De concurrentibus actionibus liber singularis
Dig. 44,7,34Idem libro singulari de concurrentibus actionibus. Qui servum alienum iniuriose verberat, ex uno facto incidit et in Aquiliam et in actionem iniuriarum: iniuria enim ex affectu fit, damnum ex culpa et ideo possunt utraeque competere. sed quidam altera electa alteram consumi. alii per legis Aquiliae actionem iniuriarum consumi, quoniam desiit bonum et aequum esse condemnari eum, qui aestimationem praestitit: sed si ante iniuriarum actum esset, teneri eum ex lege Aquilia. sed et haec sententia per praetorem inhibenda est, nisi in id, quod amplius ex lege Aquilia competit, agatur. rationabilius itaque est eam admitti sententiam, ut liceat ei quam voluerit actionem prius exercere, quod autem amplius in altera est, etiam hoc exsequi. 1Si is, cui rem commodavero, eam subripuerit, tenebitur quidem et commodati actione et condictione, sed altera actio alteram peremit aut ipso iure aut per exceptionem, quod est tutius. 2Hinc de colono responsum est, si aliquid ex fundo subtraxerit, teneri eum condictione et furti, quin etiam ex locato: et poena quidem furti non confunditur, illae autem inter se miscentur. et hoc in legis Aquiliae actione dicitur, si tibi commodavero vestimenta et tu ea ruperis: utraeque enim actiones rei persecutionem continent. et quidem post legis Aquiliae actionem utique commodati finietur: post commodati an Aquiliae remaneat in eo, quod in repetitione triginta dierum amplius est, dubitatur: sed verius est remanere, quia simplo accedit: et simplo subducto locum non habet.
The Same, On Concurrent Actions. Anyone who strikes the slave of another in such a way as to injure him becomes liable by his act to a suit under the Aquilian Law, as well as to one for the reparation of damage, for injury is intentionally-committed, and damage is caused by negligence; therefore both actions will lie. There are, however, certain authorities who hold that when one of these actions is chosen, the other is lost; and others are of the opinion that if the action under the Aquilian Law is selected, the one for the reparation of damage will be lost; since it ceases to be proper and equitable for judgment to be rendered against him who has paid the amount of damages appraised. If, however, the action for reparation of damage has already been brought, the party will still be liable under the Aquilian Law. This opinion should be restricted by the Prætor, unless suit is brought for the excess that can be obtained under the Aquilian Law. Hence it is more reasonable to admit that the plaintiff can make his choice of the actions, and afterwards employ the other to collect anything more than he can obtain by the first one. 1If anyone steals an article which I have lent to him for his own use, he will be liable both to an action on loan, and to a personal action to recover the property, but either one of these proceedings annuls the other, either by operation of law, or by the pleading of an exception; which is the better opinion. 2Hence it was held with reference to the tenant who had stolen something belonging to the land, that he was liable both to an action for the recovery of the property, to one for theft, and to one on the lease. The penalty of theft is not merged, but the other two actions are. This is applicable to the proceeding under the Aquilian Law; for if I lend you clothing, and you tear it, both actions will lie to recover the property. After suit under the Aquilian Law has been brought, the right to sue on the loan is extinguished; and after the action on the loan is instituted, there is some doubt as to whether the one under the Aquilian Law cannot be brought within thirty days, for the reason that it is more advantageous. The better opinion is, that the right to bring it is retained, because it adds to the simple value of the property, and if the simple value has been paid, there will be no ground for bringing it.
Dig. 47,2,89Idem libro singulari de concurrentibus actionibus. Si quis egerit vi bonorum raptorum, etiam furti agere non potest: quod si furti elegerit in duplum agere, potest et vi bonorum raptorum agere sic, ut non excederet quadruplum.
The Same, On Concurrent Actions. Where anyone brings an action for robbery with violence, he cannot also bring one for theft. If, however, he should prefer to bring an action of theft for double damages, he can also bring one for robbery with violence; provided that fourfold the value of the property is not exceeded.