The Same, On the Address of the Divine Antoninus and Commodus. Where anyone is not actually a guardian, but the responsibilities of guardianship, nevertheless, attach to him, is he included in the terms of the Address; as, for instance, where his female ward is captured by the enemy, or where he withdraws from the guardianship by means of false allegations, so that he still remains subject to the responsibilities of the trust under the Sacred Constitutions? It must be said that these instances also come under the Decree of the Senate; for it has been established that liability of this kind existed in a case involving three guardianships. 1Where, however, anyone is charged with responsibility for the person of another, let us see whether this may not be beyond the scope of the Decree of the Senate; for example, if a magistrate incurs responsibility in case of guardianship, or a party becomes surety for a guardian or a curator; because under such circumstances, these things will not be considered to apply to a third guardianship, and it must be approved in consequence. 2But what if an honorary guardian is appointed, as such a guardianship is not included among the three, will this same question arise? Reason indicates the contrary, because it is stated that an honorary guardian must assume the responsibility if he suffers the guardianship to be improperly administered. 3There is no doubt that a party who, after having been appointed guardian, does not attend to the administration of the trust, comes within the scope of the Address, because he is liable under the Sacred Constitutions just as if he had administered it. 4But what if the guardian desired to be excused for some reason, and could not produce any proof at the time, so that the investigation of his excuse was deferred; and meanwhile his female ward should grow up, would the Decree of the Senate be applicable to him? The question is dependent on whether, after the ward had arrived at puberty, and the guardianship was at an end, his excuse could be accepted. For if it was accepted, and he should be discharged, he can marry her with impunity; but if it ought not to be accepted after his trust is terminated, he cannot legally marry her. Papinianus says in the Fifth Book of Opinions that where the office of a guardian is terminated, his excuse must not be accepted; and therefore he is responsible for the time which has elapsed. This opinion, however, is by no means satisfactory to me, for it is unjust for the guardian not to be excused, or for his marriage to be prevented where his excuse has been accepted, on account of delay which did not take place through fraud, but from necessity. 5Although it is provided by the terms of the Address that a guardian cannot marry his ward, it must still be understood that he cannot even be betrothed to her; for she, generally speaking, cannot be betrothed to a person to whom she cannot be married, since she who can be married can be legally betrothed. 6But what if the adopted son of a guardian should illegally marry the ward, and afterwards be emancipated? It must be believed that the Senate did not have reference to the adoption of children who had been emancipated, because, after emancipation, the adoptive family is left entirely out of consideration. 7The natural children of a guardian, even though they may have been given in adoption, are included in the Decree of the Senate. 8But what if a guardian, after having been appointed, should appeal, and his heir is subsequently defeated, must he be responsible during the time which has elapsed? And if the heir is the son of the guardian, and should lose his case, will he come within the scope of the Address? It follows that he would, since he has an account to render.