The Same, On the Libonian Decree of the Senate. A child under the age of puberty should not be said to come within the scope of this Edict, for he can hardly be liable for the crime of forgery, as he is not capable of criminality at that age. 1If a father writes a bequest for the benefit of his son, who is in the hands of the enemy, it must be said that on his return his father will be liable to the penalty of the Decree of the Senate; but if he had died in captivity, his father would have been considered innocent. 2If, however, he should write a bequest for the benefit of his emancipated son, he can do this legally; and the same rule applies to a son given in adoption. 3Likewise, if he has written one for the benefit of his slave, to whom he is in default in granting freedom under the terms of a trust, it must be said that he is not liable under the terms of the Decree of the Senate, as it is established that everything acquired by means of a slave of this kind must be delivered to him after he has been manumitted. 4If he has written a bequest for the benefit of a slave who is serving him in good faith, he is guilty so far as his intention is concerned; because he wrote it for the benefit of one who he thought belonged to him. But as neither a legacy nor an estate is acquired by a bona fide possessor, we hold that he should be exempt from the penalty. 5Where a master writes a bequest for the benefit of his slave, “when he shall become free,” we say that the master is not affected by the Decree of the Senate, as he in no way had his own interests in view. The same rule applies to a son subsequently emancipated. 6Anyone who confirms a codicil, made before a will, in which a legacy was bequeathed to him, comes within the terms of the Decree of the Senate; as Julianus, also, has stated. 7A person becomes liable to the penalty by taking anything away, just as he does when he gives anything to himself; for instance, where a slave was bequeathed to him, and also was manumitted, he deprives him of his liberty with his own hands. This is the case, even if he deprives him of it in accordance with the wish of the testator, for if he is ignorant of the fact, the grant of freedom will be valid. The same rule will apply if, having been asked to pay a legacy with which he was charged, he erases the clause creating the trust! 8Anyone who, with his own hand, writes the assignment of a freedman, is liable, not according to the letter, but according to the spirit of the Decree of the Senate. 9In like manner, a slave who writes a bequest of freedom to himself, under a trust, in the will of another, is not included in the terms of the Decree of the Senate. A doubt may arise on this point, however, for (as we stated above), the Senate only remits the penalty in the case of a slave who has written a bequest of freedom for himself under a trust, in the will of his master, when the latter has stated the fact over his signature. And, indeed, there is still more reason to hold that he violates the Decree of the Senate to a greater extent than he who writes the bequest of a legacy to himself, as, under no circumstances, will he be entitled to his freedom, but he can acquire the legacy for his master. 10If the person who writes the will should grant freedom under a trust to his own slave, let us see whether he is not free from the penalty, as he obtains no advantage, unless he did this in order that the slave might be purchased from him at an exorbitant price, in order to be manumitted. 11He, also, who, when a tract of land was devised to Titius, added with his own hand, as a condition, that money should be paid to him, comes within the terms of the Decree of the Senate. 12He who, with the consent of his father, disinherits himself, or deprives himself of a legacy, is not liable, either according to the letter or the spirit of the Decree of the Senate.