Ad Dig. 18,4,21Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 390, Note 17; Bd. II, § 422, Note 8; Bd. III, § 621, Note 13.Paulus, Questions, Book XVI. A vendor sold to a party his right of succession to an estate, and agreed by a stipulation to transfer to him everything belonging to the estate. The question arose as to what he ought to deliver in accordance with the stipulation; for a stipulation is, by no means, doubly binding, so that both the property and the price are due. And, in fact, if the party afterwards sold the property, and the stipulation was entered into, we think that the price is included in the stipulation. If, however, the stipulation was made beforehand, and the party then obtained the property, in this instance, he will owe the property. If he should sell a slave, and the latter died, would he owe the price of said slave? If he who had promised Stichus should sell him, the slave being dead at the time, he would not owe the price if he had not been in default. Where, however, I sold the right of succession to an estate, and afterwards disposed of property belonging to the same, it will be held that I was transacting the business of the purchaser, rather than that of the estate. But this does not apply to a case where any particular property is concerned, for if I sell you a slave, and, before he is delivered, I sell him again to a third person, and receive the price, and the slave dies; let us consider whether I do not owe you something on account of the purchase, since I was not in default in making delivery, for the price of the slave that was sold to the second purchaser was not collected on account of the property, but on account of the transaction; and hence the result is just as if I had not sold the slave to another, for I will owe you the property, and not the right of action against the second purchaser. Where, however, a right to the succession of an estate is sold, it is held to be tacitly agreed that if I do anything as heir, I must make it good to the purchaser, in the same way as if I was transacting his business; just as the vendor of a tract of land is obliged by considerations of good faith to surrender the crops, even though he were not at all to blame for neglecting to harvest crops belonging to another, unless he could be called to account for negligence. But what if I sold property while another party was in possession, and I accepted the damages appraised, would I owe the party the property or the price of the same? I would certainly owe him the property, for I would not be compelled to transfer to him my rights of action but the property itself. If I was deprived of the property by force, or had been condemned to pay double damages on account of an action for theft, this would not in any way affect the purchaser, for if the vendor ceased to hold possession of the property without his fault, he would be obliged to assign his rights of action and also the damages he received, but not the property; and in case a building was consumed by fire, he ought to transfer the ground on which it stood.

The Same, Questions, Book XVI. A father gave a tract of land to his daughter by way of dowry. This having been evicted, a doubt arises (and not without reason) as to whether an action on purchase will lie, or one for double damages based on the stipulation; just as if the father himself had suffered loss. For as the dowry belongs to the woman, it cannot be said to be the property of the father, nor can she be compelled, during the continuation of the marriage, to share with her brothers the dowry which is derived from him. Let us see, however, whether it can not be said with greater probability that under these circumstances the stipulation becomes operative; for it is to the interest of the father that his daughter should be endowed, and if she remains under his control, he may have the expectation of sometime recovering the dowry. But if she has been emancipated, it can hardly be maintained that the stipulation immediately becomes operative, because in one instance the dowry may revert to him. Therefore, can he bring an action against the vendor, since, if his daughter should die during marriage, he will be able to recover the dowry in case the land should not be evicted? Or, in this case, has the father an interest in having his daughter endowed, so that he can at once bring suit against the promisor? This opinion is the better one, as paternal affection is involved in the matter.