De appellationibus libri
Ex libro II
Dig. 4,1,8Macer libro secundo de appellationibus. Inter minores viginti quinque annis et eos qui rei publicae causa absunt hoc interest, quod minores annis etiam qui per tutores curatoresve suos defensi sunt, nihilo minus in integrum contra rem publicam restituuntur, cognita scilicet causa: ei vero qui rei publicae causa absit, ceteris quoque qui in eadem causa habentur, si per procuratores suos defensi sunt, hactenus in integrum restitutione subveniri solet, ut appellare his permittatur.
Macer, On Appeals, Book III. This difference exists between the case of minors under twenty-live years of age and parties who are absent on public business, namely: minors, even where they are defended by their guardians and curators, may still obtain complete restitution against the State, that is, where proper cause is shown; but where anyone is absent on public business, or where others who enjoy the same privilege, if they are defended by their agents, are usually only relieved by complete restitution to the extent of being permitted to appeal.
Dig. 42,1,63Macer libro secundo de appellationibus. Saepe constitutum est res inter alios iudicatas aliis non praeiudicare. quod tamen quandam distinctionem habet: nam sententia inter alios dicta aliis quibusdam etiam scientibus obest, quibusdam vero, etiamsi contra ipsos iudicatum sit, nihil nocet. nam scientibus nihil praeiudicat, veluti si ex duobus heredibus debitoris alter condemnatur: nam alteri integra defensio est, etiamsi cum coherede suo agi scierit. item si ex duobus petitoribus alter victus adquieverit, alterius petitioni non praeiudicatur: idque ita rescriptum est. scientibus sententia, quae inter alios data est, obest, cum quis de ea re, cuius actio vel defensio primum sibi competit, sequentem agere patiatur, veluti si creditor experiri passus sit debitorem de proprietate pignoris, aut maritus socerum vel uxorem de proprietate rei in dote acceptae, aut possessor venditorem de proprietate rei emptae: et haec ita ex multis constitutionibus intellegenda sunt. cur autem his quidem scientia nocet, superioribus vero non nocet, illa ratio est, quod qui scit coheredem suum agere, prohibere eum, quo minus uti velit propria actione vel defensione utatur, non potest: is vero, qui priorem dominum defendere causam patitur, ideo propter scientiam praescriptione rei quamvis inter alios iudicatae summovetur, quia ex voluntate eius de iure, quod ex persona agentis habuit, iudicatum est. nam et si libertus meus me interveniente servus vel libertus alterius iudicetur, mihi praeiudicatur. diversa causa est, si fundum a te Titius petierit, quem ego quoque, sed non ex persona Titii ad me pertinere dico: nam quamvis contra Titium me sciente iudicatum sit, nullum tamen praeiudicium patior, quia neque ex eo iure, quo Titius victus est, vindico, neque potui Titio intercedere, quo minus iure suo utatur, sicuti et de coherede supra diximus.
Ad Dig. 42,1,63Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 132, Note 2.Macer, On Appeals, Book II. It has often been stated in the Imperial Constitutions that judgments obtained by certain persons do not prejudice the rights of others. This, however, admits of a certain distinction, for in some instances a judgment rendered against certain persons does prejudice others who have knowledge of it, but, in other cases, does not injure even those against whom it was rendered. A judgment is of no disadvantage to those who have knowledge of it, as where one of two heirs of a debtor has judgment rendered against him; for the right of the other to defend himself remains unimpaired, even if he knew that he was sued with his co-heir. Moreover, where one of two plaintiffs, having lost his case, acquiesces in the decision, the claim of the other is not prejudiced. This has been stated in a rescript. A decision rendered against certain parties injures others who are aware of it, when anyone who has a right to bring or defend an action before another suffers someone else to do so; as, for instance, where a creditor permits his debtor to bring suit involving the right to a pledge; or a husband allows his father-in-law, or his wife to institute proceedings to determine the ownership of property received by way of dowry; or a possessor permits the vendor to bring an action to establish the title to property which he has purchased. These points are understood to have been settled by many constitutions. For why should knowledge injure these parties, when it does not injure those previously mentioned? The reason for this is, that when anyone knows that his co-heir brings suit, he cannot prevent him from using any means which he may be able to employ in bringing or defending an action in which he is interested. He, however, who suffers a former owner of the property in dispute to defend an action is, on account of his knowledge, barred by an exception, even though the suit was decided with reference to others; because the decision was rendered with his consent, so far as any right derived from the party appearing in the case was concerned. For if, through my intervention, my freedman is decided to be the slave or the freedman of another, my rights will be prejudiced. A distinction, however, arises where Titius brings suit against you to recover a tract of land, which I allege belongs to me directly, and not through Titius; for even though judgment has been rendered against Titius with my knowledge, I still do not suffer any prejudice to my rights, as I do not claim the land by the same title under which Titius was defeated; and I cannot interfere to prevent him from availing himself of his alleged right, just as was the case with the co-heir above mentioned.
Dig. 49,1,9Macer libro secundo de appellationibus. Illud sciendum est neque pupillum neque rem publicam, cum pro libertate iudicatur, in integrum restitui posse, sed appellationem esse necessariam. idque ita rescriptum est.
Macer, On Appeals, Book II. It must be remembered that neither a ward, nor the State, can obtain complete restitution in a case where freedom is involved, but an appeal is necessary. This has been stated in various rescripts.
Dig. 49,4,3Idem libro secundo de appellationibus. Illud videamus, si, cum imperatori scriberetur, exemplum litterarum litigatori editum sit neque is appellaverit et postea contra eum rescriptum sit, an appellare a litteris pridem sibi editis possit? quia qui tunc non appellavit, vera esse quae scripta sunt consensisse videtur: nec audiendus est, si dicat eventum rescripti sacri se sustinuisse.
The Same, Appeals, Book II. When a letter is written to the Emperor, and a copy of the same is shown to one of the litigants, who did not appeal, and afterwards the Emperor decides against him in a Rescript, let us see whether he can appeal from the letter which was previously shown to him, since as he did not do so at the time, he seems to have admitted its contents were true. He should not be heard, if he should state that he was waiting for the issue of the Imperial Rescript.
Dig. 49,5,6Macer libro secundo de appellationibus. Sciendum est, cum appellatio non recipitur, praecipi sacris constitutionibus omnia in eodem statu esse nec quicquam novari, etiamsi contra fiscum appellatum sit: eumque, qui appellationem non receperit, opinionem suam confestim per relationem manifestare et causam, pro qua non recepit appellationem, eiusque exemplum litigatori edere debere mandatis cavetur.
Macer, On Appeals, Book II. It must be remembered that, when an appeal is rejected, it has been decided by the Imperial Constitutions that everything must remain in the same condition, and nothing new be done, even if the appeal is taken against the Treasury; and he who refuses to receive the appeal must immediately make a report giving his opinion, and the reason for its rejection; and it is provided by the Imperial Mandates that he shall furnish the litigant with a copy of his report.
Dig. 49,8,1Macer libro secundo de appellationibus. Illud meminerimus: si quaeratur, iudicatum sit nec ne, et huius quaestionis iudex non esse iudicatum pronuntiaverit: licet fuerit iudicatum, rescinditur, si provocatum non fuerit. 1Item si calculi error in sententia esse dicatur, appellare necesse non est: veluti si iudex ita pronuntiaverit: ‘Cum constet Titium Seio ex illa specie quinquaginta, item ex illa specie viginti quinque debere, idcirco Lucium Titium Seio centum condemno’: nam quoniam error computationis est, nec appellare necesse est et citra provocationem corrigitur. sed et si huius quaestionis iudex sententiam centum confirmaverit, si quidem ideo, quod quinquaginta et viginti quinque fieri centum putaverit, adhuc idem error computationis est nec appellare necesse est: si vero ideo, quoniam et alias species viginti quinque fuisse dixerit, appellationi locus est. 2Item cum contra sacras constitutiones iudicatur, appellationis necessitas remittitur. contra constitutiones autem iudicatur, cum de iure constitutionis, non de iure litigatoris pronuntiatur. nam si iudex volenti se ex cura muneris vel tutelae beneficio liberorum vel aetatis aut privilegii excusare, dixerit neque filios neque aetatem aut ullum privilegium ad muneris vel tutelae excusationem prodesse, de iure constituto pronuntiasse intellegitur: quod si de iure suo probantem admiserit, sed idcirco contra eum sententiam dixerit, quod negaverit eum de aetate sua aut de numero liberorum probasse, de iure litigatoris pronuntiasse intellegitur: quo casu appellatio necessaria est. 3Item cum ex edicto peremptorio, quod neque propositum est neque in notitiam pervenit absentis, condemnatio fit, nullius momenti esse sententiam constitutiones demonstrant. 4Si apud eundem iudicem invicem petamus, si et mea et tua petitio sine usuris fuit et iudex me priorem tibi condemnavit, quo magis tu prior me condemnatum habeas: non est mihi necesse pro hac causa appellare, quando secundum sacras constitutiones iudicatum a me petere non possis, priusquam de mea quoque petitione iudicetur. sed magis est, ut appellatio interponatur.
Macer, On Appeals, Book II. We must remember that when an inquiry is made whether a case has been decided or not, and the judge of this question declares that it has not been decided, even though it may have been, it is rescinded, even if no appeal has been taken. 1Ad Dig. 49,8,1,1ROHGE, Bd. 7 (1873), S. 59: Berichtigung von Rechnungsfehlern in einem Erkenntnisse.Likewise, if an error in the calculation is alleged to exist in the decision, it is not necessary to appeal, for instance, if the judge decides as follows: “As it is proved that Titius owes Seius fifty sesterces for such-and-such an article, and also twenty-five for another; therefore I hold that Lucius Titius shall pay Seius a hundred sesterces;” because, as the mistake is one of computation, it is not necessary to appeal, and it can be corrected without doing so. If, however, the judge of this question should render a decision for a hundred sesterces, for the reason that he thought that fifty and twenty-five made a hundred, still, the same mistake is one of computation, and it is not necessary to appeal. But when the judge decides that there is another sum of twenty-five sesterces due, there will be ground for appeal. 2Likewise, when the decision is contrary to the Imperial Constitutions, the necessity for appeal does not exist. A decision is rendered against the constitutions when it is pronounced in compliance with the law as laid down by them, and not with reference to the rights of the litigant; for if the judge, in the case of a person desiring to be excused from the charge of a public office, or of a guardianship, on account of having children, or through age, or by reason of some privilege, should hold that neither children, nor age, nor any privilege will avail to excuse anyone from office, or from guardianship, he is understood to have decided with reference to the law as set forth in the constitutions. If, however, he should permit a person to establish his right, and then renders a decision against him because he did not prove his age, or the number of his children; he is understood to have decided with reference to the rights of the litigant, in which case an appeal will be necessary. 3Likewise when, under a peremptory Edict which has not been published, and of which the party has not been notified, he is convicted while absent, the constitutions declare that a decision of this kind is of no effect. 4If you and I both apply to the same judge, and neither of our petitions asks for interest, and the judge renders a decision against me before doing so against you, in order that you may be the first to have a judgment in your favor; it is not necessary for me to appeal on this ground, as, according to the Sacred Constitutions, you cannot ask for an execution against me before judgment has been rendered with reference to my claim; but the better opinion is that an appeal should be taken.
Dig. 49,9,2Macer libro secundo de appellationibus. Si procurator absentis appellaverit, deinde rationes reddiderit, nihilo minus ipse respondere debet. sed an eo cessante dominus litis respondere possit exemplo adulescentis, videamus: magis tamen observatur, ut audiri debeat in causis appellationis reddendis is, cuius absentis procurator appellavit.
Macer, Appeals, Book II. When the attorney of an absent party appeals, and afterwards gives his reasons for doing so, he will, nevertheless, be obliged to answer. If, however, he fails to do so, can the party to the suit answer, as in the case of a minor? is a question which we should consider. We rather incline to the opinion that he ought to be heard in giving the reasons for the appeal, who, as the attorney of the absent party, applied for it.
Dig. 49,13,1Macer libro secundo de appellationibus. Appellatore defuncto, si quidem sine herede, cuiuscumque generis appellatio fuit, evanescit. quod si appellatori heres extiterit, si quidem nullius alterius interest causas appellationis reddi, cogendus non est peragere appellationem: si vero fisci vel alterius, contra quem appellatum est, interest, heres causas appellationis reddere necesse habet. nullius autem interest, veluti cum sine ademptione bonorum relegatus est. nam si ademptis bonis relegatus vel in insulam deportatus vel in metallum datus provocatione interposita decesserit, imperator noster Alexander Plaetorio militi ita rescripsit: ‘Quamvis pendente appellatione morte rei crimen extinctum sit, data tamen etiam de parte bonorum eius sententia proponitur, adversus quam non aliter is, qui emolumentum successionis habet, optinere potest, quam si in reddendis causis appellationis iniquitatem sententiae detexerit’. 1Tutor quoque in negotio pupilli appellatione interposita si decesserit, heredem eius causas appellationis reddere necesse est, etiamsi rationes tutelae heres reddiderit, quia sufficit mortis tempore ad causas appellationis reddendas obligatum fuisse. sed divi Severus et Antoninus rescripserunt non cogendum tutorem post rationes redditas causas appellationum reddere.
Macer, On Appeals, Book II. Where the appellant dies without leaving an heir, an appeal of this kind is extinguished. If, however, an heir of the appellant should appear, and no one else has any interest in stating the ground for the appeal, the heir cannot be forced to prosecute it. But when the Treasury, or any other party against whom the appeal was taken, is interested in the case, the heir will be required to state the grounds for the appeal. No one has any interest, where, for example, the party has been relegated without having been deprived of his property. In case he should be relegated after having been deprived of his property, or be deported to an island, or sentenced to the mines, or should die after the appeal was taken, our Emperor Alexander made the following statement in a Rescript addressed to Pletorius, a soldier, as being applicable: “Although, while the appeal is pending, the accusation of the defendant is annulled by death, still, as it is alleged that a part of his property has been confiscated under the judgment, be who is entitled to the benefit of the succession can only obtain it if he gives good reasons for the appeal, and establishes the injustice of the decision.” 1If a guardian, after having taken an appeal pertaining to the business of his ward, should die, his heir will be compelled to state the grounds for the appeal, even if he has already rendered his account of the guardianship, for the reason that it is sufficient that he would have been obliged to state the grounds for it at the time of his death. The Divine Severus and Antoninus, however, stated in a Rescript that a guardian, after having rendered his accounts, should not be compelled to set forth the grounds of the appeal.