Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIII. Where a party is unwilling either to swear or to tender back the oath, it is an evidence of manifest depravity, and equivalent to a confession.

Ad Dig. 22,1,22ROHGE, Bd. 15 (1875), Nr. 102, S. 363, 371: Feststellung des Zeitpunkts des Verzugs mit Rücksicht auf die subjective Auffassung des Säumigen über die Sachlage.Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXVII. Provided this is not done deceitfully for the purpose of committing fraud.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXVII. Ad Dig. 22,1,24 pr.ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 263: Voraussetzung der mora, wenn zur Erfüllung der Verbindlichkeit die Mitwirkung des Gläubigers erforderlich ist. Durch Mittheilung der Klage wird der Schuldner noch nicht unbedingt in Verzug gesetzt.ROHGE, Bd. 15 (1875), Nr. 102, S. 363, 371: Feststellung des Zeitpunkts des Verzugs mit Rücksicht auf die subjective Auffassung des Säumigen über die Sachlage.Where anyone delays in making payment, but is ready to join issue in the suit, he is not held to be in default, at least if he has just cause for applying to the court. 1Where the principal debtor is in default, the surety is also liable. 2A debtor is in default to his creditor where he does not make payment either to the creditor himself or to someone whom he has directed to receive the money, or to him who is in the habit of transacting his business. In this instance it is not held that he acquires, anything through a free person, because these parties are only discharging their duties; just as where anyone arrests a thief in the act of stealing from me, he is transacting my business, and acquires for me a right of action for manifest theft. Again, where an agent makes a demand for a slave upon a promisor, he renders the stipulation perpetual.

The Same, On the Edict, Book XXXVII. Where the husband has once been in default, and his wife refuses to accept a dotal slave after he has been tendered by him, and the slave afterwards dies; neither the husband nor his heir will be liable for the value of said slave, nor will he be liable for damages, because his wife refused to accept the slave after her husband had tendered him.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book LVII. For it is not just that the husband should be compelled to sell his own property, even for its full value, if he is unwilling to do so.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXVII. If a woman, despairing of the life of her husband, after having surreptitiously removed some of his property, should obtain a divorce, and her husband should recover, an equitable action for the recovery of property wrongfully appropriated should be granted him. 1Where a slave belonging to a wife removes property of her husband by order of his mistress who intends to obtain a divorce, Pedius thinks that she is not guilty of theft, since she does not obtain anything to his own advantage; nor is she held to have rendered any aid to the slave committing the offence, as the woman herself did not commit it, although the slave should not obey his owner when ordered to commit a crime; but an action on the ground of property wrongfully appropriated will lie. 2Still, if a slave given as dowry steals from the husband, and the wife knew that he was dishonest, she must make good the entire loss to her husband; but if she was not aware of the bad character of the slave, she will then not be liable beyond the surrender of the slave by way of reparation. 3The action to recover property wrongfully appropriated is brought for reparation of the injury, even though the exaction of the dowry can only subsequently be demanded. 4If, where property has been wrongfully appropriated by his wife, the husband has been deprived of some advantage, this must be taken into consideration. 5Although this action arises from the commission of a crime, it still includes the claim for the property, and therefore is not prescribed after the expiration of a year, as is the case in a personal action for the recovery of stolen goods. Moreover, it will lie in favor of heirs. 6In this action, neither the husband nor the wife can obtain any benefit from insolvency, because it is based upon theft.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXVII. A woman acts fraudulently who does not prevent another party from obtaining possession; or for the purpose of defrauding anyone, places another in possession clandestinely, and by means of some artifice. 1If fraud is proved to have been committed by the father and the daughter, an action can be brought against either of them whom the plaintiff may select; because it is granted in favor of the party in interest. Therefore he can recover anything which he may have lost from the woman who is under paternal control, but this action will not be available to him beyond the expenses incurred by the prosecution of the case.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXVII. When a son under paternal control promises to deliver Stichus, and it was his fault that he was not delivered, and Stichus should die, an action De peculia will be granted against the father for the amount for which the son was liable under the obligation. If, however, the father was in default, the son will not be liable, but a prætorian action should be granted against the father. All these things are said to be applicable to a surety. 1If I stipulate that nothing shall be done by you to prevent me from enjoying a right of way, and I accept a surety from you, and it should be the fault of the surety that I do not enjoy the servitude, neither party will be liable; but if the promisor is to blame, both of them will be. 2In the following stipulation, “It shall be done neither by you nor by your heir,” the act is considered to have been performed by the heir, even though he may have been absent, and ignorant of the fact, and hence did not do what was required by the terms of the stipulation. A minor, however, is not considered to be responsible for a stipulation of this kind, even if he is the heir. 3If the promisor of a slave is required to deliver him before the time agreed upon, and the slave should die, he will not be held responsible.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXVII. It sometimes happens that a criminal prosecution is prejudiced, as in the action under the Aquilian Law; in the action of theft, and the one for property taken by violence; in the interdict Unde vi and in that to compel the production of a will; for in these cases private matters are concerned.