Excusationum libri
Ex libro IV
Dig. 27,1,13Idem libro quarto excusationum. Εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι οὔτε οἱ χειροτονηθέντες ἐπίτροποι οὔτε οἱ κατὰ διαθήκην δοθέντες ἐκκαλεῖσθαι ἀνάγκην ἔχουσιν, ὡς δηλοῖ διάταξις τῶν θειοτάτων Σεβήρου καὶ Ἀντωνίνου. τοῦτο δὲ παραφυλάττειν δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χειροτονηθέντων κουρατόρων· ἐν ὀλίγοις γὰρ πάνυ διαλλάττουσιν οἱ κουράτορες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων. κατὰ μέντοι τῶν ψήφων τῶν ἐκβαλλουσῶν αὐτοῖς τὰς ἐξκουσατίονας ἄδειαν ἕξουσιν ἐκκαλεῖσθαι. 1Πολλὰ δὲ παραφυλάττειν προσήκει, ἵνα ἐπιτραπῶσιν ἐπίτροποι ἢ κουράτορες τὰ δίκαια παρασχέσθαι τῆς ἀφέσεως. δεῖ γὰρ αὐτούς ἐμπροθέσμως προσελθεῖν τῷ δικαστῇ. εἰσὶν δὲ αἱ προθεσμίαι αὗται· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει ὤν, ὅπου κεχειροτόνηται, ἢ ἐντὸς ἑκατοστοῦ μιλίου τῆς πόλεως ἐντὸς πεντήκοντα ἡμερῶν παραιτήσεται, ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο οὐ συγχωρηθήσεται, ἀλλ’ ἕξεται τῆς φροντίδος. κἂν τούτων τι μὴ ποιήσῃ, ἔσται ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ αἰτίᾳ, ἐν ᾗ ἦν ἂν εἰ ἀπεφάνθη τῷ ἰδίῳ κινδύνῳ αὐτὸν ὀλιγωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ καταλείπεσθαι αὐτῷ τινα ὁδὸν πρὸς παραίτησιν. ὁ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑκατὸν μίλια τῆς πόλεως ἀποδημῶν εἴκοσι μίλια ἕξει ἀριθμούμενα αὐτῷ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν, ἀφ’ ἧς ἂν γνῷ (δεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ μηνυθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἢ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίασ) καὶ ἔξωθεν τούτων ἄλλας τριάκοντα ἡμέρας ἔχει πρὸς δικαιολογίαν. τοῦτο δὲ διαφέρει καὶ τοῖς κατὰ διαθήκας δοθεῖσιν, ἐάν τε ἐπίτροποι ὦσιν ἐάν τε κουράτορες, οὓς κουράτορας βεβαιοῦσθαι ἔθος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡγουμένου. 2Ἕτερον δὲ ἐκεῖνο εὑρίσκομεν ἐκ τῆς Μάρκου νομοθεσίας ζητήσεως ἄξιον· τῷ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει ὄντι, ἐν ᾗ κεχειροτόνηται ἢ ἐντὸς ἑκατὸν μιλίων πεντήκοντα ἡμερῶν ἔδωκεν ὁ νομοθέτης προθεσμίαν. τῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑκατὸν μίλια διατρίβοντι καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν δεῖν ἀριθμεῖσθαι εἴκοσι μίλια ἐκέλευσεν καὶ ἔξωθεν τούτων ἄλλας τρίακοντα ἡμέρας προσέθηκεν εἰς δικαιολογίαν. ὅθεν συμβαίνει, ἐὰν ᾖ τις ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν ἑξήκοντα μιλίων τὰς διατριβὰς ποιούμενος, τούτῳ εἶναι προθεσμίαν ὄκτω καὶ τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν, ὄκτω μὲν τῶν ἑκατὸν ἑξήκοντα μιλίων, ὡς καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν εἴκοσι μιλίων ἀριθμουμένων, τριάκοντα δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὴν δικαιολογίαν. ἔσται οὖν ἐν χείρονι τάξει ὁ πόῤῥωθεν διατρίβων τοῦ ἐντὸς ἑκατὸν μιλίων ὄντος ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει, εἴγε τούτοις μὲν ἀεὶ πεντήκοντα ἡμέραι προθεσμίας εἰσὶν, ἐκείνοις δὲ ἐλάττους. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τὸ ῥητὸν τοῦ νόμου ταύτην ἀποτελεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅμως ἡ γνώμη τοῦ νομοθέτου ἄλλοβούλεται. οὕτως γὰρ καὶ Κερβίδιος Σκαίβολας καὶ Παῦλος καὶ Δομίτιος Οὐλπιανὸς οἱ κορυφαῖοι τῶν νομικῶν γράφουσιν, φάσκοντες οὕτως δεῖν ταῦτα παραφυλάττειν, ὡς μηδέποτέ τινι ἐλάττω δίδοσθαι τῶν πεντήκοντα ἡμερῶν προθεσμίαν, τότε δὲ μακροτέραν, ὁπόταν ἡ διαρίθμησις τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ ὁδῷ ἡμερῶν προστιθεμένη ταῖς τριάκοντα ἡμέραις, ἃς πρὸς δικαιολογίαν ὁ νόμος δίδωσιν, ὑπερβαίνει τὰς πεντήκοντα ἡμέρας, οἷον ἐάν τινα φῶμεν ἀπὸ τετρακοσίων τεσσαράκοντα μιλίων διατρίβειν· οὗτος γὰρ τῆς μὲν ὁδοῦ ἕξει ἡμέρας εἴκοσι δύο, πρὸς δικαιολογίαν δὲ ἄλλας τριάκοντα. 3Παραφυλάξουσιν δὲ ταύτην τὴν προθεσμίαν πάντες οἱ ὁπωσοῦν παραιτούμενοι ἐπιτροπὴν ἢ κουρατορίαν ἢ μέρος γε ταύτης. 4Ἀκόλουθον δέ ἐστιν πιστεύειν, ὅτι εἰ καί τινι εἴδει παραιτήσεως ᾖ τις χρώμενος, οὐκ ἄλλως ἀκουσθήσεται, ἐάν μὴ φυλάξῃ τὴν προθεσμίαν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τῆς ἑτέρας πόλεωσ πολίτης ἐστίν. 5Οὕτως δὲ ἐπαναγκές ἐστιν φυλάττειν τὴν προθεσμίαν, ὅτι κἂν δικαιολογησάμενος ἀφεθῇ, μὴ ἐλευθεροῦσθαι αὐτὸν οἱ θειότατοι Σεβῆρος καὶ Ἀντωνῖνος δηλοῦσιν ἐν διατάξει κελεύσαντες μὴ κρατεῖσθαι τὸν εἰς τόπον αὐτοῦ χειροτονηθέντα, ὡς οὐκ ἐξὸν δεδόμενον εἰς τόπον ὄντος ἐπιτρόπου. 6Ἀπόχρη δὲ ἐντὸς τῆς προθεσμίας ἐντυχεῖν μόνον· ἐὰν γὰρ μετὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἑκὼν ἀπολειφθῇ, οὐκ ἔσται παραγράψιμος. διόπερ ἐὰν ἀφοσιώσεως χάριν μόνον ἐντύχῃ, μὴ ἐπιμείνῃ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τῇ δικαιολογίᾳ, μετὰ τὴν προθεσμίαν ὑποπεσεῖται τῇ παραγραφῇ. καὶ λέγει τοῦτο διάταξις τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων Σεβήρου καὶ Ἀντωνίνου. 7Ἐὰν γάρ τις διὰ νόσον ἢ δι’ ἄλλην ἀνάγκην, οἷον θαλάσσης ἢ χειμῶνος ἢ ἐφόδου λῃστῶν ἤ τινα ἑτέραν παραπλησίαν, ἐμπροθέσμως μὴ δύνηται ἐντυχεῖν, συνγνώμης τυγχάνειν. οὗ τὴν πίστιν ἤρκει συστῆσαι καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φύσει δικαίου, πλὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ διάταξίς ἐστιν τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων Σεβήρου καὶ Ἀντωνίνου ταῦτα λέγουσα. 8Εἰδέναι δὲ δεῖ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόχρη τὸ προσελθεῖν τῷ δικάζοντι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῆσ ἀφέσεως μαρτύρασθαι, καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔχει πρὸς ἄφεσιν δίκαια, πάντα ὀνομάσαι· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅμοιός ἐστιν τῷ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν προσεληλυθότι ὁ προσελθὼν μέν, δίκαιον δὲ ἀφέσεως μὴ ὀνομάσας. 9Αἱ δὲ πεντήκοντα ἡμέραι συνημμέναι ψηφίζονται ἀρχόμεναι ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ τῆς γνώσεως, ἐν ᾧ τις ἔγνω ἑαυτὸν δεδόσθαι. 10Χρὴ δὲ μιᾷ μαρτύρασθαι πρό βήματος ἢ ἄλλως ἐπὶ ὑπομνημάτων· δύναται δὲ καὶ βιβλίδια ἐπιδοῦναι χαμᾶθεν, ὡς οἱ αὐτοί φασιν αὐτοκράτορες. 11Ταῦτα περὶ τῶν φυλάσσειν τὴν προθεσμίαν ὀφειλόντων· περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ ὑποκειμένων ταῖς προθεσμίαις φέρε σκεψώμεθα. 12Οἱ γὰρ παρανόμως δοθέντες ἐπίτροποι, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἢ ὑφ’ ὧν μὴ ἐχρῆν, ἢ οὗτοι οὓσ μὴ ἐχρῆν, ἢ οἷς μὴ ἐχρῆν, ἢ ὃν μὴ ἐχρῆν τρόπον, ἐάν μήτε βεβαιωθῶσιν μήτε ἐφάψωνται τοῦ χειρισμοῦ, εἰσὶν ἀνεύθυνοι, οὐδὲ προοίσει τις αὐτοῖς ὅτι τὰς προθεσμίας οὐκ ἐτήρησαν τῶν παραιτήσεων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχουσιν παραιτήσεως ἀνάγκην, ὡς δείκνυται ἐκ τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων διατάξεων, ἃς παραδείγματος χάριν ὑπέταξα, ἐφαρμόζοιντο δὲ ἂν πᾶσιν. ‘Divi Severus et Antoninus Augusti Narcisso. Ab avo materno tutor datus necesse non habuisti excusari, cum ipso iure non teneris: si igitur administrationi te non miscuisti, potes esse securus’. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν τὸν μὴ ὑποκείμενον τῇ δικαιοδοσίᾳ χειροτονήσωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐπίτροπον ἢ κουράτορα, οὐδὲ οὗτος ἀνάγκην ἔχει παραφυλάσσειν τὰς προθεσμίας, οἷον τὸν μήτε πολίτην μήτε ἰνκόλαν.
The Same, Excuses, Book IV. It must be noted that neither guardians appointed by proper authority nor testamentary guardians are required to appeal, as is stated by the Constitution of the Divine Severus and Antoninus. This rule should also be observed with reference to the appointment of a curator, for curators in very few respects differ from guardians. They, however, have permission to appeal from decisions brought against them when they offer excuses. 1It is necessary, however, for many formalities to be observed in order that guardians and curators may show good cause for their discharge. They are required, in the first place, to make application to the court within the time prescribed by law, which is as follows. He who is in the same town where he has been appointed, or within the hundredth milestone from said town, shall file his excuse within fifty days, for after this he shall not be permitted to do so, but will be obliged to discharge his duties; and if he does not observe any of these requirements, he will be in the same position as if he had been guilty of negligence, and there will be no way left for him to offer his excuse. Where, however, he is distant more than a hundred miles from the town, he will be entitled to twenty miles for every day from the one on which he received notice of his appointment (and this notice must be served upon him by the Governor either personally, or at his residence) and, in addition to the above twenty days, he shall be entitled to thirty more for the purpose of offering his excuse. This rule likewise applies to all designated by will, whether they are guardians or curators, whose appointments it is customary to have confirmed by a magistrate. 2We also find another provision in the Decree of the Divine Marcus, which is worthy of examination. For, indeed, the legislator grants to the guardian who is in the town in which he was appointed, or who is within the distance of a hundred miles from the same, the term of fifty days, but to him who resides beyond the distance of a hundred miles, he grants one day for every twenty miles, and, in addition to these, he allows thirty days for the presentation of his excuses. It results from this that, if the residence of the person is distant one hundred and sixty miles, he would be entitled to a term of thirty-eight days, that is to say, eight days for the hundred and sixty miles, or one day for every twenty miles, and thirty days in addition, in which to make application to be excused. Therefore, he whose residence is farther away is in a worse condition that he who resides within a hundred miles, or in the town itself; for, indeed, the term of fifty days is always granted to the latter, but a shorter time is allowed the former. But although the terms of the law, if strictly interpreted, should be understood in this way, still, the intention of the legislator was entirely different; for Cerbidius Scævola, Julius Paulus, and Domitius Ulpianus, authorities most eminent and learned in the law, held that this is the case, stating that the rule must be observed that no one shall be entitled to a term of less than fifty days, when the time computed for the journey added to the thirty days which the law allows for the offering of excuses, exceeds fifty days; for instance, if we should say than anyone resides four hundred and forty miles from the town, he will be entitled to twenty-two days to make the journey, and thirty more to present his application to be excused. 3All must observe this rule with reference to time who, for any reason whatsoever, desire, either wholly or in part, to be released from the duties of guardianship or curatorship. 4It has been decided as the result of this that, where anyone desires to avail himself of any kind of an excuse, he shall not be heard, if he does not make his application within the prescribed time; unless, indeed, he should be a citizen of some other state. 5It is so necessary for the prescribed time to be observed, that if this is not done, and the party having presented his excuse should be discharged, he will not be released; as the Divine Severus and Antoninus state in one of their Constitutions which directs that he who has been appointed in the place of a guardian shall not be retained in office, on the ground that it is not lawful for a second guardian to be appointed where there already is one. 6It will be sufficient for the guardian to apply to be excused within the prescribed time; for if afterwards, he, having changed his mind, should desist, it will not prejudice him. Therefore, if anyone merely presents himself, and does not afterwards remain for the purpose of offering his excuses, after the prescribed time has elapsed he will be barred by an exception. This is stated in a Constitution of the Emperors Severus and Antoninus. 7Where anyone, by reason of illness or any other necessity (for instance, on account of the dangers of the sea, or the severity of the winter, or the attacks of robbers, or any other similar impediment), is not able to appear within the prescribed time, indulgence should be granted him, since his good faith is sufficiently established by natural justice; as the Constitution of the Emperors Severus and Antoninus sets forth. 8Again, it should be remembered that it is not sufficient for the guardian to merely appear in court, but he is required to give evidence with reference to the reason for which he asks his discharge, and if he has several reasons to advance which may facilitate it, he must enumerate them all; and if he does not do so, he will resemble a party who has never appeared, or if he did appear, did not show good cause for his discharge. 9The fifty days aforesaid are reckoned continuously, beginning from the time of notice served upon the party who was appointed. 10It is necessary for the reasons for discharge to be presented orally in court, or by a petition. The party can also reduce his reasons to writing, as the same Emperors declare. 11These are the rules having reference to the time prescribed by law which must be obeyed. Now let us consider those who are not required to comply with these rules. 12Guardians who have not been legally appointed (that is to say, who have been appointed by parties who have no right to do so; or where they were not eligible; or where the wards were responsible for the illegality; or in case the proper legal formalities were not observed), and were not confirmed, and did not administer the trust, will be discharged, and no one can raise the objection that they did not, in their application to be excused, observe the time prescribed by law; for they are not required to make such application, as is proved by the constitutions hereinafter mentioned, which I have submitted by way of example, and which, indeed, are applicable to all cases. “The Divine Severus and Antoninus, Emperors, to Narcissus: Having been appointed guardian by the maternal grandfather of the ward, you are not required to make application to be excused, for you are not legally liable, and therefore if you do not interfere in the administration of the estate you will be secure.” Again, in like manner, where magistrates appoint a guardian or a curator who is not subject to their jurisdiction, he will not be required to observe the time prescribed by law, inasmuch as he is neither a citizen, nor a resident of the town.