The Same, Manuals, Book I. We do not always acquire a right of action by an agent, but we retain one that is already acquired; as, for instance, where suit is brought within the time prescribed by law; or where notice of objection to some new structure is served; so that we can make use of the Interdict Quod vi aut clam for here our former right is reserved for us.

Paulus, Manuals, Book I. A syndic can also be appointed in the case of notice of a new structure, and for the purpose of entering into stipulations; as for instance, in case of legacies, the prevention of threatened injury, or for the enforcement of a decree; although it is preferable for security to be given to a slave of the municipality, still, if it is given to the syndic, the party who has charge of the business of the municipality will have an equitable right of action.

The Same, Manuals, Book I. Where a slave in whom another party has an usufruct is surrendered, by way of reparation for damage, by the mere owner to the usufructuary; the servitude is merged and the usufruct terminated by the acquisition of the property.

The Same, Manuals, Book I. For no one can impose a servitude upon his own building, unless the grantor and the grantee have the buildings in sight, so that one can interfere with the other.

The Same, Manuals, Book I. A right of way can be granted through a place where a river flows, if it can either be crossed by a ford or there is a bridge; but it is different where it must be crossed by ferry-boats. This is the case where the river runs through the land of one of the parties; but it is otherwise if your land joins mine, and then comes the river, and the land of Titius, and then a highway up to which I wish to acquire a right of way. Let us consider whether there is anything to prevent you from giving me a right of way as far as the river, and then my receiving one from Titius as far as the highway. Again, let us consider whether the same legal principle will apply even if you are the owner of the land which is beyond the river on this side of the highway; because a right of way can be complete as far as a town, or as a highway, or as a river which must be crossed by ferry-boats, or as far as the land belonging to the same owner. If this be the case the servitude is not held to be interrupted, even though a public river intervenes between two tracts of land belonging to the same person.

Paulus, Manuals, Book I. It has been settled that several joint-owners, even where they do not join in the conveyance, may impose or acquire servitudes, on the ground that former acts are confirmed by more recent ones; so that it is the same as if all of them had made the grant at the same time. Therefore, if he who first granted the servitude should die, or dispose of his share in any other way, and afterwards his joint-owner should make a grant, the entire transaction will be void; for when the last one makes the grant the servitude is not considered to be acquired retroactively, but it is held to be the same as if when the last one made the grant all of them had done so; consequently, the last act will remain in abeyance until the new joint-owner makes a grant. The same rule applies where a grant is made to one of the joint-owners, and afterwards some such occurrence as those above mentioned with reference to the person of another joint-owner takes place. Hence, on the other hand, if any of these things should happen to one of the joint-owners who has not made a grant, all of them will be compelled to make a new grant; for only so much time is conceded to them as to enable them to make a grant even at different times, and therefore the grant cannot be made to one person, or by one person. The same rule applies where one party grants a servitude and another bequeaths it by will, for if all the joint-owners bequeath a servitude, and their estates are entered upon at the same time, it may be said that the servitude is properly bequeathed; but if the estates are entered upon at different times, the legacy does not legally vest; for it has been established that the acts of living persons may be suspended so far as their operation is concerned, but that those of deceased persons cannot.

Ad Dig. 17,2,83Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 142, Note 4.Paulus, Manuals, Book I. The question arose whether, where a tree which grows on the boundary line, or a stone which extends on each side of the line of two contiguous tracts of land, will belong proportionately to the owner of each tract; or, if the tree is cut down, or the stone removed, it will remain undivided; as occurs where two masses of metal belonging to two owners are melted together the entire mass becomes the common property of both; and thus, in this instance where a tree is separated from the soil, there is all the more reason for considering it to belong to both owners, than is the case with a mass of metal; since it only forms one body composed of the same substance. It is in accordance with natural reason, however, that, after the separation of the stone or the tree, each of the two owners should have the same share of the same to which he was entitled while it remained in the earth.

Paulus, Manuals, Book I. Where one person directs another to demand prætorian possession of an estate for him if he should deem it advisable, and, after the demand is made, he becomes insane, he will, nevertheless, acquire possession of the property. If, however, before the demand is made, he whom he ordered to make it should become insane, it must be said that he will not immediately acquire possession of the estate. Therefore, the demand for prætorian possession should be confirmed by ratification.

Paulus, Manuals, Book I. Where a donation mortis causa is made to a slave, let us see whose death must be taken into consideration, that is to say, the death of the master, or that of the slave himself, in order that there may be ground for a personal action to recover the property. The better opinion is that the death of the person to whom the donation was made should be considered; still, the donation does not follow the manumitted slave after the death of his master, before the will is opened.

Paulus, Manuals, Book I. An usufruct cannot exist without a person, and therefore a slave belonging to an estate cannot legally stipulate for an usufruct. It, however, is said that an usufruct can be bequeathed to him, for the reason that its time does not begin immediately, while an unconditional stipulation cannot remain in abeyance. But what if the stipulation was made under a condition? It will not be valid, even in this instance, because a stipulation receives its power from the present time, although the right of action to which it gives rise may remain in suspense.

The Same, Manuals, Book I. Gross negligence is a fault: a great fault is a fraud.