The Same, Digest, Book XXI. A daughter, born after the emancipation of her father, requested her paternal uncle, as her heir-at-law, to give her share of the estate, and two tracts of land, in addition, to her maternal uncle. The succession of the said daughter passed equally to both of her uncles, as next of kin, through prætorian possession. As the trust was not valid with reference to that part of the estate to which her maternal uncle would be entitled as heir-at-law through prætorian possession, the question arose, whether it, nevertheless, would not be valid, as far as half of the said tract was concerned; so that the said Titius, her uncle, might have two shares of said tracts, that is to say, one of them through his right under Prætorian Law, and the other which he could claim by virtue of the trust. The answer was that he was entitled to make the claim. The question was also asked, if the deceased daughter had also charged her paternal uncle with trusts for the benefit of others, whether he would be obliged to execute them altogether, or only in proportion to his share of the estate. The answer was that he would be obliged to execute them in their entirety. 1A testator appointed Seia his heir to three-fourths of his estate, and Mævius his heir to one-fourth, and he charged Seia with a trust as follows: “I ask, and I charge you to deliver to your son everything that you obtained from my estate after reserving my gardens for yourself.” Since he had charged her with a trust in general terms, the question arose whether anyone who would become his heir would be compelled to pay whatever legacies he had bequeathed, and execute whatever trusts he had created; or whether, if Seia should surrender three-fourths of the estate, she could claim all the gardens. The answer was that it appeared that the co-heir was charged by the trust to deliver to Seia the fourth interest which he had in said gardens.

Scævola, Digest, Book XXI. A testator, after having appointed his son and daughter his heirs, bequeathed certain property to each of them as preferred legacies, but he left much less to his daughter than to his son. He devised to the former, in addition, a house which was encumbered, including everything belonging to it and all its utensils, and added the following clause, “I make this devise on condition that Titius, the freedman of my son, shall pay any debts due on said house, and if he does, the house shall belong to both of them in common.” If the daughter should desire to avail herself of the benefit of the Falcidian Law for the purpose of reserving her fourth, the question arose whether the debts should be deducted from the share of the estate which was left to her, and she should obtain her fourth out of what was left. The answer was that she could claim it by law, but that she could not accept what was left to her, if it was sufficient to make up her fourth, without complying with the wishes of the deceased, and paying what she had been charged with.

The Same, Digest, Book XXI. A husband had charge of the property of his wife, which did not include her dowry, and she, having died before her husband had rendered her an account of his administration, left him heir to her entire estate, and charged him, when he died, to deliver ten shares of the same to their common son, and to deliver two shares to her grandson. The question arose whether what was found to have remained in the hands of her husband from his administration of the property should be transferred to the son, along with the other assets, in proportion to ten shares of the estate. The answer was that what the husband owed the estate would also be included in the distribution. 1The paternal uncle of a girl, whom her mother requested to transfer her estate to Titius, if she should die before reaching the age of puberty, became her legal heir. In estimating the amount due under the Falcidian Law, the heir desired to deduct from the estate the principal, out of the interest of which the deceased minor had paid several persons money that was due for support furnished on account of the testatrix. If he should make this deduction, the question arose whether he ought to give security to pay the principal of said sums of money, the amounts of the same to be determined by the time of death of each of the parties entitled to support. The answer was that he should give such security. 2Three years after having entered upon the estate an heir wished to enforce the Falcidian Law against the legatees, for the reason that the testator had administered certain guardianships of which no account had yet been rendered, and because he denied that as much could be recovered from the claims due to the minor as had been deducted on account of the security given by the testator. The question arose whether on the demand of the legatees copies should be taken of the accounts of the deceased, and of all the documents belonging to the estate, as well as a statement of the sums due to the wards, in order to prevent the heir from producing what papers he might select, and in this way defraud the legatees. The answer was that it was the duty of the court to examine any documents by which the amount of the estate might be established.

The Same, Digest, Book XXI. Lucius Titius, expecting to die intestate, and having a wife and a daughter by her whom he had emancipated, inserted the following provision into a codicil, “This codicil has reference to my wife and my daughter. Therefore I ask that anything that I may leave you, or that you yourself have, will belong to you in common; and whatever I do not ask you to do, I am sure that you will do, through your affection for me.” The daughter acquired possession of the estate of her intestate father under the Prætorian Law. The question arose whether any part of the estate of Lucius Titius was due from the daughter to her mother, on account of the trust. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, a part of it was due, if the wife was ready to place her own property in a common fund with that of her daughter. 1Mævia left two daughters her heirs, and in the same will she inserted the following provision: “I charge my heirs to leave all my property on deposit, without interest, with Gaius Seius and Lucius Titius, whom, if it should be lawful, I have appointed the curators of my estate, excluding all others, in order that they may transfer it to my grandchildren pro rata, when each one of them arrives at the age of twenty-five years; or if only one of them should reach that age, to transfer all my estate to him.” The question arose whether the trust should be executed by the appointed heirs for the benefit of Lucius Titius and Seius. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, Lucius Titius and Gaius Seius could not claim the trust. 2A woman appointed three heirs, her brother Mævius to three-fourths of her estate, Seius to a sixth, and Stichus, the slave of the said Seius and the natural son of Mævius, to a twelfth; and she charged Seius to manumit Stichus, as follows, “I charge you, Seius, to manumit Stichus, and I have given you the means to do so.” She also made the following provision in a codicil: “If Seius should originate any controversy with reference to the twelfth of my estate, to which I have appointed Stichus the heir, I desire it to revert to my brother Mævius; and my brother, as I rely upon your good faith and recollection, I ask to deliver everything which may come into your hands from my estate to your son Stichus, and I charge you to do this under a trust.” As Seius entered upon the estate and on this account was compelled to manumit Stichus, the question arose whether he was obliged to transfer to Stichus, after his manumission, the twelfth of the estate to which the latter had been appointed heir. The answer was, that there was nothing stated to show that Seius was charged to transfer to him the twelfth part of the estate. 3Inquiry was also made, if Seius wished to raise any question with reference to the twelfth to which Stichus had been appointed heir, and Mævius should obtain the said twelfth from Seius under the terms of the trust, whether he must also transfer to Stichus the three-fourths of the estate to which Mævius himself had been appointed heir. The answer was that it was the intention of the testatrix that all of the estate which had come into the hands of Mævius in any way whatsoever should be transferred to Stichus. 4A father appointed his son and daughter his heirs, and substituted them for one another, and then substituted several heirs for them, in case neither of them should become an heir, and substituted the substitutes themselves for one another, by the following words, “I substitute the substituted heirs for one another.” He also charged any one of his children who might survive the others and die without issue before reaching the age of thirty years to transfer his estate to those whom he had substituted as the heirs of the said child. His son survived his sister, and died without issue before reaching his thirtieth year. One of the substitutes having died before the son, as his share would belong to the other substitutes who survived, the question arose whether ft would pass to them equally, or in proportion to the shares of the estate for which they had been substituted. The answer was that the substitutes were entitled to the benefit of the trust in proportion to their respective shares. 5Mævius appointed her son heir to five-twelfths of her estate, her daughter, Titia, to a fourth, and her other son, Septitius, to a third; and she charged the latter with a trust in the following words, “My son, Septitius, I ask you to transfer to your brothers all of my estate which may come into your hands, if, before reaching your twentieth year, you should die without leaving any children.” Septitius, having died without issue before reaching his twentieth year, the question arose whether the estate would belong to the brother and sister in proportion to their respective shares of the same, or whether it would belong to them equally. The answer was that it would belong to them in proportion to their respective shares. 6Titia, having been appointed sole heir to an entire estate and charged to transfer half of the same to Mævia, did so; she, however, refused to pay the amount for which a tract of land had been encumbered by the testator, but as the creditor sold the property she directed Seia to redeem it. The question arose whether Titia would be liable to Mævia under the terms of the trust. The answer was that, as the heir was charged to transfer the estate, there was nothing in what was stated to show that she should not be liable. Claudius: For she is obliged to pay Mævia half the value of the land, and as much more as had been necessary to satisfy the creditor. 7A certain man, having appointed Gaius Seius heir to half of his estate, Titia heir to a quarter of the same, and other persons heirs to the remainder, inserted the following provision into his will, “I charge you, Gaius Seius, at your death to give and deliver to Titius and Sempronius half of my estate, that is to say, the portion which I have given to you.” Both of the above-mentioned persons having accepted the estate, and Gaius Seius having subsequently died after appointing Lucia Titia his heir, the question arose whether the said Lucia Titia was obliged to transfer immediately half of the estate which Gaius Seius had been charged to deliver, or whether she should, at the time of her death, transfer the entire trust, not only that with which she was charged, but also that of Gaius Seius. The answer was that Lucia Titia was bound to immediately transfer half of the estate which Seius had received. 8A testator appointed his daughter his heir, together with his grandson, who was her son, and after making a pupillary substitution to the latter, inserted the following provision into his will: “I bequeath to Lucius Titius, my nephew, and my son-in-law, two hundred aurei, and I know that he will be content with this legacy, as I have left all my estate to my daughter and my grandson, whom I have appointed my heirs, so that the entire estate will belong to them in common, and I commend them to one another.” The daughter, having entered upon her father’s estate, separated from her husband. The question arose whether Titius, her former husband, could, under the terms of the trust, in his own name or in that of his son, acquire the property held in common, either while his said former wife was living or after her death. The answer was that, according to the facts stated, there was nothing given to the son-in-law under the trust except two hundred aurei. 9The same wife appointed her husband her heir, and charged him at the time of his death to transfer to their common son everything which he had received from her estate; it was also asked whether the property and effects which he had given by way of dowry, and which had been returned to the woman after the divorce, should be included in the trust. The answer was that all the property which the woman left was included therein. Claudius: Advice having been taken at another time with reference to the same question, the conclusion was that either the property should be transferred in accordance with the opinion above given, and should be computed as part of the estate of the woman; or, if this was not done because of a stipulation entered into with reference to the restoration of the dowry, the estate should be considered to have increased on this account. 10A woman who had a son and by him a grandson, both of whom were under the control of her husband, appointed the latter her sole heir, and charged him with a trust as follows, “If my husband, Titius, should be my heir, I ask and charge him, at the time of his death, to give and transfer everything which may come into his hands from my estate, in such a way that our son Gaius may have ten-twelfths of the same, and our grandson Seius two-twelfths; and I charge my heir Titius to see that this is done.” The father emancipated his son, lost his grandson, and then died, being survived by his son. The question arose whether the son, under the terms of the trust, by the first part of the will, was entitled to the entire estate of his father, and whether the following words, “In such a way that my son may have ten-twelfths of the same, and my grandson two-twelfths,” should, in compliance with the intention of the deceased, only be applicable where both the son and grandson were living at the time the trust became due; or, as the grandson was not living at that time, whether the following clause of the will would be of no force or effect. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, it was evident that only ten-twelfths of the estate should be given to the son. 11An appointed heir, having been asked to transfer three entire estates to the wife of the testator, did so, after having deducted a fourth of the same. The question arose, if the wife had been asked by the testator to transfer the fourth part to his estate immediately, and the remainder after a certain time had elapsed, whether that portion which the heir had deducted from it as a fourth should be accounted for when the property was transferred under the trust? The answer was that the woman was only liable for the amount which she had received under the trust. 12A testator charged his heirs to transfer all of the third part of his estate, which might come into their hands, to Gaius Mævius, whom he had brought up, when the latter should reach the age of fifteen years, and added the following words: “In the meantime, you will employ the income of the amount which may come into your hands to keep him from poverty which amount should be lent at interest. In addition to this, I give to my said foster-child a certain slave, his foster-brother, born in my house, and another slave, a shoemaker, who can assist in supporting him with the proceeds of their labor.” As the heirs had provided the child with maintenance at a cost much below the amount of the interest of the sum which had been bequeathed for that purpose, the question arose whether they could be compelled to pay the balance for the entire time during which support was due, or only after he had attained his fifteenth year. And, as the slaves who had been specially bequeathed to him in order to contribute to his support with the proceeds of their labor had been immediately sold by their heirs, it was also asked whether their wages, with interest, could be claimed by the child. The answer was that, according to the facts stated, the intention of the testator seemed to have been that the entire income of the estate, as well as the wages of the slaves, should be delivered. 13A certain man having appointed several persons, including three freedmen, heirs to three-fourths of his estate, left them also some lands as a preferred legacy, and charged them “Not to alienate the said lands, so that whichever of them survived might acquire all for himself.” He afterwards charged one of the said freedmen to transfer to Titius everything that came into his hands from his estate, or his property, after having deducted the debts and legacies, and reserved twenty aurei for himself. The question arose whether he should also have deducted the third of the lands which had been devised to him and his fellow freedmen as a preferred legacy. The answer was that, according to the facts stated, the lands should not be transferred, as the testator himself had desired the legacies to be excepted. 14A husband, having appointed his wife heir to a third part of his estate, and charged her with several trusts, also bequeathed to her her dowry as a preferred legacy, in the following terms, “I wish the amount of her dowry which she brought me to be paid by my son to my wife, Seia,” and he charged his wife, at the time of her death, to leave to their common son, Titius, her share of the estate, and anything else which he had bequeathed to her. The question arose whether she would also be obliged to transfer to her son the amount of her dowry, together with the other legacies which she had received by virtue of the trust. The answer was that the testator did not intend that her dowry should also be transferred, unless it was otherwise established; and even if it was proved that he had intended this to be done, it could not be demanded, unless the amount which could be retained under the Falcidian Law was less than that of the dowry. 15An heir who was charged to transfer an estate to Septitius, when he reached the age of twenty years, in the meantime sold certain lands which the deceased had received by way of pledge; and having been sued by the debtor on account of the pledge, died, leaving Sempronius his heir, who transferred the estate to Titius before the case was decided. The question arose whether Sempronius himself should, nevertheless, have judgment rendered against him; for he could have retained the property in his hands, or could have exacted security for what he might be compelled to pay if he was defeated in court. The answer was that the judgment against the heir could still be executed after the delivery of the estate. 16The heir of a testator, who was charged to transfer the entire estate after his death, transferred only a small sum of money, which he alleged was all the property that belonged to the estate, to the beneficiaries of the trust who were entitled to it; and documents having subsequently been found, it appeared that there was four times as much in the estate as had been paid. The question arose whether suit could be brought against the heir for the remainder under the terms of the trust. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, an action could be brought if no compromise had been made with him.