have released himself from liability for eviction, but, because he deceived the purchaser, he will be liable to an action on sale. 6Where the amount stated to be included in a tract of land which is sold falls short, a part of the price is deducted in proportion to the value of all the jugera which the land was alleged to contain.

Scævola, Questions, Book II. Where a husband has judgment rendered against him for a sum which he is able to pay, and he has claims equal to, but not greater than the amount of the dowry, he will not be compelled to assign his rights of action.