Institutionum libri
Ex libro I
Dig. 41,2,41Paulus libro primo institutionum. Qui iure familiaritatis amici fundum ingreditur, non videtur possidere, quia non eo animo ingressus est, ut possideat, licet corpore in fundo sit.
Paulus, Institutes, Book I. Anyone who enters upon a tract of land as a friend, by the right of familiarity, is not considered to possess it, because he did not enter upon it with the intention of doing so, although he may have actual possession of the land.
Ex libro II
Dig. 8,2,4Paulus libro secundo institutionum. Luminum in servitute constituta id adquisitum videtur, ut vicinus lumina nostra excipiat: cum autem servitus imponitur, ne luminibus officiatur, hoc maxime adepti videmur, ne ius sit vicino invitis nobis altius aedificare atque ita minuere lumina nostrorum aedificiorum.
Ad Dig. 8,2,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 211a, Note 8.Paulus, Institutes, Book II. Where a servitude of lights is created, it is held that what is acquired is that a neighbor must not interfere with our lights, but if the servitude imposed is to prevent the obscuring of lights, we seem to have especially acquired the right that a neighbor shall not raise his building any higher against our will, so as to lessen the amount of light in our house.
Dig. 44,7,3Paulus libro secundo institutionum. Obligationum substantia non in eo consistit, ut aliquod corpus nostrum aut servitutem nostram faciat, sed ut alium nobis obstringat ad dandum aliquid vel faciendum vel praestandum. 1Non satis autem est dantis esse nummos et fieri accipientis, ut obligatio nascatur, sed etiam hoc animo dari et accipi, ut obligatio constituatur. itaque si quis pecuniam suam donandi causa dederit mihi, quamquam et donantis fuerit et mea fiat, tamen non obligabor ei, quia non hoc inter nos actum est. 2Verborum quoque obligatio constat, si inter contrahentes id agatur: nec enim si per iocum puta vel demonstrandi intellectus causa ego tibi dixero ‘spondes’? et tu responderis ‘spondeo’, nascetur obligatio.
Paulus, Institutes, Book II. The nature of obligations does not consist in the fact that they render some property or some servitude ours, but that they require us to give something, to do something, or to be responsible for something. 1In the case of a loan in order for the obligation to be contracted it is not sufficient for the money merely to be given and received, but it must be given and received with the understanding that this will be the case. Therefore, if anyone gives his money to me as a donation, although it belongs to the donor, and passes into my hands, still I am not liable to him for it, because this was not our intention. 2A verbal obligation is also contracted, if this was the intention of the parties; for instance, if I should say to you by way of jest, or for the purpose of explaining what a stipulation is, “Do you promise me So-and-So?” and you answer, “I do promise,” an obligation will not arise.