Paulus, On the Edict, Book X. Moreover, where anyone is released from an obligation this may be considered as receiving money; and also where money is loaned him to be used gratuitously, or property is sold or leased for less than its value. It makes no difference whether the party himself received the money, or ordered it to be paid to someone else, or ratified it after it had been accepted in his behalf by another.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book X. Where anyone has received money from another in order to prevent me from being subjected to annoyance, then, if it was given through my direction, or by my agent who had charge of all my business, or by a party who voluntarily acted in my behalf, and whose act I ratified, I am considered to have paid the money myself. But if another party did not pay it on my order, even though he did it through consideration for me in order that the act should not be committed, and I did not ratify what he did; then the party who paid the money can recover it, and I have a right of action for fourfold the amount. 1If the money was paid for the purpose of having a vexatious suit brought against the son of a family, the father also is granted this action. In like manner, if the son of a family should accept money to induce him to bring a vexatious suit against anyone, or not to bring it; an action will be granted against his father. If another party paid him money not to bring the action without any direction from me, he can then recover it, and I will have a right to bring suit for quadruple the amount. 2Where a farmer of the revenue retains a person’s slaves, and money was paid to him which was not due, he, also, is liable in an action in factum by this section of the Edict.

Paulus, On the Edict, Book X. The heir of a freedman is entitled to all the rights of a stranger against the patron of the deceased.

The Same, On the Edict, Book X. Where anyone is released from an obligation, his creditor is presumed to have received his money. 1He cannot be considered to have obtained anything who, having made a stipulation, can be barred by an exception.