Ad Dig. 19,1,25Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. II, § 321, Note 2; Bd. II, § 355, Note 6; Bd. II, § 472, Note 1b.The Same, Digest, Book LIV. When anyone purchases a vintage which is not yet harvested, and is forbidden by the vendor to gather the grapes, he can avail himself of an exception against him if suit is brought for the purchase-money, and not for the recovery of the property which was sold, but not delivered. But if, after delivery has been made, the purchaser is forbidden to press the grapes which have been gathered, or to remove the new wine, he can bring an action for production, or for injury committed, just as if he were forbidden to remove any other property whatsoever which belonged to him.

The Same, Digest, Book LIV. Where a testator bequeaths a slave, in general terms, and reserves Stichus, he does not annul the legacy, but he weakens it;

The Same, Digest, Book LIV. If anyone, who has stipulated to give Stichus, becomes the heir of a person who is entitled to the said Stichus under the terms of a will, and he brings suit under the will to recover Stichus, he does not annul the stipulation. On the other Rand, if he brings an action to recover Stichus under the stipulation, he will still be entitled to one under the will; because in the beginning, these two obligations were contracted in such a way that if one of them was brought into court, the other would, nevertheless, remain unimpaired.

The Same, Digest, Book LIV. He who stipulates for the usufruct of land, and afterwards for the land itself, resembles one who stipulates for a part, of the land and afterwards for the whole of it, because the land is not understood to be conveyed if the usufruct is reserved. And, on the other hand, where anyone stipulates for the land, and afterwards for the usufruct, he resembles one who stipulates for all of it, and afterwards for a part. When a person stipulates for a right of way to drive, and afterwards for a footpath, the subsequent stipulation is void, just as where the stipulation of anyone for ten aurei, and afterwards for five, is void. Likewise, if anyone stipulates for the crops, and afterwards for the use of the land, the stipulation is void; unless, in all these cases, he expressly states that he does this with the intention of making a new stipulation, for then the first obligation having been extinguished, a right of action will arise from the second, and the right of passage, and the use of the land, as well as the five aurei, can be exacted.

Julianus, Digest, Book LIV. The principal, however, should ratify the act as soon as he is informed of it, but with some degree of latitude and allowance, and it should include a certain period of time. As in the case of a legacy, where either its acceptance or rejection is concerned, a certain period of time, which is neither too small or too great, and which can better be understood than expressed in words, should be permitted.

The Same, Digest, Book LIV. Where anyone who has promised to give a slave, or pay ten aurei to you, or to Titius, delivers to Titius a part of the slave, and afterwards pays you ten aurei, he can bring an action to recover the part of the slave, not against Titius, but against you, just as if he had given to Titius with your consent, something that he did not owe him. The same rule will apply if he should pay ten aurei after the death of Titius; as he can recover the share of the slave rather from you than from the heir of Titius. 1If two joint-stipulators contract that a slave shall be delivered to them, and the promisor delivers to each of them different shares of different slaves, there is no doubt that he will not be released. If, however, he gives to both of them the shares of the same slave, a release takes place, because the common obligation has such an effect that what is paid to two persons is held to have been paid to one. On the other hand, when two sureties promise a slave shall be delivered, and they give shares of different slaves, they will not be released, but if they give shares of the same slave, they will be freed from liability. 2I stipulated for ten aurei to be paid to me, or a slave to be delivered to Titius. If the slave is delivered to Titius, the promisor will be released, so far as I am concerned; and before he is delivered I can demand the ten aurei. 3Ad Dig. 46,3,34,3ROHGE, Bd. 4 (1872), S. 303: Zahlung an einen zur Geldempfangnahme beauftragten Gehilfen nach Widerruf der Vollmacht.ROHGE, Bd. 10 (1874), S. 381: Wirkung des theilweisen Widerrufs bez. der Beschränkung einer bisher unbeschränkten Vollmacht auf den Verkehr mit dritten Contrahenten.If I give Titius charge of all my business, and afterwards, without the knowledge of my debtors, I forbid him to transact it, the latter, by paying him, will be released; for he who gives anyone charge of his business is understood to direct his debtors to pay him as his agent. 4If my debtor, without any authority from me, should erroneously believe that he has my consent to pay money to another person, he will not be released; and therefore no one will be freed from liability by payment of an agent, who voluntarily offers himself to transact the affairs of another. 5If a fugitive slave who asserts that he is free sells any property, it has been decided that the purchasers are not released from liability to his master by paying the fugitive slave. 6If a son-in-law pays a dowry to his father-in-law, without the knowledge of the daughter of the latter, he will not be released, but he can bring a personal action for recovery against his father-in-law, unless the daughter ratines what he has done. The son-in-law, to a certain extent, resembles one who pays the agent of a person who is absent, because, in the case of a dowry, the daughter participates in the dowry, and is, as it were, a partner in the obligation. 7If I, desiring to make a donation to Titius, order my debtor to pay a sum of money to him, even though Titius may accept the money with the intention of rendering it mine, the debtor will, nevertheless, be released from liability. If, however, Titius afterwards gives me the same money, it will become mine. 8A testator appointed, as his heir, a son under paternal control from whom he had received a surety. If he should enter upon the estate by the order of his father, the question arises whether the latter can bring an action against the surety. I stated that whenever the principal debtor became the heir of him who received security, the sureties would be released, because they could not be indebted to the same person, on account of the same person. 9If a thief restores to someone claiming an estate property which he has collected from debtors of the estate, the latter will be released. 10If I stipulate that ten aurei shall be paid, or a slave be delivered, and I receive two sureties, Titius and Mævius, and Titius pays five aurei, he will not be released until Mævius also pays five. If, however, Mævius delivers a share of a slave, both of them will remain liable. 11Anyone who can protect himself by means of a perpetual exception can recover what he has paid, and therefore will not be released. Hence, when one of two promisors makes an agreement that nothing shall be demanded of him, even though he should make payment, the other will, nevertheless, remain liable.

Julianus, Digest, Book LIV. Where anyone stipulates for a slave or ten aurei, and receives a receipt for five, he extinguishes a part of the stipulation, and he can demand five, or the half of a slave.

The Same, Digest, Book LIV. The species of sophistry which the Greeks designate a “concise syllogism” is where from premises which are evidently true, by means of trifling changes, conclusions are deduced which are clearly false.