Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. If a slave should commit damage to an estate before it had been entered upon, and, after having been liberated, he should cause other damage to the property, he will be liable to both actions, because these things have reference to two different acts.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. Where a number of slaves held in common, or one alone commits a theft, with the knowledge of one of his owners the latter will be liable in the name of both, and if suit is brought against him this will release the others from liability; nor can he obtain anything from his joint-owner, as he deserved the penalty on account of his own act. But where one who was ignorant of the commission of the offence pays double damages, he can recover simple damages from his joint-owner.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. Nor can the legatee himself bring a personal action, for this is only available by the person whose property has been stolen or by his heir; but the legatee has a right to recover property which was bequeathed to him by means of another action.

Ad Dig. 13,1,13Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 187, Note 3.Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. Where cups have been made out of stolen silver, Fulcinius says that a personal action can be brought, and therefore in the proceedings for their recovery an estimate should be made of the value of any engraving which was done at the expense of the thief; just as where a slave-child is stolen and grows up, an estimate is made of his value when grown, even though he was reared under the care and at the expense of the thief.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. Where a slave is given by way of pledge, he cannot be manumitted, even if the debtor is wealthy.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. Labeo says that the word “theft” is derived from the term meaning black, because the offence is committed secretly, and in obscurity, and generally at night; or from the word “fraud,” as Sabinus held; or from the verbs to take, and to carry away; or from the Greek term which designates thieves as φῶρας. And, indeed, the Greeks themselves derived the word from the verb to carry away. 1Hence the sole intention of committing a theft does not make a thief. 2Thus, anyone who denies that a deposit has been made with him does not immediately become liable to an action for theft, but only when he has hidden the property with the intention of appropriating it. 3A theft is the fraudulent handling of anything with the intention of profiting by it; which applies either to the article itself or to its use or possession, when this is prohibited by natural law.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. He who breaks a door for the purpose of causing injury (although property may be taken away by others as the result of this), will not be guilty of theft, for the wish and intention of the culprit make a distinction in the case of crime. 1If a slave of the lender of an article for use steals it, and he from whom it was taken is solvent, Sabinus says that an action on loan can be brought against him, as well as one against the master on account of the theft committed by the slave. Where, however, the master has the money which he collected, the right of action for theft will be extinguished. The same rule applies where the action on loan is dismissed. 2If your slave steals property which has been lent to you for use, an action for theft will not lie against you, but only one on loan, because the property was at your risk. 3Anyone who volunteers to transact the business of others is not entitled to the action for theft, although the property may have been lost by his fault; but judgment can be rendered against him in a suit based on voluntary agency, if the owner transfers to him his right of action. The same rule applies to one who administers affairs in the place of a guardian, as well as to a guardian who is bound to observe diligence; as, for example, where several testamentary guardians have been appointed, and one of them alone, after having given security, undertakes the administration of the trust. 4If you hold my property through the donation of another, and I steal it, Julianus says that you can only bring the action for theft against me, if it was to your interest to retain possession; for instance, if you have defended a slave who was given in a noxal action, or if you have taken care of him when he was ill, you will have a just cause to retain him against the person demanding him.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. In computing the amount of the interest of the owner in not having the damage committed, the value of the trees themselves should be deducted, and an appraisement made of what remains. 1Whoever cuts down a tree clandestinely cuts it down by stealth. 2Therefore, if he should cut and remove it for the purpose of profiting by it, he will be liable for the theft of the wood, and also to a personal action, as well as to one for the production of property. 3Anyone who, with the knowledge of the owner, cuts down a tree by violence, is not liable to this action.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. He is free from blame who is aware of a breach of the law being committed, but is unable to prevent it.