Paulus, Manuals, Book II. Where a partner is appointed sole heir to an estate, and the legacy is bequeathed to a slave held in common by both partners, without the grant of his freedom, this legacy is void. It is evident that a legacy can legally be bequeathed under a condition, and without the grant of freedom, since a bequest can be made legally to one’s own slave, and the heir be charged with the execution of it under a condition. Wherefore, where a partner is appointed an heir, a slave can be also appointed his co-heir, without the grant of his freedom, as, for instance, where he belongs to another; because a slave can be appointed an heir after his master has already been appointed.

Paulus, Manuals, Book II. Where, after a father or a master had been appointed an heir, and charged with a legacy payable to a son or a slave of the former, under a condition, neither can demand security for the preservation of the legacy. If, however, the son or the slave should be emancipated or manumitted while the condition is pending, and demands security, the question arises whether he should be heard, lest the benefit which he has received from his father or his master may be to his disadvantage, or whether the father and the master should blame themselves for having given them the power to make such a demand. The better opinion is to dispose of this point by adopting a middle course, and say that they can only be held liable for the hypothecation of their property.

Paulus, Manuals, Book II. The right to demand services sometimes remains even after the right of patronage has ceased to exist, which occurs in the case of the brothers of him to whom the freedman has been assigned; or with reference to the grandson of one patron, where there is a son of another patron.

Ad Dig. 41,1,62Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 528, Note 7.Paulus, Manuals, Book II. There are certain things which cannot themselves be alienated but pass by universal custom; hence a dotal tract of land and property which is not an object of commerce pass to the heir; for although it cannot be bequeathed to him, it, nevertheless, becomes his after his appointment.

The Same, Manuals, Book II. If, believing that I am indebted to you, I give you property in payment, usucaption can only take place if you yourself think that it is due. The case is different, if I think that I am bound on account of a sale, and therefore deliver the property to you, for no action will lie against me, and you, as the purchaser, will not be entitled to usucaption. The reason for the difference arises from the fact that, in other instances, the time of payment should be considered. Nor does it matter whether, at the time when I make the stipulation, I am aware that the property belongs to another or not, as it will be sufficient if I think it is mine, when you give it to me in payment for a purchase; however, not only the time when a contract was entered into, but also that of payment is taken into account, for no one can acquire property by usucaption as a purchaser who did not buy it, and he cannot, as in other contracts, say that it has been received in payment.

Paulus, Manuals, Book II. A son who has been disinherited, or who has rejected the estate of his father, cannot have judgment rendered against him, on a contract of his own, for more than he is able to pay. Let us see to what extent he shall be considered solvent, whether this relates to what remains after all his debts have been paid, as in the case of one who is sued on account of a donation, or does it apply to a husband and a patron, whose indebtedness is not deducted? It is unquestionably the law that payment should be made as in the case of a husband or a patron, for we should be more indulgent to a donor than to one who is obliged to discharge an actual debt,

Paulus, Manuals, Book II. If anyone should cause his property to be fraudulently sold, he will be liable in full. 1Where anyone refuses to admit a creditor to take possession of his property, which has been granted to him for its preservation, and the vendor pays the creditor all that he is entitled to, the question arises whether the debtor will be released. I think that he would act dishonorably who wishes to obtain a second time what he has already received.

Paulus, Manuals, Book II, And, even in prætorian stipulations, there can be two joint-stipulators.

The Same, Manuals, Book II. A slave owned in common, whether he makes a purchase or stipulates, even though he may pay the money out of his peculium which belongs to one of his masters, will, nevertheless, acquire for both of them. The case of a slave subject to an usufruct is, however, different.

Paulus, Manuals, Book II. Where anyone, in obedience to my mandate, makes a stipulation to be executed after my death, payment will legally be made to him, because such is the law of obligations. Therefore he can legally be paid, even against my consent. But when I have ordered my debtor to pay someone after my death, payment will not be legally made, because the mandate is annulled by death.

The Same, Manuals, Book II. He who has an interest in not having the property stolen is entitled to the action for theft, if he also has possession of it with the consent of the owner; that is to say, where, for instance, the property is. leased to him. He, however, who voluntarily administers affairs as a guardian, just like a regular guardian or curator, cannot bring an action for theft on account of property which has been stolen through his fault. Likewise, anyone to whom a slave is due either under the terms of a stipulation or by a will, although he has an interest, cannot bring the action for theft; nor can he do so who has become surety for a tenant.

The Same, Manuals, Book II. Prætorian possession of an estate is not conceded to the heirs of the heir, by the following clause of the Edict: “I will grant possession to him who is the heir of the deceased.” 1Again, in the following substitution, “Whosoever shall be my heir,” only the next heir is meant, or the appointed heir, even if he is not the one next in succession.