The Same, Questions, Book XIV. Where a ward, after arriving at puberty, discharged one of his guardians, he will be guilty of a dishonorable act if he attempts to call the other to account for the acts of the former whom he discharged. We say that the same rule applies in the case of two magistrates who are colleagues, and the government brings suit against one of them. I have reference, in this instance, to a case where two magistrates are jointly liable, as the principle is not always applicable, for if both of them are solvent, there is no ground for a choice in instituting proceedings. A party who is released by lapse of time is not like one who has nothing, because he has the means of opposing the party bringing suit on the claim.

Paulus, Questions, Book XIV. Where a sentence is ambiguous, we cannot interpret it both ways, but only according to the intention of the testator. Therefore, where anyone said something that he did not intend to say, he did not say what the words mean, because this was not his intention; nor did he say what he intended, because he did not make use of language suitable for that purpose.

Paulus, Questions, Book IV. Where a legacy was bequeathed as follows, “Let such-and-such a sum be paid to Titius, after ten years, if he does not require security from my heirs,” and Titius should die before the term of ten years has elapsed, he will transmit the legacy to his heir, because the condition was complied with at the time of his death.

Paulus, Questions, Book XIV. Ad Dig. 42,1,41 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 267, Note 12.Nesennius Apollinaris: If you are about to make a donation to me, and I delegate you to pay my creditor, can an action be brought against you for the entire amount? And if you are sued for the entire amount, do you think that it will be different, if I should not appoint you to pay my creditor, but someone to whom I desire to give an equal sum? And what must be done in the case of one who, desiring to give a donation to a woman, promises a dowry to her husband? The answer was that the creditor cannot be barred by an exception, although the person who was delegated can avail himself of one against him in whose name he made the promise. The case of the husband is the same; and especially so, if he brings an action during the existence of the marriage. And, as the heir of the donor can have judgment rendered against him in full, so the surety, who rendered himself liable for the donation, can also be sued for the entire amount, as well as anyone else to whom the donation was not given. 1A certain person donated a tract of land. If he did not deliver it, he can have judgment rendered against him just like any other possessor. If, however, he delivered the land, judgment may be rendered against him for the entire crop, if he has not consumed it, and he cannot be released from liability, even if he surrenders it immediately. If he has ceased to hold possession through fraud, the donee shall be sworn in court, and judgment shall be rendered in accordance with the sum to which he makes oath. 2A donor, against whom judgment has been rendered for the full amount of the donation, is not liable to a sum beyond his ability to pay, which is an advantage conferred by the constitutions.

Ad Dig. 44,2,30Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 130, Note 4.Paulus, Questions, Book XIV. A certain man who could succeed to it as heir at law, having been appointed heir to the sixth part of an estate, contested the legality of the will, and having demanded half of the estate from one of the appointed heirs, lost his case. He is held to have included the sixth part of the estate in his claim, and therefore, if he brought suit for the same share under the same will, an exception on the ground of res judicata will operate as a bar against him. 1Ad Dig. 44,2,30,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 248, Noten 25, 26.Latinus Largus: A transaction took place with reference to an estate which belonged to Mævius, but whose right to it was disputed by Titius, and a transfer of the property of the estate was made by Titius to Mævius, as the heir, in which transfer a certain tract of land which, several years before, had been hypothecated to the grandfather of Mævius, and afterwards to another person was delivered, in pursuance of the contract. These matters having been settled, the second creditor of Titius brought suit for his claim, and gained it. After this judgment, Mævius found among the papers of his grandfather the note executed by Titius, by which it appeared that the land which was included in the said transaction had also been encumbered by the said Titius to his grandfather. Therefore, as it was evident that the land formerly hypothecated to the grandfather of Mævius, the heir, was the same as that on account of which Mævius had a judgment rendered against him in favor of the second creditor, I ask whether the right of his grandfather, of which he was ignorant at the time that the action was brought to recover the land, could not be barred by pleading an exception. I answered that if the ownership of the land was in question, and a decision was rendered in favor of the said creditor, we should hold that an exception on the ground of res judicata would operate as a bar against the party who lost the former suit bringing another, because as the plaintiff had been successful, the question appears to be the same one previously involved. If, however, the person in possession should be discharged from liability, and, having lost possession, should bring suit to recover it from the same party who was not successful in the first place, he will not be barred by an exception, for in the judgment rendered in his favor, nothing was decided with reference to his title. When, however, the action on pledge was brought against the first creditor, no question might happen to be raised as to the title of the party in possession, because in controversies having reference to ownership, what was decided to be mine is at the same time decided not to belong to another; but, in the case of an obligation, the result will be that, where property is encumbered in favor of one person, it does not follow that it is not encumbered to another, if the latter can prove that this is the fact. It may be said, that it is probable that an exception will not operate as a bar, as there was no doubt as to the right of the possessor, but only as to the encumbrance. In the case stated, however, the point which presents the greatest difficulty to me is whether the right of pledge is extinguished, when the ownership of property is acquired; for the right of pledge cannot continue to exist where the creditor becomes the owner of the property. An action on pledge, however, will lie, because it is true that the property was pledged and the claim was not satisfied. For which reason I do not think that an exception on the ground of res judicata will operate as a bar.

Paulus, Questions, Book XIV. When a will is broken, the rights of children who have been disinherited and who have received nothing from their father’s will should be preserved, and an exception on the ground of bad faith cannot be pleaded against them. This not only applies to them personally, but also to their heirs and descendants.