Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Ner.
Neratii Opera

Neratii Opera

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Index

1.
Membranarum libri (44 fragmenta)
2.
Responsorum libri (13 fragmenta)
3.
Regularum libri (7 fragmenta)

Membranarum libri

Ex libro I

Dig. 9,2,53Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Bo­ves alie­nos in an­gus­tum lo­cum co­egis­ti eo­que ef­fec­tum est, ut de­ice­ren­tur: da­tur in te ad ex­em­plum le­gis Aqui­liae in fac­tum ac­tio.

Ad Dig. 9,2,53ROHGE, Bd. 20 (1877), Nr. 96, S. 382: Schaden durch Ausbringen eines Ankers im Hafen ohne Bezeichnung.Neratius, Parchments, Book I. You drove oxen belonging to another into a narrow place which caused them to be thrown to the ground and injured. An action resembling that brought under the Lex Aquilia will be granted against you.

Dig. 20,2,4Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Eo iu­re uti­mur, ut quae in prae­dia ur­ba­na in­duc­ta il­la­ta sunt pig­no­ri es­se cre­dan­tur, qua­si id ta­ci­te con­ve­ne­rit: in rus­ti­cis prae­diis con­tra ob­ser­va­tur. 1Sta­bu­la quae non sunt in con­ti­nen­ti­bus ae­di­fi­ciis quo­rum prae­dio­rum ea nu­me­ro ha­ben­da sint, du­bi­ta­ri pot­est. et qui­dem ur­ba­no­rum si­ne du­bio non sunt, cum a ce­te­ris ae­di­fi­ciis se­pa­ra­ta sint: quod ad cau­sam ta­men ta­lis ta­ci­ti pig­no­ris per­ti­net, non mul­tum ab ur­ba­nis prae­diis dif­fe­runt.

Neratius, Parchments, Book I. It is our practice that whatever is placed on urban estates is considered to be pledged, as it were, by tacit agreement; in rustic estates, however, the contrary rule is observed. 1Ad Dig. 20,2,4,1ROHGE, Bd. 6 (1872), S. 281: Pfandrecht des Vermiethers an den eingebrachten zum Verkaufe bestimmten Waaren des Miethers. Zeitweise und dauernde Bestimmung der Verwendung.Can it be doubted whether stables which are not joined to other buildings should be considered as being included in these estates? And, indeed, there is no question with respect to urban estates, since they are separated from other buildings. However, with reference to a tacit pledge of this kind, they do not differ greatly from urban estates.

Dig. 27,10,9Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Cu­ius bo­nis dis­tra­hen­dis cu­ra­to­res fa­ce­re se­na­tus per­mi­sit, eius bo­na cre­di­to­ri­bus ven­de­re non per­mi­sit, quam­vis cre­di­to­res post id be­ne­fi­cium bo­na ven­de­re mal­lent: sic­ut enim in­te­gra re po­tes­tas ip­so­rum est utrum ve­lint eli­gen­di, ita cum al­te­rum ele­ge­rint, al­te­ro abs­ti­ne­re de­bent. mul­to­que ma­gis id ser­va­ri ae­quum est, si et­iam fac­tus est cu­ra­tor, per quem bo­na dis­tra­he­ren­tur, quam­vis non­dum ex­pli­ca­to eo neg­otio de­ces­se­rit. nam et tunc ex in­te­gro alius cu­ra­tor fa­cien­dus est ne­que he­res prio­ris cu­ra­to­ris one­ran­dus, cum ac­ci­de­re pos­sit, ut neg­otio vel prop­ter se­xus vel prop­ter ae­ta­tis in­fir­mi­ta­tem vel prop­ter dig­ni­ta­tem ma­io­rem mi­no­rem­ve, quam in prio­re cu­ra­to­re spec­ta­ta erat, ha­bi­lis non sit, pos­sint et­iam plu­res he­redes ei ex­is­te­re ne­que aut per om­nes id neg­otium ad­mi­nis­tra­ri ex­pe­diat aut quic­quam di­ci pos­sit, cur unus ali­quis ex his po­tis­si­mum one­ran­dus sit.

Neratius, Parchments, Book I. When the Senate permits the appointment of curators for the sale of property, it does not authorize the creditors to dispose of the same, even though they prefer to sell it after this privilege has been granted; as, while the latter have the right to choose whichever one they may desire, still, after they have selected one curator, they must not apply to another. It is much more just for this rule to be observed where the curator, after having been appointed for the sale of property, dies before the transaction has been concluded; for, in this instance, another curator must be appointed for the settlement of the entire matter, and the heir of the first curator cannot be entrusted with it, since it may happen that the heir may not be fitted for the business, either on account of sex, or the infirmity of age, or the higher or lower rank, of the former curator; and, moreover, there may be several heirs to the first curator, and it may not be expedient for all of them to transact the business, or some reason may be alleged why one of them should be charged with this duty rather than the others.

Dig. 28,5,55Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Pa­ter fi­lio im­pu­be­ri ser­vum he­redem sub­sti­tuit li­be­rum­que es­se ius­sit: eum pu­pil­lus ven­di­dit Ti­tio: Ti­tius eum iam pri­mo tes­ta­men­to fac­to in se­cun­do tes­ta­men­to li­be­rum he­redem­que es­se ius­sit. su­pe­rius tes­ta­men­tum Ti­tii rup­tum est, quia is ser­vus et he­res pot­est es­se et, ut su­pe­rius tes­ta­men­tum rum­pa­tur, suf­fi­cit ita pos­te­rius fac­tum es­se, ut ali­quo ca­su po­tue­rit ex eo he­res ex­is­te­re. quod ad vim au­tem eius in­sti­tu­tio­nis per­ti­net, ita se res ha­bet, ut, quam­diu pu­pil­lo ex ea sub­sti­tu­tio­ne he­res pot­est es­se, ex Ti­tii tes­ta­men­to li­ber­ta­tem he­redi­ta­tem­que con­se­qui non pos­sit: si pu­pil­lus in suam tu­te­lam per­ve­ne­rit, per­in­de ex Ti­tii tes­ta­men­to li­ber he­res­que sit ac si pu­pil­lo sub­sti­tu­tus non fuis­set: si pu­pil­lo he­res ex­sti­tit, pro­pius est, ut Ti­tio quo­que, si ve­lit, he­res es­se pos­sit.

Neratius, Parchments, Book I. A father substituted his slave as heir to his minor son, and at the same time granted the latter his freedom, and the minor sold the said slave to Titius. Titius, who had already made one will, in a second ordered the slave to be free and his heir. The first will of Titius was broken because the said slave could be his heir; and as the first will was broken, it is sufficient that the one subsequently executed provided that the heir appointed by it should, in a certain contingency, succeed to the testator. With reference to the effect of this appointment, the result will be that as long as the heir can succeed to the minor by reason of this substitution, he can not obtain his freedom and the estate under the will of Titius. If the heir should obtain control of himself, he would then obtain his freedom, and the estate by the terms of the will of Titius, just as if he had not been substituted for the minor; and if he should become the heir of the minor, there is the best reason to conclude that he could also be the heir of Titius, if he was willing.

Dig. 47,2,65Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo mem­bra­na­rum. A Ti­tio he­rede ho­mo Se­io le­ga­tus an­te ad­itam he­redi­ta­tem Ti­tio fur­tum fe­cit. si ad­ita he­redi­ta­te Se­ius le­ga­tum ad se per­ti­ne­re vo­lue­rit, fur­ti eius ser­vi no­mi­ne aget cum eo Ti­tius, quia ne­que tunc, cum fa­ce­ret fur­tum, eius fuit, et (ut ma­xi­me quis ex­is­ti­met, si ser­vus es­se coe­pe­rit eius, cui fur­tum fe­ce­rat, tol­li fur­ti ac­tio­nem, ut nec si alie­na­tus sit, agi pos­sit eo no­mi­ne) ne post ad­itam qui­dem he­redi­ta­tem Ti­tii fac­tus est, quia ea, quae le­gan­tur, rec­ta via ab eo qui le­ga­vit ad eum cui le­ga­ta sunt trans­eunt.

Neratius, Parchments, Book I. Titius, an heir, having been charged with the legacy of a slave to Seius, the said slave committed a theft against Titius, before the estate was entered upon. If, after it had been entered upon, Seius should wish to have the legacy, Titius could bring an action for theft against him, on account of the act of the slave, because when the latter committed the crime, he did not belong to Titius; and even though anyone should hold that if the slave had begun to belong to him against whom he committed the theft, the right of action for theft would be extinguished, so that even if he was alienated, suit could not be brought on this ground. The slave did not become the property of Titius until after the estate had been entered upon, because legacies pass directly from the person who leaves them to him to whom they are bequeathed.

Dig. 50,5,4Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Tem­pus va­ca­tio­nis, quod da­tur eis qui rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa afue­runt, non ex eo die nu­me­ran­dum est, quo quis ab­es­se de­siit, sed cum quo­dam la­xa­men­to iti­ne­ris: ne­que enim mi­nus ab­es­se rei pu­bli­cae cau­sa in­tel­le­gen­dus est, qui ad id neg­otium vel ab eo re­ver­ti­tur. si quis ta­men plus ius­to tem­po­ris aut iti­ne­re aut in alio lo­co com­mo­ra­tus con­sump­se­rit, ita ea in­ter­pre­tan­da erit, ut ex eo tem­po­re va­ca­tio­nis dies in­ci­piat ei ce­de­re, quo iter ex com­mo­do per­age­re po­tuis­set.

Neratius, Parchments, Book I. The term of exemption which is conceded to those who are absent on business for the State should not be calculated from the day on which the person ceased to be absent, but some time should be allowed him to rest after his journey; and he is still understood to be absent in the public service if he transacts any business either while going or returning. But if anyone delays longer than is proper while on his way, or in any place, in this instance, the time of exemption should be understood to begin from the date when he could have conveniently concluded his journey.

Ex libro II

Dig. 2,11,14Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do mem­bra­na­rum. Si pro­cu­ra­tor ita sti­pu­la­tus est, ut sis­tat dum­ta­xat eum quem sti­pu­la­re­tur, non et­iam poe­nam si sta­tus non es­set sti­pu­la­re­tur: prope­mo­dum nul­lius mo­men­ti est ea sti­pu­la­tio, quia pro­cu­ra­to­ris, quod ad ip­sius uti­li­ta­tem per­ti­net, ni­hil in­ter­est sis­ti. sed cum alie­num neg­otium in sti­pu­lan­do ege­rit, pot­est de­fen­di non pro­cu­ra­to­ris, sed eius cu­ius neg­otium ges­se­rit uti­li­ta­tem in ea re spec­tan­dam es­se: ut quan­tum do­mi­ni li­tis in­ter­fuit sis­ti, tan­tum ex ea sti­pu­la­tio­ne non sta­to reo pro­cu­ra­to­ri de­bea­tur. ea­dem et for­tius ad­huc di­ci pos­sunt, si pro­cu­ra­tor ita sti­pu­la­tus es­set ‘quan­ti ea res erit’: ut hanc con­cep­tio­nem ver­bo­rum non ad ip­sius, sed ad do­mi­ni uti­li­ta­tem re­la­tam in­ter­pre­te­mur.

Neratius, Parchments, Book II. If one man, as the agent for another, stipulates that he will merely produce him whom he agreed to produce without mentioning a penalty, and he should not appear, a stipulation of this kind can hardly have any weight; because the agent, so far as it relates to himself, has no interest in his appearance. But since, in making the stipulation, he is transacting the business of another, it may be stated that the benefit which must be considered in the matter does not accrue to the agent, but to the party whose business he was transacting; so that if the party does not appear, there should be due to the agent an amount equal to the interest of the principal in the suit in accordance with the terms of the stipulation. The same rule can be said to apply even more strongly, where the agent had stipulated in the following terms: “Whatever compensation is proper”; as we understand these words to have reference not to the benefit of the agent himself, but to that of the principal in the action.

Dig. 12,4,8Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do mem­bra­na­rum. Quod Ser­vius in li­bro de do­ti­bus scri­bit, si in­ter eas per­so­nas, qua­rum al­te­ra non­dum ius­tam ae­ta­tem ha­beat, nup­tiae fac­tae sint, quod do­tis no­mi­ne in­ter­im da­tum sit, re­pe­ti pos­se, sic in­tel­le­gen­dum est, ut, si di­vor­tium in­ter­ces­se­rit, prius­quam utra­que per­so­na ius­tam ae­ta­tem ha­beat, sit eius pe­cu­niae re­pe­ti­tio, do­nec au­tem in eo­dem ha­bi­tu ma­tri­mo­nii per­ma­nent, non ma­gis id re­pe­ti pos­sit, quam quod spon­sa spon­so do­tis no­mi­ne de­de­rit, do­nec ma­neat in­ter eos ad­fi­ni­tas: quod enim ex ea cau­sa non­dum co­ito ma­tri­mo­nio da­tur, cum sic de­tur tam­quam in do­tem per­ven­tu­rum, quam­diu per­ve­ni­re pot­est, re­pe­ti­tio eius non est.

Neratius, Parchments, Book II. With reference to what Servius states in his book on Dowries; that is, if a marriage has taken place between persons neither of whom has yet reached the proper age, whatever in the meantime has been given by way of dowry can be recovered; we must understand by this that if a divorce is obtained before either person has reached the lawful age, the money may be recovered, but so long as they remain in the state of matrimony the property cannot be recovered any more than where it is given as dowry by a betrothed woman to her betrothed husband, so long as the connection exists between them; for when anything is given on this account before the marriage has been consummated, then, (since it is given in such a way that it may become a dowry) it cannot be recovered as long as it is possible that this may happen.

Dig. 16,3,18Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do mem­bra­na­rum. De eo, quod tu­mul­tus in­cen­dii rui­nae nau­fra­gii cau­sa de­po­si­tum est, in he­redem de do­lo mor­tui ac­tio est pro he­redi­ta­ria por­tio­ne et in sim­plum et in­tra an­num quo­que: in ip­sum et in so­li­dum et in du­plum et in per­pe­tuum da­tur.

Neratius, Parchments, Book II. In case a deposit is made on account of a tumult, a fire, the destruction of a house, or a shipwreck, the action brought against the heir on account of the fraud of the deceased is for his share of the estate, and for simple damages, and it also must be brought within a year; but where it is brought against the heir himself it is granted for the entire amount, for double damages, and without reference to time.

Dig. 25,1,15Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do mem­bra­na­rum. Quod di­ci­tur im­pen­sas, quae in res do­ta­les ne­ces­sa­rio fac­tae sunt, do­tem de­mi­nue­re, ita in­ter­pre­tan­dum est, ut, si quid ex­tra tu­te­lam ne­ces­sa­riam in res do­ta­les im­pen­sum est, id in ea cau­sa sit: nam tue­ri res do­ta­les vir suo sump­tu de­bet. alio­quin tam ci­ba­ria do­ta­li­bus man­ci­piis da­ta et quae­vis mo­di­ca ae­di­fi­cio­rum do­ta­lium re­fec­tio et agro­rum quo­que cul­tu­ra do­tem mi­nuent: om­nia enim haec in spe­cie ne­ces­sa­ria­rum in­pen­sa­rum sunt. sed ip­sae res ita prae­sta­re in­tel­le­gun­tur, ut non tam in­pen­das in eas, quam de­duc­to eo mi­nus ex his per­ce­pis­se vi­dea­ris. quae au­tem im­pen­dia se­cun­dum eam di­stinc­tio­nem ex do­te de­du­ci de­beant, non tam fa­ci­le in uni­ver­sum de­fi­ni­ri, quam per sin­gu­la ex ge­ne­re et mag­ni­tu­di­ne in­pen­dio­rum aes­ti­ma­ri pos­sunt.

Neratius, Parchments, Book II. Where it is stated that necessary expenses incurred with reference to dotal property diminish the dowry, this must be understood to mean where anything is expended on such property over and above what is necessary for its preservation, that is to say, for its benefit. For a man should preserve dotal property at his own expense; otherwise, provisions furnished to dotal slaves, and any moderate repairs of buildings, or even the cultivation of the soil, would diminish the dowry; for all these things are included under the head of necessary expenses. The property itself, however, is understood to yield a certain income, so that you appear not to have expended money upon it, but, after having deducted the expenses, you have received a smaller return therefrom. It is not easy, generally speaking, to decide in accordance with this distinction what expenses should be deducted from the dowry, but they can be estimated in detail according to their nature and amount.

Dig. 29,2,59Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do mem­bra­na­rum. Qui pa­tri he­res ex­sti­tit si idem fi­lio im­pu­be­ri sub­sti­tu­tus est, non pot­est he­redi­ta­tem eius prae­ter­mit­te­re: quod sic re­ci­pien­dum est et­iam si vi­vo pu­pil­lo mor­tuus erit, de­in­de pu­pil­lus im­pu­bes de­ces­se­rit. nam is qui he­res ex­sti­te­rit pu­pil­lo quo­que he­res ne­ces­sa­rio erit: nam si ip­sum in­vi­tum ob­li­gat, con­iun­gi eam pa­ter­nae he­redi­ta­ti et ad­cres­cen­di iu­re ad­quiri cui­cum­que pa­tris he­redi ex­is­ti­man­dum est.

Neratius, Parchments, Book II. Where anyone becomes the heir of his father, and is also appointed the substitute of a child under the age of puberty, he cannot reject the estate of the latter. This must be understood to apply, even if the heir should die during the lifetime of the minor, and then the minor himself should die; for whoever becomes the heir will necessarily also be the heir of the minor. For if the second heir binds himself against his will, it must be held that the estate of the minor is united with that of the father, and, by the right of accrual, it is acquired by whoever becomes the heir of the father.

Ex libro III

Dig. 2,14,58Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Ab emp­tio­ne ven­di­tio­ne, lo­ca­tio­ne con­duc­tio­ne ce­te­ris­que si­mi­li­bus ob­li­ga­tio­ni­bus quin in­te­gris om­ni­bus con­sen­su eo­rum, qui in­ter se ob­li­ga­ti sint, re­ce­di pos­sit, du­bium non est. Aris­to­ni hoc am­plius vi­de­ba­tur, si ea, quae me ex emp­to prae­sta­re ti­bi opor­te­ret, prae­sti­tis­sem et cum tu mi­hi pre­tium de­be­res, con­ve­nis­set mi­hi te­cum, ut rur­sus prae­sti­tis mi­hi a te in re ven­di­ta om­ni­bus, quae ego ti­bi prae­sti­tis­sem, pre­tium mi­hi non da­res tu­que mi­hi ea prae­sti­tis­ses: pre­tium te de­be­re de­si­ne­re, quia bo­nae fi­dei, ad quam om­nia haec red­igun­tur, in­ter­pre­ta­tio hanc quo­que con­ven­tio­nem ad­mit­tit. nec quic­quam in­ter­est, utrum in­te­gris om­ni­bus, in quae ob­li­ga­ti es­se­mus, con­ve­ni­ret, ut ab eo neg­otio dis­ce­de­re­tur, an in in­te­grum re­sti­tu­tis his, quae ego ti­bi prae­sti­tis­sem, con­sen­ti­re­mus, ne quid tu mi­hi eo no­mi­ne prae­sta­res. il­lud pla­ne con­ven­tio­ne, quae per­ti­net ad resol­ven­dum id quod ac­tum est, per­fi­ci non pot­est, ut tu quod iam ego ti­bi prae­sti­ti con­tra prae­sta­re mi­hi co­ga­ris: quia eo mo­do non tam hoc agi­tur, ut a pris­ti­no neg­otio dis­ce­da­mus, quam ut no­vae quae­dam ob­li­ga­tio­nes in­ter nos con­sti­tuan­tur.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. There is no doubt that the parties can withdraw in all contracts relating to purchase, sale, leasing, hiring, and other similar obligations, where everything remains the same by the common consent of those who have bound themselves. The opinion of Aristo goes still farther, for he thinks that if I have performed all the acts which it was necessary for me to perform as vendor, with regard to the property sold to you; and, while you still owe me the purchase money, it is agreed between us that you shall restore to me everything relating to the property sold, which was delivered to you by me, and that you shall not pay the purchase money; and, in accordance with this, you do return it to me, you will cease to owe me the money; because good faith which governs matters of this kind admits of this interpretation and agreement. It does not matter whether the agreement is made to abandon the contract, all things as to which we bound ourselves remaining the same; or whether you return everything which I delivered to you, and we then agree that you shall not give me anything on account of the contract. It is certain that the following cannot be accomplished by a contract which has reference to annulling what has been done; that is, that you may be compelled to return to me what I have already given you; since, in this way, the business would be transacted not so much by annulling our former contract, as by creating new obligations between ourselves.

Dig. 6,2,17Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Pu­bli­cia­na ac­tio non id­eo com­pa­ra­ta est, ut res do­mi­no au­fe­ra­tur: eius­que rei ar­gu­men­tum est pri­mo ae­qui­tas, de­in­de ex­cep­tio ‘si ea res pos­ses­so­ris non sit’: sed ut is, qui bo­na fi­de emit pos­ses­sio­nem­que eius ex ea cau­sa nac­tus est, po­tius rem ha­beat.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. The Publician Action was not invented for the purpose of depriving the real owner of his property (and this is proved in the first place on equitable principles; and in the second place by the use of the exception: “If the property in dispute does not belong to the possessor”); but, for the reason that where a man purchases anything in good faith and has obtained possession of it, he, rather than his adversary, should be entitled to hold it.

Dig. 7,1,44Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Usu­fruc­tua­rius no­vum tec­to­rium pa­rie­ti­bus, qui ru­des fuis­sent, im­po­ne­re non pot­est, quia tam­et­si me­lio­rem ex­co­len­do ae­di­fi­cium do­mi­ni cau­sam fac­tu­rus es­set, non ta­men id iu­re suo fa­ce­re pot­est, aliud­que est tue­ri quod ac­ce­pis­set an no­vum fa­ce­ret.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. An usufructuary is not permitted to put fresh plaster on walls which are rough; because, even though by improving the house he would render the condition of the owner better, he cannot do this through any right of his own; for it is one thing for him to take care of what he has received, and another to do something new.

Dig. 10,2,54Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Ex he­redi­ta­te Lu­cii Ti­tii, quae mi­hi et ti­bi com­mu­nis erat, fun­di par­tem meam alie­na­vi, de­in­de fa­mi­liae er­cis­cun­dae iu­di­cium in­ter nos ac­cep­tum est. ne­que ea pars quae mea fuit in iu­di­cio ve­niet, cum alie­na­ta de he­redi­ta­te ex­ie­rit, ne­que tua, quia et­iam­si re­ma­net in pris­ti­no iu­re he­redi­ta­ria­que est, ta­men alie­na­tio­ne meae par­tis ex­it de com­mu­nio­ne. utrum au­tem unus he­res par­tem suam non alie­na­ve­rit an plu­res, ni­hil in­ter­est, si mo­do ali­qua por­tio alie­na­ta ab ali­quo ex he­redi­bus he­redi­ta­ria es­se de­siit.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. You and I were both joint heirs to the estate of Lucius Titius, and I sold my share of a tract of land belonging to the estate, and then an action for the partition of the estate was brought between us. In this instance, the share which was mine will not be included in the case, since when it was sold it was no longer a part of the estate; nor will your share be taken into consideration, because even if it remains in its former legal condition and belongs to the estate; still, by the sale of my share the ownership of it ceased to be common. Whether one heir does not sell his share or several do not do so, is of no importance; provided a certain portion which has been alienated by one of the heirs and has ceased to form part of the estate.

Dig. 19,1,31Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Si ea res, quam ex emp­to prae­sta­re de­be­bam, vi mi­hi ad­emp­ta fue­rit: quam­vis eam cus­to­di­re de­bue­rim, ta­men pro­pius est, ut ni­hil am­plius quam ac­tio­nes per­se­quen­dae eius prae­sta­ri a me emp­to­ri opor­teat, quia cus­to­dia ad­ver­sus vim pa­rum pro­fi­cit. ac­tio­nes au­tem eas non so­lum ar­bi­trio, sed et­iam pe­ri­cu­lo tuo ti­bi prae­sta­re de­be­bo, ut om­ne lu­crum ac dis­pen­dium te se­qua­tur. 1Et non so­lum quod ip­se per eum ad­quisii prae­sta­re de­beo, sed et id, quod emp­tor iam tunc si­bi tra­di­to ser­vo ad­quisi­tu­rus fuis­set. 2Uter­que nos­trum ean­dem rem emit a non do­mi­no, cum emp­tio ven­di­tio­que si­ne do­lo ma­lo fie­ret, tra­di­ta­que est: si­ve ab eo­dem emi­mus si­ve ab alio at­que alio, is ex no­bis tuen­dus est, qui prior ius eius ad­pre­hen­dit, hoc est, cui pri­mum tra­di­ta est. si al­ter ex no­bis a do­mi­no emis­set, is om­ni­mo­do tuen­dus est.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. If the property which I am obliged to deliver in accordance with the contract of sale is taken from me by force, although I am required to be responsible for its safe-keeping, it is still more proper that I should only be required to transfer to the purchaser my rights of action for the recovery of said property; because its safe custody is of very little advantage where violence is employed. I should assign to you not only the rights of action which relate to profit, but also such as have reference to loss, so that you may obtain all the gain as well as be responsible for the expense. 1I should assign to you not only what I myself have acquired by means of the said property, but also what the purchaser would have acquired if the slave had been delivered to him at once. 2Ad Dig. 19,1,31,2Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 199, Note 13.Two of us purchased the same property from a party who was not the owner, the purchase and sale were concluded without bad faith. and the property was delivered. Whether we both made the purchase from the same person, or from two different ones, he must be protected who first acquired his right; that is to say, the one to whom delivery was first made. Where one of two parties makes a purchase from the owner of the property, he must by all means be protected.

Dig. 23,3,53Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Cum vir uxo­ri do­na­re vel­let, de­bi­tor mu­lie­ris qui sol­ven­do non erat do­tem ei pro­mi­sit. ad id dum­ta­xat, ad quod sol­ven­do fuit, vi­ri pe­ri­cu­lo ea res est: et si quid de­bi­to­ri ad sol­ven­dum fa­cul­ta­tis ac­ces­se­rit, pe­ri­cu­lum ad eam sum­mam quae ac­ces­se­rit cres­cet per­ma­ne­bit­que et­iam, si rur­sus pau­pe­rior fac­tus erit: quia ne­que tum, cum dos pro­mit­te­re­tur, do­na­tio fac­ta est ni­si eius pe­cu­niae quae a de­bi­to­re ser­va­ri non pot­erat, ne­que cum sol­ven­do is es­se coe­pit, do­na­tio­nis cau­sa per­ma­neat, cum eo lo­co res sit, quo es­set, si tum quo­que, cum pro­mit­te­re­tur dos, lo­cu­ples fuis­set.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. A man wished to make a present to his wife, and a debtor of hers, who was not solvent, promised her a dowry. The husband will only be responsible to the extent that the debtor was solvent, and if the latter should acquire anything which might enable him to meet his obligations, the responsibility will increase in proportion to the amount which he acquired. And it will continue to exist, even if he afterwards became more indigent because when the dowry was promised, the donation consisted only of what could not be collected from the debtor, and when the latter became solvent, the obligation still persisted, on account of the donation; since the matter is in the same condition as it would be if the debtor had been wealthy at the time when the dowry was promised.

Dig. 40,7,17Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Si de­cem he­redi de­dis­set, ius­sus est li­ber es­se: de­cem ha­bet et tan­tun­dem do­mi­no de­bet: dan­do haec de­cem non li­be­ra­bi­tur. nam quod sta­tu­li­be­ro ex pe­cu­lio suo da­re ex­plen­dae con­di­cio­nis cau­sa con­ces­sum est, ita in­ter­pre­ta­ri de­be­mus, ut non et­iam ex eo da­re pos­sit, quod ex­tra pe­cu­lium est. nec me prae­terit hos num­mos pe­cu­lia­res pos­se di­ci, quam­vis, si ni­hil prae­ter­ea ser­vus ha­beat, pe­cu­lium nul­lum sit. sed du­bi­ta­ri non opor­tet, quin haec mens fue­rit id con­sti­tuen­tium, ut qua­si ex pa­tri­mo­nio suo dan­di eo no­mi­ne ser­vo po­tes­tas es­set, quia id ma­xi­me si­ne in­iu­ria do­mi­no­rum con­ce­di vi­de­ba­tur. quod si ul­tra quis pro­gre­die­tur, non mul­tum ab­erit, quin et­iam eos num­mos, quos do­mi­no sub­ri­pue­rit, dan­do sta­tu­li­be­rum con­di­cio­ni sa­tis­fac­tu­rum ex­is­ti­met.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. A slave is ordered to be free if he pays ten aurei to the heir. He has the amount, but he owes an equal sum to his master. He will not be free by payment of these ten aurei, because where a slave is permitted to pay money out of his peculium for the purpose of complying with a condition, we must understand this to mean that he must not pay what does not belong to his peculium. I am perfectly aware that this money can be said to form part of his peculium; although if the slave had nothing else, he would have no peculium. But it cannot be doubted that the intention of those who established the rule was that the slave should have the power of making payment out of his peculium, just as out of his patrimony, because this could be conceded as being done without any injury to his master. If, however, anyone should go farther, the case would not differ much from one where a person might hold that the slave complied with the condition by the payment of money which he had stolen from his master.

Dig. 43,20,6Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. De in­ter­dic­to de aqua aes­ti­va, item cot­ti­dia­na quae­ren­tes pri­mum con­sti­tuen­dum ex­is­ti­ma­ba­mus, quae es­set aqua aes­ti­va, de qua pro­prium in­ter­dic­tum ad prio­ris aes­ta­tis tem­pus re­la­tum red­di so­let, hoc est aes­ti­va aqua utrum­ne ex iu­re aes­ti­vo dum­ta­xat tem­po­re uten­di di­ce­re­tur, an ex men­te pro­pos­i­to­que du­cen­tis, quod aes­ta­te eam du­cen­di con­si­lium ha­be­ret, an ex na­tu­ra ip­sius aquae, quod aes­ta­te tan­tum du­ci pot­est, an ex uti­li­ta­te lo­co­rum, in quae du­ce­re­tur. pla­ce­bat igi­tur aquam ob has duas res, na­tu­ram suam uti­li­ta­tem­que lo­co­rum in quae de­du­ci­tur, pro­prie ap­pel­la­ri, ita ut, si­ve eius na­tu­ra erit, ut ni­si aes­ta­te du­ci non pos­sit, et­iam­si hie­me quo­que de­si­de­ra­re­tur, si­ve om­ni tem­po­re an­ni du­ci eam ip­sius na­tu­ra per­mit­te­ret, si uti­li­tas per­so­nis, in quam du­ci­tur, aes­ta­te dum­ta­xat usum eius ex­ige­ret, aes­ti­va rec­te di­ce­re­tur.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. While we are examining the interdicts which have reference to water used during the summer, we think that we should first determine what summer water is, concerning which an interdict is usually granted relating to the preceding season; that is to say, whether summer water should be decided to be such as one only has a right to use during the summer, whether the intention of him who has the right to conduct it during that season ought to be taken into account; whether this designation depends upon the nature of the water itself, which can only be conducted during the summer; or whether the advantage to the places to which it is conducted should be considered. Hence it was held that the water was properly so called on account of two things; namely, its nature, and the benefit of the land upon which it is conveyed; so that if its nature is such that it can only be conducted during the summer, even though it is also desired to do this during the winter; or if its nature permits it to be conducted during any season of the year, and the benefit to the places where it is taken only requires its use during the summer by the persons entitled to it, it is very properly called summer water.

Dig. 46,7,16Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Ex iu­di­ca­tum sol­vi sti­pu­la­tio­ne ob rem non de­fen­sam cum uno ex fi­de­ius­so­ri­bus age­re vo­lo: is, quod pro par­te eius fit, sol­ve­re mi­hi pa­ra­tus est: non de­bet mi­hi in eum da­ri iu­di­cium. ne­que enim ae­quum est aut iu­di­cio de­strin­gi aut ad in­fi­tia­tio­nem com­pel­li eum, qui si­ne iu­di­ce da­re pa­ra­tus est, quo non am­plius ad­ver­sa­rius eius per iu­di­cem ab eo con­se­cu­tu­rus est.

Ad Dig. 46,7,16Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 479, Note 10.Neratius, Parchments, Book III. When I desire to institute proceedings against one of several sureties, under a stipulation to pay the judgment because the case has not been defended, and the surety is ready to pay his share, judgment should not be rendered in my favor against him. For it is not just for him. to be annoyed by an action, or be compelled to interpose a denial, where he is ready to pay what he owes without a judgment by which his adversary could not compel him to pay a larger sum.

Dig. 50,1,9Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio mem­bra­na­rum. Eius, qui ius­tum pa­trem non ha­bet, pri­ma ori­go a ma­tre eo­que die, quo ex ea edi­tus est, nu­me­ra­ri de­bet.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. He who has not a legitimate father derives his origin from his mother, which should be reckoned from the day on which he was born.

Ex libro IV

Dig. 44,1,21Ne­ra­tius li­bro quar­to mem­bra­na­rum. Rei ma­io­ris pe­cu­niae prae­iu­di­cium fie­ri vi­de­tur, cum ea quaes­tio in iu­di­cium de­du­ci­tur, quae vel to­ta vel ex ali­qua par­te com­mu­nis est quaes­tio­ni de re ma­io­ri.

Neratius, Parchments, Book IV. One action is said to prejudge another, with reference to a larger sum of money, when a question arises in court which is connected either wholly, or in part, with a suit involving a larger amount of property.

Dig. 44,4,11Ne­ra­tius li­bro quar­to mem­bra­na­rum. Si pro­cu­ra­tor agit, de do­lo eius ex­ci­pi non de­bet, quia alie­na lis est is­que rei ex­tra­neus, ne­que alie­nus do­lus no­ce­re al­te­ri de­bet. si post li­tem con­tes­ta­tam do­lo quid fe­ce­rit, an ex­cep­tio eo no­mi­ne in iu­di­cium ob­icien­da sit, du­bi­ta­ri pot­est, quia li­tis con­tes­ta­tio­ne res pro­cu­ra­to­ris fit eam­que suo iam quo­dam­mo­do no­mi­ne ex­equi­tur. et pla­cet de pro­cu­ra­to­ris do­lo ex­ci­pien­dum es­se. idem de tu­to­re, qui pu­pil­li no­mi­ne aget, di­cen­dum est. 1In uni­ver­sum au­tem haec in ea re re­gu­la se­quen­da est, ut do­lus om­ni­mo­do pu­nia­tur, et­si non ali cui, sed ip­si, qui eum ad­mi­sit, dam­no­sus fu­tu­rus erit.

Neratius, Parchments, Book IV. Where an agent brings an action, an exception based on his bad faith should not be interposed against him, because the suit is that of another, and he is a stranger to it, and the bad faith of one person should not injure another. If he commits a fraudulent act after issue has been joined, it may be doubted whether an exception on this ground can be pleaded; because, by the trial of the case, it becomes that of the agent, and he conducts it, to some extent, in his own name. It has been decided that an exception can be pleaded on account of fraud committed by the agent. The same rule will apply to the case of a guardian who brings an action in the name of his ward. 1In general, however, the following rule should be observed in matters of this kind, that is to say, that fraud should always be punished, even if it will not injure anyone but the person who committed it.

Dig. 46,6,11Ne­ra­tius li­bro quar­to mem­bra­na­rum. Cum rem sal­vam fo­re pu­pil­lo ca­ve­tur, com­mit­ti­tur sti­pu­la­tio, si, quod ex tu­te­la da­ri fie­ri opor­tet, non prae­ste­tur: nam et si sal­va ei res sit, ob id non est, quia, quod ex tu­te­la da­ri fie­ri opor­tet, non sol­vi­tur.

Neratius, Parchments, Book IV. When security is furnished to a ward for the preservation of his property, the stipulation will become operative if anything which should be given or done on account of the guardianship is not executed. For although the property itself may be secure, it is not so where something which should be paid or done on account of the guardianship is not carried into effect.

Ex libro V

Dig. 17,1,35Ne­ra­tius li­bro quin­to mem­bra­na­rum. Si fun­dum, qui ex par­te tuus est, man­da­vi ti­bi ut eme­res mi­hi, ve­rum est man­da­tum pos­se ita con­sis­te­re, ut mi­hi ce­te­ris par­ti­bus red­emp­tis et­iam tuam par­tem prae­sta­re de­beas. sed si qui­dem cer­to pre­tio emen­das eas man­da­ve­rim, quan­ti­cum­que alio­rum par­tes red­eme­ris, sic et tua pars co­ar­ta­bi­tur, ut non ab­un­det man­da­ti quan­ti­ta­tem, in quam ti­bi emen­dum to­tum man­da­vi: sin au­tem nul­lo cer­to pre­tio con­sti­tu­to eme­re ti­bi man­da­ve­rim tu­que ex di­ver­sis pre­tiis par­tes ce­te­ro­rum red­eme­ris, et tuam par­tem vi­ri bo­ni ar­bi­tra­tu aes­ti­ma­to pre­tio da­ri opor­tet,

Neratius, Parchments, Book V. If I directed you to purchase for me a tract of land in which you have a share, it is true that, in compliance with this mandate, you are also required to deliver me your share, after the remaining shares have been purchased. If, however, I should direct you to purchase the said shares at a certain price, and you have bought some of them at any price whatsoever, your share of the proceeds will be subject to diminution, so that the total amount will not exceed that for which I directed the property to be purchased. But if I directed you to make the purchase without fixing any price, and you buy the shares of the other parties at different prices, you should also sell your shares for a sum which would be approved by the judgment of a good citizen.

Dig. 18,3,5Ne­ra­tius li­bro quin­to mem­bra­na­rum. Le­ge fun­do ven­di­to dic­ta, ut, si in­tra cer­tum tem­pus pre­tium so­lu­tum non sit, res in­emp­ta sit, de fruc­ti­bus, quos in­ter­im emp­tor per­ce­pis­set, hoc agi in­tel­le­gen­dum est, ut emp­tor in­ter­im eos si­bi suo quo­que iu­re per­ci­pe­ret: sed si fun­dus re­ve­nis­set, Aris­to ex­is­ti­ma­bat ven­di­to­ri de his iu­di­cium in emp­to­rem dan­dum es­se, quia ni­hil pe­nes eum re­si­de­re opor­te­ret ex re, in qua fi­dem fe­fel­lis­set.

Neratius, Parchments, Book V. Where it is stated in the contract for the sale of land that if the price is not paid within a certain time, the property will not be considered sold; it must be understood to be the intention that the purchaser shall, in the meantime, be entitled to the crops of said land, but if it is restored to the vendor, Aristo is of the opinion that an action for the recovery of the crops should be granted to him against the purchaser, because nothing derived from the property should remain in the hands of the party who has not complied with his contract.

Dig. 22,6,2Ne­ra­tius li­bro quin­to mem­bra­na­rum. In om­ni par­te er­ror in iu­re non eo­dem lo­co quo fac­ti igno­ran­tia ha­be­ri de­be­bit, cum ius fi­ni­tum et pos­sit es­se et de­beat, fac­ti in­ter­pre­ta­tio ple­rum­que et­iam pru­den­tis­si­mos fal­lat.

Neratius, Parchments, Book V. Error in law should not, in every instance, be considered to correspond with ignorance of the fact; since the law can, and should be definitely settled, but the interpretation of the fact very frequently deceives even the wisest men.

Dig. 24,1,44Ne­ra­tius li­bro quin­to mem­bra­na­rum. Si ex­tra­neus rem vi­ri igno­rans eius es­se igno­ran­ti uxo­ri, ac ne vi­ro qui­dem scien­te eam suam es­se, do­na­ve­rit, mu­lier rec­te eam usu­ca­piet. idem­que iu­ris erit, si is, qui in po­tes­ta­te vi­ri erat, cre­dens se pa­trem fa­mi­lias es­se uxo­ri pa­tris do­na­ve­rit. sed si vir re­scie­rit suam rem es­se, prius­quam usu­ca­pia­tur, vin­di­ca­re­que eam pot­erit nec vo­let et hoc et mu­lier no­ve­rit, in­ter­rum­pe­tur pos­ses­sio, quia trans­iit in cau­sam ab eo fac­tae do­na­tio­nis. ip­sius mu­lie­ris scien­tia pro­pius est, ut nul­lum ad­quisi­tio­ni do­mi­nii eius ad­fe­rat im­pe­d­imen­tum: non enim om­ni­mo­do uxo­res ex bo­nis vi­ro­rum, sed ex cau­sa do­na­tio­nis ab ip­sis fac­tae ad­quire­re pro­hi­bi­tae sunt.

Ad Dig. 24,1,44Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 365, Note 5.Neratius, Parchments, Book V. Where a stranger gives property belonging to a husband to the wife of the latter, both of them being ignorant of this fact, and where the husband also does not know that he has donated property belonging to himself, the woman can lawfully acquire said property by usucaption. The same rule of law will apply where anyone who is under the control of the husband, believing himself to be independent, makes a gift to his father’s wife. If, however, the husband should ascertain that the property was his before its title by usucaption vests, he can recover it, and her possession will be interrupted; even though the husband does not wish for this to be done, and the woman becomes aware that it is his; because this is an instance where the woman herself knows that the donation was made by her husband. It is more proper to hold that no impediment to the acquisition of the ownership of the property by her exists; for women are not absolutely prohibited from acquiring the property of their husbands, except where donations are made to them by the latter.

Dig. 30,124Ne­ra­tius li­bro quin­to mem­bra­na­rum. Si he­redes no­mi­na­tim enu­me­ra­ti da­re quid dam­na­ti sunt, pro­pius est, ut vi­ri­les par­tes de­beant, quia per­so­na­rum enu­me­ra­tio hunc ef­fec­tum ha­bet, ut exae­quen­tur in le­ga­to prae­stan­do, qui, si no­mi­na­ti non es­sent, he­redi­ta­rias par­tes de­bi­tu­ri es­sent.

Ad Dig. 30,124Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. III, § 626, Note 11.Neratius, Parchments, Book V. If heirs who are expressly mentioned are charged with the delivery of property, it is more reasonable to suppose that they are charged with equal portions, because the enumeration of the persons has the effect to make them all equally liable for the payment of the legacy, for, if they had not been expressly mentioned, they would be liable only for their respective shares in the estate.

Dig. 41,1,14Ne­ra­tius li­bro quin­to mem­bra­na­rum. Quod in li­to­re quis ae­di­fi­ca­ve­rit, eius erit: nam li­to­ra pu­bli­ca non ita sunt, ut ea, quae in pa­tri­mo­nio sunt po­pu­li, sed ut ea, quae pri­mum a na­tu­ra pro­di­ta sunt et in nul­lius ad­huc do­mi­nium per­ve­ne­runt: nec dis­si­mi­lis con­di­cio eo­rum est at­que pis­cium et fe­ra­rum, quae si­mul at­que ad­pre­hen­sae sunt, si­ne du­bio eius, in cu­ius po­tes­ta­tem per­ve­ne­runt, do­mi­nii fiunt. 1Il­lud vi­den­dum est, sub­la­to ae­di­fi­cio, quod in li­to­re po­si­tum erat, cu­ius con­di­cio­nis is lo­cus sit, hoc est utrum ma­neat eius cu­ius fuit ae­di­fi­cium, an rur­sus in pris­ti­nam cau­sam rec­ci­dit per­in­de­que pu­bli­cus sit, ac si num­quam in eo ae­di­fi­ca­tum fuis­set. quod pro­pius est, ut ex­is­ti­ma­ri de­beat, si mo­do re­ci­pit pris­ti­nam li­to­ris spe­ciem.

The Same, Parchments, Book V. Whatever anyone builds upon the shore of the sea will belong to him; for the shores of the sea are not public like the property which forms part of the patrimony of the people, but resembles that which was formed in the first place by Nature, and has not yet been subjected to the ownership of anyone. For their condition is not dissimilar to that of fish and wild animals, which, as soon as they are taken, undoubtedly become the property of him under whose control they have been brought. 1Where a building which has been erected upon the seashore is removed, it should be considered what the condition of the ground on which it was situated is, that is to say whether it will remain the property of him to whom the building belonged, or whether it will revert to its former condition and again become public; just as if it had never been built upon. The latter should be deemed the better opinion, provided it remains in its former condition as a part of the shore.

Dig. 41,10,5Ne­ra­tius li­bro quin­to mem­bra­na­rum. Usu­ca­pio re­rum, et­iam ex aliis cau­sis con­ces­sa in­ter­im, prop­ter ea, quae nos­tra ex­is­ti­man­tes pos­si­de­re­mus, con­sti­tu­ta est, ut ali­quis li­tium fi­nis es­set. 1Sed id, quod quis, cum suum es­se ex­is­ti­ma­ret, pos­se­de­rit, usu­ca­piet, et­iam­si fal­sa fue­rit eius ex­is­ti­ma­tio. quod ta­men ita in­ter­pre­tan­dum est, ut pro­ba­bi­lis er­ror pos­si­den­tis usu­ca­pio­ni non ob­stet, vel­uti si ob id ali­quid pos­si­deam, quod ser­vum meum aut eius, cu­ius in lo­cum he­redi­ta­rio iu­re suc­ces­si, emis­se id fal­so ex­is­ti­mem, quia in alie­ni fac­ti igno­ran­tia to­le­ra­bi­lis er­ror est.

Neratius, Parchments, Book V. The usucaption of property which we have obtained for other reasons than because we think that we are entitled to it as our own has been established in order to put an end to litigation. 1A person can acquire by usucaption the property of which he has possession, thinking that it belongs to him; even if this opinion is false. This, however, should be understood to mean that a plausible error of the party in possession does not interfere with his right to usucaption; for instance, if I possess some article because I erroneously think that my slave, or the slave of someone whom I have succeeded as heir at law, purchased it, as ignorance of the act of another is an excusable mistake.

Dig. 47,10,41Ne­ra­tius li­bro quin­to mem­bra­na­rum. Pa­ter, cu­ius fi­lio fac­ta est in­iu­ria, non est im­pe­dien­dus, quo mi­nus duo­bus iu­di­ciis et suam in­iu­riam per­se­qua­tur et fi­lii.

Neratius, Parchments, Book III. A father, against whose son an injury has been committed, should not be prevented from bringing suit for his own injury and that of his son, by two different proceedings.

Ex libro VI

Dig. 1,3,21Ne­ra­tius li­bro VI mem­bra­na­rum. et id­eo ra­tio­nes eo­rum, quae con­sti­tuun­tur, in­qui­ri non opor­tet: alio­quin mul­ta ex his quae cer­ta sunt sub­ver­tun­tur.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VI. Hence it is not necessary to seek for the reasons of those laws which have been established; otherwise many rules which are based upon the same and which are now accepted, will be overthrown.

Dig. 12,6,41Ne­ra­tius li­bro sex­to mem­bra­na­rum. Quod pu­pil­lus si­ne tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­ta­te sti­pu­lan­ti pro­mi­se­rit sol­ve­rit, re­pe­ti­tio est, quia nec na­tu­ra de­bet.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VI. Where a ward, without the consent of his guardian, promises in a stipulation to make payment and does so, he will have a right of action for recovery; for the reason that he did not owe the money even under natural law.

Dig. 21,2,48Ne­ra­tius li­bro sex­to mem­bra­na­rum. Cum fun­dus ‘uti op­ti­mus ma­xi­mus­que est’ emp­tus est et ali­cu­ius ser­vi­tu­tis evic­tae no­mi­ne ali­quid emp­tor a ven­di­to­re con­se­cu­tus est, de­in­de to­tus fun­dus evin­ci­tur, ob eam evic­tio­nem id prae­sta­ri de­bet quod ex du­plo re­li­quum est: nam si aliud ob­ser­va­bi­mus, ser­vi­tu­ti­bus ali­qui­bus et mox pro­prie­ta­te evic­ta am­plius du­plo emp­tor quam quan­ti emit con­se­que­re­tur.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VI. Where a tract of land is bought as being absolutely unincumbered, and the purchaser obtains anything from the vendor on account of some servitude to which the land was subject, and afterwards the entire tract is evicted, the vendor should refund the amount remaining from the double damages, on account of said eviction. For, if we do not observe this rule, the vendor can recover more than double the sum paid for the land, in case of eviction; in the first place, on account of certain servitudes, and afterwards on the ground of ownership.

Dig. 25,1,16Idem li­bro sex­to mem­bra­na­rum. Et an­te om­nia quae­cum­que in­pen­sae quae­ren­do­rum fruc­tuum cau­sa fac­tae erunt, quam­quam eae­dem et­iam co­len­di cau­sa fiant id­eo­que non so­lum ad per­ci­pien­dos fruc­tus, sed et­iam ad con­ser­van­dam ip­sam rem spe­ciem­que eius ne­ces­sa­riae sint, eas vir ex suo fa­cit nec ul­lam ha­bet eo no­mi­ne ex do­te de­duc­tio­nem.

The Same, Parchments, Book VI. And, by all means, any expenses incurred by the husband in harvesting the crops must be paid by him out of his own purse, even though these expenses may have been incurred for the purpose of cultivating the land; and therefore not only those made in gathering the crops are included but also such as are necessary for preserving the property itself, and the husband is entitled to no deduction from the dowry on this account.

Dig. 37,10,9Ne­ra­tius li­bro sex­to mem­bra­na­rum. Quod La­beo scri­bit, quo­tiens sup­po­si­tus es­se di­ci­tur pu­pil­lus, cum quo de pa­tris eius he­redi­ta­te con­tro­ver­sia est, cu­ra­re prae­to­rem de­be­re, ut is in pos­ses­sio­ne sit: de eo pu­to eum vel­le in­tel­le­gi, qui post mor­tem pa­tris fa­mi­liae, qui se si­ne li­be­ris de­ce­de­re cre­di­dit, fi­lius eius es­se di­ci coe­pit: nam eius, qui ad­gni­tus est ab eo, de cu­ius bo­nis quae­ri­tur, ius­tior in ea re cau­sa est quam pos­tu­mi.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VI. Labeo stated that whenever a minor is said to be supposititious, and a controversy arises with reference to his right to his father’s estate, the Prætor should be careful to place him in possession of the same. I think that Labeo intended this to be applicable to a child born after the death of his father, who alleges that he was his son, even though the deceased thought that he had no children; for he who has been acknowledged by the person whose estate is in dispute has a more equitable claim to it than a posthumous child.

Dig. 39,2,47Ne­ra­tius li­bro sex­to mem­bra­na­rum. Quod con­cla­ve bi­na­rum ae­dium do­mi­nus ex aliis ae­di­bus in alia­rum usum con­ver­tit, non so­lum si con­tig­na­tio, qua id sus­ti­ne­bi­tur, orie­tur ex par­te ea­rum ae­dium, in qua­rum usum con­ver­sum erit, ea­rum fiet, sed et­iam si trans­ver­sa con­tig­na­tio to­ta in alia­rum ae­dium pa­rie­ti­bus se­de­bit. sed et La­beo in li­bris pos­te­rio­rum scri­bit bi­na­rum ae­dium do­mi­num utris­que por­ti­cum su­per­po­suis­se in­que eam ad­itu ex al­te­ris ae­di­bus da­to al­te­ras ae­des ser­vi­tu­te one­ris por­ti­cus ser­van­dae im­po­si­ta ven­di­dis­se: to­tam por­ti­cum ea­rum ae­dium es­se, quas re­ti­nuis­set, cum per lon­gi­tu­di­nem utrius­que do­mus ex­ten­sa es­set trans­ver­sae con­tig­na­tio­ni, quae ab utra­que par­te pa­rie­ti­bus do­mus, quae venis­set, sus­ti­ne­re­tur. nec ta­men con­se­quens est, ut su­pe­rior pars ae­di­fi­cii, quae nul­li con­iunc­ta sit ne­que ad­itum ali­un­de ha­beat, al­te­rius sit, quam cu­ius est id cui su­per­po­si­ta est.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VI. If the owner of two houses restricts the use of a passage which had been common to both of them, to one alone, it will only belong to the house to whose use it has been restricted, not only where the timbers by which it is supported form part of it, but even where they all rest upon the walls of another building. Moreover, Labeo, in his Last Works, says, where the owner of two houses built a portico attached to both of them, and made an opening to one of the houses from said portico, and then sold the other house, after imposing upon it the servitude of supporting the portico, that the entire portico will belong to the house which the vendor retained; even though it may extend the entire length of both houses, and is crossed by timbers supported on both sides by the walls of the house which was sold. He, however, says that this rule will not apply when the upper part of the building, which is not joined to the portico, and has no other entrance, belongs to another house than the one by which the portico is supported.

Ex libro VII

Dig. 5,3,57Ne­ra­tius li­bro sep­ti­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Cum idem ean­dem he­redi­ta­tem ad­ver­sus duos de­fen­dit et se­cun­dum al­te­rum ex his iu­di­ca­tum est, quae­ri so­let, utrum per­in­de ei he­redi­ta­tem re­sti­tui opor­teat, at­que opor­te­ret, si ad­ver­sus alium de­fen­sa non es­set: ut sci­li­cet si mox et se­cun­dum alium fue­rit iu­di­ca­tum, ab­sol­va­tur is cum quo ac­tum est, quia ne­que pos­si­deat ne­que do­lo ma­lo fe­ce­rit, quo mi­nus pos­si­de­ret quod iu­di­cio re­vic­tus re­sti­tue­rit: an quia pos­sit et se­cun­dum alium iu­di­ca­ri, non ali­ter re­sti­tue­re de­beat quam si cau­tum ei fue­rit, quod ad­ver­sus alium ean­dem he­redi­ta­tem de­fen­dit. sed me­lius est of­fi­cio iu­di­cis cau­tio­ne vel sa­tis­da­tio­ne vic­to mede­ri, cum et res sal­va sit ei, qui in ex­se­cu­tio­ne tar­dior venit ad­ver­sus prio­rem vic­to­rem.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VII. Where the same party defends two actions against the same estate, and judgment is rendered in favor of one of them, the question sometimes arises whether the estate should then be surrendered to him who gained the suit, just as would have been done if no defence had been made against the other; so that, in fact, if judgment should afterwards be rendered in favor of the other party, the defendant would be released from liability; since he was neither in possession, nor had acted fraudulently to avoid being in possession, as he had surrendered the property when he lost the case; or because it was possible that the other plaintiff might be able to obtain a decision in his favor, the defendant should not be obliged to surrender the estate unless security is given him, for the reason that he was compelled to defend the action for recovery of the estate against the other party. The better opinion is that it should be the judge’s duty to come to the relief of the defeated party by security or a bond, since in that way the property remains for the benefit of him who is slow in asserting his rights against the successful plaintiff who preceded him.

Dig. 15,3,18Ne­ra­tius li­bro sep­ti­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Quam­vis in eam rem pro ser­vo meo fi­de­ius­se­ris, quae ita con­trac­ta est, ut in rem meam ver­sa­re­tur (vel­uti si, cum ser­vus fru­men­tum emis­set quo fa­mi­lia ale­re­tur, ven­di­to­ri fru­men­ti fi­de­ius­se­ris), pro­pius est ta­men, ut de pe­cu­lio eo no­mi­ne, non de in rem ver­so age­re pos­sis, ut unius dum­ta­xat in quo­quo con­trac­tu de in rem ver­so sit ac­tio, qui id ip­sum cre­di­dit quod in rem do­mi­ni ver­sum est.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VII. Although you have become surety for my slave in a contract which was made with reference to my business, for example, if where a slave had purchased grain for the maintenance of the entire body of slaves, you gave security to the vendor of the grain; still, the better opinion is that you may bring the action De peculio on this account, but not an action based on the employment of property in the affairs of another; so that an action on the latter ground will lie in any contract solely in favor of the person who loaned the very property which has been employed in the affairs of the matter.

Dig. 17,1,39Ne­ra­tius li­bro sep­ti­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Et Aris­to­ni et Cel­so pa­tri pla­cuit pos­se rem hac con­di­cio­ne de­po­ni man­da­tum­que sus­ci­pi, ut res pe­ri­cu­lo eius sit qui de­po­si­tum vel man­da­tum sus­ce­pit: quod et mi­hi ve­rum es­se vi­de­tur.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VII. It was held by both Aristo and Celsus, the father, that property could be deposited, and the performance of a mandate assumed, under the following condition, namely: “That the property should be at the risk of the party who received the deposit, or undertook the performance of the mandate.” This appears to me to be correct.

Dig. 36,3,13Ne­ra­tius li­bro sep­ti­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Ei quo­que, cui le­ga­to­rum ac­tio da­tur in eum, qui prae­ter­mis­sa in­sti­tu­tio­ne ab in­tes­ta­to pos­si­det he­redi­ta­tem, le­ga­to­rum sa­tis­da­tur et, ni­si sa­tis­da­bi­tur, in pos­ses­sio­nem le­ga­to­rum ser­van­do­rum cau­sa mit­ti­tur: nam haec quo­que prae­tor per­in­de sal­va es­se vult at­que ea quae iu­re ci­vi­li de­ben­tur. idem Aris­to­ni pla­cet.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VII. Security may also be given for the payment of legacies to him to whom an action is granted on account of said legacies as against one who, having rejected his appointment as heir, has acquired the estate on the ground of intestacy; and, unless security is furnished, he will be placed in possession of it for the purpose of preserving the legacies, as the Prætor desires them to be secure, just as in the case of those due under the Civil Law. Aristo holds the same opinion.

Dig. 41,3,41Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Si rem sub­rep­tam mi­hi pro­cu­ra­tor meus ad­pre­hen­dit, quam­vis per pro­cu­ra­to­rem pos­ses­sio­nem apis­ci nos iam fe­re con­ve­niat, ni­hi­lo ma­gis eam in po­tes­ta­tem meam red­is­se usu­que ca­pi pos­se ex­is­ti­man­dum est, quia con­tra sta­tui cap­tio­sum erit.

The Same, Parchments, Book VII. If my agent recovers property which has been stolen from me, although, generally speaking, it is now almost conclusively settled that we can obtain possession by means of an agent, the property, nevertheless, will not again come under my control so that it can be acquired by usucaption, because to decide otherwise would be fallacious.

Dig. 44,2,27Ne­ra­tius li­bro sep­ti­mo mem­bra­na­rum. Cum de hoc, an ea­dem res est, quae­ri­tur, haec spec­tan­da sunt: per­so­nae, id ip­sum de quo agi­tur, cau­sa pro­xi­ma ac­tio­nis. nec iam in­ter­est, qua ra­tio­ne quis eam cau­sam ac­tio­nis com­pe­te­re si­bi ex­is­ti­mas­set, per­in­de ac si quis, post­ea­quam con­tra eum iu­di­ca­tum es­set, no­va in­stru­men­ta cau­sae suae rep­pe­ris­set.

Neratius, Parchments, Book VII. When, in a second action, the question arises whether the property is the same as that which was the object of the first one, the following things must be considered: first, the parties interested; second, the property for which suit was brought; and third, the immediate cause of action. For now it is of no consequence whether anyone believes that he has a good cause of action, any more than if, after judgment had been rendered against him, he should find new documents to strengthen his case.

Responsorum libri

Ex libro I

Dig. 15,1,55Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. Is cum quo de pe­cu­lio age­bam a te vi ex­emp­tus est: quod tunc cum vi ex­ime­res in pe­cu­lio fue­rit, spec­ta­ri.

Neratius, Opinions, Book I. He whom I was suing on the peculium was forcibly carried away by you; what was the peculium at the time that you removed him by force must be considered.

Dig. 16,3,30Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. Si fi­de­ius­sor pro te apud quem de­po­si­tum est li­tis aes­ti­ma­tio­ne dam­na­tus sit, rem tuam fie­ri.

Neratius, Opinions, Book I. If your surety has judgment rendered against him for damages on account of property deposited with you, the said property becomes yours.

Dig. 19,5,6Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. In­su­lam hoc mo­do, ut aliam in­su­lam re­fi­ce­res, ven­di­di. re­spon­dit nul­lam es­se ven­di­tio­nem, sed ci­vi­li in­ten­tio­ne in­cer­ti agen­dum est.

Neratius, Opinions, Book I. I sold you a house on condition that you would repair another. The opinion was given that there was no sale, but that a civil action could be brought for an uncertain amount of damages.

Dig. 26,7,52Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. Cu­ra­tor pro mi­no­re non tan­tum do­tem da­re de­bet, sed et­iam im­pen­dia, quae ad nup­tias fa­cien­da sunt.

Neratius, Opinions, Book I. A curator not only should give a dowry for a minor, but should also pay the expenses incurred by the marriage.

Dig. 38,1,50Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. Ope­ra­rum edi­tio­nem pen­de­re ex ex­is­ti­ma­tio­ne eden­tis: nam dig­ni­ta­ti fa­cul­ta­ti­bus con­sue­tu­di­ni ar­ti­fi­cio eius con­ve­nien­tes eden­das. 1Non so­lum au­tem li­ber­tum, sed et­iam alium quem­li­bet ope­ras eden­tem alen­dum aut sa­tis tem­po­ris ad quaes­tum ali­men­to­rum re­lin­quen­dum et in om­ni­bus tem­po­ra ad cu­ram cor­po­ris ne­ces­sa­riam re­lin­quen­da.

Neratius, Opinions, Book I. The nature of the services to be rendered depends upon the status of the person who renders them, for they must conform to his rank, his means, his mode of life, and his occupation. 1Moreover, a freedman, and everyone else who is required to perform services, must be supported, or he must be given sufficient time to provide for his maintenance; and, in every instance, time must be granted him for the proper and necessary care of his person.

Dig. 39,6,43Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. Ful­ci­nius: in­ter vi­rum et uxo­rem mor­tis cau­sa do­na­tio­nem ita fie­ri, si do­na­tor ius­tis­si­mum mor­tis me­tum ha­beat. Ne­ra­tius: suf­fi­ce­re ex­is­ti­ma­tio­nem do­nan­tis hanc es­se, ut mo­ri­tu­rum se pu­tet: quam ius­te nec ne sus­ce­pe­rit, non quae­ren­dum. quod ma­gis tuen­dum est.

Neratius, Opinions, Book I. Fulcinius: A donation mortis causa can be made between husband and wife, if the donor has an exceedingly well-founded apprehension of death. Neratius: It is sufficient if the donor has a belief of this kind, and thinks that he is going to die, and no inquiry should be made whether his opinion was well grounded or not. This rule should be observed.

Dig. 47,2,84Ne­ra­tius li­bro pri­mo re­spon­so­rum. Si quis ex bo­nis eius, quem pu­ta­bat mor­tuum, qui vi­vus erat, pro he­rede res ad­pre­hen­de­rit, eum fur­tum non fa­ce­re. 1Ei, cum quo suo no­mi­ne fur­ti ac­tum est, si ser­vi no­mi­ne de alia re ad­ver­sus eum aga­tur, non dan­dam ex­cep­tio­nem fur­ti una fac­ti.

Neratius, Opinions, Book I. Where anyone, thinking that a person is dead, who in fact is still living, takes possession of his property as his heir, he does not commit a theft. 1If, after having begun an action for theft against a man in his own name, you bring another against him for some article stolen by his slave, he cannot plead an exception on the ground that both thefts were committed at the same time.

Ex libro II

Dig. 7,1,61Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Usu­fruc­tua­rius no­vum ri­vum pa­rie­ti­bus non pot­est im­po­ne­re. ae­di­fi­cium in­choa­tum fruc­tua­rium con­sum­ma­re non pos­se pla­cet, et­iam­si eo lo­co ali­ter uti non pos­sit, sed nec eius qui­dem usum fruc­tum es­se: ni­si in con­sti­tuen­do vel le­gan­do usu fruc­tu hoc spe­cia­li­ter ad­iec­tum sit, ut utrum­que ei li­ceat.

Neratius, Opinions, Book II. An usufructuary cannot attach a new gutter to a wall; and where a building is not completed, it has been decided that a usufructuary cannot finish it, even if he is unable to make use of that portion of it without doing so. And indeed, it is considered that he has not even an usufruct in said building; unless, when it was created or bequeathed, it was expressly added that he could do either of the two above mentioned things.

Dig. 32,24Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Cre­di­to­ri ita pot­est le­ga­ri, ne in­de­bi­tum ab eo re­pe­te­re­tur.

Neratius, Opinions, Book II. A bequest can be made to a creditor in order to prevent his heir from recovering money which is not due.

Dig. 33,7,23Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Cum quae­ra­tur, quod sit ta­ber­nae in­stru­men­tum, in­ter­es­se, quod ge­nus neg­otia­tio­nis in ea ex­er­ce­ri so­li­tum sit.

Neratius, Opinions, Book II. When the question is asked what is the equipment of a shop, it is usual to ascertain what kind of business is transacted therein.

Dig. 45,3,22Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Ser­vum fruc­tua­rium ex re do­mi­ni in­uti­li­ter fruc­tua­rio sti­pu­la­ri, do­mi­no ex re fruc­tua­rii uti­li­ter sti­pu­la­ri.

Neratius, Opinions, Book II. A slave, subject to an usufruct, cannot, by employing the property of his master, make a valid stipulation for the benefit of the usufructuary, but he can make a valid one for the benefit of his owner, by employing property belonging to the usufructuary.

Dig. 45,3,24Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Et si duo­rum usus fruc­tus sit, quod ex ope­ris suis al­te­ri eo­rum sti­pu­la­tus sit, pro ea dum­ta­xat par­te, ex qua usus fruc­tus eius sit, ad­quiri.

Neratius, Opinions, Book II. If the usufruct belongs to two persons, and the slave stipulates for his services with one of them, the latter will acquire only to the extent of his share in the usufruct.

Dig. 47,9,8Ne­ra­tius li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Ra­tis vi flu­mi­nis in agrum meum de­la­tae non ali­ter po­tes­ta­tem ti­bi fa­cien­dam, quam si de prae­terito quo­que dam­no mi­hi ca­vis­ses.

Neratius, Opinions, Book II. If your boat has been carried by the force of the stream upon my land, you cannot remove it, unless you give me security for any damage which may have been caused by it.

Regularum libri

Ex libro III

Dig. 26,1,18Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio re­gu­la­rum. Fe­mi­nae tu­to­res da­ri non pos­sunt, quia id mu­nus mas­cu­lo­rum est, ni­si a prin­ci­pe fi­lio­rum tu­te­lam spe­cia­li­ter pos­tu­lent.

Neratius, Rules, Book III. Women cannot be appointed guardians, because this is an office which belongs to men unless they obtain the guardianship of their children through an express application to the Emperor.

Dig. 26,3,2Ne­ra­tius li­bro ter­tio re­gu­la­rum. Mu­lier li­be­ris non rec­te tes­ta­men­to tu­to­rem dat: sed si de­de­rit, de­cre­to prae­to­ris vel pro­con­su­lis ex in­qui­si­tio­ne con­fir­ma­bi­tur nec sa­tis­da­bit pu­pil­lo rem sal­vam fo­re. 1Sed et si cu­ra­tor a ma­tre tes­ta­men­to da­tus sit fi­liis eius, de­cre­to con­fir­ma­tur ex in­qui­si­tio­ne.

Neratius, Rules, Book III. A woman cannot legally appoint a guardian by will, but if she should do so, he shall be confirmed by the decree of the Prætor or the Proconsul, after an examination has been made; and he shall not be required to give security to the ward for the preservation of his property. 1If a curator should be appointed by the will of a mother for her children, the appointment will be confirmed by a decree after an investigation has been made.

Ex libro IV

Dig. 8,3,2Ne­ra­tius li­bro quar­to re­gu­la­rum. Rus­ti­co­rum prae­dio­rum ser­vi­tu­tes sunt li­ce­re al­tius tol­le­re et of­fi­ce­re prae­to­rio vi­ci­ni, vel cloa­cam ha­be­re li­ce­re per vi­ci­ni do­mum vel prae­to­rium, vel pro­tec­tum ha­be­re li­ce­re. 1Aquae duc­tus et haus­tus aquae per eun­dem lo­cum ut du­ca­tur, et­iam plu­ri­bus con­ce­di pot­est: pot­est et­iam, ut di­ver­sis die­bus vel ho­ris du­ca­tur: 2si aquae duc­tus vel haus­tus aquae suf­fi­ciens est, pot­est et plu­ri­bus per eun­dem lo­cum con­ce­di, ut et is­dem die­bus vel ho­ris du­ca­tur.

Neratius, Rules, Book IV. Ad Dig. 8,3,2 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 210, Note 2.The servitudes of rustic estates include the right to raise a building and interfere with the residence of a neighbor, or to have a drain under the house or residence of a neighbor, or to have a projecting roof. 1The right to an aqueduct, or to draw water in order that it may be conducted over the same place, can also be granted to several persons; and this can be done on different days, or at different hours. 2Where the water-course or the supply of water to be drawn is sufficient, the right may be granted to several people to conduct the water over the same place, on the same days, or during the same hours.

Ex libro V

Dig. 41,1,15Idem li­bro quin­to re­gu­la­rum. Qui au­tem in ri­pa flu­mi­nis ae­di­fi­cat, non suum fa­cit.

The Same, Rides, Book V. He, however, who erects a house on the bank of a stream does not thereby make it his own.

Dig. 41,3,40Ne­ra­tius li­bro quin­to re­gu­la­rum. Coep­tam usu­ca­pio­nem a de­func­to pos­se et an­te ad­itam he­redi­ta­tem im­ple­ri con­sti­tu­tum est.

Neratius, Rules, Book V. It has been established that where usucaption has been begun by a deceased person, it can be completed before the estate has been entered upon.

Ex libro VI

Dig. 41,1,13Ne­ra­tius li­bro sex­to re­gu­la­rum. Si pro­cu­ra­tor rem mi­hi eme­rit ex man­da­to meo ei­que sit tra­di­ta meo no­mi­ne, do­mi­nium mi­hi, id est pro­prie­tas ad­quiri­tur et­iam igno­ran­ti. 1Et tu­tor pu­pil­li pu­pil­lae si­mi­li­ter ut pro­cu­ra­tor emen­do no­mi­ne pu­pil­li pu­pil­lae pro­prie­ta­tem il­lis ad­quirit et­iam igno­ran­ti­bus.

Neratius, Rules, Book VI. Ad Dig. 41,1,13 pr.Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 155, Note 6.If my agent, by my direction, should purchase anything for me, and it is delivered to him in my name, the ownership of the article, that is to say, the title to it, is acquired by me, even if I am not aware of the fact. 1The guardian of a male or female ward, just like an agent, acquires property for him or her by purchasing it in the name of the ward, even without his or her knowledge.

Ex libro X

Dig. 30,118Ne­ra­tius li­bro de­ci­mo re­gu­la­rum. Et eo mo­do re­lic­tum: ‘ex­igo’ ‘de­si­de­ro, uti des’, fi­dei­com­mis­sum va­let: sed et ita: ‘vo­lo he­redi­ta­tem meam Ti­tii es­se’ ‘scio he­redi­ta­tem meam re­sti­tu­tu­rum te Ti­tio’.

Neratius, Rules, Book X. Where a trust is expressed in the following terms: “I require; I desire; that you give,” it is valid, or where it is expressed as follows, “I wish my estate to belong to Titius; I know that you will deliver my estate to Titius.”