Ad Plautium libri
Ex libro II
Dig. 5,3,43Paulus libro secundo ad Plautium. Postquam legatum a te accepi, hereditatem peto. Atilicinus quibusdam placuisse ait non aliter mihi adversus te dandam petitionem, quam si legatum redderem. videamus tamen, ne non aliter petitor hereditatis legatum restituere debeat, quam ut ei caveatur, si contra eum de hereditate iudicatum fuerit, reddi ei legatum: cum sit iniquum eo casu possessorem hereditatis legatum, quod solverit, retinere, et maxime si non per calumniam, sed per errorem hereditatem petierit adversarius: idque et Laelius probat. imperator autem Antoninus rescripsit ei, qui legatum ex testamento abstulisset, causa cognita hereditatis petitionem negandam esse, scilicet si manifesta calumnia sit.
Paulus, On Plautius, Book II. After I accepted a legacy from you, I brought an action to recover the estate. Atilicinus says that it has been held by certain authorities that I am not entitled to an action for recovery against you, unless I refund the legacy. Still, let us consider whether the plaintiff who brings an action to recover the estate is only obliged to return the legacy where security is given him that, if judgment is rendered against him in the case, the legacy will be repaid to him; since it is unjust that in this instance the possessor should retain a legacy which he had paid, and especially where his adversary did not bring the action for the purpose of annoyance, but on account of a mistake; and Lælius approves this opinion. The Emperor Antoninus, however, stated in a Rescript that where a man retained a legacy under a will, an action for the recovery of the estate should be refused him, where proper cause was shown; that is, where the intention to cause annoyance was manifest.
Dig. 6,1,26Paulus libro secundo ad Plautium. Nam si actor scit, tunc is non ab alio, sed a se decipitur: et ideo reus absolvitur.
Paulus, On Plautius, Book II. For if the plaintiff is aware of the facts, then he is not deceived by another, but by himself; and therefore the defendant will be discharged.
Dig. 9,2,33Paulus libro secundo ad Plautium. Si servum meum occidisti, non affectiones aestimandas esse puto, veluti si filium tuum naturalem quis occiderit quem tu magno emptum velles, sed quanti omnibus valeret. Sextus quoque Pedius ait pretia rerum non ex affectione nec utilitate singulorum, sed communiter fungi: itaque eum, qui filium naturalem possidet, non eo locupletiorem esse, quod eum plurimo, si alius possideret, redempturus fuit, nec illum, qui filium alienum possideat, tantum habere, quanti eum patri vendere posset. in lege enim Aquilia damnum consequimur: et amisisse dicemur, quod aut consequi potuimus aut erogare cogimur. 1In damnis, quae lege Aquilia non tenentur, in factum datur actio.
Paulus, On Plautius, Book II. If you kill my slave, I do not think that my affection for him should be considered; as, for instance, if anyone should kill your natural son whom you would be willing to purchase at a high price if he belonged to someone else; but the question involved is what is he worth generally speaking? Sextus Pedius says that the price of property is not fixed by affection or by beneficial interest, but on general principles; so that a man who has possession of his natural son as a slave, is none the more wealthy because if someone else had possession of him he would be willing to purchase him for a considerable sum of money; and the party who has possession of the son of another has not property enough to be equal to what he could sell that son for to his father; for under the Lex Aquilia, we can recover damages, and we will be considered to have lost either what we could have obtained, or what we were compelled to pay out. 1Ad Dig. 9,2,33,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 455, Note 6.An action in factum is granted with reference to damages which are not included in the Lex Aquilia.
Dig. 11,1,13Idem libro secundo ad Plautium. Confessionibus falsis respondentes ita obligantur, si eius nomine, de quo quis interrogatus sit, cum aliquo sit actio, quia quae cum alio actio esset, si dominus esset, in nosmet confessione nostra conferimus. et si eum, qui in potestate patris esset, respondissem filium meum esse, ita me obligari, si aetas eius pateretur, ut filius meus esse possit, quia falsae confessiones naturalibus convenire deberent. propter quae fiat, ut patris familias nomine respondendo non obliger. 1Eum, qui patrem familias suum esse responderit servum, non teneri noxali actione: ac ne, si bona fide liber homo mihi serviat, mecum noxali iudicio agi potest et, si actum fuerit, manebit integra actio cum ipso qui admisit.
The Same, On Plautius, Book II. Persons who, while answering, make false confessions, are bound by the same only where anyone has a right of action against another on account of a matter with reference to which he was interrogated; because where suit can be brought against another party if he were the owner, we render ourselves liable by our confession. Hence, where someone is under the control of his father, and I answer that he is my son, I will only be liable where his age appears to be such that he can be my son; because false confessions must agree with what is natural; and on this account the result would be that if I answered on behalf of the father I will not be held liable. 1Where anyone answers that the head of a household is his slave, he will not be liable to a noxal action; and even if a free man serves me in good faith as a slave, a noxal action cannot be brought against me; and if proceedings should be instituted, the right of action against the person who committed the illegal act will remain unimpaired.
Dig. 13,2,1Paulus libro secundo ad Plautium. Si obligatio lege nova introducta sit nec cautum eadem lege, quo genere actionis experiamur, ex lege agendum est.
Paulus, On Plautius, Book II. Where an obligation is introduced by a new law, and it is not provided in the said law by what kind of an action we are to proceed, this must be done in accordance with this law.
Dig. 46,1,35Idem libro secundo ad Plautium. Cum fideiubeat aliquis pro servo, in solidum tenetur, etiamsi nihil in peculio sit. plane si pro domino fideiubeat, cum quo de peculio est, dumtaxat de peculio tenebitur, quod tunc erit, cum res iudicatur.
The Same, On Plautius, Book II. When anyone becomes surety for a slave he is liable in full, even if there is nothing in the peculium of the slave. It is clear that if he becomes surety for the master, against whom he has a right of action De peculia, he will only be liable for the amount of the peculium at the time when judgment was rendered.
Dig. 46,3,59Paulus libro secundo ad Plautium. Si ita stipulatus sim: ‘mihi aut Titio dare spondes?’ et debitor constituerit se mihi soluturum, quamvis mihi competat de constituta actio, potest adhuc adiecto solvere. et si a filio familias mihi aut Titio stipulatus sim, patrem posse Titio solvere quod in peculio est, scilicet si suo, non filii nomine solvere velit: dum enim adiecto solvitur, mihi solvi videtur: et ideo si indebitum adiecto solutum sit, stipulatori posse condici Iulianus putat: ut nihil intersit, iubeam te Titio solvere an ab initio stipulatio ita concepta sit.
Paulus, On Plautius, Book II. If I stipulate as follows, “Do you promise to pay me or Titius?” and the debtor agrees to pay me, although an action to collect money on an informal agreement will lie in my favor, the promisor can still pay him who has been added. And if I stipulate for myself or for Titius with a son under paternal control, the father can pay Titius out of the peculium, that is, if he wishes to pay in his own name, and not in that of his son; for when payment is made to the person who was added, it is considered to be made to me. Therefore, if payment of something which is not due is made to the person who has been added, Julianus says that suit can be brought against the stipulator to recover it, so that it makes no difference whether I direct you to pay Titius, or whether the stipulation was framed in this way in the beginning.
Dig. 50,17,169Idem libro secundo ad Plautium. Is damnum dat, qui iubet dare: eius vero nulla culpa est, cui parere necesse sit. 1Quod pendet, non est pro eo, quasi sit.
The Same, On Plautius, Book II. He commits a wrong who orders it to be committed. He, however, is not to blame who is compelled to obey. 1Anything which is in suspense is not considered to exist.