Definitionum libri
Ex libro I
Dig. 1,3,1Papinianus libro primo definitionum. Lex est commune praeceptum, virorum prudentium consultum, delictorum quae sponte vel ignorantia contrahuntur coercitio, communis rei publicae sponsio.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. A statute is a general precept; a resolution of men learned in the law; a restraint of crimes committed either voluntarily or through ignorance; or a general obligation of the State.
Dig. 2,15,5Papinianus libro primo definitionum. Cum Aquiliana stipulatio interponitur, quae ex consensu redditur, lites, de quibus non est cogitatum, in suo statu retinentur. liberalitatem enim captiosam interpretatio prudentium fregit.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. When the Aquilian stipulation is made use of, the consent of the contracting parties is implied, and any actions which they had not yet thought of remain in their former condition; for the interpretation of persons learned in the law is opposed to all captious liberality.
Dig. 12,1,37Papinianus libro primo definitionum. Cum ad praesens tempus condicio confertur, stipulatio non suspenditur et, si condicio vera sit, stipulatio tenet, quamvis tenere contrahentes condicionem ignorent, veluti ‘si rex Parthorum vivit, centum mihi dari spondes?’ eadem sunt et cum in praeteritum condicio confertur.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. When a condition refers to the time when the obligation was contracted, the stipulation is not suspended, and if the condition is an actual one, the stipulation will hold, even though the contracting parties do not know that this is the case; for instance: “Do you promise to pay me a hundred thousand sesterces if the King of the Parthians is living?” The same rule also applies where the condition refers to time which has passed:
Dig. 12,1,39Papinianus libro primo definitionum. Itaque tunc potestatem condicionis optinet, cum in futurum confertur.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. Therefore the clause only acquires the force of a condition when it relates to the future.
Dig. 18,1,74Idem libro primo definitionum. Clavibus traditis ita mercium in horreis conditarum possessio tradita videtur, si claves apud horrea traditae sint: quo facto confestim emptor dominium et possessionem adipiscitur, etsi non aperuerit horrea: quod si venditoris merces non fuerunt, usucapio confestim inchoabitur.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. Possession is held to have been transferred where the keys of a warehouse containing merchandise have been delivered, provided they are given up at the said warehouse; and when this is done, the purchaser immediately acquires ownership, and possession of the same, even though he does not open the warehouse; and if the merchandise does not belong to the vendor, the right of usucaption begins immediately to run.
Dig. 22,6,8Idem libro primo definitionum. Error facti ne maribus quidem in damnis vel compendiis obest, iuris autem error nec feminis in compendiis prodest: ceterum omnibus iuris error in damnis amittendae rei suae non nocet.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. An error of fact does not, indeed, prejudice the rights of men where they seek to obtain property, or to avoid losing it; and ignorance of the law is no advantage, even to women, when they attempt to acquire it. A mistake in law, however, does not injure any person in an attempt to avoid the loss of property.
Dig. 23,2,63Idem libro primo definitionum. Praefectus cohortis vel equitum aut tribunus contra interdictum eius provinciae duxit uxorem, in qua officium gerebat: matrimonium non erit: quae species pupillae comparanda est, cum ratio potentatus nuptias prohibuerit. sed an huic quoque si virgo nupsit, non sit auferendum quod testamento relictum est, deliberari potest: exemplo tamen pupillae nuptae tutori, quod relictum est potest mulier consequi. pecuniam tamen in dotem datam mulieris heredi restitui necesse est.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. Where the prefect of a cohort or of cavalry, or a tribune, marries a woman of the province in which he is stationed, this being prohibited by law, the marriage will be void. This case is similar to that of a ward, as the marriage is forbidden on account of the authority exercised. But is there room for doubt that where a virgin marries, she can be deprived of what was left to her by will? As in the case of a ward married to her guardian, the wife can acquire everything that is bequeathed to her; still, any money which has been left by way of dowry must be given up to the heir of the woman.
Dig. 23,4,27Idem libro primo definitionum. Si liberis sublatis reversa post iurgium per dissimulationem mulier veluti venali concordio ne dotata sit conveniat, conventio secundum ordinem rei gestae moribus improbanda est.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. If a woman who has children should return to her husband through duplicity, after a quarrel; as for instance, where, through venal motives, she agrees that she shall not be endowed; this agreement being contrary to custom ought not to be enforced, in accordance with the circumstances of the case.
Dig. 26,7,42Idem libro primo definitionum. Ex pluribus tutoribus in solidum unum tutorem iudex condemnavit. in rem suam iudicatus procurator datus privilegium pupilli non habebit, quod nec heredi pupilli datur: non enim causae, sed personae succurritur, quae meruit praecipuum favorem.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. A judge decided that one guardian out of several was liable for the entire amount. He who was the subject of the decree can act as attorney with reference to his own affairs, but he will not be entitled to the privilege of a ward, since this is not conferred even upon the heir of a ward, and relief is given, not to the case, but to the person of the ward, who is deserving of a special favor.
Dig. 27,3,21Idem libro primo definitionum. Cum pupillus tutelae actione contra tutorem alterum tutori, quem iudex in solidum condemnavit, cessit, quamvis postea iudicatum fiat, tamen actio data non intercidit, quia pro parte condemnati tutoris non tutela reddita, sed nominis pretium solutum videtur.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. When a ward transfers his right of action on guardianship to the guardian against whom a judgment has been rendered in full, to be enforced against his fellow-guardian, the right of action will not be extinguished, even though this is done after the judgment has been satisfied, because it is held that an account is not rendered for the share of the defeated guardian, but that the amount of the claim has been paid.
Dig. 28,3,1Papinianus libro primo definitionum. Testamentum aut non iure factum dicitur, ubi sollemnia iuris defuerunt: aut nullius esse momenti, cum filius qui fuit in patris potestate praeteritus est: aut rumpitur alio testamento, ex quo heres existere poterit, vel adgnatione sui heredis: aut in irritum constituitur non adita hereditate.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. A will is said not to have been executed in compliance with the law, where the legal formalities are lacking; or to be of no force and effect, where a son who is under the control of his father is passed over; or broken by another subsequent will, when by the terms of the latter, an heir is created, or the birth of a proper heir takes place; or where it does not become operative because the estate is not entered upon.
Dig. 28,5,34Papinianus libro primo definitionum. Hereditas ex die vel ad diem non recte datur, sed vitio temporis sublato manet institutio.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. An estate cannot legally be bequeathed from a certain time or until a certain time, but the defect with reference to the time having been ignored, the appointment of the heir will stand.
Dig. 28,5,80Idem libro primo definitionum. Quod si non sit reliqui facta mentio, tantundem in altero asse habebit Maevius quantum Titius in primo.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. If no mention was made of the remainder, and the number of the shares was doubled, Mævius would only be entitled to as much as Titius would have been entitled to in the first place.
Dig. 28,6,42Idem libro primo definitionum. Qui duos impuberes filios heredes reliquerat, ita substituit, si ambo mortui essent: deinde pueri post mortem patris simul perierunt: duae hereditates substituto deferuntur. sed si diversis temporibus vita decedant, in hereditate novissimi pueri eius fratris, qui ante mortuus est, hereditatem substitutus inveniet: sed in ratione Falcidiae pueri prioris hereditas non veniet nec substitutus amplius quam sescunciam iure testamenti desiderabit: legata quoque, quae a substituto eius filii data sunt, qui prior intestato decessit, ad irritum reccidunt.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. Where a man left two children his heirs who had not yet reached the age of puberty, and made a substitution for them as follows: “If both of them should die”, and both died at the same time, after the death of their father, the two estates will belong to the substitute; but if they died at different times, the substitute will find in the estate of the boy who died last that of his brother who died previously, but, according to the terms of the Falcidian Law, the estate of the first boy will not be included; the substitute cannot claim more than an eighth of the estate under the will; and the legacies, with whose distribution the substitute of the son who first died intestate was charged, become of no effect.
Dig. 31,80Idem libro primo definitionum. Legatum ita dominium rei legatarii facit, ut hereditas heredis res singulas. quod eo pertinet, ut, si pure res relicta sit et legatarius non repudiavit defuncti voluntatem, recta via dominium, quod hereditatis fuit, ad legatarium transeat numquam factum heredis.
Ad Dig. 31,80Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 652, Note 17.The Same, Definitions, Book I. A legacy transfers the ownership of the property bequeathed, just as inheritance vests in the heir the ownership of each individual article included in it, the result of which is, that if the property is bequeathed absolutely, and the legatee does not reject the will of the deceased, the ownership of the property belonging to the estate passes directly to the legatee, without having become the property of the heir.
Dig. 35,1,79Idem libro primo definitionum. ‘Heres meus, cum morietur Titius, centum ei dato’. purum legatum est, quia non condicione, sed mora suspenditur: non potest enim condicio non existereaaDie Großausgabe liest exsistere statt existere.. 1‘Heres meus, cum ipse morietur, centum Titio dato’. legatum sub condicione relictum est: quamvis enim heredem moriturum certum sit, tamen incertum est, an legatario vivo. dies legati non cedit et non est certum ad eum legatum perventurum. 2Qui post Mucianam cautionem interpositam legatum accepit, si contra cautionem aliquid fecerit, stipulatione commissa etiam fructus heredi restituet: hoc enim legatarius et in exordio cavere cogitur. 3Quamvis usus fructus, cum morietur legatarius, inutiliter legetur, tamen cautionis Mucianae remedium usu fructu quoque sub condicionem alicuius non faciendi legato locum habet. 4Quod in fraudem legis ad impediendas nuptias scriptum est, nullam vim habet, veluti: ‘Titio patri centum, si filia, quam habet is in potestate, non nubserit, heres dato’ vel: ‘filio familias, si pater eius uxorem non duxerit, heres dato’.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. “Let my heir pay Titius a hundred aurei at the time of the latter’s death.” The legacy is absolute for the reason that it is not dependent upon the condition, but upon delay; for a condition cannot exist under such circumstances. 1“Let my heir, when he dies, pay Titius a hundred aurei.” This legacy is bequeathed under a condition. For although it is certain that the heir will die, it is, nevertheless, uncertain whether the time for the payment of the legacy will arrive during the life of the legatee, and it is not certain that he will receive it. 2Where anyone receives a legacy after having furnished a Mucian bond, and does something contrary to the terms of the bond, and the stipulation becomes operative, he must also restore the profits of the property to the heir. In this instance the legatee should be compelled to give security from the beginning. 3Although an usufruct to take effect at the time of the death of the legatee, when bequeathed in this way is void, still, the remedy of the Mucian bond will be available where the usufruct of property is bequeathed to anyone under the condition that he will not perform some act. 4Anything which is done to evade the law by preventing marriage has no force or effect, as for example, “Let my heir pay Titius a hundred aurei if his daughter, whom he has under his control, does not marry,” or “Let my heir pay the said sum to such-and-such a son under paternal control, if his father does not marry.”
Dig. 44,7,28Idem libro primo definitionum. Actio in personam infertur: petitio in rem: persecutio in rem vel in personam rei persequendae gratia.
The Same, Definitions, Book I. The claim made against a person is designated an “action;” one made against a thing is called a “petition,” the term “pursuit,” instituted for the purpose of recovering the property, is employed both against things and persons.
Dig. 45,1,123Papinianus libro primo definitionum. Si flagitii faciendi vel facti causa concepta sit stipulatio, ab initio non valet.
Ad Dig. 45,1,123ROHGE, Bd. 15 (1875), Nr. 7, S. 18: Verweisung des Gläubigers seitens eines Solidarschuldners an den andern unter Sicherstellung des Gläubigers. Keine Einrede daraus für den andern Schuldner?Papinianus, Definitions, Book I. A stipulation entered into concerning a crime which has been Or is to be committed, is void from the beginning.
Ex libro II
Dig. 1,1,7Papinianus libro secundo definitionum. Ius autem civile est, quod ex legibus, plebis scitis, senatus consultis, decretis principum, auctoritate prudentium venit. 1Ius praetorium est, quod praetores introduxerunt adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civilis gratia propter utilitatem publicam. quod et honorarium dicitur ad honorem praetorum sic nominatum.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book II. The Civil Law is that which is derived from statutory enactments, plebiscites, decrees of the Senate, edicts of the Emperors, and the authority of learned men. 1The Prætorian Law is that which the Prætors introduced for the purpose of aiding, supplementing, or amending, the Civil Law, for the public welfare; which is also designated honorary law, being so called after the “honor” of the Prætors.
Dig. 7,2,11Papinianus libro secundo definitionum. Cum singulis ab heredibus singulis eiusdem rei fructus legatur, fructuarii separati videntur non minus, quam si aequis portionibus duobus eiusdem rei fructus legatus fuisset: unde fit, ut inter eos ius adcrescendi non sit,
Papinianus, Definitions, Book II. Where an usufruct in the same thing is bequeathed to different persons at the charge of different heirs, the usufructuaries are not less held to be separate than if the usufruct of the same property had been bequeathed to the two in equal shares; whence it happens that no right of accrual exists between them:
Dig. 12,6,59Idem libro secundo definitionum. Si fideiussor iure liberatus solverit errore pecuniam, repetenti non oberit: si vero reus promittendi per errorem et ipse postea pecuniam solverit, non repetet, cum prior solutio, quae fuit irrita, naturale vinculum non dissolvit, nec civile, si reus promittendi tenebatur.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. Where a surety who is legally released pays money through mistake, he will not be prevented from bringing an action for its recovery; but if the principal debtor should afterwards himself make payment by mistake, he cannot bring suit to recover, since the first payment, which was void, does not dissolve a natural or a civil obligation if the principal debtor was liable.
Dig. 26,9,6Idem libro secundo definitionum. Tutor interposito decreto praetoris actorem reliquit. secundum eum sententia dicta iudicati transfertur ad pupillum actio non minus, quam si tutor optinuisset.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. A guardian, in compliance with a decree of the Prætor, left an agent for the administration of the affairs of his ward. If judgment is rendered in favor of said agent, an action for its enforcement will be transferred to the ward, just as if the guardian himself had obtained it.
Dig. 40,1,22Idem libro secundo definitionum. Nepos ex filio voluntate avi ut filius voluntate patris potest manumittere, sed manumissus patris vel avi libertus est.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. A grandson can manumit a slave with the consent of a grandfather, as a son can do with the consent of his father; but the manumitted slave will become the freedman of the father, or the grandfather.
Dig. 40,7,36Idem libro secundo definitionum. In tabulis secundis filio servum data libertate substitutum iure statuliberi prudentes munierunt: quod utilitas recipit, scilicet ut cum sua causa alienaretur, ne patris testamentum puer filius rescindat. quae iuris auctoritas citra dilectum ordinis ad secundum quoque vel tertium substitutum porrecta est.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. Persons learned in the law have placed in the class of slaves to be conditionally free one who has been substituted for a son with the grant of his freedom by a second will. This rule is useful, as it prevents a son, who is a minor, from annulling his father’s will by permitting the slave to be alienated subject to the charge of his freedom. This interpretation of the law extends, without any distinction, to every case where the slave is substituted either in the second or the third degree.
Dig. 41,2,45Idem libro secundo definitionum. licet neque servum neque colonum ibi habeamus,
The Same, Definitions, Book II. Although we do not leave a slave or a tenant there when we depart.
Dig. 41,2,49Idem libro secundo definitionum. Possessio quoque per servum, cuius usus fructus meus est, ex re mea vel ex operis servi adquiritur mihi, cum et naturaliter a fructuario teneatur et plurimum ex iure possessio mutuetur. 1Qui in aliena potestate sunt, rem peculiarem tenere possunt, habere possidere non possunt, quia possessio non tantum corporis, sed et iuris est. 2Etsi possessio per procuratorem ignoranti quaeritur, usucapio vero scienti competit, tamen evictionis actio domino contra venditorem invito procuratore non datur, sed per actionem mandati ea cedere cogitur.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. Possession can be acquired by me through a slave in whom I have the usufruct if this is done by means of my property, or the services of the slave; because the latter is naturally held by the usufructuary, and possession borrows many things from the law. 1Those who are under the control of others can hold property belonging to their peculium, but they cannot possess it; for the reason that possession is not only a matter of fact, but is also one of law. 2Although possession through an agent can be acquired by a principal without his knowledge, usucaption can only benefit one who knows that possession has been taken; still, an action for eviction is not granted to the principal against the vendor without the consent of the agent, but he can be compelled to grant it by an action on mandate.
Dig. 44,3,11Idem libro secundo definitionum. Cum heres in ius omne defuncti succedit, ignoratione sua defuncti vitia non excludit, veluti cum sciens alienum illum illo vel precario possedit: quamvis enim precarium heredem ignorantem non teneat nec interdicto recte conveniatur, tamen usucapere non poterit, quod defunctus non potuit. idem iuris est, cum de longa possessione quaeritur: neque enim recte defendetur, cum exordium ei bonae fidei ratio non tueatur.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. Where an heir succeeds to all the rights of the deceased, his ignorance does not affect any defective title of the latter; for example, if the deceased knew that the property belonged to another, he held possession of it by a precarious title. For, although such a title does not bind the heir who was not aware of it, and proceedings under the interdict cannot properly be brought against him, still, he cannot acquire the property by usucaption, as the deceased was unable to do so. The same rule of law applies where property is claimed on the ground of long-continued possession, for an action cannot legally be defended where, in the beginning, it was not founded on a bona fide title.
Dig. 45,1,124Idem libro secundo definitionum. ‘Insulam intra biennium illo loco aedificari spondes?’ ante finem biennii stipulatio non committitur, quamvis reus promittendi non aedificaverit et tantum residui temporis sit, quo aedificium extrui non possit: neque enim stipulationis status, cuius dies certus in exordio fuit, ex post facto mutatur. idque et in stipulatione iudicio sistendi causa facta placuit, scilicet ut ante diem stipulatio non committatur, si certum esse coeperit parere stipulationi residuo tempore non posse.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. “Do you promise to build a house in such-and-such a place within two years?” The stipulation will not become operative before the end of two years, even though the person making the promise should not build it, and sufficient time does not remain in which it can be completed; for the provisions of the stipulation, the time of which was fixed in the beginning, cannot be changed by something which may afterwards occur, and this was inserted in the agreement for the purpose of compelling someone to appear in court; that is to say, the stipulation will not become operative before the prescribed date, even if it is certain that there is not sufficient time remaining to comply with the contract.
Dig. 46,2,28Idem libro secundo definitionum. Fundum Cornelianum stipulatus quanti fundus est postea stipulor: si non novandi animo secunda stipulatio facta est, cessat novatio: secunda vero stipulatio tenet, ex qua non fundus, sed pecunia debetur. itaque si reus promittendi fundum solvat, secunda stipulatio iure non tollitur, nec si litem actor ex prima contestetur. denique meliore vel deteriore facto sine culpa debitoris postea fundo praesens aestimatio fundo petito recte consideretur, in altera vero ea aestimatio venit, quae secundae stipulationis tempore fuit.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. Having stipulated for the Cornelian Estate, I afterwards stipulated for the value of the land. If the second stipulation was not made with the intention of creating a novation, the novation will not take place; but the second stipulation, by the terms of which not the land, but the money is due, will stand. Therefore, if the promisor should convey the land, the second stipulation will not be extinguished by operation of law, not even when the plaintiff institutes proceedings under the terms of the first one. Finally, if the land, being improved, or having subsequently deteriorated without the fault of the debtor, is claimed, the present estimate may properly be considered; and if, on the other hand, its value is demanded, the appraisement at the time of the second stipulation should be accepted.
Dig. 46,3,97Idem libro secundo definitionum. Cum ex pluribus causis debitor pecuniam solvit, utriusque demonstratione cessante potior habebitur causa eius pecuniae, quae sub infamia debetur: mox eius, quae poenam continet: tertio quae sub hypotheca vel pignore contracta est: post hunc ordinem potior habebitur propria quam aliena causa, veluti fideiussoris. quod veteres ideo definierunt, quod verisimile videretur diligentem debitorem admonitum ita negotium suum gesturum fuisse. si nihil eorum interveniat, vetustior contractus ante solvetur. si maior pecunia numerata sit, quam ratio singulorum exposcit, nihilo minus primo contractu soluto, qui potior erit, superfluum ordini secundo vel in totum vel pro parte minuendo videbitur datum.
Ad Dig. 46,3,97ROHGE, Bd. 22 (1878), Nr. 14, S. 65: Zahlungsanrechnung bei Existenz mehrerer Forderungen.The Same, Definitions, Book II. When a debtor pays money on account of several claims, and does not indicate which one of them he wishes to discharge, that which involves infamy is considered to be entitled to the preference; next, the one to which a penalty is attached; third, one which is secured by the hypothecation or pledge of property; and after this an individual obligation shall have priority, rather than one for which another is liable, as, for instance, that of a surety. The ancient authorities established this rule because it seemed to them probable that a diligent debtor, if properly advised, would transact his business in this manner. Where none of these conditions exist, payment should first be made upon the oldest claim. If the amount paid is larger than that required by any single debt, the first obligation which has the preference having been discharged, the surplus will be considered to have been credited on the second one, either in full satisfaction, or for the purpose of diminishing it to that extent.
Dig. 48,1,10Papinianus libro secundo definitionum. Inter accusatorem et reum cognitione suscepta excusatio pro absente iustis rationibus admittitur: nec per triduum per singulos dies ter citatus reus damnetur vel de accusatoris absentis praesente reo calumnia pronuntietur.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book II. While the case between the accuser and the defendant is pending in court, the excuse of absence for good reasons is admitted; and although the defendant may have been called three times a day for three days, he should not be condemned; or if the accuser should be absent and the defendant present, the former ought not be convicted of malicious prosecution.
Dig. 48,19,41Papinianus libro secundo definitionum. Sanctio legum, quae novissime certam poenam irrogat his, qui praeceptis legis non obtemperaverint, ad eas species pertinere non videtur, quibus ipsa lege poena specialiter addita est. nec ambigitur in cetero omni iure speciem generi derogare, nec sane verisimile est delictum unum eadem lege variis aestimationibus coerceri.
Papinianus, Definitions, Book II, The sanction of the laws, which, in the last section, impose a certain penalty upon those who do not obey their precepts, is not held to apply to those cases in which a penalty is specifically added by the law itself, and there is no doubt that in every law the species is subordinated to the genus. Nor is it probable that one crime should be punished by different penalties under the same law.
Dig. 49,17,17Idem libro secundo definitionum. Pater, qui castrense peculium intestati filii retinebit, aes alienum intra modum eius et annum utilem iure praetorio solvere cogitur: idem, si testamento scriptus heres extiterit, perpetuo civiliter ut heres convenietur. 1Pater a filio milite vel qui militavit heres institutus testamenti causam omisit et castrense peculium possidet: legitimi heredis exemplo cogetur ad finem peculii perpetuo legata praestare. quod si filius post annum quam militare desierat iure communi testamento facto vita decessit, ratione Falcidiae retinebitur quarta. ceterum si testamenti causam pater omisit, cum peculium creditoribus solvendo non esset, nihil dolo videbitur fecisse, quamvis temporis incurrat compendium.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. A father having the right to retain the castrense peculium of his son who died intestate is compelled by the Prætorian Law to pay his debts during the available year, as far as the peculium will allow. Likewise, if he should become the testamentary heir of his son, he will always be liable for these debts as his heir, under the Civil Law. 1A father who was appointed heir by his son, who either was or had been in the army, did not accept the estate under the will, and kept possession of his castrense peculium. He can, just as an heir at law, be compelled without limit of time to pay any legacies bequeathed by his son, to the extent that the peculium will permit. If, however, the son, having made his will according to the Common Law, should die within a year after leaving the army, a fourth of his estate can be retained by his father under the Falcidian Law. But if his father should fail to accept the estate under the will, because the peculium was not sufficient to satisfy the creditors, he will not be considered to have acted fraudulently; although he may be obliged to discharge the indebtedness during the prescribed time.
Dig. 50,17,83Idem libro secundo definitionum. Non videntur rem amittere, quibus propria non fuit.
The Same, Definitions, Book II. No one is considered to have lost something if it did not belong to him.