Celsus, Digest, Book XIX. If the betrothal has not yet been made, and you promise a dowry to Titius in behalf of Seia, at a time when she refused to marry him, and she should, notwithstanding, marry him afterwards, you will owe the dowry, unless another marriage should have taken place in the meantime. 1Where a woman entered into a stipulation with Titius for the female slave Pamphila, and, afterwards, being about to marry him, she permitted him to take as dowry what he owed her; even though Pamphila did not belong to him, would Pamphila, nevertheless, be included in the dowry, and would she be at the risk of the woman in case of her death? Or in case she should have a child, must it be returned to the woman? If the first stipulation remained in force, the offspring of the slave should not be given up, unless it made a difference whether the husband had possession of the property which he owed at the time that the dowry was constituted (for it could be held that the property itself came into his hands), or did not have possession of it; as, if the latter was the case, the better opinion is that the release from the obligation should rather be considered to have come into his hands than the property itself, and therefore that the offspring of the slave is not due to the woman.

Ad Dig. 31,20Windscheid: Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7. Aufl. 1891, Bd. I, § 169a, Note 5.The Same, Digest, Book XIX. I learned from my father, and Proculus also held the same opinion, that where a legacy is bequeathed to a slave owned in common, and one of his masters refuses it, his share will not accrue to the other, for the bequest was not made conjointly, but a portion was left to each of the parties; and if both should demand it, each of them will be only entitled to a share of the same in proportion to his interest in the slave.

Celsus, Digest, Book XIX. The rule is different where the slave is bequeathed with his clothing.

Celsus, Digest, Book XIX. When a slave is ordered to be free by a testator, and his peculium is left to him, the sub-slaves of his sub-slaves are embraced in three legacies.

Celsus, Digest, Book XIX. Labeo says that the term “supellex” is derived from the custom of persons who, when about to start on a journey, were accustomed to place in skins such articles as would be of use to them. 1Tubero attempts to explain the term household goods as utensils destined for the daily use of the head of the family, which do not come under some other designation, as, for example, provisions, silver plate, clothing, ornaments, implements intended for farming or for a house. It is not strange that the name has changed with the manners of the citizens, and their use of different articles; for, in former times, household goods were composed of earthenware, wood, glass, or copper, and afterwards they were made of ivory, tortoise-shell, and silver, and, at present, gold and even jewels are employed as material for such things. Hence, it is necessary to consider the nature of the articles, rather than the material of which they are composed, in order to determine whether they should be classed as household goods, silver plate, or clothing. 2Servius admits that it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the person who made the bequest, and the category in which he was in the habit of placing the articles bequeathed. If, however, anyone is accustomed to designate as household goods things which there is no doubt should be classed otherwise (as, for instance, silver plate for the table, cloaks, and togas), it should not, for that reason, be held that the articles which he left are also included among his household goods; for the names should not be derived from the opinions of individuals, but from the custom of people in general. Tubero says that this does not seem to be clear to him, for he asks of what value are names unless to show the intention of the person who uses them. And, indeed, I do not think that anyone would say something which he did not intend, especially if he used the term by which the article was commonly designated; for we make use of speech, and no one should be presumed to have said what he did not have in his mind. However, although the judgment and the authority of Tubero has great weight with me, still, I do not dissent from the opinion of Servius, that a man should not be considered to have said anything because he did not make use of the name by which it is indicated. For although the intention of the person speaking is preferable, and more important than his words, still, no one is held to have said anything without speech, unless indeed, those who cannot talk, and by their gestures and the utterance of certain sounds, that is to say, by inarticulate expressions, are considered to have spoken.

Celsus, Digest, Book XIX. A certain man left his wife everything which he had provided for her use, and obtained a divorce from her before his death. Proculus says that she will not be entitled to the property, because it appears that it was taken from her. This, however, is a question of fact, for even though he may have repudiated her, he could not have intended to deprive her of the legacy.

Celsus, Digest, Book XIX. By the words “movable property” and “personal property” are meant the same thing, unless it appears that the deceased, by using the expression “movable” property, only intended to refer to animals because they moved themselves. This is correct.