Digestorum libri
Ex libro XLIII
Dig. 22,3,20Iulianus libro quadragesimo tertio digestorum. Si quis liberum hominem vi rapuerit, in vinculis habuerit, is indignissime commodum possessoris consequeretur, quia probari non poterit hominem eo tempore quo primum lis ordinaretur in libertate fuisse.
Julianus, Digest, Book XLIII. Where anyone seizes a freeman by force, and keeps him in chains, he is most unworthy of the advantages enjoyed by a possessor, because it cannot be proved that, at the time that proceedings were first instituted, the man was free.
Dig. 35,1,23Idem libro quadragesimo tertio digestorum. Qui duobus heredibus decem dare iussus est et fundum sibi habere, verius est, ut condicionem scindere non possit, ne etiam legatum scindatur. igitur quamvis alteri quinque dederit, nullam partem fundi vindicabit, nisi alteri quoque adeunti hereditatem reliqua quinque numeraverit aut illo omittente hereditatem ei, qui solus adierit hereditatem, tota decem dederit.
The Same, Digest, Book XLIII. Where a testator directed his legatee to pay ten aurei to his two heirs, and to take for himself a certain tract of land, the better opinion is that the heir cannot divide the condition, unless the legacy is also divided. Therefore, although he may have paid five aurei to one of the heirs, he can claim no part of the land unless he pays the remaining five to the heir who enters upon the estate; or if he should reject it, he pays the entire ten to the one who alone accepts it.
Dig. 40,7,13Idem libro quadragensimo tertio digestorum. Si quis ita libertatem dedisset ‘Stichus, si eum heres meus testamento suo non manumiserit, liber esto’, secundum voluntatem defuncti hoc significari videtur ‘si testamento suo heres non adscripserit ei libertatem’. quare si quidem heres libertatem servo testamento suo dederit, defectus condicione videtur: si non dederit, impleta condicione ultimo vitae tempore heredis ad libertatem perveniet. 1Servus communis liber esse iussus ita ‘si decem dederit’ ex peculio dare potest, quod quocumque modo adquisitum habuerit: nec refert, apud heredem id an apud socium fuerit et heredi an extraneo dare iussus sit. nam per omnia causae statuliberi applicatur: qui condicionis implendae gratia alienare peculiares nummos potest. 2Si duo servi rationibus redditis liberi esse iussi fuerint et separatim rationes gesserint, non dubie separatim quoque condicioni parere poterunt. sed si actus eorum communiter gestus ita immixtus fuerit, ut separari non possit, necessario alter cessando alterius libertatem impediet. nec videbitur condicio in alterius persona impleta, nisi id, quod computatione rationum habita reliquum fuerit, aut uterque aut alter totum solverit. 3Qui ita liber iussus est ‘si iuraverit se Capitolium ascensurum’, confestim ut iuraverit, quamvis Capitolium non ascenderit, liber erit. 4Servus heredis rem ipsius heredis dare iussus et liber esse ad libertatem perveniet, quia potest testator et sine ulla dandi condicione heredis servum manumitti iubere. 5Haec scriptura ‘Stichus cum erit annorum triginta, liber esto. Stichus si decem non dederit, liber ne esto’ hanc vim habet ‘Stichus si decem dederit et ad annos triginta pervenerit, liber esto’: namque ademptio libertatis vel legati sub condicione facta incipit contrariam condicionem legato vel libertati, quae prius data erat, iniecisse.
The Same, Digest, Book XLIII. Where a testator bequeaths a grant of freedom as follows, “Let Stichus be free, if my heir does not manumit him by his will,” the intention of the testator is held to be that the slave will be free if the heir does not grant him freedom by his will. Hence, if the heir should emancipate the slave by his will, the condition is considered to have failed; if he does not emancipate him, the condition will be fulfilled at the time of the death of the heir, and the slave will obtain his freedom. 1If a slave held in common is ordered to be free under the condition of his paying ten aurei, he can pay the said sum out of his peculium, no matter in what way he may have obtained it; nor does it make any difference whether the peculium was in the hands of the heir, or in those of a joint-owner; or whether the slave was ordered to pay the money to the heir, or to a stranger. For it is a rule of general application that slaves who are to be free conditionally can alienate property belonging to their peculium for the purpose of complying with a condition upon which their freedom is dependent. 2Where two slaves are ordered to be free on condition of rendering their accounts, and they have transacted business separately, there is no doubt that they can also comply with the condition separately. If, however, their administration has been conducted in common, and is so confused that it cannot be divided, it necessarily happens that if one of them fails to render an account, he will prevent the other from obtaining his freedom; nor will the condition be held to have been complied with with reference to one of them, unless both or either should pay all which may be found to be due as a balance after examination of the accounts. 3Where a slave is ordered to be free under the condition that he will swear that he will ascend to the Capitol, and immediately takes such an oath, he will become free even if he does not ascend to the Capitol. 4The slave of the heir, who is ordered to deliver property belonging to the heir himself, and be free, will be entitled to his freedom, because the testator can order the slave of the heir to be manumitted without imposing the condition of giving anything. 5The following clause, “Let Stichus be free when he is thirty years old; Stichus shall not be free unless he pays ten aurei,” has the same effect as if it had been said that they should let Stichus be free if he pays ten aurei and reaches the age of thirty years. For the deprivation of freedom, or of the legacy which is bequeathed under a certain condition, is considered to impose the contrary condition upon the legacy or the grant of freedom previously made.
Dig. 43,8,6Iulianus libro quadragensimo tertio digestorum. Ei, qui hoc interdicto experitur ‘ne quid in loco publico fiat, quo damnum privato detur’, quamvis de loco publico interdicat, nihilo minus procuratoris dandi facultas est.
Julianus, Digest, Book XLIII. He who avails himself of this interdict to prevent any work done in a public place from causing damage to a private individual can employ an attorney, although the proceeding under the interdict has reference to a public place.
Dig. 46,1,12Idem libro quadragensimo tertio digestorum. Plane eius actionis nomine, quae de peculio adversus eum competit, fideiussor recte accipitur.
The Same, Digest, Book XLIII. It is evident that a surety can properly be taken on account of the action De peculio, which will lie against the father.