Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XLIX1,
De appellationibus et relegationibus
Liber quadragesimus nonus
I.

De appellationibus et relegationibus

(On Appeals and Reports.)

1Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus. Ap­pel­lan­di usus quam sit fre­quens quam­que ne­ces­sa­rius, ne­mo est qui ne­sciat, quip­pe cum in­iqui­ta­tem iu­di­can­tium vel im­pe­ritiam re­cor­ri­gat: li­cet non­num­quam be­ne la­tas sen­ten­tias in pe­ius re­for­met, ne­que enim uti­que me­lius pro­nun­tiat qui no­vis­si­mus sen­ten­tiam la­tu­rus est. 1Quae­si­tum est, an ad­ver­sus re­scrip­tum prin­ci­pis pro­vo­ca­ri pos­sit, for­te si prae­ses pro­vin­ciae vel quis alius con­su­lue­rit et ad con­sul­ta­tio­nem eius fue­rit re­scrip­tum: est enim quae­si­tum, an ap­pel­lan­di ius su­per­sit. quid enim, si in con­su­len­do men­ti­tus est? de qua re ex­tat re­scrip­tum di­vi Pii πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Θρᾳκῶν, quo os­ten­di­tur pro­vo­ca­ri opor­te­re. ver­ba re­scrip­ti ita se ha­bent: ‘Ἐὰν ἐπιστείλῃ τις ἡμῖν ἃ διὰ καὶ ἀντιγράφωμεν ἡμεῖς ὁτιοῦν, ὑπάρξει τοῖσ βουλομένοις έπικαλεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόφασιν. εἰ γὰρ διδάξειν ἢ ψευδῶς ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα, οὐδὲν ὑφ’ ἡμῶν εἶναι δόξῃ προδιεγνωσμένον, τῶν ὡς ἑτέρως ἔχουσιν τοῖσ γραφεῖσιν ἀντεπεσταλκότων’. 2Huic con­se­quen­ter vi­de­tur re­scrip­tum a con­sul­ta­tio­ne iu­di­cis non es­se ap­pel­lan­dum, si quis for­te in­ter­lo­cu­tus fuit prin­ci­pem se con­sul­ta­tu­rum, cum pos­sit post re­scrip­tum pro­vo­ca­re. 3Si quis in ap­pel­la­tio­ne er­ra­ve­rit, ut pu­ta cum alium ap­pel­la­re de­be­ret, alium ap­pel­la­ve­rit, vi­den­dum, an er­ror ei ni­hil of­fuit. et si qui­dem, cum ma­io­rem iu­di­cem ap­pel­la­re de­be­ret, ita er­ra­vit, ut mi­no­rem ap­pel­let, er­ror ei no­ce­bit: si ve­ro ma­io­rem iu­di­cem pro­vo­ca­vit, er­ror ei ni­hil ob­erit. et ita mul­tis con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus con­ti­ne­tur. de­ni­que cum qui­dam iu­di­cem ex re­scrip­to prin­ci­pis a con­su­li­bus ac­ce­pis­set et prae­fec­tum ur­bi ap­pel­las­set, er­ro­ri eius sub­ven­tum est re­scrip­to di­vo­rum fra­trum, cu­ius ver­ba haec sunt: ‘Cum per er­ro­rem fac­tum di­cas, uti a iu­di­ce, quem ex re­scrip­to nos­tro ab am­plis­si­mis con­su­li­bus ac­ce­pe­ras, ad Iu­nium Rus­ti­cum ami­cum nos­trum prae­fec­tum ur­bi pro­vo­ca­res, con­su­les am­plis­si­mi per­in­de co­gnos­cant, at­que si ad ip­sos fac­ta es­set pro­vo­ca­tio’. si quis er­go vel pa­rem vel ma­io­rem iu­di­cem ap­pel­la­ve­rit, alium ta­men pro alio, in ea cau­sa est, ut er­ror ei non no­ceat: sed si mi­no­rem, no­ce­bit. 4Li­bel­li qui dan­tur ap­pel­la­to­rii ita sunt con­ci­pien­di, ut ha­beant scrip­tum et a quo da­ti sint, hoc est qui ap­pel­let, et ad­ver­sus quem et a qua sen­ten­tia.

1Ulpianus, On Appeals, Book I. There is no one who is not aware how frequently appeals are employed, and how necessary they are to correct the injustice or the ignorance of judges; although sometimes sentences which have been properly imposed are changed for the worse, as he who renders the last judgment does not, for this reason, render a better one. 1The question arose whether an appeal could be taken from a Rescript of the Emperor, when the Governor of a province, or anyone else, asked his advice, and the Rescript was issued by way of answer. It was also asked whether the right of appeal remained. What should be done if the Governor, when asking advice, had made a false statement? There is a Rescript of the Divine Pius on this point, addressed to the Community of the Thracians, by which it is shown that the right to appeal continues to exist. The words of the Rescript are as follows: “If anyone should write to us and we should state anything to him in a Rescript by way of reply, he will be permitted to appeal from our decision. For if it should be shown that what had been written to us was either untrue, or was misrepresented, no decision will be considered to have been rendered by us; and any statement made to us will be considered as not having been made before the answer deciding against it was written.” 2In consequence of this, it is held to have been decided that an appeal should not be taken after the consultation of the judge, if he happens to have rendered an interlocutory decree setting forth that he will consult the Emperor, since the party can take an appeal after the Rescript has been issued. 3When anyone makes a mistake in an appeal, for instance, when he should appeal to one judge, and he appeals to another, let us see whether his mistake will prejudice him. And, indeed, if he ought to appeal to a superior judge, and errs by appealing to one of inferior jurisdiction, the mistake will prejudice him. If, however, he appeals to a superior judge, his mistake will not be to his disadvantage, and this rule is contained in several constitutions. Hence when anyone has accepted a judge appointed by the Consuls under a Rescript of the Emperor, and afterwards appeals to the Prefect of the City, relief is given him for his mistake, under a Rescript of the Divine Brothers, the words of which are as follows: “As you say that, through mistake, you have appealed from the judge, whom you accepted under the terms of our Rescript from the eminent Consuls, to our friend, Julius Rusticus, the Prefect of the City, the said eminent Consuls shall take cognizance of the case, just as if the appeal had been made to them.” If, then, anyone should appeal to a judge of equal or superior jurisdiction, or to one instead of another, his mistake will not prejudice him; but if he appeals to a judge of inferior jurisdiction, it will prejudice him. 4The document presented by the appellants ought to be drawn up in such a way as to contain the names of the parties by whom it has been filed; that is to say, the names of those who appeal, and state against whom they appeal, and from what decision.

2Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo de ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus. Sed si apud ac­ta quis ap­pel­la­ve­rit, sa­tis erit, si di­cat ‘ap­pel­lo’.

2Macer, On Appeals, Book I. When anyone appeals at the time when the judgment is rendered, it will be sufficient for him to say, “I appeal.”

3Ul­pia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus. Scio quae­si­tum, si quis non ad­di­de­rit in li­bel­lis, con­tra quem ad­ver­sa­rium ap­pel­let, an prae­scrip­tio­ni sub­icia­tur: et pu­to ni­hil opor­te­re prae­scri­bi. 1Sed il­lud ce­ci­dit in quaes­tio­nem, si plu­res ha­bue­rit ad­ver­sa­rios et quo­run­dam no­mi­na li­bel­lis sint com­ple­xa, quo­run­dam non, an ae­que prae­scri­bi ei pos­sit ab his, quo­rum no­mi­na com­pre­hen­sa non sunt, qua­si ad­ver­sus ip­sos ad­quie­ve­rit sen­ten­tiae. et cum una cau­sa sit, ar­bi­tror non es­se prae­scri­ben­dum. 2Cer­te si plu­res hi sunt, ad­ver­sus quos pro­nun­tia­tur, et quo­run­dam no­mi­na in li­bel­lis sint com­pre­hen­sa, quo­run­dam non, hi so­li ap­pel­las­se vi­de­bun­tur, quo­rum no­mi­na li­bel­lis sunt com­pre­hen­sa. 3Quid er­go, si cau­sam ap­pel­lan­di cer­tam di­xe­rit, an li­ceat ei dis­ce­de­re ab hac et aliam cau­sam al­le­ga­re? an ve­ro qua­si for­ma qua­dam ob­stric­tus sit? pu­to ta­men, cum se­mel pro­vo­ca­ve­rit, es­se ei fa­cul­ta­tem in agen­do et­iam aliam cau­sam pro­vo­ca­tio­nis red­de­re per­se­qui­que pro­vo­ca­tio­nem suam qui­bus­cum­que mo­dis po­tue­rit.

3Ulpianus, On Appeals, Book I. When anyone does not mention in his petition against what adversary he appealed, I am aware that it has been asked whether he can be barred by an exception. I do not think that he can be barred in this manner. 1Where the appellant had several adversaries, and the names of some of them were included in his appeal, and those of others were not, the question arose whether he could be barred by an exception on the ground that, as their names were not included, he had, as it were, acquiesced in the decision, so far as they were concerned. As the cause of all is the same, I think that he should not be barred by an exception. 2It is clear that if there are several persons who have been convicted, and the names of some of them are included in the appeal, and those of the others are not, they only will be considered to have appealed whose names are mentioned in the petition. 3But what if a certain ground of appeal is mentioned? Can the appellant abandon it, and state another V Or, indeed, will he be bound, as by a certain formula? I think that when a party has once appealed, he should be permitted to give even another cause for doing so, and to prosecute it in every way that he can.

4Ma­cer li­bro pri­mo de ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus. Ab ex­se­cu­to­re sen­ten­tiae ap­pel­la­re non li­cet. 1Sed ab eo, qui sen­ten­tiam ma­le in­ter­pre­ta­ri di­ci­tur, ap­pel­la­re li­cet, si ta­men is in­ter­pre­tan­di po­tes­ta­tem ha­buit, vel­ut prae­ses pro­vin­ciae aut pro­cu­ra­tor Cae­sa­ris: ita ta­men, ut in cau­sis ap­pel­la­tio­nis red­den­dis hoc so­lum quae­ra­tur, an iu­re in­ter­pre­ta­tum sit: id­que et­iam di­vus An­to­ni­nus re­scrip­sit. 2Alio con­dem­na­to is cu­ius in­ter­est ap­pel­la­re pot­est. qua­lis est, qui per pro­cu­ra­to­rem ex­per­tus vic­tus est nec pro­cu­ra­tor suo no­mi­ne ap­pel­let. 3Item si emp­tor de pro­prie­ta­te vic­tus est, eo ces­san­te auc­tor eius ap­pel­la­re pot­erit: aut si auc­tor ege­rit et vic­tus sit, non est de­ne­gan­da emp­to­ri ap­pel­lan­di fa­cul­tas. quid enim, si ven­di­tor, qui ap­pel­la­re no­luit, ido­neus non est? quin et­iam si auc­tor ap­pel­la­ve­rit, de­in­de in cau­sae de­fen­sio­ne su­spec­tus vi­sus sit, per­in­de de­fen­sio cau­sae emp­to­ri com­mit­ten­da est, at­que si ip­se ap­pel­las­set. 4Id­que ita con­sti­tu­tum est in per­so­na cre­di­to­ris, cum de­bi­tor vic­tus ap­pel­las­set nec ex fi­de cau­sam de­fen­de­ret. quae con­sti­tu­tio ita ac­ci­pien­da est, si in­ter­ve­nien­te cre­di­to­re de­bi­tor de pig­no­re vic­tus pro­vo­ca­ve­rit: nam ab­sen­ti cre­di­to­ri nul­lum prae­iu­di­cium de­bi­tor fa­cit, id­que sta­tu­tum est. 5Si pro­cu­ra­tor, qui iu­di­cio in­ter­fuit, vic­tus sit, an ip­se quo­que per pro­cu­ra­to­rem ap­pel­la­re pos­sit, vi­dea­mus, quia con­stat pro­cu­ra­to­rem alium pro­cu­ra­to­rem fa­ce­re non pos­se. sed me­mi­nis­se opor­tet, quod pro­cu­ra­tor li­te con­tes­ta­ta do­mi­nus li­tis ef­fi­ci­tur: et id­eo et per pro­cu­ra­to­rem ap­pel­la­re pot­est.

4Macer, On Appeals, Book I. It is not permitted to appeal from the execution of a judgment. 1It is, however, permitted to appeal from the decision of one who is alleged to have placed a wrong interpretation upon a judgment, if he had the authority to interpret it, as, for instance, the Governor of a province, or the Imperial Procurator; provided that, in discussing the causes for granting the appeal the question alone is raised whether the interpretation was according to law. This was also stated by the Divine Antoninus in a Rescript. 2Where another person has been convicted, he who has an interest in the case can appeal; for instance, one who, having appointed an attorney, has been defeated, and the attorney did not appeal in his name. 3Likewise, if the purchaser is evicted of the property sold, and neglects to appeal, the vendor can appeal. Or, if he brings suit and is defeated, the vendor should not be denied the right to appeal. But what if the vendor who refused to appeal is not solvent? And even if he should appeal, and appears to be liable to suspicion when conducting the case, the defence for this reason can be entrusted to the purchaser, just as if he himself had appealed. 4This has been decided with reference to the creditor, when the debtor is defeated and appeals, for he did not faithfully defend his case. This constitution should be understood to mean that the creditor having intervened, the debtor lost his case involving a pledge and took an appeal. For it has been decided that the debtor, in case of the absence of his creditor, does not prejudice him in any way. 5Where an attorney who is conducting a case loses it, let us see whether he himself can appeal through another attorney, because it is established that one attorney cannot appoint another. It must, however, be remembered that an attorney, by the joinder of issue, becomes the master of the case, and therefore can appeal by the agency of another attorney.

5Mar­cia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus. A sen­ten­tia in­ter alios dic­ta ap­pel­la­ri non pot­est ni­si ex ius­ta cau­sa, vel­uti si quis in co­he­redum prae­iu­di­cium se con­dem­na­ri pa­ti­tur vel si­mi­lem huic cau­sam (quam­vis et si­ne ap­pel­la­tio­ne tu­tus est co­he­res): item fi­de­ius­so­res pro eo pro quo in­ter­ve­ne­runt. igi­tur et ven­di­to­ris fi­de­ius­sor emp­to­re vic­to ap­pel­la­bit, li­cet emp­tor et ven­di­tor ad­quies­cant. 1Si he­res in­sti­tu­tus vic­tus fue­rit ab eo, qui de in­of­fi­cio­so tes­ta­men­to age­bat, le­ga­ta­riis et qui li­ber­ta­tem ac­ce­pe­runt per­mit­ten­dum est ap­pel­la­re, si que­ran­tur per col­lu­sio­nem pro­nun­tia­tum: sic­ut di­vus Pius re­scrip­sit. 2Idem re­scrip­sit le­ga­ta­rios cau­sam ap­pel­la­tio­nis age­re pos­se. 3Sed et si in frau­dem suam trans­ac­tio­nem fac­tam ab eo qui ap­pel­las­set di­ce­rent, idem di­cen­dum est. sed et si­ne ap­pel­la­tio­ne si fue­rit trans­ac­tum, si­mi­li­ter re­scrip­tum est. 4Si quis ip­so die in­ter ac­ta vo­ce ap­pel­la­vit, hoc ei suf­fi­cit: sin au­tem hoc non fe­ce­rit, ad li­bel­los ap­pel­la­to­rios dan­dos bi­duum vel tri­duum com­pu­tan­dum est.

5Marcianus, On Appeals, Book I. An appeal cannot be taken from a decision affecting other parties, unless for some good reason; for instance, where a man has permitted himself to be convicted to the prejudice of his co-heir, or for some similar cause, although the co-heir may be secure even without an appeal. Likewise, where sureties appeal in behalf of him for whom they have become responsible. Therefore the surety of a vendor can appeal if the purchaser is defeated, even though both the purchaser and the vendor may acquiesce in the decision. 1When a testamentary heir is defeated by someone who brings an action on the ground that a will is inofficious, the legatees and those who have received their freedom are permitted to appeal, if they complain that the judgment has been obtained by collusion; as the Divine Pius stated in a Rescript. 2He also stated in a Rescript that legatees could appeal. 3The same must be said if they allege that the appellant has been concerned in a fraudulent transaction, to their prejudice. 4The same rule has been laid down in a Rescript as applicable, where a compromise has been effected without an appeal. When anyone, upon the same day, appeals verbally during the proceedings, this will be sufficient. If, however, he should not do so, two or three days should be computed to enable him to file his appeal.

6Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus. Non tan­tum ei, qui ad sup­pli­cium du­ci­tur, pro­vo­ca­re per­mit­ti­tur, ve­rum alii quo­que no­mi­ne eius, non tan­tum si il­le man­da­ve­rit, ve­rum quis­quis alius pro­vo­ca­re vo­lue­rit. ne­que di­stin­gui­tur, utrum ne­ces­sa­rius eius sit nec ne: cre­do enim hu­ma­ni­ta­tis ra­tio­ne om­nem pro­vo­can­tem au­di­ri de­be­re. er­go et si ip­se ad­quies­cit sen­ten­tiae: nec quae­ri­mus, cu­ius in­ter­sit. quid er­go, si re­sis­tat qui dam­na­tus est ad­ver­sus pro­vo­ca­tio­nem, nec ve­lit ad­mit­ti eius ap­pel­la­tio­nem perire fes­ti­nans? ad­huc pu­tem dif­fe­ren­dum sup­pli­cium.

6Ulpianus, On Appeals, Book II. Not only is he who is brought to punishment permitted to appeal, but also others in his name; and not only when he himself directs this to be done, but where anyone else desires to appeal he can do so, nor does it make any difference whether he is nearly related to the defendant or not; for I think that on the ground of humanity every persons who appeals should be heard. Therefore, if the defendant himself acquiesces in the decision, we do not ask whether anyone else has an interest in the matter. But what should be done if the convicted person, hastening to lose his life, opposes the appeal, and does not wish it to be entertained? I still think that his punishment should be postponed.

7Mar­cia­nus li­bro pri­mo de ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus. Cum qui­dam prop­ter vio­len­tiam iu­di­cis non ip­si a quo ap­pel­la­vit de­dit li­bel­los, sed pu­bli­ce pro­pos­uis­set, di­vus Se­ve­rus ve­niam ei de­dit et per­mi­sit ei cau­sas ap­pel­la­tio­nis age­re.

7Marcianus, On Appeals, Book I. When a certain man, being apprehensive of the violence of the judge, gave notice of appeal, not only to the court from which he appealed, but published it, the Divine Severus excused him, and permitted him to prosecute the appeal.

8Ul­pia­nus li­bro quar­to de ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus. Il­lud scien­dum est eum qui pro­vo­ca­vit non de­be­re con­vi­cia­ri ei a quo ap­pel­lat: ce­te­rum opor­te­bit eum plec­ti. et ita di­vi fra­tres re­scrip­se­runt.

8Ulpianus, On Appeals, Book IV. It must be remembered that the party who appeals should not abuse him from whom he appeals, for if he does, he shall be punished. This was stated by the Divine Brothers in a Rescript.

9Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do de ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus. Il­lud scien­dum est ne­que pu­pil­lum ne­que rem pu­bli­cam, cum pro li­ber­ta­te iu­di­ca­tur, in in­te­grum re­sti­tui pos­se, sed ap­pel­la­tio­nem es­se ne­ces­sa­riam. id­que ita re­scrip­tum est.

9Macer, On Appeals, Book II. It must be remembered that neither a ward, nor the State, can obtain complete restitution in a case where freedom is involved, but an appeal is necessary. This has been stated in various rescripts.

10Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Si qui se­pa­ra­tim fue­rint con­dem­na­ti, quam­vis ex ea­dem cau­sa, plu­ri­bus eis ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus opus est. 1Si quis, cum una ac­tio­ne age­re­tur, quae plu­res spe­cies in se ha­beat, plu­ri­bus sum­mis sit con­dem­na­tus, qua­rum sin­gu­lae no­tio­nem prin­ci­pis non fa­ciunt, om­nes au­tem con­iunc­tae fa­ciunt: pot­erit ad prin­ci­pem ap­pel­la­re. 2Sed cum ad­ver­sus plu­res pro­ba­tae es­sent ra­tio­nes quae eis no­ce­rent, suf­fi­cit eis una ap­pel­la­tio, quia uno ti­tu­lo com­pro­ba­ta­rum ra­tio­num om­nes con­ve­nie­ban­tur. 3Quo­tiens au­tem plu­res in unam sum­mam con­dem­nan­tur, utrum una sen­ten­tia est et qua­si plu­res in unam sum­mam rei sint pro­mit­ten­di, ut unus­quis­que eo­rum in so­li­dum te­n­ea­tur, an ve­ro scin­di­tur in per­so­nas sen­ten­tia, quae­ri­tur. et Pa­pi­nia­nus re­spon­dit scin­di sen­ten­tiam in per­so­nas at­que id­eo eos qui con­dem­na­ti sunt vi­ri­les par­tes de­be­re. 4Quod est re­scrip­tum in com­mu­ni cau­sa, quo­tiens al­ter ap­pel­lat, al­ter non, al­te­rius vic­to­riam ei pro­fi­ce­re qui non pro­vo­ca­vit, hoc ita de­mum pro­ban­dum est, si una ea­dem­que cau­sa fuit de­fen­sio­nis: ce­te­rum si di­ver­sae, alia cau­sa est. ut in duo­bus tu­to­ri­bus pro­ce­dit, si al­ter tu­te­lam ges­se­rat, al­ter non at­ti­ge­rat et is qui non ges­se­rat pro­vo­ca­vit: in­iquum est enim, qui id­cir­co ad­gno­ve­rat sen­ten­tiam, quon­iam ges­sis­se se scit, prop­ter ap­pel­la­tio­nem eius qui non ges­se­rat op­ti­ne­re.

10Ulpianus, Disputations, Book VIII. When several persons have been convicted separately, although in the same case, they will be required to file several appeals. 1If anyone should bring an action which includes several claims, and the defendant is condemned to pay several sums of money, no one of which is sufficient to be submitted to the decision of the Emperor, but all of them united are sufficient, he can appeal to the Emperor. 2Where evidence was produced against several parties which caused them to be defeated, a single appeal will be sufficient, because all of them were sued together, and defeated by the same testimony. 3Whenever several persons are condemned to pay a single sum of money, is there not a single decision, and are they, as joint defendants, liable for the same amount, so that each one of them is liable in full; or should the judgment be divided into as many parts as there are persons? is a question which has been asked. Papinianus answered that the judgment should be divided among the persons, and therefore that those condemned were liable for equal portions. 4Ad Dig. 49,1,10,4BOHGE, Bd. 1 (1871), S. 62: Appellation gegen einen Litisconsorten auch als Appellation gegen die andern.The statement contained in rescripts that, in a common cause, whenever one party appeals and another does not, the success of the first will benefit the second who did not appeal, is a rule which must be adopted, if there was but one ground of defence. Where, however, there were several, it is another thing; as happens in the case of two guardians, where one of them administers a guardianship, and the other has nothing to do with it, and the latter takes an appeal; for it is unjust that he who acquiesces in the judgment, as he knows that he transacted the business, should gain his case by the appeal of him who took no part in the administration of the guardianship.

11Idem li­bro ter­tio de om­ni­bus tri­bu­na­li­bus. Cum ex cau­sa iu­di­ca­ti so­lu­ta es­set pe­cu­nia ex ne­ces­si­ta­te iu­di­cis ab eo, qui ap­pel­la­tio­ne in­ter­po­si­ta me­rue­rit me­lio­rem sen­ten­tiam, re­ci­pe­re eum pe­cu­niam quam sol­vit opor­tet.

11The Same, On All Tribunals, Book III. When money was paid on the execution of a judgment, and on appeal a more favorable decision was rendered, the party can recover the money which he paid.

12Idem li­bro se­cun­do opi­nio­num. Si con­stet nul­lo ac­tu ex le­ge ha­bi­to duum­vi­rum crea­tum, sed tan­tum vo­ci­bus po­pu­la­rium pos­tu­la­tum eis­que tunc pro­con­su­lem, quod fa­ce­re non de­buit, con­sen­sis­se: ap­pel­la­tio in re aper­ta su­per­va­cua fuit.

12The Same, Opinions, Book II. If it is established that a duumvir has been created without observing the formalities prescribed by law, but only because he was demanded by the voice of the people, to which the Proconsul consented without having any right to do so, an appeal in so plain a case is superfluous.

13Idem li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Ap­pel­lan­ti ni­hil ob­es­se, quod in li­bel­lis a qua par­te sen­ten­tiae ap­pel­la­ret non sig­ni­fi­ca­vit. 1Non so­le­re im­pro­ba­ri ap­pel­la­tio­nem eo­rum, qui vel unam cau­sam ap­pel­lan­di pro­ba­bi­lem ha­bue­runt.

13The Same, Opinions, Book II. It is no disadvantage to an appellant if, in his petition, he did not indicate from what part of the decision he appealed. 1It is not customary to reject the appeal of those who have at least one good ground for appeal.

14Idem li­bro quar­to de­ci­mo ad edic­tum. Si per­lu­so­rio iu­di­cio ac­tum sit ad­ver­sus tes­ta­men­tum, an ius fa­ciat iu­dex, vi­den­dum. et di­vus Pius, cum in­ter con­iunc­tas per­so­nas di­ce­re­tur per col­lu­sio­nem in ne­cem le­ga­ta­rio­rum et li­ber­ta­tium ac­tum, ap­pel­la­re eis per­mi­sit. et ho­die hoc iu­re uti­mur, ut pos­sint ap­pel­la­re: sed et age­re cau­sam apud ip­sum iu­di­cem, qui de tes­ta­men­to co­gnos­cit, si su­spi­can­tur non ex fi­de he­redem cau­sam age­re. 1Quo­tiens he­rede non re­spon­den­te se­cun­dum ad­ver­sa­rium sen­ten­tia da­tur, re­scrip­tum est ni­hil no­ce­re ne­que le­ga­tis ne­que li­ber­ta­ti­bus. et hoc di­vo­rum fra­trum epis­tu­la con­ti­ne­tur ad Do­mi­tium in haec ver­ba: ‘Quod ab­sen­te pos­ses­so­re nec quo­quam no­mi­ne eius re­spon­den­te pro­nun­tia­tum est, non ha­bet rei iu­di­ca­tae auc­to­ri­ta­tem ni­si ad­ver­sus eum so­lum qui ad­es­se neg­le­xe­rit. qua­re his, qui tes­ta­men­to li­ber­ta­tes vel le­ga­ta vel fi­dei­com­mis­sa ac­ce­pe­runt, sal­vae sunt ac­tio­nes, si quas ha­bue­runt, per­in­de ac si ni­hil es­set iu­di­ca­tum: et id­eo ad­ver­sus eum qui vi­cit per­mit­ti­mus eis age­re’.

14The Same, On the Edict, Book XIV. When a judgment is rendered against a will, by collusion, let us see whether the decision of the court will stand. The Divine Pius permitted the parties to appeal when it was alleged that certain persons had joined together, through collusion, to annul the rights of legatees, and slaves who had obtained their freedom; and, at present, this is the law, that is to say, they can appeal, and even appear in court before the same judge who tried the case relating to the will, if they have reason to suspect that the heir will not faithfully conduct the defence. 1Whenever the heir does not answer, a decision is rendered in favor of his adversary, and it has been stated in a Rescript that this does not prejudice either legacies or grants of freedom. This Rescript of the Divine Brothers, addressed to Domitius, is as follows: “Whenever the possessor is absent, and no one answers in his name, it has been decided that the judgment will not have the authority of res judicata, unless it is rendered only against him alone who failed to appear. Therefore rights of action are preserved for those who have received freedom, legacies, or trusts by the will, if they are entitled to any, just as if no judgment had been rendered; and therefore we permit them to proceed against the party who gained the case.”

15Mar­cel­lus li­bro pri­mo di­ges­to­rum. Ser­vi ap­pel­la­re non pos­sunt: sed do­mi­ni eo­rum ad opem ser­vo fe­ren­dam pos­sunt uti au­xi­lio ap­pel­la­tio­nis, et alius do­mi­ni no­mi­ne id fa­ce­re pot­est. sin ve­ro ne­que do­mi­nus ne­que alius pro do­mi­no ap­pel­la­ve­rit, ip­so11Die Großausgabe liest ip­si statt ip­so. ser­vo, qui sen­ten­tiam tris­tem pas­sus est, au­xi­lium si­bi im­plo­ra­re non de­ne­ga­mus.

15Marcellus, Digest, Book I. Slaves cannot appeal, but their masters, in order to assist them, can resort to an appeal, and anyone else can do this in the name of the master. When, however, neither the master appeals, nor anyone else does so for him, we do not refuse the slave the privilege of imploring relief for himself, after having received so severe a sentence.

16Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro sex­to dif­fe­ren­tia­rum. Con­sti­tu­tio­nes, quae de re­ci­pien­dis nec non ap­pel­la­tio­ni­bus lo­quun­tur, ut ni­hil no­vi fiat, lo­cum non ha­bent in eo­rum per­so­na, quos dam­na­tos sta­tim pu­ni­ri pu­bli­ce in­ter­est: ut sunt in­sig­nes la­tro­nes vel sed­itio­num con­ci­ta­to­res vel du­ces fac­tio­num.

16Modestinus, Differences, Book VI. The constitutions which discuss the question whether appeals should be received or not, so that nothing new may be introduced against them, do not apply to those whom it is for the interest of the public to be punished without delay; as, for instance, notorious robbers, or persons who instigate sedition, or the leaders of factions.

17Idem li­bro oc­ta­vo re­gu­la­rum. Cum in una cau­sa se­pa­ra­tim du­plex sen­ten­tia di­vi­sa da­tur, vel­uti una sor­tis, alia usu­ra­rum, du­plex ap­pel­la­tio ne­ces­sa­ria est, ne al­te­ram ad­gno­vis­se, de al­te­ra pro­vo­cas­se in­tel­le­ga­tur. 1Tu­tor pu­pil­lo da­tus si pro­vo­cet, in­ter­im pu­pil­lo cu­ra­tor da­bi­tur. sed si tu­to­ris auc­to­ri­tas fue­rit ne­ces­sa­ria, vel­uti ad ad­eun­dam he­redi­ta­tem, tu­tor ei ne­ces­sa­rio da­bi­tur, quon­iam cu­ra­to­ris auc­to­ri­tas ad hoc in­uti­lis est.

17The Same, Rules, Book VIII. Where two separate decisions have been rendered in a single case, for example, one with reference to the principal and the other with reference to the interest, two appeals will be necessary, lest it may be understood that the party accepted one, and appealed from the other. 1When a guardian, appointed for a ward, appeals, a curator will be appointed for the ward in the meantime. If, however, the authority of the guardian should be necessary, as, for instance, for the acceptance of an estate, a guardian will necessarily be appointed, as the authority of a curator is not sufficient for this purpose.

18Idem li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Lu­cius Ti­tius pro ser­vo suo, qui ad bes­tias da­tus est, pro­vo­ca­tio­nem in­ter­po­suit: quae­ro, an hu­ius­mo­di ap­pel­la­tio­nis cau­sas per pro­cu­ra­to­rem red­de­re pos­sit. Mo­des­ti­nus re­spon­dit pos­se.

18The Same, Opinions, Book XVII. Lucius Titius filed an appeal for his slave, who had been condemned to be thrown to wild beasts. I ask whether he can state the grounds for an appeal of this kind by an attorney. Modestinus answered that he could do so.

19Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de enu­clea­tis ca­si­bus. Si ex­pres­sim sen­ten­tia con­tra iu­ris ri­go­rem da­ta fue­rit, va­le­re non de­bet: et id­eo et si­ne ap­pel­la­tio­ne cau­sa de­nuo in­du­ci pot­est. non iu­re pro­fer­tur sen­ten­tia, si spe­cia­li­ter con­tra le­ges vel se­na­tus con­sul­tum vel con­sti­tu­tio­nem fue­rit pro­la­ta. un­de si quis ex hac sen­ten­tia ap­pel­la­ve­rit et prae­scrip­tio­ne sum­mo­tus sit, mi­ni­me con­fir­ma­tur ex hac prae­scrip­tio­ne sen­ten­tia. un­de pot­est cau­sa ab in­itio agi­ta­ri.

19The Same, Cases Explained. If a decision has been rendered directly against the strict interpretation of the law, it should not be valid, and therefore the case can be heard again without an appeal. A decision is not legally pronounced, if it is rendered specially against the laws, a Decree of the Senate, or an Imperial Constitution. Therefore, when anyone appeals from such a decision, and is barred by an exception, the decision is by no means confirmed by this procedure, hence the action can be brought again.

20Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de prae­scrip­tio­ni­bus. Qui su­spec­tum tu­to­rem fa­cit et qui de non re­ci­pien­da tu­te­la ex­cu­sa­tio­nem agi­tat, alie­no no­mi­ne age­re in­tel­le­gen­dus est. 1Is ve­ro qui in rem suam pro­cu­ra­tor da­tus est, in­tra bi­duum ap­pel­la­re de­bet, quia suam cau­sam agit. 2Mi­li­ti­bus ap­pel­lan­di tem­po­ra non re­mit­tun­tur, et vic­ti si non pro­vo­ca­ve­rint et sol­lem­nia fe­ce­rint, post­ea non au­diun­tur.

20The Same, On Prescriptions. Anyone who accuses a guardian of being liable to suspicion, and calls in question his excuse for not accepting the guardianship, is understood to act in the name of another. 1He who is appointed an attorney in his own behalf should appeal within two days, because he is conducting his own case. 2No further time for appeal is granted to soldiers, and if, after having been defeated, they do not appeal and comply with the usual formalities, they shall not afterwards be heard.

21Pa­pi­rius Ius­tus li­bro pri­mo de con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus. Im­pe­ra­to­res An­to­ni­nus et Ve­rus re­scrip­se­runt ap­pel­la­tio­nes, quae rec­to ad prin­ci­pem fac­tae sunt omis­sis his, ad quos de­bue­runt fie­ri ex imo or­di­ne, ad prae­si­des re­mit­ti. 1Idem re­scrip­se­runt ab iu­di­ce, quem a prae­si­de pro­vin­ciae quis ac­ce­pe­rat, non rec­te im­pe­ra­to­rem ap­pel­la­tum es­se id­eo­que re­ver­ti eum ad prae­si­dem de­be­re. 2Si ma­gis­tra­tus crea­tus ap­pel­la­ve­rit, col­le­gam eius in­ter­im utrius­que of­fi­cium sus­ti­ne­re de­be­re: si uter­que ap­pel­la­ve­rit, alium in­ter­im in lo­cum eo­rum crean­dum: et eum, qui non ius­te ap­pel­la­ve­rit, dam­num ad­gni­tu­rum, si quod res pu­bli­ca pas­sa sit: si ve­ro ius­ta sit ap­pel­la­tio et hoc pro­nun­tie­tur, eos aes­ti­ma­tu­ros, cui hoc ad­scri­ben­dum sit. in lo­cum au­tem cu­ra­to­ris, qui an­no­nam ad­mi­nis­tra­tu­rus est, alium in­ter­im ad­su­men­dum, quo­ad us­que ap­pel­la­tio pen­deat. 3Idem re­scrip­se­runt, quam­vis usi­ta­tum non sit post ap­pel­la­tio­nem fruc­tus agri, de quo dis­cep­ta­tio sit, de­po­ni, ta­men, cum po­pu­li tra­he­ren­tur ab ad­ver­sa­rio, ae­quum si­bi vi­de­ri fruc­tus apud se­ques­tres de­po­ni.

21Papirius Justus, On the Constitutions, Book I. The Emperors Antoninus and Verus stated in a Rescript that appeals which have been made directly to the Emperor, without having been first presented to those magistrates of inferior rank, before whom this ought to be done, are returned to the Governors. 1They also stated in a Rescript that an appeal is not properly taken to the Emperor from a judge appointed by the Governor of the province, and therefore that it should be sent back to the latter. 2When anyone who has been appointed a magistrate appeals, his colleague, in the meantime, shall discharge the duties of both. If both should appeal, another magistrate shall temporarily be appointed in their stead, and he who did not appeal justly must pay the damage sustained by the government. Where, however, the appeal was well founded, and it was so decided, it shall be determined who shall pay the damages sustained. Another should, in the meantime, be appointed a curator, to take charge of the distribution of provisions while the appeal is pending. 3They also stated in a Rescript that although it is not customary, after an appeal has been taken, for the crops of land in litigation to be deposited, still, as they might be destroyed by the adverse party, it seemed to them to be just that they should be placed in the hands of a sequestrator.

22Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Ad prin­ci­pem re­mis­sa co­gni­tio ab eo cir­cum­du­ci pot­est, qui re­mi­sit.

22Papinianus, Opinions, Book II. When a case is submitted to the Emperor for examination, it can be recalled by the person who sent it.

23Idem li­bro no­no de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Ex con­sen­su li­ti­gan­tium ci­tra com­pro­mis­sum a prae­si­de pro­vin­ciae iu­di­ce da­to vic­tus pot­est pro­vo­ca­re. 1Cum pro­cu­ra­tor Cae­sa­ris, qui par­ti­bus prae­si­dis non fun­ge­ba­tur, in li­te pri­va­to­rum ius dan­di iu­di­cis non ha­buis­set, frus­tra pro­vo­ca­tum ab ea sen­ten­tia con­sti­tit, quae non te­ne­bat. 2Fi­lium fa­mi­lias, cum ad­ver­sus pa­trem eius de bo­nis, quae per ip­sum pot­erant ad­quiri, pro­nun­tia­tum es­set, re­spon­di non ni­si pa­tris no­mi­ne po­tuis­se pro­vo­ca­re. 3Eum, qui co­gno­vit edic­tum per­emp­to­rium, se­cun­dum or­di­nis cau­sam da­ti pla­cuit non rec­te pro­vo­cas­se, cum in eius po­tes­ta­te fue­rit an­te diem prae­sti­tu­tum pro tri­bu­na­li re­spon­den­tem aut de­fen­sum edic­ti de­nun­tia­tio­nem rum­pe­re.

23The Same, Opinions, Book XIX. When a judge has been appointed by the Governor of a province for the purpose of compromising a case with the consent of the litigants, the defeated party can appeal. 1When a representative of the Emperor who did not discharge the duties of Governor, or have the right to appoint a judge in private causes, gave a decision, it was held that it was useless to appeal from a judgment which did not render anyone liable. 2When a decision was rendered against the father of a son under paternal control, involving property which he could acquire through his son, I gave it as my opinion that the son could not appeal except in the name of his father. 3It was decided that he who knew that a peremptory Edict was granted him on account of his rank had no right to appeal, since it was in his power to answer in court before the day appointed, and thereby protect himself by avoiding the denunciation of the Edict.

24Scae­vo­la li­bro quin­to re­spon­so­rum. Neg­otio­rum ges­tor vel tu­tor vel cu­ra­tor bo­na fi­de con­dem­na­ti ap­pel­la­ve­runt et diu neg­otium trac­tum est: quae­si­tum est ap­pel­la­tio­ne eo­rum in­ius­ta pro­nun­tia­ta an, quia tar­dius iu­di­ca­tum sit, usu­rae prin­ci­pa­lis pe­cu­niae me­dii tem­po­ris de­bean­tur. re­spon­dit se­cun­dum ea quae pro­po­ne­ren­tur dan­dam uti­lem ac­tio­nem. 1Cu­ra­tor iu­ve­nis ad­ver­sus tu­to­ris he­redes iu­di­cio ex­per­tus ap­pel­la­tio­nem in­ter­po­suit: cum im­ples­set au­tem vi­cen­si­mum quin­tum an­num ae­ta­tis iu­ve­nis et in mi­li­tia age­ret, ex­equi ap­pel­la­tio­nem de­siit. quae­ro, re­gres­sus a mi­li­tia utrum ip­se ap­pel­la­tio­nem ex­pli­ca­re de­be­ret an ve­ro cu­ra­to­rem in eam rem con­ve­ni­ri opor­te­ret. re­spon­dit ip­sum mi­li­tem li­tem ad se per­ti­nen­tem ex­se­qui de­be­re se­cun­dum ea quae pro­po­ne­ren­tur.

24Scævola, Opinions, Book V. Where anyone who transacts the business of another in good faith or as a guardian, or a curator, has been condemned, and has appealed; and, after the case had been protracted for a long time, the appeal finally was decided not to have been made on good grounds; the question arose whether, because judgment was rendered subsequently, the interest on the principal for the intermediate time is due. The answer is that, according to the facts stated, a prætorian action should be granted. 1The curator of a minor in a suit brought against the heirs of his guardian filed an appeal. As the young man had then passed the age of twenty-five years, and was in the army, he neglected to prosecute his appeal. Having returned from the army, I ask whether he himself should prosecute his appeal, or should apply to his curator to do so. The answer was that, in accordance with the facts stated, the soldier himself should proceed with the case in which he was interested.

25Pau­lus li­bro vi­cen­si­mo re­spon­so­rum. Ἀυτοκράτωρ Ἀλέξανδρος τῷ κοινῷ τῶν ἐν Βιθυνίᾳ Ἑλλήνων. Ἐκκαλεῖσθαι μὲν πῶς ἄν τις κωλύοιτο ὑπὸ τῶν δικαζόντων, οὐχ ὁρῶ, ὁπότε ἔξεστιν τὴν ἑτέραν ὁδὸν τρεπόμενον ταὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ θᾶττον πρός με ἀφικνεῖσθαι. ὕβρει δὲ καὶ βίᾳ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐκκαλουμένους καὶ φρουρὰν στρατιωτικὴν περιιστᾶν καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀποφράττειν αὐτοῖς τὴν δεῦρο ἄνοδον ἀπαγορεύομεν τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις καὶ τοῖς ἡγουμένοις τῶν ἐθνῶν. καὶ πεισθήσονται ταύτῃ μου τῇ προρρήσει, εἰδότες ὅτι τοσοῦτόν μοι μέλει τῆς τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐλευθερίας, ὅσον καὶ τῆς εὐνοίας αὐτῶν καὶ πειθοῦς.

25Paulus, Opinions, Book XX. “The Emperor Alexander to the Community of the Greeks, who are in Bithynia. I do not see how anyone can be prevented from appealing from a judgment, when there is another way open to do the same thing, and to reach me more promptly. We forbid curators and the heads of nations to make use of abuse and violence against parties who appeal, and (to speak more plainly) to prevent them from having access to us; and they must obey this my decision, being well aware that the liberty of those who govern is as much the object of my solicitude as their good will and obedience.”

26Her­mo­ge­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do iu­ris epi­to­ma­rum. Ad im­pe­ra­to­rem cau­sam re­mis­sam par­ti­bus con­sen­tien­ti­bus prae­ses, si ad eius no­tio­nem per­ti­net, au­di­re pot­est.

26Hermogenianus, Epitomes of Law, Book II. When a case is sent to the Emperor, the Governor can hear it with the consent of the parties, if it is in his jurisdiction.

27Idem li­bro quin­to iu­ris epi­to­ma­rum. Tu­tor si in neg­otio pu­pil­li pro­vo­ca­ve­rit vel cu­ra­tor in ad­ul­ti, he­res eius, an­te­quam red­dat ra­tio­nes, ap­pel­la­tio­nis cau­sam per­se­qui de­bet: nam post red­di­tas ra­tio­nes nec ip­se tu­tor nec cu­ra­tor ap­pel­la­tio­nis me­ri­ta pro­ba­re co­gi­tur.

27The Same, Epitomes of Laiv, Book V. Where a guardian takes an appeal in a matter concerning his ward, or a curator does so in the case of an adult, he can prosecute the appeal before the heir of either renders his accounts; for after the accounts have been rendered, neither the guardian nor the curator will be compelled to sustain the merits of the appeal.

28Scae­vo­la li­bro vi­cen­si­mo quin­to di­ges­to­rum. Cre­di­tor cum fi­de­ius­so­ri­bus ege­rat: sed post iu­di­cium ac­cep­tum ad agen­dam cau­sam ip­se non ad­fuit et, cum ab­so­lu­ti es­sent fi­de­ius­so­res, ser­vus eius ap­pel­la­vit. quae­si­tum est, an ap­pel­la­tio, quam ser­vus in­ter­po­suit no­mi­ne do­mi­ni, nul­lius mo­men­ti es­set. re­spon­dit eius­mo­di ap­pel­la­tio­nem non es­se ob­ser­van­dam. 1Ius­sus a iu­di­ce ex­hi­be­re se­cun­dum prae­cep­tum prae­si­dis pro­vin­ciae ra­tio­nes, quas apud se es­se ca­ve­rat, in­stru­men­to­rum gra­tia da­ta di­la­tio­ne nec post­ea ex­hi­buit id­eo­que se­cun­dum con­sti­tu­tio­nem re­ci­ta­tam, quia per con­tu­ma­ciam in­stru­men­ta non ex­hi­bue­rat, cum pe­ti­tor quan­ti sua in­ter­es­set ex­hi­be­ri iu­ras­set, fac­ta erat con­dem­na­tio. quae­si­tum est, an post ius­iu­ran­dum ap­pel­la­tio­nem in­ter­po­ne­re pos­sit. re­spon­dit ni­hil pro­po­ni, cur de­ne­gan­dum es­set ap­pel­la­tio­nis au­xi­lium. 2Sub­sti­tu­ti tu­to­res in lo­cum le­gi­ti­mi tu­to­ris ex­per­ti cum eo tu­te­lae iu­di­cio, cum ar­bi­ter in­ique con­dem­na­vit, quam rei ae­qui­tas ex­ige­bat, a sen­ten­tia eius pro­vo­ca­ve­runt: pen­den­te cau­sa ap­pel­la­tio­nis iu­ve­nes ad­ole­ve­runt. quae­si­tum est, cum om­nis ex­se­cu­tio hu­ius ad ad­ul­tos per­ti­neat et cau­sam ad se per­ti­nen­tem ido­nee tue­ri pos­sunt, an pos­tu­la­tio eo­rum, con­tra quos ap­pel­la­tum erat, di­cen­tium il­los de­buis­se cau­sas ap­pel­la­tio­nis red­de­re, qui pri­mi sunt ex­per­ti, ad­mit­ten­da non sit. re­spon­dit eos, quo­rum tu­te­la ges­ta es­set, si vel­lent cau­sam ex­se­qui, non pro­hi­ben­dos. idem et in cu­ra­to­ri­bus ob­ser­van­dum est, si in­ter­im ad­ul­tus ad le­gi­ti­mam ae­ta­tem per­ve­nit.

28Scævola, Digest, Book XXV. A creditor who had brought suit against the sureties was not present at the trial of the case, after issue had been joined, and when the sureties were discharged his slave appealed. The question was asked whether the appeal which the slave interposed in behalf of his master was of any force or effect. The answer was that such an appeal should not receive any attention. 1A man having been ordered by a judge to appear in court, in accordance with the command of the Governor of the province, and produce certain accounts which he alleged were in his possession, did not do so, even after delay had been granted him for this purpose; and therefore, after the constitution had been read to him, for the reason that through obstinacy he had failed to produce the documents demanded, and the plaintiff proved the amount of his interest in having them produced, by taking an oath, the defendant was convicted. The question arose whether he could file an appeal after the oath had been taken. The answer was that nothing had been stated to show why the benefit of an appeal should be denied him. 2Guardians who had been substituted in the place of a legal guardian, having brought an action on guardianship against him, the arbitrator appointed condemned him unjustly, and because the equity of the case required it, they appealed from his decision. While the appeal was pending, the young men grew up. As the entire procedure had reference to persons who were grown, and they were in a condition to protect their own interests, the question arose whether the demand of those against whom the appeal had been taken, who alleged that the ground of the appeal must be stated by those who first brought the suit, should be admitted. The answer was, that if those whose guardianship had been administered desired to proceed with the case, they ought to be prevented from doing so. The same rule should be observed with reference to curators, if, in the meantime, the youth should arrive at lawful age.