Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

1 Paulus, On Plautius, Book XVI. A rule is a statement, in a few words, of the course to be followed in the matter under discussion. The law, however, is not derived from the rule, but the rule is established by the law. Hence, a short decision of the point in question is made by the rule; or, as Sabinus says, a concise explanation of the case is given, which, however, in other instances to which it is not applicable loses its force.

2 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book I. Women are excluded from all civil or public employments; therefore they cannot be judges, or perform the duties of magistrates, or bring suits in court, or become sureties for others, or act as attorneys. 1A minor, also, must abstain from all civil employments.

3 The Same, On Sabinus, Book III. He who can consent openly can likewise do so by not refusing.

4 The Same, On Sabinus, Book VI. He is not considered to give his full consent who obeys the command of his father or his master.

5 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book II. In business transactions, the condition of an insane person is one thing, and that of a minor beyond the age of infancy is another, although neither may perfectly understand what is required of him, for an insane person cannot transact any business whatever, but a minor can attend to anything of this kind with the authority of his guardian.

6 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book VII. A person does not wish to be an heir who is willing that an estate should be transferred to another.

7 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book III. Our law does not suffer anyone who is in civil life to die both testate and intestate, for there is a natural antagonism between the two terms.

8 The Same, On Sabinus, Book IV. The rights of blood cannot be annulled by any Civil Law.

9 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XV. In matters which are obscure, we always follow the one which is the least ambiguous.

10 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book III. It is in accordance with nature that he should enjoy the benefit of anything who pays the expenses attaching to it.

11 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book V. That which is ours cannot be transferred to another without our consent.

12 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book III. In the interpretation of wills, the intention of the testator should be liberally construed.

13 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XIX. He is not considered to have acquired anything whose claim is barred by an exception.

14 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book V. In all obligations in which the time of payment is not inserted, the debt is due immediately.

15 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book IV. Anyone who has a right of action to recover property is considered to have possession of the same.

16 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXI. A sale is not fictitious when the price is agreed upon.

17 The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXIII. When a time is prescribed by a will, it is considered to have been inserted for the benefit of the heir, unless the intention of the testator was otherwise; as in the case of stipulations, where time is granted in favor of the promisor.

18 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book VI. When legacies pass to our heirs after our death, they will benefit those under whose control we were at the time that we acquired them. The case is different where we make stipulations; for if we stipulate under a condition, we will acquire the property, for the same parties under all circumstances, even if the condition should be fulfilled after we have been released from the authority of a master. Paulus: When a son under paternal control stipulates under a condition, and is then emancipated, and the condition is afterwards fulfilled, an action will lie in favor of his father, because, in the case of stipulations, the time when we contract is taken into account.

19 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXIV. Anyone who makes an agreement with another either is not ignorant or should not be ignorant of his condition; the heir, however, cannot be blamed under such circumstances, as he did not voluntarily contract with the legatees. 1An exception on the ground of fraud does not usually operate as a bar to those who are not excluded by the will of the testator.

20 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book VII. Whenever the meaning of a grant of freedom is doubtful, a decision must be rendered in favor of liberty.

21 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVII. He who is permitted to do more shall be allowed to do less.

22 The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXVIII. No obligation will bind anyone of a servile condition. 1The rule is generally approved that, wherever, in bona fide agreements, a condition is left to the decision of the owner of the property, or his agent, this is understood to be done in accordance with the judgment of a good citizen.

23 The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXIX. Certain contracts only involve fraud, others involve both fraud and negligence. Those which involve fraud are deposits and transfers under a precarious title; those which involve both fraud and negligence are mandate, loan for use, sale, pledge, hiring, and also the bestowal of dowry, guardianship, and the transaction of business. (The two last, however, demand extraordinary diligence.) Partnership and joint-ownership of property involve both fraud and negligence. This, however, is the case only where nothing has been expressly agreed upon for either more or less in the different contracts; for what was agreed upon in the beginning must be observed, since the contract imposes a law; except where, as Celsus says, the contract would not be valid if it was agreed that no fraud should be committed, for this is contrary to the good faith attaching to contracts; and this is our present practice. No responsibility, however, is assumed in the case of accidents to animals, or their death, or to anything else that happens which is not due to negligence; or with reference to the flight of slaves whom it was not customary to guard, robbers, tumults, fires, inundations, and the attacks of thieves.

24 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book V. Whenever the interest of anyone is concerned, it is a question of fact, and not one of law.

25 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XI. Real is better than personal security.

26 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXX. Anyone who has the right to alienate property against the consent of a person who is present has a much better right to do so when he is ignorant of the fact, and absent.

27 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XVI. Nothing prescribed either by the Prætorian or the Civil law can be changed by the agreement of private individuals; although the basis of the obligation may be altered by mutual consent, by operation of the law itself, and by the pleading of an exception on the ground of an informal agreement; for the reason that the cause of an action conferred either by the law or by the Prætor is not annulled by the agreement of private individuals, unless it was made between them at the time when the suit was brought.

28 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXXVI. The Divine Pius stated in a Rescript that those who were sued on account of a display of liberality could only have judgment rendered against them for an amount which they were able to pay.

29 Paulus, On Sabinus, Book VIII. Anything which is void in the beginning cannot be remedied by lapse of time.

30 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXXVI. Consent and not cohabitation constitutes marriage.

31 The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLII. It is true that neither agreements nor stipulations can abrogate an act which has already been performed; for whatever is impossible cannot be included in an agreement or a stipulation in such a way as to render a prætorian action or agreement effective.

32 The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLIII. So far as the Civil Law is concerned, slaves are not considered persons, but this is riot the case according to natural law, because natural law regards all men as equal.

33 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXII. Where either the plaintiff or the defendant attempts to prove a lucrative title, the case of the plaintiff is the more difficult to establish.

34 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XLII. In all stipulations and other contracts, we follow the intention of the parties; and if it is not apparent what their intention was, we observe the custom of the place where the transaction was concluded. But what rule should be adopted if the custom of the place did not settle anything, because it varied? In this instance, the smallest amount should be exacted.

35 The Same, On Sabinus, Book XLVIII. Nothing is so natural as that an obligation should be abrogated in the same way in which it was contracted; therefore a verbal obligation is abrogated by words, and one based upon the mere consent of the parties is annulled by the dissent of both.

36 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXVII. It is culpable to interfere in something with which one has no concern.

37 Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book LI. Anyone who has the power to condemn has also the power to acquit.

38 Pomponius, On Sabinus, Book XXIX. Just as an heir should not be liable to a penalty incurred by the deceased for a crime, so also he should not profit by anything which may come into his hands on account of the crime.

39 The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXXII. In every instance, an act is considered as having been performed, where anyone is prevented from performing it by another.

40 The Same, On Sabinus, Book XXXIV. An insane person, and one who is forbidden to manage his property, has no will.

41 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVI. Anything which a plaintiff is not allowed to do is not permitted the defendant. 1Where the right to property is obscure, it is better to favor the party who attempts to recover it than he who is striving to obtain it for the first time.

42 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book IX. Those who succeed to another have good reason to plead ignorance as to whether what is demanded is due or not. Sureties, also, as well as heirs, can allege ignorance as an excuse. This, however, only applies to an heir when he is sued, and not when he brings the action; for it is clear that anyone who brings suit must be informed, for it is in his power to do so when he wishes, and he should, in the first place, carefully examine the claim, and then proceed to collect it.

43 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXVIII. No one who denies that he owes anything is prevented from making any other defence unless the law prohibits it. 1Whenever several actions can be brought for the same thing, one alone should be employed.

44 The Same, On the Edict, Book XXIX. We grant an action against an heir for the amount by which he has profited through the fraud of the deceased, but this does not apply to any fraud of his own.

45 The Same, On the Edict, Book XXX. Neither the pledge, nor the deposit, nor possession by a precarious title, nor the purchase, nor the hiring of one’s own property, can stand. 1The agreement of private individuals does not affect public law.

46 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book X. No one is compelled to make restitution of anything which has been exacted by way of penalty.

47 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXX. No obligation is incurred by giving advice which is not fraudulent; if, however, it should be given with fraudulent and deceitful intent, an action for fraud will lie. 1The partner of my partner is not mine.

48 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXV. Anything which is done or said in the heat of anger is not considered of any effect, unless the perseverance of the party in question discloses the condition of his or her mind. Therefore, when a wife returns after a short time, she is not considered to have been divorced.

49 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXXV. The cheating of one person does not afford ground to another for an action when he was not affected by it.

50 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXXIX. He is free from blame who is aware of a breach of the law being committed, but is unable to prevent it.

51 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XV. No one is considered to acquire something which he is obliged to deliver to another.

52 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XLIV. Not only he who conceals himself is considered not to defend a case, but also he who, being present, refuses to defend himself or is unwilling to proceed.

53 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XLII. A person has a right to recover money which he has paid by mistake, but where he pays it designedly it is considered a donation.

54 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XLVI. No one can transfer to another a right which he himself does not possess.

55 Gaius, On Wills Relating to the Urban Edict, Book II. No one is considered to commit a fraud who does what he has a right to do.

56 The Same, On Legacies Relating to the Urban Edict, Book III. In questions which are doubtful, the more benevolent opinion should always obtain the preference.

57 The Same, On the Principal Edict, Book XVIII. Good faith does not permit the same debt to be collected twice.

58 Ulpianus, Disputations, Book II. An action De peculia is not usually granted against a father in criminal cases.

59 The Same, Disputations, Book III. It is decided that an heir has the same authority and rights that were enjoyed by the deceased.

60 The Same, Disputations, Book X. He is always understood to direct something to be done who does not prevent another from intervening in his behalf. If, however, anyone who did not consent should ratify a transaction, he will be liable to an action on mandate.

61 The Same, Opinions, Book III. Anyone has the right to repair his own house, provided he does not do so against the consent of another, on land to which he has no right.

62 Julianus, Digest, Book VI. Inheritance is nothing more than succession to every right enjoyed by the deceased.

63 The Same, Digest, Book XVII. Anyone who, without fraudulent intent, proceeds to trial, is not held to be in default of payment.

64 The Same, Digest, Book XXIX. Anything which rarely occurs should not rashly be considered in the transaction of business.

65 The Same, Digest, Book LIV. The species of sophistry which the Greeks designate a “concise syllogism” is where from premises which are evidently true, by means of trifling changes, conclusions are deduced which are clearly false.

66 The Same, Digest, Book LX. Marcellus says that he ceases to be a debtor who obtains a legal exception, and one which is not contrary to natural equity.

67 The Same, Digest, Book LXXXVII. Whenever a sentence has two meanings, that should be accepted which is the better adapted to the case.

68 Paulus, On the Recovery of a Dowry. In every instance it should be observed that when the condition of a person affords ground for an advantage, and it is lacking, the advantage also disappears; but where the action requires it, anyone can prosecute it, and the ground for the advantage remains.

69 The Same, Concerning the Assignment of Freedmen. A benefit is not conferred upon a person who is unwilling to accept it.

70 The Same, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book II. No one upon whom has been conferred the right to sentence an offender to death, or to any other punishment, can transfer his authority to another.

71 The Same, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book II. Everything which requires an investigation cannot be settled by means of a petition.

72 Javolenus, On the Last Works of Labeo, Book III. The profits of any kind of property can be given in pledge.

73 Quintus Mucius Scævola, Rules. Guardianship is derived from the right of inheritance, except where there are female heirs. 1No one can appoint a guardian for anyone except for his proper heirs, or unless he had such heirs at the time of his death, or would have had them if he had lived. 2That is considered to be done with violence which anyone does after having been prohibited; and he acts clandestinely who proceeds without the knowledge of the other party, if he has a controversy with him, or thinks that he will have one. 3Anything which is stated in a will in such a way that it cannot be understood is just the same as if it had not been mentioned at all. 4No one can benefit another to the detriment of a third party, either by an agreement, by prescribing a condition, or by entering into a stipulation.

74 Papinianus, Questions, Book I. An unjust condition should not be imposed by one person upon another.

75 Papinianus, Questions, Book III. No one can change his mind to the injury of another.

76 The Same, Questions, Book XXIV. No transactions which require the consent of the parties interested can be carried out, unless actual and positive proof of this exists.

77 The Same, Questions, Book XXVIII. Lawful acts which are not dependent upon time or a condition, as, for instance, emancipation, release, the acceptance of an estate, the choice of a slave, the appointment of a guardian, are absolutely annulled by the addition of time, or a condition. Occasionally, however, the above-mentioned acts become tacitly operative under circumstances which, if openly stated, would render them void. For when anyone absolutely acknowledges the receipt of something which was promised him under a condition, his release will be considered valid if the condition of the obligation should be fulfilled; where, however, the condition of the release was expressly stated, the transaction will be of no force or effect.

78 The Same, Questions, Book XXXI. Generally speaking, when any question arises with reference to a fraud, not what the plaintiff has in his hands, but what he might have had, if it had not been for his adversary, should be taken into consideration.

79 The Same, Questions, Book XXXII. The establishment of the existence of fraud, according to the Civil Law, does not always depend upon the event, but whether there was an intention to commit it.

80 The Same, Questions, Book XXXIII. In all legal matters, the species takes precedence of the genus, and whatever has reference to it is considered of the most importance.

81 The Same, Opinions, Book III. Whatever is inserted in contracts for the purpose of removing ambiguity does not prejudice the Common Law.

82 The Same, Opinions, Book IX. Anything is considered to be donated which is given without the compulsion of law.

83 The Same, Definitions, Book II. No one is considered to have lost something if it did not belong to him.

84 The Same, Questions, Book V. When more is paid than is due, and it is not possible to deduct the surplus, the entire debt is understood to be unpaid, and the former obligation will continue to exist. 1He in whose honesty we have confided owes by natural law what he owes by the Law of Nations.

85 The Same, Questions, Book VI. When any doubt arises, it is better to decide in favor of the dowry. 1It is no new principle that whatever has once been decided to be valid, will stand; although a case may arise in which a beginning could not have been made. 2Whenever either natural reason, or doubt of the law is opposed by equity, moderation must be observed in rendering a decision.

86 The Same, Questions, Book VII. The condition of those who engage in litigation is not usually made worse than if they had not undertaken it, but for the most part it is improved.

87 The Same, Questions, Book XIII. No one, by attempting to recover his property, makes his case worse, but he improves it. Finally, after issue has been joined, the right passes to the heir, and the heir is also liable under all circumstances.

88 Scævola, Questions, Book V. No one is understood to be in default where the claim is void.

89 Paulus, Questions, Book X. As long as a will is valid, the heir at law is not admitted to the succession.

90 The Same, Questions, Book XV. In all matters, and especially in those relating to the law, equity must be considered.

91 The Same, Questions, Book XVII. Whenever a succession belongs to anyone by a double right, if the more recent one should be rejected, the older one will remain.

92 Scævola, Opinions, Book V. If a copyist makes a mistake in transcribing a stipulation, this will not prevent the debtor and the surety from being liable.

93 Marcianus, Trusts, Book I. A son under paternal control is considered neither to retain, to recover, nor to acquire possession of his peculium.

94 Ulpianus, Trusts, Book II. It is not usual for superfluous matter to vitiate a document.

95 The Same, Trusts, Book VI. No one doubts that he should be considered solvent who is defended.

96 Marcianus, Trusts, Book XII. When an instrument is ambiguous, the intention of the party who produced it should be considered.

97 Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book III. The sentence of deportation, alone, deprives a person of his property, which is confiscated by the Treasury.

98 The Same, Epitomes of Law, Book IV. Whenever property is claimed by two persons under a lucrative title, he whose title to the same is the more ancient should have the preference.

99 Venuleius, Stipulations, Book XII. No one can be considered dishonest who does not know how much he ought to pay.

100 Gaius, Rules, Book I. Any obligation contracted under one law is annulled by a contrary law.

101 Paulus, On Judicial Inquiries. When the law mentions the term of two months, and the party appears on the sixty-first day, he should be heard; for this the Emperor Antoninus and his Divine Father stated in a Rescript.

102 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book I. Anyone who commits an act against the order of the Prætor is properly said to have violated the Edict. 1He has the right to refuse an action, who can also grant it.

103 Paulus, On the Edict, Book I. No one can be taken by force from his own house.

104 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book II. Where two actions are brought, in one of which a large sum is claimed as damages, and in the other an infamous charge is made, the one which affects the party’s reputation is entitled to the preference. But where both actions are such that the sentences will brand the defendant with infamy, they should both be considered to be of the same importance, even though the amounts involved are unequal.

105 Paulus, On the Edict, Book I. Whenever a judicial inquiry is demanded, recourse must be had to the Prætor.

106 The Same, On the Edict, Book II. Liberty is a possession of inestimable value.

107 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book I. No action at law can be brought against a slave.

108 Paulus, On the Edict, Book IV. In inflicting penalties, the age and inexperience of the guilty party must always be taken into account.

109 The Same, On the Edict, Book V. He is not an accomplice in a crime who does not prevent it from being committed when he is unable to do so.

110 The Same, On the Edict, Book VI. The less is always included in the greater. 1No one is considered to be legally responsible for another, unless he gives security. 2A minor is not considered to have consented to something to his injury. 3Where two sentences in a contract referring to the same thing are not connected, it is sufficient for one of them to be complied with. 4Relief should be granted to women for their protection, but not to enable them the more readily to impose upon others.

111 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book II. A minor who is near the age of puberty is capable of theft and the commission of injury. 1Penal actions growing out of breaches of the law do not pass against the heir, as, for instance, those of theft, wrongful damage, robbery with violence, and injury.

112 Paulus, On the Edict, Book VIII. It makes no difference, so far as the result is concerned, whether anyone is not entitled to an action under the law, or whether he may be barred by an exception.

113 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book III. A part is included in the whole.

114 Paulus, On the Edict, Book IX. When words are ambiguous, their most probable or ordinary signification should be adopted.

115 The Same, On the Edict, Book X. Where anyone is released from an obligation, his creditor is presumed to have received his money. 1He cannot be considered to have obtained anything who, having made a stipulation, can be barred by an exception.

116 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XI. Nothing is so opposed to consent, which is the basis of bona fide contracts, as force and fear; and to approve anything of this kind is contrary to good morals. 1He is not taken advantage of who conforms to the public law. 2Those who make mistakes are not considered to consent.

117 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XI. The Prætor considers the possessor of an estate under the Edict as taking the place of the heir in every respect.

118 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XII. Anyone who is in servitude cannot acquire property by usucaption; for even when he has possession, he is not considered to hold it legally.

119 The Same, On the Edict, Book XIII. He does not alienate who merely fails to obtain possession.

120 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XII. No one can leave to his heir any rights which he himself does not possess.

121 The Same, On the Edict, Book XIII. He who does not do what he should is considered to have violated his duty; and he who does what he ought not to do is understood not to do what was enjoined upon him.

122 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book V. Liberty is favored above all things.

123 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIV. No one can legally bring suit in the name of another. 1A temporary change does not injuriously affect the rights of a province.

124 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVI. In transactions where not speech, but the presence of the party is required, a dumb person who has intelligence can be considered to answer. The same rule applies to one who is deaf, for he also can answer. 1Pomponius, in the First Book says: “An insane person occupies the same position as one who is absent.”

125 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book V. Defendants are regarded with greater favor than plaintiffs.

126 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XV. No one is a depredator who pays the price of what he obtains. 1He who acquires a freedman does not become any more wealthy on this account. 2When a question arises with reference to the claims of two persons, the position of the possessor is preferable.

127 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XX. When the Prætor grants an action against an heir for the amount by which he has profited, it is sufficient if the computation be made from the time when the property obtained by the fraud of the deceased came into his hands.

128 The Same, On the Edict, Book XIX. When two persons hold property by the same title, the possessor has the advantage. 1Those who succeed to the entire rights of anyone are considered to occupy the place of his heirs.

129 The Same, On the Edict, Book XXI. A creditor is not guilty of fraud who receives that to which he is entitled. 1When the principal thing ceases to exist, its accessories also disappear.

130 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Actions, and especially penal ones, which have reference to the same subject, never abrogate one another.

131 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXII. Anyone who fraudulently relinquishes possession has judgment rendered against him as the possessor, because his fraud renders him liable as possessor.

132 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book VII. Ignorance is classed as negligence.

133 The Same, On the Provincial Edict, Book VIII. Our condition can be improved by our slaves, but it cannot be rendered worse.

134 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXI. Creditors are not defrauded when nothing is acquired by their debtor, but only when his property is diminished. 1No one can improve his condition by means of a crime.

135 The Same, On the Edict, Book XXIII. Property cannot be delivered which either does not exist or which is not considered as included in the contract.

136 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XVIII. Good faith concedes as much to a possessor as he is really entitled to, whenever the law does not prevent this from being done.

137 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXV. He who obtains anything by the authority of a court is a bona fide possessor.

138 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXVII. Every estate, even though subsequently entered upon, is considered to have been accepted at the time of the death of the deceased. 1The gravity of an offence never increases on account of the time which has elapsed since it was committed.

139 Gaius, On the Edict of the Urban Prætor. All rights of action which are extinguished by death or by lapse of time continue to exist when they have once been brought into court. 1Nothing is considered to absolutely belong to anyone of which he can be deprived by some event.

140 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LVI. The absence of him who is away on business for the State should not prejudice him, or anyone else.

141 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LIV. Anything which is established against a rule of law should not become a precedent. 1Two heirs of the same person cannot each become the heir to his entire estate.

142 The Same, On the Edict, Book LVI. He who is silent does not always confess, still, it is true that he does not deny.

143 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXII. Anything which will bar persons who have entered into a contract will also bar their successors.

144 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXII. Everything which is permissible is not always honorable. 1In stipulations, the time when we contracted should be considered.

145 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVI. No one is considered to defraud those who are aware of the facts, and give their consent.

146 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXII. Whatever anyone did while a slave cannot benefit him after he becomes free.

147 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXIV. Special matters are always included in general ones.

148 Paulus, On the Short Edict, Book XVI. When the effect of anything benefits all the parties in interest, each of them should also bear his share of the expense.

149 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXVII. Anyone who profits by the acts of another should guarantee them.

150 The Same, On the Edict, Book LXVIII. The legal position of him who has committed fraud in order to obtain possession of, or to hold property, and that of him who has committed it to avoid having possession of or holding property, is necessarily the same.

151 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXIV. No one commits a wrong against another unless he does something which he has no right to do.

152 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXIX. It is our practice to prosecute as a crime everything which is accomplished by either public or private violence. 1He who directs a person to be deprived of possession deprives him of it. 2The ratification of the commission of an offence resembles an order to commit it. 3In contracts involving fraud or good faith, the heir is liable in full.

153 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXV. We become liable in the same way as, on the other hand, we are released from contracts; for as we acquire property by certain methods, we also lose it by the same means. Therefore, as possession cannot be obtained except by intention and corporeal exertion, so,none can be lost, unless both these things exist.

154 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXX. When the parties to a suit are guilty of the same crime, the plaintiff labors under a disadvantage, and the position of the possessor is preferable; as is the case when an exception is filed on account of the fraud of the plaintiff, and a reply is not granted to the latter, even if the defendant committed fraud in the same transaction. He who himself is not guilty should be permitted to collect a penalty from the other party.

155 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXV. A person is responsible for his own act, and it should not prejudice his adversary. 1He is not considered to employ violence who avails himself of his own right, and brings an ordinary action at law. 2In penal cases, the most benevolent construction should be adopted.

156 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXX. No one can be compelled to defend another against his will. 1Anyone can say that the party to whom we grant actions has much more reason to plead an exception. 2When one person succeeds another, it is not just that whatever might have prejudiced the individual whom he succeeded should not also prejudice him. 3Generally speaking, a purchaser should have the same right to bring an action, or defend it, that the vendor has. 4What is granted to anyone for his own benefit is not bestowed upon him if he refuses to accept it.

157 The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXI. Where a crime or an offence is not classed as atrocious, it will be pardoned in those who commit it, if, as slaves, they have obeyed their masters; or where the offenders have obeyed those who take the place of masters, as, for instance, guardians and curators. 1Anyone who commits a fraud for the purpose of relinquishing possession is considered to still retain possession. 2In contracts, the successors of those who have been guilty of fraud are not only liable for any profits which they may obtain, but also for the entire amount; that is to say, each one will be liable for his share as heir.

158 Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book XXVI. A creditor who permits property which has been pledged to be sold loses his lien.

159 Paulus, On the Edict, Book VII. We may be entitled to property by virtue of different obligations, but it cannot belong to us by different titles.

160 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVI. It is one thing to sell, and another to consent for the vendor to sell. 1Anything which is done publicly by a majority is considered to have been done by all the parties interested. 2It is absurd that a person to whom a tract of land has been devised should have a better title to the same than the heir, or the testator himself if he were living.

161 The Same, On the Edict, Book LXXVII. It was a rule adopted by the Civil Law that whenever a party in interest prevents a condition from being complied with, it is considered the same as if it had been fulfilled. This applies to grants of freedom, legacies, and the appointment of heirs; and, under this rule, stipulations also become operative, when, through the act of the promisor, the stipulator is prevented from complying with the condition.

162 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXX. Any act performed through necessity should not be cited as a precedent.

163 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LV. When a person has a right to give anything, he also has the right to sell and alienate it.

164 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LI. Suits which involve a penalty, and have once been brought, can be transmitted against heirs.

165 Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LIII. He who can alienate property can also consent to its alienation. But where the right to donate it is not granted to a person, the rule should be adopted that his wishes must not be considered, even if he consents to its donation by another.

166 Paulus, On the Edict, Book XLVIII. He who defends the case of another is never considered solvent.

167 The Same, On the Edict, Book XLIX. Anything which, at the time it was given, does not become the property of him who receives it is not considered to have been given at all. 1A party who does something by order of a judge is not considered to have committed fraud, because he was obliged to obey.

168 The Same, On Plautius, Book I. That course should be pursued which affords the prospect of the most equitable settlement. 1Any question which is doubtful ought to be interpreted according to the intention of the parties in interest.

169 The Same, On Plautius, Book II. He commits a wrong who orders it to be committed. He, however, is not to blame who is compelled to obey. 1Anything which is in suspense is not considered to exist.

170 The Same, On Plautius, Book III. Any act of a magistrate which has no reference to his judicial duties is void.

171 The Same, On Plautius, Book IV. No one is liable for a debt on the ground that he can collect from another what he has paid for him.

172 The Same, On Plautius, Book V. In a contract of sale, any sentence of doubtful signification is interpreted against the vendor. 1A claim which is ambiguous should be construed in such a way as to be favorable to the plaintiff.

173 The Same, On Plautius, Book VI. When judgment is rendered against anyone to the extent of his means, everything which he had should not be extorted from him; but the rule of law should be observed which does not permit him to be reduced to poverty. 1When the expression, “You shall make restitution,” is found in a law, the profits must also be restored, even if this is not specially provided for. 2Everyone is prejudiced by his own delay in making payment, which rule is observed where two debtors are jointly liable. 3He is guilty of fraud who demands something which he is obliged to return.

174 The Same, On Plautius, Book VIII. He can act who already appears able to comply with the condition. 1Anything which a person cannot have, even if he wishes it, he cannot reject.

175 The Same, On Plautius, Book XI. A slave cannot perform any duty which the laws require to be performed by persons who are free. 1I should not be in any better condition than the person from whom I derive my rights.

176 The Same, On Plautius, Book XIII. No one is granted the privilege of doing for himself what can be publicly done through a magistrate; and this is prescribed in order to avoid opportunities for promoting disorder. 1The value of freedom and relationship is boundless.

177 The Same, On Plautius, Book XIV. He who succeeds to the privileges or ownership of another should avail himself of his legal rights of his predecessor. 1No one should be accused of fraud who is ignorant of the reason why he should not bring an action.

178 The Same, On Plautius, Book XV. When the principal thing is no longer in existence, its accessories, generally speaking, also cease to exist.

179 The Same, On Plautius, Book XVI. When the intention of a person granting manumission is obscure, a decision should be rendered in favor of freedom.

180 The Same, On Plautius, Book XVII. Anything which is paid by the order of a creditor is the same as if it had been paid to the latter himself.

181 The Same, On Vitellius, Book I. If no one accepts an estate, the force of the will is entirely destroyed.

182 The Same, On Vitellius, Book III. When the title to property cannot vest in anyone, no obligation can cause it to do so.

183 Marcellus, Digest, Book XIII. Although the formalities required by law are not easily changed, still relief should be granted where equity clearly demands it.

184 Celsus, Digest, Book VII. The excuse of an empty fear is not a legal one.

185 The Same, Digest, Book VIII. No obligation is binding which is impossible.

186 The Same, Digest, Book XII. Nothing can be demanded before the time when it can be delivered, according to the natural course of things; and when the date of payment is inserted into an obligation, it cannot be collected unless the time has elapsed.

187 The Same, Digest, Book XVI. Where anyone leaves his wife pregnant, he is not considered to have died without children.

188 The Same, Digest, Book XVII. Where two contradictory things are ordered in a will, neither of them will be valid. 1Whatever is prohibited by the nature of things cannot be confirmed by any law.

189 The Same, Digest, Book XIII. A minor is not presumed to give his consent, or to refuse it, on account of his age; for the authority of his guardian is necessary in any matter requiring knowledge or judgment.

190 The Same, Digest, Book XXIV. Anything which is evicted is not included in property.

191 The Same, Digest, Book XXXIII. Neratius, having been consulted as to whether a privilege granted by the Emperor to a person whom he believed to be living, but who in fact was already dead, should be considered to take effect, answered that it did not seem to him that the Emperor would have bestowed it if he had known that the grantee was dead, but still that it should be ascertained from him himself, to what extent he intended the privilege to be applicable.

192 Marcellus, Digest, Book XXIX. Property which cannot be divided will be due in its entirety from the heirs, as individuals. 1In matters which are ambiguous, it is not less just than safe to adopt the more benevolent interpretation.

193 Celsus, Digest, Book XXXVIII. Almost all the rights of heirs are considered to be the same as if they had become such immediately after the death of the testator.

194 Modestinus, Differences, Book VI. Those who become heirs through a distant degree of relationship to the deceased are considered to be none the less heirs than if they had been of the first degree.

195 The Same, Differences, Book VII. Things clearly stated are prejudicial; others are not.

196 The Same, Rules, Book VIII. Some privileges are real, and some are personal. The former are transmitted to the heir: those which are personal do not pass to him.

197 The Same, On the Rite of Marriage. In matrimonial unions, not only what is lawful but also what is honorable should be considered.

198 Javolenus, On Cassius, Book XIII. Fraud committed by a guardian, whether he is solvent or not, should not prejudice the rights of his ward in an interdict, or in any other legal proceeding.

199 The Same, Epistles, Book VI. He cannot be considered to be free from fraud who refuses to obey the order of a magistrate.

200 The Same, Epistles, Book VII. Whenever a decision cannot be rendered without causing injury, that course should be adopted which is productive of the least injustice.

201 The Same, Epistles, Book X. Every provision contained in a will is not considered to have any effect, unless it was valid at the time it was made.

202 The Same, Epistles, Book XI. Every definition in the Civil Law is subject to modification, for a slight discrepancy may render it inapplicable.

203 Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book VIII. He who sustains any damage through his own fault is not considered to have been injured.

204 The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXVIII. It is less advantageous to have a right of action than to have the property which is the subject of it.

205 The Same, On Quintus Mucius, Book XXXIX. It frequently happens that property of which we can, under certain circumstances, be deprived, is in such a condition as to be incapable of being taken from us. Hence, if we have become liable to the Treasury by encumbering a tract of land, we can sometimes bring an action to recover it, alienate it, and impose a servitude upon it.

206 The Same, On Various Passages, Book IX. It is but just, and in accordance with the Law of Nations that no one, by the commission of an injury, can be enriched at the expense of another.

207 Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book I. Where a matter has been decided, it is considered as true.

208 Paulus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book XIII. No one can be considered to have lost something which he never had.

209 Ulpianus, On the Lex Julia et Papia, Book IV. We, to a certain extent, compare slavery with death.

210 Licinius Rufinus, Rules, Book II. When the appointment of an heir is void from the beginning it cannot be rendered valid by lapse of time.

211 Paulus, On the Edict, Book LXIX. A slave cannot be absent on business for the State.