Ad Dig. 16,1,29ROHGE, Bd. 14 (1875), Nr. 45, S. 114: Intercession der Ehefrau. Voraussetzung der intercessio tactita. Betrug. Beweislast, daß keine Schenkung zum Grunde gelegen.Paulus, Opinions, Book XVI. Ad Dig. 16,1,29 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 487, Note 7.A certain man wished to contract with the heirs of Lucius Titius and to lend them money, but as he suspected that they were not solvent, he preferred to lend it to the widow of the testator, and take a pledge for her. The woman lent the same money to the heirs, and took a pledge from them. I ask whether she is held to have obligated herself for another, and whether the pledges which she took are liable to the creditor? Paulus answers that if the creditor who desired to make a contract with the heirs of Lucius Titius avoided doing so with them, and preferred to have the widow as his debtor, the Decree of the Senate which was enacted with reference to the obligations contracted by women for others, will be available against him, and that the pledges given by her will not be liable. The property which the woman received by way of pledge from those in whose behalf she became bound will be liable to the creditor of the woman, and the Prætor will not act unreasonably if he grants an action against the principal creditors, for the purpose of relieving the woman from responsibility, as well as against the property which had been encumbered by them to her. 1Paulus states that everything which can be proved to have been planned to evade the provisions of the Decree of the Senate enacted with reference to the obligations incurred by women for others, should not be considered valid.

The Same, Opinions, Book XVI. Paulus holds that it is not necessary to pay interest on any profits acquired after issue has been joined, and which the judge, in the discharge of his duty, directs to be turned over, nor on those which have been collected before that time, and which are stated to have been fraudulently obtained by the possessor.

Paulus, Opinions, Book XVI. Gaius Seius, while in a feeble condition, complained that he had been poisoned by his slaves, and then died. His sister, Lucia Titia, became his heir, and after his death neglected to prosecute his murderer. She herself died ten years afterwards, and someone gave notice that the estate of Gaius Titius was liable to forfeiture. I ask whether the criminal prosecution was extinguished by the death of Titia. Paulus answered that, in the case stated, it did not appear to be extinguished by the death of the ungrateful heir, as a pecuniary penalty was involved.

Ad Dig. 34,9,19Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 548, Note 9.Paulus, Opinions, Book XVI. If the appointed heirs are deprived of the estate because the testator, having changed his mind, desired to make another will and was prevented by them from doing so, he will be considered to have entirely revoked his former will.

Ad Dig. 42,1,43ROHGE, Bd. 24 (1879), Nr. 91, S. 354: Voraussetzung der Gleichheit der Antheile mehrerer Berechtigter. Legitimation zur Geltendmachung der Rechte Einzelner.The Same, Opinions, Book XVI. Paulus also gave it as his opinion that where a number of parties had had judgment rendered against them for a certain sum of money, they could not by the same decision be compelled to pay any more than their respective shares. If judgment was rendered against three parties, and Titius paid his share, an action could Hot be brought against him under the same judgment to compel him to pay the shares of the others.

Paulus, Opinions, Book XVI. A creditor, who could have been barred from the possession of his pledge by lapse of time, sold the pledge. I ask whether the possessor could legally avail himself of an exception against the purchaser. Paulus answered that this exception could also be pleaded against the purchaser.

The Same, Opinions, Book XVI. Paulus gave it as his opinion that a judicial order which is impossible was void. 1He also gave it as his opinion, that there was no ground for appeal where a decision had been rendered, which, in the nature of things, could not be complied with.