Julianus, Digest, Book XLII. According to the Lex Cornelia, the wills of those who die while in the power of the enemy are confirmed, just as if those who had executed them had never been in the hands of the enemy, and their estates pass to whomever are entitled to them under the testamentary provisions. Wherefore, in case a slave is appointed heir by a person who dies while in the power of the enemy, he will become free and the heir of the testator, whether he is willing or not; although he is improperly said to be a necessary heir, for the son of a man who dies while in the hands of the enemy must assume the obligation of the estate, even if unwilling to do so, although he cannot be said to be his heir, as he was not under his control at the time of his death.

The Same, Digest, Book XLII. If Stichus should be bequeathed to me, and I should be charged, “To deliver either Stichus, or Pamphilus, my slave,” and I lose anything on account of the legacy through the operation of the Falcidian Law, I shall be obliged to give my slave Pamphilus entirely to Titius, or that share in Stichus which I have received by way of legacy.

Julianus, Digest, Book XLII. If a father should permit his son to manumit his slave, and, in the meantime, should die intestate, and his son, not being aware that his father was dead, should grant the slave his freedom, the slave will become free through the favor conceded to liberty, as it does not appear that the master changed his mind. If, however, the father had, by means of a messenger, forbidden his son to liberate the slave, and the son did not know this, and, before ascertaining it, he should manumit the slave, the latter will not become free; for in order that a slave may obtain his freedom through the manumission of a son, the intention of the father must continue to exist; since, if he should change his mind, it would not be true that the son had manumitted the slave with his father’s consent. 1Whenever a master manumits his slave, even though he may think he belongs to another, it is, nevertheless, true that the slave is manumitted with the consent of his master, and therefore he will become free. And, on the other hand, if Stichus does not think that he belongs to the person who manumits him, he will, nevertheless, obtain his freedom, for there is more in the fact itself than in opinion; and, in both cases, it is true that Stichus was manumitted with the consent of his master. The same rule of law will apply where both the master and the slave are mistaken, and one of them thinks that he is not the master, and the other believes that he is not his slave. 2A minor of twenty years of age, who is a master, cannot legally manumit without appearing before the proper authority. Paulus says that if a minor of twenty years of age permits a slave over whom he has the right of pledge to be manumitted, the manumission is legal; because he is not understood to have actually liberated him, but only not to have interfered with his manumission.

Julianus, In the Same Book. The question has often been asked whether a magistrate appointed for the purpose of examining manumissions can, himself, manumit a slave. I remember that Javolenus, my preceptor, manumitted his slaves in Africa and in Syria, when he was a member of the board of magistrates; and I followed his example, and liberated some of my slaves in my tribunal, both while I was Prætor and Consul; and I advised certain other Prætors and Consuls to do the same.

The Same, Digest, Book XLII. Freedom which is granted to take effect at the last moment of life, as for example, “Let Stichus be free when he dies,” is held to be of no force or effect. The following testamentary disposition, “Let Stichus be free, if he does not ascend to the Capitol,” must be understood to mean if he does not ascend to the Capitol as soon as he possibly can. Hence, Stichus would obtain his freedom in this way, if having the power to ascend to the Capitol he abstained from doing so. 1The question arose whether freedom should be considered to have been conditionally granted by the following provision in a will: “Let Pamphilus be free, in order that he may render an account to my children.” The answer was that freedom should be granted absolutely, and that the addition, “In order that he may render an account,” does not impose any condition upon the grant of freedom; still, because the manifest wish of the testator was expressed, the slave should be compelled to render his account. 2Where a slave is indefinitely ordered to be free after several years, he will become free after the expiration of two years. The favor-conceded to liberty requires this, and the words themselves are susceptible of such a construction; unless the person who is charged with the grant of freedom can prove by the clearest evidence that the intention of the testator was otherwise.

Julianus, Digest, Book XLII. If a father should appoint his two sons his heirs, and his will is annulled by the birth of a posthumous child, although the estate will belong to them equally, still, the grants of freedom under the trust ought not to be executed, as they are not compelled to pay any other legacies, or execute any other trusts. 1Where an heir who is charged to manumit a slave belonging to a third party, or one who is owned in common, or one in whom the usufruct belongs to another, conceals himself, relief will not improperly be granted under the Decree of the Senate. 2If freedom is bequeathed to Stichus by a trust under the condition that he shall render his account, and he is ready to pay over the balance in his hands, during the absence of the heir, it is the duty of the Prætor to select some reliable person under whose supervision the account may be rendered, so that the slave can deposit the money which is due according to the calculation; and then the Prætor shall decree that the slave is entitled to his freedom under the terms of the trust. It is proper for this to be done when the heir is absent for some good reason; for if he conceals himself, it will be sufficient to satisfy the Prætor that it is not the fault of the slave that the condition is not complied with, and hence he must decree that he is entitled to his freedom. 3Where freedom is bequeathed conditionally to a slave who forms part of the legacy, he should not be delivered to the beneficiary of the trust, unless the latter gives security that he will surrender him if the condition should be complied with. 4A certain woman, at the time of her death, made the following statement in the presence of several respectable men, and of her mother, who was entitled to the estate as her heir at law, “I wish my female slaves, Mævia and Seia, to be free,” and then died intestate. I ask, if her mother does not claim the estate as heir at law under the Decree of the Senate, and it should pass to the next of kin, whether the slaves will be entitled to freedom under the terms of the trust. I answered that they would be, for when the woman being at the point of death said, “I wish my female slaves, So-and-So and So-and-So, to be free,” she is considered to have asked this to be done by all those who would be her heirs at law, or the possessors of her estate under the Prætorian Edict.