Paulus, On the Lex Ælia Sentia, Book II. He who permits his freedman to swear that he will not marry, or have any children, is understood to be in the same position as one who compels his freedwoman to swear that she will not marry, or have any children. If, however, his son should do this, without his father’s knowledge, or if he should enter into a stipulation with the freedman, this will not prejudice him in any way; but if a son who is under the control of his father should do so by his order, it is clear that he will be liable under the above-mentioned law. 1A patron stipulated for a hundred days of labor to be performed, or five aurei to be paid for each day by his freedman. This agreement does not seem to be contrary to law, because the freedman has the power to perform the labor. 2Although no person is excepted by this law, still it should be understood only to refer to those who can have children. Hence, if anyone should compel a freedman who has been castrated to take such an oath, it must be said that he cannot be held liable under this law. 3If a patron should compel his freed woman to swear to marry him, and he does so with the intention of marrying her, he will not be considered to have done anything illegal. If, however, the patron should not marry her, and only required her to take the oath to prevent her from marrying another, Julianus says that he has committed a fraud against the law, and that he should be liable, just as if he had compelled his freedwoman to swear not to marry at all. 4An oath is permitted by the Lex Julia relating to marriages of different orders, which, in this instance, is imposed upon a freedman or a freedwoman, not to marry, provided they desire to contract a legal marriage.