The Same, Opinions, Book IV. The power to compromise for the purpose of settlement is not included in a general mandate; and therefore if the party who gave the mandate does not afterwards ratify the compromise, he will not be prevented from making use of his original right of action.

Paulus, Opinions, Book IV. If a son under paternal control during the absence of his father, borrows money as having received a mandate from his father, and enters into an obligation, and sends letters to his father to pay the money in a province; his father, if he disapproves of the act of his son, should immediately send a statement of his wish to the contrary.

Paulus, Opinions, Book IV. Publia Mævia, when about to depart to visit her husband, entrusted to Gaia Seia a closed box containing clothing and written documents, and addressed her as follows: “If I come back safe and sound you will return this to me, but if anything should happen to me, give it to my son whom I had by my first husband.” The woman having died intestate, I wish to know to whom the property which she had entrusted to the other should be delivered, to her son, or to her husband? Paulus answered, to her son. 1Lucius Titius made the following statement: “I have received, and have in my hands as a deposit the sum of ten thousand denarii of silver, and I promise and bind myself to return all the said amount, as agreed upon between us; and, in accordance with the contract entered into, I will pay you every month four oboli for each pound by way of interest, until payment of the entire sum has been made.” I ask whether interest can be demanded? Paulus answers that the contract to which reference has been made exceeds the limit of a deposit of money, and therefore, in accordance with the agreement, interest can be claimed in an action on deposit. 2Titus, to the members of the family of Sempronius, Greeting: “I have received from you the weight of about ten pieces of gold, two discs, and a sealed sack, on which you owe me ten pieces, which you have deposited with Titius, and you also owe ten to Trophimas; and you also owe ten on an account of your father, and something more besides.” I ask whether any obligation arises from a written paper of this kind, and especially anything which has reference to this money? The answer was that, in fact, no obligation seems to have arisen from the letter which was the object of the inquiry, but that it could only serve to prove that a deposit of property was made. The judge must determine whether the party, who bound himself for ten pieces of gold in the same letter, can prove what he wrote.

The Same, Opinions, Book IV. If Calpurnius stipulated for the payment of money which had been lent by the direction of Titius, but had not been given with the intention of making a present of the same, an action on mandate can be brought against him by the heir of Titius, to compel him to assign his rights. The same rule applies where the money was exacted from Calpurnius. 1Paulus held that, if the surety purchased from the creditor property given in pledge by the debtor, an action on mandate could be brought against him by the heir of the debtor for its recovery, and that he could be compelled to surrender the profits together with the entire debt; for he should not be considered as resembling a stranger who had become the purchaser, since he was required to display good faith in every contract. 2Paulus also gave it as his opinion that, when the day on which Lucius Titius stated in writing that he would deliver the property is inserted in the mandate, this offers no obstacle to the bringing of an action on mandate against him after the time has elapsed. 3He also says that one of two mandataries who are bound for the entire amount can be selected, even if this has not been mentioned in the mandate; but that, after judgment has been rendered against both, execution can, and should be issued against each one of them for only half of the judgment. 4A creditor sold a pledge; I ask, if the purchaser was deprived of possession under a superior title, whether the creditor can have recourse to the mandator? And does it make any difference whether he made the sale under his right as creditor, or guaranteed the title in accordance with the Common Law? Paulus gave it as his opinion that if the creditor could not realize enough from the sale of the pledges to discharge the indebtedness, the surety would not seem to be released. From this opinion it is apparent that he will not be liable on the ground of eviction, but that this will contribute to his release. 5So-and-So to So-and-So, Greeting: “I direct you to lend eight aurei to Blæsius Severus, my relative, under such-and-such a pledge, and I will be accountable for the said sum, as well as any addition to it by way of interest; and you will be indemnified for the same as long as Blæsius Severus lives.” The mandator having been afterwards frequently sued, did not answer, and I ask whether he will be released by the death of the debtor? Paulus replied that the obligation growing out of the mandate was a perpetual one, although it may have been inserted in the mandate that, on account of it the mandatary would be indemnified for the amount as long as Blæsius Severus lived. 6Paulus also stated that a person was not held to have complied with the conditions of a mandate, when it was inserted in the latter that proper security should be required of the debtor, if neither surety nor pledges had been received.

The Same, Opinions, Book IV. Lucius Titius was indebted to his wife, Gaia Seia, for money loaned on a pledge, or on land which was hypothecated; and, together with his wife, he gave the same land by way of dowry to Sempronius, who was about to marry Seia Septitia, their daughter. 1Lucius Titius, having died, his daughter, Septitia, declined to accept the estate of her father, and I ask whether her mother could claim the property which was hypothecated to her? Paulus answered that Gaia Seia was held to have released the obligation of the pledged land which she had consented that her husband should give as dowry to their daughter, when the said property was given in behalf of the said daughter, but that the personal liability continued to exist; the action, however, could not be granted against her who had refused to accept her father’s estate.

The Same, Opinions, Book XII. Seia borrowed money from Septitius, and it was agreed with reference to the interest: “That unless the above-mentioned interest was paid at the different times specified, or within three months, Seia would then be liable for a higher rate, and afterwards, at each payment, if the interest was not forthcoming in accordance with the prescribed condition, the said condition should be observed until the entire sum due was paid.” I ask whether the following words, “And afterwards, at each payment, if the interest is not forthcoming, in accordance with the prescribed condition, the said condition shall be observed,” mean that even though the first stipulation may become operative, still, the debtor cannot be sued for a larger amount of interest than was due at the time appointed for the first payment, when she was in default. Paulus answered that the stipulation contains several conditions, and that it is subject to the payment of a higher rate of interest; that is to say, that the condition should be considered with reference to each payment of a lower rate of interest which should have been, but was not made at the proper time, and therefore that the penalty for subsequent payment could be avoided.

The Same, Opinions, Book IV. A creditor, to whom property given in pledge by a debtor is bequeathed, is not prevented from demanding the money loaned, if the intention of the testator is clearly shown not to have been to compensate him for the debt by means of the legacy.

Paulus, Opinions, Book IV. A certain sum of money was due to Lucius Titius under a judgment. He lent the same debtor another sum of money, and in taking security for its payment, he did not mention that the amount due under the judgment should also be given to him. I ask whether Lucius Titius is entitled to both actions. Paulus answered that there is nothing in the case stated why both rights of action should not remain unimpaired.

The Same, Opinions, Book IV. Paulus gave it as his opinion that a surety to whom pledges given by his fellow-sureties have been transferred, does not appear to be substituted in the place of the purchaser, but only in that of him who received the pledges, and therefore he must be accountable for the crops and the interest.

Paulus, Opinions, Book IV. Holds that a debtor should not be compelled to receive his money in other property, if he will sustain any loss by doing so.