Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. Where anyone receives money from my slave to prevent him from giving information concerning a theft which he committed, whether he gives the information or not, Proculus says that an action will lie for the recovery of the money.

Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. I, being ignorant of the fact, purchased my own slave from you, and paid you the money for him. I am perfectly convinced that I am entitled to an action against you for the recovery of the money, and that such a suit can be brought against you for that purpose, whether you knew that the slave was mine, or were not aware of it.

Ad Dig. 13,6,20BOHGE, Bd. 1 (1871), S. 267: Verpflichtung des Käufers wegen Zurücksendung der Emballage durch einen zuverlässigen Transportanden.The Same, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. If I give silver lent by you to me to a slave of mine to be delivered to you, who is so reliable that no one would think that he would be imposed upon by any evil-minded persons, and if such persons obtain possession of the silver, the loss will not be mine.

The Same, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. If I should be unwilling to enter upon an estate unless security is furnished me that I will be indemnified for any loss, and, under such circumstances, a mandate is given; I think that an action on mandate will lie. If, however, a party has directed another not to reject a legacy, the case is very different; for where a legacy is acquired, it cannot cause any loss to the person receiving it, but the acceptance of an estate is sometimes injurious. In a word, whenever such contracts are made, and every time a surety is bound in behalf of the parties, I think that the obligation of mandate is established; for it does not make much difference who the individual is, who, after being interrogated, became surety, or whether one who is absent directs this to be done. Moreover, it is proper to notice that it is a matter of common occurrence for estates thought to be insolvent, to be entered upon by the direction of creditors; and there is no doubt that this creates liability to an action on mandate.

Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. A certain person attempted to purchase a tract of land from another who had encumbered it, with the understanding, “That it should be considered to be purchased by him, if the vendor released the land, provided he did so before the Kalends of July.” The question arose whether he could properly bring an action of purchase founded on such an agreement, to compel the vendor to remove the encumbrance from the land. The answer was that we should ascertain the intention of the purchaser and vendor, for if it had been intended that the vendor should remove the lien from the land absolutely, before the Kalends of July, the action on purchase should be brought to compel him to do so, and that the purchase was not understood to be made under a condition; as, for instance, if the purchaser had addressed the vendor as follows: “I will buy your land if you will remove the lien on the same before the Kalends of July,” or “If you will redeem it from Titius before that date.” Where the purchase was made under a condition, proceedings cannot be instituted until the condition has been complied with. 1You sold me a table plated with silver, with the understanding that it was solid, neither of us being aware that it was not. The sale is void, and the money paid on account of it can be recovered.

Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. The purchaser would be entitled to an action under the Lex Aquilia against the ædile, if he acted illegally; or he will certainly have an action on sale against the vendor, to compel him to assign to him the rights of action which he has against the Ædile.

Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. You sold me certain lands, and it was agreed between us that I should perform some act, and that, if I did not do so, I should be liable to a penalty. The opinion was given that the vendor can bring an action on sale before suing for the penalty under the stipulation, and if he should recover an amount equal to that fixed as a penalty, he will be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud, if he brings an action on the stipulation. If you should recover the penalty by an action on the stipulation, you will be prevented by operation of law from bringing an action on the sale, unless the amount of the judgment is less than the interest of the vendor in having the agreement executed.

The Same, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. A certain man charged his heir to manumit his slave, and if his heir did not do so he directed that he should be free, and he left him a legacy. The heir manumitted the slave. Several authorities hold that he obtained his freedom by the will, ana”, as this was the case, that he was also entitled to the legacy.

Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. If a slave, the usufruct of whom has been bequeathed, and who has never been in possession of the heir, should be stolen, the question arises, can the slave be acquired-by usucaption, because the heir is entitled to an action of theft? Sabinus says that no usucaption can exist in the case of property on account of which an action for theft will lie, but that he who is entitled to the usufruct can bring this action. This, however, must be understood to apply to a case where the usufructuary can use and enjoy his right; for otherwise, the slave would not be in the condition in which he should be. But if the slave had been stolen from the usufructuary, while in the enjoyment of his right, not only he himself, but also his heir, can bring the action for theft.

The Same, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. A man who has received from his own slave a female slave in consideration of the grant of his freedom, can, as a purchaser, acquire by usucaption the child of the said female slave.

Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. No one can acquire property by usucaption on the ground of abandonment who erroneously thinks that it has been abandoned.

Julianus, On Urseius Ferox, Book III. My slave, being in the hands of a thief, stipulated that he should be given to him. Sabinus denies that he is due to the latter, because when he made the stipulation, he was not serving him as a slave. I, however, cannot bring suit by virtue of this agreement, because at the time that the slave made it, he was not serving me. But if he made a stipulation without mentioning the thief personally, the right of action will be acquired by me, but neither a suit on mandate, nor any other, should be granted the thief against me.