The Same, Digest, Book XVI. A certain man in whom the ownership of a slave was vested, having appointed as his heir one who had the usufruct of said slave, bequeathed the slave to a third party. The heir cannot avail himself of an exception on the ground of fraud, if the legatee desires to claim the slave without leaving the usufruct for the benefit of the heir.

Marcellus, Digest, Book XVI. If anyone should insert the following clause into his will, “I desire my slave to be the freedman of such-and-such a person,” the slave can demand his liberty, and the other party can claim him as his freedman.

The Same, Digest, Book XVI. A certain man inserted the following provision in his will, “I do not wish my slaves, So-and-So and So-and-So, to be sold.” Therefore, if he did not wish them to be sold and intended, if they were sold, that they should become free, their freedom should be granted them; for freedom is considered to have been bequeathed to a slave by the following clause, “I do not wish So-and-So to belong to anyone but you.” Hence, in accordance with this, if the heir should attempt in any way to sell the slave, the latter can immediately claim his freedom, and if the heir should purchase him to prevent him from obtaining it, it will be of no advantage to him, because the condition has been fulfilled. 1A slave who was entitled to his freedom was sold. If he is willing to be manumitted by the heir, there will be no necessity to bring the purchaser, who has concealed himself, into court along with the present heir, as the slave can avail himself of the decree of the Senate to obtain his freedom under the will. 2A slave who was entitled to his freedom under a trust permitted himself to be transferred to a bona fide purchaser by the heir, who was not solvent. Do you think that an action can be granted against this manumitted slave, just as where a freeman deceived his purchaser by pretending that he was a slave? I, however, am inclined to believe that an action will properly lie against the vendor, as the case seems to be similar to that of a slave entitled to be free under a certain condition, and who suffered this to be done the day before he was to obtain his freedom by will.

Marcellus, Digest, Book XVI. “Let Stichus be free if he promises my heir ten aurei, or swears to give him his services.” The condition will be fulfilled if the slave makes the promise, for it can be said that he has, to a certain extent, bound himself, even if the obligation may not be compulsory.

The Same, Digest, Book XVI. A slave, having been ordered to pay ten aurei to a ward and become free, if the ward is an heir, or the condition is merely personal, can the slave, by making payment to the ward in the absence of his guardian, obtain his freedom? Some difficulty will arise in comparing this condition with that which consists of an act; for instance, if he should give his services to a ward, which can be done without the intervention of his guardian. And, it is asked, what if he is ordered to make payment to an insane person, who has a curator; will he, by paying the curator, be released? Suppose that a tract of land was left to someone on condition that payment should be made to a minor, or a person who is insane. It must be remembered that, in all these cases, payment can legally be made to the guardian or curator, but is not valid if made to the insane person or ward, for fear that what is paid may be lost by their weakness. For it was not the intention of the testator that the condition should be considered to have been complied with no matter in what way payment was made.