Epistularum libri
Ex libro X
Dig. 5,1,35Idem libro decimo epistularum. Non quemadmodum fideiussoris obligatio in pendenti potest esse et vel in futurum concipi, ita iudicium in pendenti potest esse vel de his rebus quae postea in obligationem adventurae sunt. nam neminem puto dubitaturum, quin fideiussor ante obligationem rei accipi possit: iudicium vero, antequam aliquid debeatur, non posse.
Ad Dig. 5,1,35ROHGE, Bd. 9 (1873), S. 33: Zulässigkeit der Klagen auf Feststellung eines obligatorischen Verhältnisses.The Same, Epistles, Book X. It is not true that, as the obligation of a surety can be left dependent upon circumstances or contracted for at some future time, so also a suit may be contingent, or in such terms that an obligation may be subsequently incurred; for I do not think that anyone would doubt that a surety can be accepted before the obligation of the principal debtor is incurred, but issue cannot be joined before some indebtedness arises.
Dig. 45,1,108Idem libro decimo epistularum. A Titio ita stipulatus sum: ‘si qua mihi nupserit, decem dotis eius nomine dare spondes?’ quaerebatur, an consistat talis stipulatio. respondit: si stipulanti mihi dos ita promissa est: ‘quamcumque uxorem duxero, dotis eius nomine decem dare spondes?’, nihil in causa est, quare ea pecunia condicione expleta non debeatur: nam cum condicio etiam ex incertae personae facto parere obligationem possit, veluti ‘si quis in Capitolium ascenderit, decem dare spondes?’ ‘si quis a me decem petierit, tot dare spondes?’, cur non idem et in dote promissa respondeatur, ratio reddi non potest. 1Nulla promissio potest consistere, quae ex voluntate promittentis statum capit.
The Same, Epistles, Book X. I stipulated with Titius as follows, “If some woman marries me, do you promise to give me ten aurei by way of dowry?” The question arose whether such a stipulation was valid. The answer was that if the dowry was promised to me, stipulating as follows: “Do you promise to pay me ten aurei by way of dowry, no matter what woman I marry?” there is no reason why the money should not be due, if the condition was complied with. For when a condition dependent upon the act of some person who is uncertain can create an obligation, as, for instance, “Do you promise to pay ten aurei if anyone ascends to the Capitol?” or, “If anyone demands ten aurei of me, do you promise to pay as many?” there is no reason why the same answer should not be given as in the case where a dowry was promised. 1Ad Dig. 45,1,108,1ROHGE, Bd. 16 (1875), Nr. 109, S. 427, 429: Ergänzung unbestimmt gelassener Vereinbarungen. Arbitrium boni viri.No promise is valid which depends upon the will of the person who makes it.
Dig. 46,1,42Iavolenus libro decimo epistularum. Si ita fideiussorem accepero: ‘quod ego decem credidi, de ea pecunia mille modios tritici fide tua esse iubes?’, non obligatur fideiussor, quia in aliam rem, quam quae credita est, fideiussor obligari non potest, quia non, ut aestimatio rerum quae mercis numero habentur in pecunia numerata fieri potest, ita pecunia quoque merce aestimanda est.
Javolenus, Epistles, Book X. If I accept a surety under the following terms, “Do you agree to be responsible for the delivery of a thousand measures of wheat, to be paid for with your money, as security for the ten aurei which I have lent?” the surety will not be liable, because he cannot become responsible for something different from what has been lent, because the estimate of the value of the property which is considered as merchandise can be made in money; just as a sum of money can be estimated in merchandise.
Dig. 46,3,79Idem libro decimo epistularum. Pecuniam, quam mihi debes, aut aliam rem si in conspectu meo ponere te iubeam, efficitur, ut et tu statim libereris et mea esse incipiat: nam tum, quod a nullo corporaliter eius rei possessio detinetur, adquisita mihi et quodammodo manu longa tradita existimanda est.
The Same, Epistles, Book X. The money which you owe me, or any other property which I direct you to produce in my presence, when this is done, causes you immediately to be released, and the property to belong to me. For as the possession of the said property is not actually held by anyone, it is acquired by me, and is, as it were, considered to be delivered to me manu longa.
Dig. 50,17,201Idem libro decimo epistularum. Omnia, quae ex testamento proficiscuntur, ita statum eventus capiunt, si initium quoque sine vitio ceperint.