Ad edictum praetoris libri
Ex libro LXXI
Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXI. An agent to whom has been committed, in general terms, the free transaction of business, can collect what is due, and can also exchange one piece of property for another.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXI. Where a husband gives money to his wife for the rebuilding of a house belonging to her, which has been destroyed by fire, the donation is only valid to the amount required for the construction of the house.
The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXI. If a legatee brings an action to recover the property bequeathed, an exception based on the fraud of the testator can be pleaded against him; for, just as an heir who succeeds to the entire estate can be barred by an exception, so a legatee can also be barred as the successor of an individual part of the same.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book VII. In order that this exception may be more clearly understood, let us first consider the reason why it was introduced, and afterwards ascertain how fraud can be committed. By this means we will learn when this exception operates as a bar, and also against what persons it can be employed. Finally, we shall examine within what time it must be pleaded. 1The Prætor introduced this exception in order that no one could, by means of the Civil Law, profit by his own fraud against the rules of natural equity. 2In order to ascertain whether a fraudulent act has been committed, the facts of the case must be taken into consideration. 3Fraud is committed in contracts, in wills, and in the execution, of the laws.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXI. But if, before the ownership of the slave was transferred to me, he should pay the ten aurei to the vendor, and I should bring an action on purchase in order to recover the ten aurei, I think that I would be entitled to this action, if I was ready to release him from the stipulation to pay double the amount of the price.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVII. You owe me ten aurei unconditionally. I bequeath you that sum under a condition. If, in the meantime, my heir should bring an action to collect the amount you owe the estate, he cannot be barred by an exception on the ground of bad faith, as the condition may fail to be fulfilled, therefore he should stipulate for the payment of the legacy. If, however, the heir Joes not give security, he will be barred by an exception on the ground of bad faith; for it is to the interest of the legatee to retain the amount in his hands rather than to be placed in possession of the property of the estate. 1If a right of way is bequeathed to anyone, and the Falcidian Law being applicable, he should bring an action to recover the entire right of way, without tendering the appraised value of the fourth part of the same, Marcellus says that he can be barred by an exception on the ground of bad faith, as the heir must provide for his own interest. 2Where I gave a tract of land to anyone but did not deliver it, and the person to whom I gave it without delivery of possession should build upon said land with my knowledge, and after he has done so I should obtain possession, and he should bring an action against me for what I have given him; and I should interpose the exception that the donation exceeds the limit prescribed by law, can a replication on the ground of bad faith be pleaded? This can be done, for I acted in bad faith when I permitted him to build, and did not reimburse him for his expenses. 3Where a slave has been appointed for the collection of money which is due, any act of bad faith subsequently committed by him will prejudice his master. 4Ad Dig. 44,4,5,4Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 421, Note 2.If a slave is sold by someone who was permitted by his master to dispose of him, and he is then returned to his master, an exception based on his return can be pleaded against the vendor, if he brings suit to recover the price of the slave, even though he who sold him has paid the purchase money to his master. He also will be barred by an exception based on the non-delivery of merchandise who has already paid the money to the owner of the same, and therefore, he who sold the merchandise can bring an action against the owner. Pedius says that the rule is the same where anyone who transacts our affairs makes a sale. 5If I delegate to my creditor someone who intends to donate property to me over and above the amount prescribed by law, he cannot make use of an exception against the creditor, if the latter brings suit, because he only claims what he is entitled to. The same rule applies to a husband, for he should not be barred by an exception who acts in his own name. Therefore, can it not also be said that an exception on the ground of the fraud of a wife cannot be pleaded against her husband, when he sues for her dowry, as he would not have married the woman without a dowry, unless a separation had already taken place? Hence the donor, or a woman who has delegated, or released a debtor, is liable to a personal action brought by the latter, either to obtain his release, or, if he has paid what was due, in order that the money may be refunded to him. 6The case is not the same where an exception on the ground of fraud is granted, as it is where a right of action is extinguished within a certain time; for the exception is perpetual, as the plaintiff has the power to avail himself of his privilege whenever he desires to do so, but the defendant can only plead the exception after he has been sued.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXXI. If the oath is tendered to a son under paternal control, and he swears that his father does not owe anything, the exception should be granted to the father. 1Ad Dig. 44,5,2,1Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 420, Note 7.If, where a game of chance is being conducted, I sell something in order that I may play, and the property having been evicted, suit is brought against me, the purchaser will be barred by an exception. 2If a slave promises a sum of money to his master in order that he may be manumitted, and his master would not otherwise have manumitted him, and, having become free, he renews his promise, it is held that his patron will not be barred by an exception if he sues to recover the money, for this sum was not promised for the purpose of placing restrictions upon freedom; otherwise it would be unjust for the master to be deprived of the slave as well as of his price. Therefore, money is promised for the purpose of imposing restrictions upon freedom whenever a master voluntarily manumits his slave, and afterwards wishes him to promise a sum of money, not with the intention of exacting it from him, but in order that his freedmen may fear and obey him.
The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXI. When the suit is ended the obligation is disposed of, and therefore it is held that under the stipulation the sureties are not liable for the payment of the judgment.