Pomponius, Decrees of the Senate, Book I. Where a woman enters upon the estate of anyone in order to assume payment of the debts due from it, it will be difficult for her to obtain relief, unless this has been contrived by the fraud of the creditors; for a woman ought not to be considered as, in every respect, occupying the position of a minor under twenty-five years of age who has been overreached. 1When a woman wishes to recover property given in pledge by her at the time she became surety for another, she should also receive the crops and the offspring of slaves, and, if the property has been deteriorated, a larger sum should be paid on this account. Where, however, the creditor who received the pledge to secure the obligation has sold it to a third party, the true opinion is that of those who think that an action should be granted to her, even against a purchaser in good faith; because the position of a purchaser should not be better than that of the vendor. 2Ad Dig. 16,1,32,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 485, Note 5.Likewise, if a woman sells a tract of land to the creditor of her husband, and delivers it on condition that the purchaser will apply the money received to the payment of her husband’s debt, and she brings suit to recover said land, she can be met by an exception on the ground of property sold and delivered; but she can reply that the sale has been made against the provisions of the Decree of the Senate. This can be done whether the creditor himself purchases the property, or whether he has employed someone else to do so, in order that the woman may be deprived of it in this manner. The same rule applies where the woman has transferred her property, not in behalf of her husband, but in behalf of some other debtor. 3Where a woman, to avoid binding herself for another, directs a third party to do this for her, will the Decree of the Senate apply to this person who has acted at the request of the woman? The entire substance of the Decree of the Senate has reference to the denial of the suit against the woman herself, and I think a distinction should be made here; as, for instance, where a creditor, to whom I have bound myself at the direction of a woman, has devised this plan for the purpose of evading the Decree of the Senate, as the woman does not seem to have bound herself in violation of that Decree, but offered someone else; he should be barred by an exception based on fraud committed against the Decree of the Senate. If, however, he should be ignorant of the facts, but I should be aware of them, then, if I bring an action on mandate against the woman, I will be barred, but I will still be liable to the creditor. 4Ad Dig. 16,1,32,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 486, Note 6.Where a woman is ready to join issue in behalf of the party for whom she obligated herself, in order that an action may not be granted against the first debtor, as she can plead the exception based on the Decree of the Senate, she must give security that she will not avail herself of the exception, and then proceed to trial. 5A woman is also understood to bind herself for another, even when she does this for one who cannot be bound; as, for instance, where she obligates herself for a slave belonging to another, but her obligation will be extinguished if the action should be restored against the master of the slave.

Pomponius, Decrees of the Senate, Book I. Aristo stated, with reference to the Decrees of Fronto: Two daughters were the necessary heirs of their father; one of them declined to accept his estate, and the other took possession of her father’s property and was ready to discharge all its liabilities. The venerable Prætor Cassius, after hearing the case, very properly decided that prætorian actions should be granted to her who had accepted the estate of her father, but should be denied to the other daughter who had refused it.