Gaius, Diurnal or Golden Matters, Book III. Obligations also arise from criminal acts, for example, from theft, damage, robbery, injuries, all of which offences are of the same kind, for they are all derived from the matter itself, that is to say from the offence; while, on the other hand, obligations arising from contract are not only derived from the transfer of the property, but also from the words and the consent of the parties.

The Same, Golden Matters, Book III. Where anyone who transacts the business of an absent person performs some act by virtue of a mandate, it is evident that, from the contract which is made, actions on mandate will lie between the parties, in which each of them can prove how one should act toward the other in compliance with the rules of good faith. If, however, the agent acts without a mandate, it has been decided that the parties will be mutually liable; and, on this account, proceedings have been introduced which we designate actions based on voluntary agency, by means of which we can compel one another to do whatever justice and good faith demand. Actions of this kind, however, do not arise either from contracts or from crimes, for he who transacts the business of another during his absence is believed to have made an agreement with him previously; and it is no breach of the law to undertake to transact the business of another without a mandate. Thus, it can still be said that he whose business has been transacted without his knowledge has either made a contract or committed a criminal offence; but through motives of convenience it has been established that the parties are liable to one another. This rule has been adopted for the reason that men frequently depart for foreign countries with the intention of speedily returning, and, on this account, do not commit the care of their business to anyone; and afterwards, through the occurrence of unforeseen events, they are necessarily absent for a longer time than they expected to be, and it is unjust that their business should suffer which would, indeed, happen if the person who offered to attend to their affairs should not be entitled to an action to recover any expense which he had properly paid out of his own purse; or if he whose affairs had been transacted should have no right of action against him who took charge of his business without authority. 1Those who are liable to an action on guardianship are not, properly speaking, considered to be bound on account of contracts, as no agreement is entered into between guardian and ward. But, for the reason that they cannot be held responsible on account of a criminal offence, they are considered to be liable under a quasi contract. In this case, also, the actions are reciprocal. For not only can the ward bring suit against his guardian, but, on the other hand, the guardian is entitled to an action against his ward, if he has expended anything upon the property of the latter, or becomes responsible for him, or encumbered his own property to one of his creditors. 2An heir who owes a legacy is not understood to be liable either on account of a contract or a crime, for a legatee is not understood to have made any contract with the deceased, or with his heir, and it is perfectly clear that no criminal offence has been committed in a case of this kind. 3He, also, who, through the mistake of the person who made the payment, received something to which he was not entitled, is bound as in the case of a loan, and is liable to the same action as that to which a debtor is liable to his creditor. It should not, however, be understood that he who is responsible in a case of this kind is bound by a contract; for anyone who pays money by a mistake does so rather with the intention of discharging an obligation than of contracting one. 4If a judge should render an improper decision, he is not, strictly speaking, considered to be liable on account of a crime, nor is he bound by virtue of a contract; still, as he has committed a fault, even if this was done through ignorance, he is considered to be liable on account of a quasi offence. 5He, also, is considered to be liable on account of a quasi offence, if, from an apartment which belongs to him, or which he has leased, or occupies gratuitously, he throws down, or pours out anything so that it injures a passer-by. Hence, he cannot properly be understood to be liable on account of having committed an offence, because very frequently he is responsible for the carelessness of another, for instance, for that of a slave, or a child. He resembles one who places or hangs something in a part of the house under which people are accustomed to pass, and which may injure someone, if it should fall. Therefore, if a son under paternal control, who lives separately from his father, should throw down or pour out anything from his apartment, or should place or hang anything above the street which threatens injury to the passers-by, it is the opinion of Julianus that an action should be granted against the son himself, and that neither an action De peculia nor a noxal action should be granted against the father. 6Likewise, the master of a ship, or the proprietor of a tavern or an inn, is held to be responsible for a quasi criminal offence for any damage or theft which may be committed on board the ship, or in the tavern or inn, provided he does not himself commit the offence, but someone does whom he employs on the ship, or in the tavern or inn; for as this action cannot be brought against him on account of a contract, and as he is, to a certain extent, guilty of neglfgence for making use of the services of bad men, he is considered to be liable on account of the quasi criminal offence.

Gaius, On Diurnal Occurrences or Golden Matters, Book III. When a judge makes case his own, he is not, properly speaking, guilty of a criminal offence; but, for the reason that he is not bound by a contract, and certainly can be understood to be, to some extent, to blame, although this may have occurred through ignorance, he is considered to be liable to an action in fætum, as having committed an unlawful act, and he must submit to any penalty which may appear just to the court having jurisdiction of the case.