Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. The Divine Hadrian, where the use of a forest had been bequeathed to certain persons, decided that the produce of the same must also be held to have been bequeathed to them; because, unless they were permitted to cut down and sell the trees, just as usufructuaries are, they would obtain nothing from the legacy. 1Even though a legatee to whom the use of a house is bequeathed may be in such reduced circumstances that he cannot have the use of the entire building; still, the owner cannot use the part which is vacant, because the party entitled to the use will be permitted to use the entire house at one time or another; as occasionally the owner uses certain portions of a building and does not use others, according as the circumstances may demand. 2Where an use is bequeathed, if the legatee exercises his right to a greater extent than he should do, is it the duty of the judge to determine how far the use may be employed? He must see that he uses it not otherwise than he should do.

Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. Where anyone knowingly pays what he does not owe with the intention of afterwards bringing suit to recover it, he has no right of action.

Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. If either through a legacy or by inheritance, property of some kind should be acquired by a slave who is given as dowry, and the testator was unwilling for the said property to belong to the husband, it must be returned to the wife if the marriage is dissolved.

Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. Quintus Mucius says that when a controversy arises as to whether anything has come into the hands of a wife, it is better and more honorable to hold that the property came into her hands through her husband, or through someone who is under his control, where it is not proved from what source she obtained it. Quintus Mucius appears to have adopted this opinion, for the purpose of avoiding any disgraceful inquiry with reference to a wife.

Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. Quintus Mucius says that where the head of a household bequeaths to his wife vases, clothing, or anything else whatsoever, as follows, “Which has been purchased and provided for her use,” he is held to have bequeathed what was obtained for her individually rather than for their common use. Pomponius: This is true, not only where the articles were procured for the use of both husband and wife, but also when this was done for that of their children, or anyone else; as such a provision would seem to indicate that the property was acquired for the private use of the wife herself. But when Quintus Mucius stated that vases, clothing, or anything else is included, the falsity of what we have stated appears to be established; since, as a rule, there is a great deal of difference where articles of this kind are generally or specially bequeathed, for if they are bequeathed in general terms (as, for instance, “Which have been procured for the use of my wife”), his explanation is correct. If, however, the subject of the bequest should be described as follows, “Such-and-such a purple garment,” by which a certain garment was indicated, even though the words, “Which I have purchased or intended for her use,” were added; for the reason that it was neither purchased nor intended for, nor given to her for her use, the legacy will undoubtedly be valid, because when a certain article is left, a false description of the same does not annul the legacy; just as if the following had been written, “Stichus, whom I purchased at the sale of Titius;” for if the testator did not purchase him at all, or bought him at some other sale, the legacy will, nevertheless, be valid. It is clear that if the legacy was bequeathed as follows, “The vases, or clothing, or articles, intended for the use of my wife,” then the opinion of Quintus Mucius will also be correct in this instance. It must be observed that even if the articles mentioned belonged to another, but the testator was under the impression that they were his, the heir will be obliged to furnish them.

Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. If a legacy should be made to Titius, payable when he reaches the age of fourteen years, and he dies before attaining his fourteenth year, it is true that the legacy will not pass to his heir, as it includes not only the time but also the condition under which it will take effect; that is to say, when the legatee reaches the age of fourteen years. Moreover, anyone who is not in existence cannot be understood to be fourteen years old. Nor does it make any difference whether the following clause, “If he should reach the age of fourteen years,” is inserted; as, in the first instance, the time is indicated by the condition, and in the second, the condition is indicated by the time, since the same condition applies to both. 1Again, some conditions are superfluous, as for example, if a testator should say, “Let Titius be my heir, and if he enters upon my estate, let him pay ten aurei to Mævius.” This condition is considered not to have been written, as the legacy will pass to the heir of Mævius, even if the latter should die before the estate was accepted. The rule will be the same where it is written, “If Titius enters upon my estate, let him pay Mævius ten aurei within a hundred days.” For this legacy was payable within a certain time, and not under a condition, and the rule of Labeo, who says that a legacy will pass to the heir of the legatee when it is certain that it will be payable if the estate is entered upon, should be adopted. 2Still, if I appoint two heirs, and charge both of them with a trust for the benefit of someone, if either should accept the estate, this condition will not be considered superfluous, but will be valid so far as the share of the co-heir is concerned; but it will be void with reference to the person to whom the condition relates, just as if the legacy had been bequeathed in the same way after the appointment of a single heir.

The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. If I stipulate that you shall do nothing to prevent me from making use of a certain house, and you do not prevent me, but prevent my wife from doing so; or, on the other hand, if my wife should make the stipulation, and you should prevent me from making use of the house, does the stipulation become operative? These words should be understood in their broadest signification; for even if I stipulate that you shall do nothing to prevent me from making use of any kind of a right of way, and you do not prevent me from doing so, but interfere with another who enters in my name, it must be held that the stipulation becomes operative.

The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. If my slave stipulates with my freedman for “services to be rendered him,” Celsus says that the stipulation is void. It would, however, be otherwise if he had stipulated without adding the word “him.”

The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book V. By the following words of the Law of the Twelve Tables, “Let a man have a right to dispose of his property by will,” the most extensive power is considered to have been granted to appoint heirs, to bequeath legacies and grants of freedom, as well as to establish guardianships. This privilege, however, has been limited either by the interpretation of the laws, or by the authority of jurists.