Corpus iurisprudentiae Romanae

Repertorium zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts

Digesta Iustiniani Augusti

Recognovit Mommsen (1870) et retractavit Krüger (1928)
Convertit in Anglica lingua Scott (1932)
Dig. XLVIII16,
Ad senatus consultum Turpillianum et de abolitionibus criminum
Liber quadragesimus octavus
XVI.

Ad senatus consultum Turpillianum et de abolitionibus criminum

(Concerning the Turpillian Decree of the Senate and the Dismissal of Charges.)

1Mar­cia­nus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri ad se­na­tus con­sul­tum Tur­pil­lia­num. Ac­cu­sa­to­rum te­me­ri­tas tri­bus mo­dis de­te­gi­tur et tri­bus poe­nis sub­ici­tur: aut enim ca­lum­nian­tur aut prae­va­ri­can­tur aut ter­gi­ver­san­tur. 1Ca­lum­nia­ri est fal­sa cri­mi­na in­ten­de­re, prae­va­ri­ca­ri ve­ra cri­mi­na abs­con­de­re, ter­gi­ver­sa­ri in uni­ver­sum ab ac­cu­sa­tio­ne de­sis­te­re. 2Ca­lum­nia­to­ri­bus poe­na le­ge rem­mia ir­ro­ga­tur. 3Sed non uti­que qui non pro­bat quod in­ten­dit pro­ti­nus ca­lum­nia­ri vi­de­tur: nam eius rei in­qui­si­tio ar­bi­trio co­gnos­cen­tis com­mit­ti­tur, qui reo ab­so­lu­to de ac­cu­sa­to­ris in­ci­pit con­si­lio quae­re­re, qua men­te duc­tus ad ac­cu­sa­tio­nem pro­ces­sit, et si qui­dem ius­tum eius er­ro­rem rep­pererit, ab­sol­vit eum, si ve­ro in evi­den­ti ca­lum­nia eum de­pre­hen­de­rit, le­gi­ti­mam poe­nam ei ir­ro­gat. 4Quo­rum al­ter­utrum ip­sis ver­bis pro­nun­tia­tio­nis ma­ni­fes­ta­tur. nam si qui­dem ita pro­nun­tia­ve­rit ‘non pro­bas­ti’, pe­pe­rcit ei: sin au­tem pro­nun­tia­vit ‘ca­lum­nia­tus es’, con­dem­na­vit eum. et quam­vis ni­hil de poe­na sub­ie­ce­rit, ta­men le­gis po­tes­tas ad­ver­sus eum ex­er­ce­bi­tur: nam, ut Pa­pi­nia­nus re­spon­dit, fac­ti qui­dem quaes­tio in ar­bi­trio est iu­di­can­tis, poe­nae ve­ro per­se­cu­tio non eius vo­lun­ta­ti man­da­tur, sed le­gis auc­to­ri­ta­ti re­ser­va­tur. 5Quae­ri pos­sit, si ita fue­rit in­ter­lo­cu­tus: ‘Lu­cius Ti­tius te­me­re ac­cu­sas­se vi­de­tur’, an ca­lum­nia­to­rem pro­nun­tias­se vi­dea­tur. et Pa­pi­nia­nus te­me­ri­ta­tem fa­ci­li­ta­tis ve­niam con­ti­ne­re et in­con­sul­tum ca­lo­rem ca­lum­niae vi­tio ca­re­re et ob id hunc nul­lam poe­nam sub­ire opor­te­re. 6Prae­va­ri­ca­to­rem eum es­se os­ten­di­mus, qui col­lu­d­it cum reo et trans­la­ti­cie mu­ne­re ac­cu­san­di de­fun­gi­tur, eo quod pro­prias qui­dem pro­ba­tio­nes dis­si­mu­la­ret, fal­sas ve­ro rei ex­cu­sa­tio­nes ad­mit­te­ret. 7Si quis au­tem ab ac­cu­sa­tio­ne ci­tra ab­oli­tio­nem de­sti­te­rit, pu­ni­tur. 8Ab­oli­tio pri­va­tim a prae­si­di­bus pos­tu­la­ri ac im­pe­tra­ri so­let, item pro tri­bu­na­li, non de pla­no: nec prae­sens hanc co­gni­tio­nem al­te­ri deman­da­re pot­est. 9Si plu­ra cri­mi­na idem ei­dem in­tu­lit, sin­gu­lo­rum de­bet ab­oli­tio­nem pe­te­re: alio­quin pro­ut quid ad­mi­se­rit, eius no­mi­ne se­na­tus con­sul­ti poe­nam pa­tie­tur. 10Ac­cu­sa­tio­nem is in­tu­lit, qui prae­scrip­tio­ne sum­mo­ve­ri pot­erat, ut qui­li­bet ad­ul­te­rii mas­cu­lo post quin­que an­nos con­ti­nuos ex die com­mis­si ad­ul­te­rii vel fe­mi­nae post sex men­ses uti­les ex die di­vor­tii: an, si de­sti­te­rit, hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to plec­ti de­bet, bel­le du­bi­ta­tur. mo­vet, quod pae­ne nul­la erit ac­cu­sa­tio, quam tem­po­ris spa­tium aut per­so­nae vi­tium om­ni­mo­do re­mo­ve­ret reo­que se­cu­ri­ta­tem ti­mo­ris ac pe­ri­cu­li pro­mit­te­ret. con­tra mo­vet, quod qua­lis­cum­que ac­cu­sa­tio il­la­ta co­gnos­cen­tis auc­to­ri­ta­te, non ac­cu­san­tis vo­lun­ta­te ab­ole­ri de­bet ma­io­re­que odio dig­nus ex­is­ti­ma­re­tur, qui te­me­re ad tam im­pro­bam ac­cu­sa­tio­nem pro­ces­sis­set. er­go ve­rius est eum quo­que de quo lo­qui­mur in se­na­tus con­sul­tum in­ci­de­re opor­te­re. ad­quin Pa­pi­nia­nus re­spon­dit mu­lie­rem, quae id­cir­co ad fal­si ac­cu­sa­tio­nem non ad­mit­te­re­tur, quod suam suo­rum­ve in­iu­riam non per­se­que­re­tur, de­sis­ten­tem se­na­tus con­sul­to Tur­pil­lia­no non plec­ti. num er­go et in ce­te­ris idem re­spon­su­rus sit? quid enim in­ter­est, prop­ter se­xus in­fir­mi­ta­tem an prop­ter sta­tus tur­pi­tu­di­nem tem­po­ris­ve fi­nem ad ac­cu­sa­tio­nem ali­quam non ad­mit­ta­tur? mul­to­que ma­gis ex­clu­den­di sunt, quod mu­lie­ris qui­dem ac­cu­sa­tio vel prop­ter pro­prium eius do­lo­rem ef­fec­tum ha­be­re po­tuit, il­lo­rum ve­ro ac­cu­sa­tio vo­ce dum­ta­xat te­nus in­ter­ve­nit. ad­quin idem alias scri­bit non pos­se ali­quem duos eo­dem tem­po­re ad­ul­te­rii ac­cu­sa­re, ma­rem et fe­mi­nam, et ta­men, si utri­que si­mul de­nun­tia­ve­rit, in utrius­que per­so­na ab­oli­tio­nem eum pe­te­re de­be­re, ne in hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to in­ci­dat. quid por­ro re­fert, prop­ter cau­sas su­pra scrip­tas ac­cu­sa­tio non va­lue­rit an prop­ter nu­me­rum per­so­na­rum non te­nue­rit? an haec in­ter­sint, ple­nam ha­bue­rit ali­quis ac­cu­san­di fa­cul­ta­tem, sed prop­ter per­so­na­rum con­iunc­tio­nem ab ac­cu­sa­tio­ne sum­mo­vea­tur, an ve­ro stric­ta ra­tio­ne qui­bus­dam ac­cu­san­di fa­cul­tas non com­pe­tat? me­ri­to ita­que di­cen­dum est om­nes ex­cep­ta mu­lie­re et mi­no­re ni­si ab­oli­tio­nem pe­tie­rint, in hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to in­ci­de­re. 11Su­spec­ti tu­to­ris ac­cu­sa­tio pro tri­bu­na­li tan­tum exa­mi­na­ri pot­est, et nul­lus alius de hu­ius­mo­di quaes­tio­ne quam prae­ses pro­nun­tia­re pot­est: et ta­men qui ab ea de­sti­tit, se­na­tus con­sul­to non te­ne­tur. 12Item si di­cat ali­quis in se­na­tus con­sul­tum in­ci­dis­se Tur­pil­lia­num, prae­si­dis est su­per ea re no­tio: et ta­men con­tra de­ser­to­rem se­na­tus con­sul­ti non in­ter­ve­nit co­er­ci­tio: qui au­tem di­cit quem in hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to in­ci­dis­se, ac­cu­sa­tor non est. 13In­ci­dit in hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to et qui ac­cu­sa­to­rem sum­mit­tit aut in­sti­gat, aut qui man­dat ali­cui et in­struit eum ad ac­cu­sa­tio­nem ca­pi­ta­lem dan­do pro­ba­tio­nes, al­le­gan­do ac­cu­sa­tio­nes: et me­ri­to: nam dif­fi­den­do cri­mi­ni quod mo­vet et ex­imen­do se pe­ri­cu­lo ca­lum­niae vel de­ser­tio­nis me­ri­to ca­lum­nian­tis et de­sis­ten­tis poe­nae sub­di de­buit, ni­si sub­or­na­tus ac­cu­sa­tor pro­ba­ve­rit cri­men quod in­ten­de­re sus­ce­pit. nec in­ter­est, per se man­da­vit ac­cu­sa­tio­nem an per alium: ve­rum hunc, qui hoc mi­nis­te­rio usus est ad man­dan­dam ac­cu­sa­tio­nem, non ex ver­bis, sed ex sen­ten­tia se­na­tus con­sul­ti pu­ni­ri Pa­pi­nia­nus re­spon­dit. sum­mis­sus enim ac­cu­sa­tor si­mi­li­ter eo­dem se­na­tus con­sul­to plec­ti­tur, id est prop­ter hoc so­lum pu­ni­tur, quod mi­nis­te­rium alie­ni ti­mo­ris re­ce­pit. 14Reus con­dem­na­tus pro­vo­ca­vit, de­in­de ac­cu­sa­tor de­sti­tit: an in hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to in­ci­dit? pro­pe est, ut in­ci­dis­se vi­dea­tur, quia pro­vo­ca­tio­nis re­me­dio con­dem­na­tio­nis ex­tin­gui­tur pro­nun­tia­tio.

1Marcianus, On the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. The recklessness of accusers is detected in three ways, and is punished by three penalties; for they either calumniate, prevaricate, or withdraw. 1To calumniate is to bring false accusations. To prevaricate is to conceal true crimes. To withdraw is to entirely abandon a charge. 2Punishment is inflicted upon calumniators by the Remmian Law. 3He who does not prove what he alleges is not immediately considered to be a calumniator, for the investigation of the offence is left to the judge, having jurisdiction of the case; who, if the defendant is acquitted, begins to inquire into the intention of the accuser, and why he was induced to bring the accusation; and if he finds this was due to a just mistake, he must discharge him. If, however, he should ascertain that he evidently has been guilty of calumny, he must inflict upon him the penalty of the law. 4The decision of either of these points is disclosed by the words of the judgment. For if it is as follows, “You have not proved your allegations,” he spares the defendant; but ff he says, “You are guilty of calumny,” he condemns him; and even though he may add nothing with reference to the penalty, still the power of the law will be enforced against him. For (as Papinianus held), the question of fact depends upon the discretion of the court, but the infliction of the punishment is not left to his will, but is reserved for the authority of the law. 5It may be asked, if the judge should make the following statement, “Lucius Titius appears to have brought a rash accusation,” should he be considered to have pronounced him a calumniator? Papinianus says that rashness affords a ground for pardon, and that unrestrained anger lacks the vice of calumny, and on this account no penalty need be incurred. 6We have shown him to be a prevaricator who is in collusion with the defendant, and who relinquishes his post as accuser, in order that he may conceal his evidence, and permit the false excuses of the defendant to be advanced. 7If, however, anyone desists from prosecuting the accusation without having it dismissed, he is punished. 8The dismissal of a case is usually asked for, and granted by the Governors of provinces. The application for it is made to the magistrate while presiding in court, and not elsewhere; and if he is present he cannot leave the investigation to another. 9If one person has accused the same individual of several offences, he should apply for the dismissal of each of them, otherwise he will suffer the penalty prescribed by the Decree of the Senate for each offence omitted. 10He who brings an accusation which can be barred by prescription, as, for instance, that of adultery, when five continuous years have elapsed since its commission by the man, or after six available months from the day of the divorce, in case of the woman; can there be any doubt whatever that, if he desists, he should be punished under this Decree of the Senate? A difficulty arises here for the reason that this accusation almost becomes of no effect when a period of time, or some defect in the person exists, which will render the defendant secure from fear and danger. On the other hand, when an accusation has once been brought, it cannot be dismissed at the wish of the accuser, but this must be done by the authority of the magistrate having cognizance of the case, and he is considered to be more worthy of odium who rashly brings such a disgraceful charge. Therefore, the better opinion is that he, also, of whom we spoke, should come within the terms of the Decree of the Senate. Papinianus, however, gives it as his opinion that if a woman who was not competent to bring an accusation of forgery, because she was not prosecuting an injury inflicted upon herself, or her family, should desist, she ought not be punished under the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. Would he have given the same opinion in other cases? For what difference does it make if an accusation is not permitted to be brought on account of the weakness of sex; the baseness of one’s condition; or the lapse of time? There is much more reason that persons should be exempt from punishment under such circumstances, because the accusation of the woman can at least be effective on account of her own injury, while the accusation of the others is nothing but the sound of a voice. However, the same authority has stated elsewhere that no one can accuse both persons, that is the man and the woman, of adultery at the same time; and still, if he did accuse both of them simultaneously, he should ask for the dismissal of the case against both, in order to avoid becoming liable under this Decree of the Senate. Moreover, what difference will it make if the accusation should prove to be void, for the reasons above mentioned, or if it could not stand on account of the number accused? Or if there is some distinction to be made where anyone has full power to bring an accusation, but is prevented from doing so because of the joinder of the two individuals; or he is not qualified to accuse them according to the strict construction of the law? Hence it is reasonable to hold that all persons (with the exception of women and minors), when they do not ask for a dismissal of the case, will come within the scope of this Decree of the Senate. 11The accusation of a suspected guardian can only be heard in open court, and no one but the Governor of the province can render a decision in such a case; and, nevertheless, anyone who desists from prosecution will not incur the penalty of the Decree of the Senate. 12Likewise, where anyone is accused of having incurred the penalty of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate, it is the duty of the Governor of the province to take cognizance of the matter; and the penalty of the Decree of the Senate will not be enforced against the party who abandons the charge, for he who says that someone has incurred the penalty of this Decree of the Senate is not an accuser. 13He comes within the terms of this decree who provides an accuser, or instigates, directs, or induces anyone to bring a capital accusation, by furnishing evidence, and by formulating charges. This is reasonable, for by failing to prove the accusation which he was instrumental in having brought, and by attempting to free himself from the danger of calumny by abandoning the case, he should certainly be subjected to punishment for those offences; unless the accuser, who had been suborned, can prove the crime which he undertook to establish. Nor does it make any difference whether he brought the charge himself, or directed it to be brought by another. Papinianus gave it as his opinion that if it was true that anyone had used means of this kind for the bringing of an accusation, he should be punished, not according to the letter, but according to the spirit of the law; for the accuser who took the place of the person who employed him is liable under the same Decree of the Senate; that is to say, he is punished for that alone which he did as the agent of another, who himself was afraid to act. 14A defendant who had been convicted, appealed, and his accuser afterwards desisted; did he come within the terms of the Decree of the Senate? He seems to have very nearly done so, because by the remedy of the appeal the decision of conviction was extinguished.

2Pau­lus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de poe­nis om­nium le­gum. Qui de­sti­te­rit, age­re am­plius et ac­cu­sa­re pro­hi­be­tur.

2Paulus, On the Penalties of All Laws. Anyone who desists from prosecuting a crime is prevented from subsequently bringing an accusation.

3Idem li­bro pri­mo sen­ten­tia­rum. Et in pri­va­tis et in ex­tra­or­di­na­riis cri­mi­ni­bus om­nes ca­lum­nio­si ex­tra or­di­nem pro qua­li­ta­te ad­mis­si plec­tun­tur.

3The Same, Sentences, Book I. And even in the cases of accusation for private and ordinary breaches of the law, all calumniators are arbitrarily punished in proportion to the gravity of the offences committed.

4Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro quin­to de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Mu­lier, quae fal­si cri­men in­iu­riae pro­priae post in­ter­po­si­tam de­nun­tia­tio­nem de­sis­tens omi­sit, ex se­na­tus con­sul­to Tur­pil­lia­no te­ne­ri non vi­de­tur. 1Post ab­oli­tio­nem idem cri­men ab eo­dem in eun­dem in­stau­ra­ri non pot­est.

4Papinianus, Opinions, Book XV. A woman who institutes a prosecution for forgery, as an injury to herself, and, having desisted, abandons it, is not considered to have incurred the penalty of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. 1After a case has been dismissed, the same charge cannot again be brought by the same accuser against the same defendant.

5Pau­lus li­bro se­cun­do re­spon­so­rum. Quae­si­tum est, an is, qui li­bel­lo prin­ci­pi da­to fal­sum se ob­iec­tu­rum mi­na­tus est, si non ob­ie­cis­set, Tur­pil­lia­no se­na­tus con­sul­to te­ne­tur. Pau­lus re­spon­dit ver­bis se­na­tus con­sul­ti Tur­pil­lia­ni eum de quo quae­ri­tur non con­ti­ne­ri.

5Paulus, Opinions, Book II. Where a man presented a petition to the Emperor and threatened to bring an accusation for forgery, but did not do so, the question arose whether he was liable to the penalty imposed by the Turpillian Decree of the Senate? Paulus answered that the party in question was not included in the terms of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate.

6Idem li­bro pri­mo sen­ten­tia­rum. Ab ac­cu­sa­tio­ne de­sti­tit, qui cum ad­ver­sa­rio suo de com­po­si­tio­ne eius cri­mi­nis quod in­ten­de­bat fue­rit lo­cu­tus. 1Ani­mo ab ac­cu­sa­tio­ne de­sti­tit, qui af­fec­tum et ani­mum ac­cu­san­di de­po­suit. 2De­sti­tis­se vi­de­tur, qui in­tra prae­fi­ni­tum ac­cu­sa­tio­nis a prae­si­de tem­pus reum suum non per­egit. 3Nun­tia­to­res, qui per no­to­riam in­di­cia pro­dunt, no­to­riis suis ad­sis­te­re iu­ben­tur. 4Ca­lum­niae cau­sa pu­niun­tur, qui in frau­dem ali­cu­ius li­brum vel tes­ti­mo­nium aliud­ve quid con­qui­sis­se vel scrip­sis­se vel in iu­di­cium pro­tu­lis­se di­cun­tur.

6The Same, Sentences, Book I. He has desisted from the accusation who has spoken with his adversary with reference to the disposal of the criminal charge which he had attempted to prosecute. 1He intentionally abandons an accusation who renounces the desire and intention of bringing it. 2He is held to have desisted, who does not prosecute the defendant within the time prescribed by the Governor to prove the charge. 3Those who serve notice in writing of their intention to prosecute are ordered to substantiate their allegations by the production of the notices. 4Those are punished for false accusations who, for the purpose of injuring another, are alleged to have searched for, written, or produced in court any book or other evidence to his prejudice.

7Ul­pia­nus li­bro oc­ta­vo dis­pu­ta­tio­num. Si quis re­pe­te­re ve­lit cri­men pu­bli­ca ab­oli­tio­ne in­ter­ve­nien­te, eo iu­re re­pe­tit, quo ac­cu­sa­bat: ne­que enim pos­sunt prae­scrip­tio­nes ei ob­ici, quae an­te reo­rum ab­oli­tio­nem non sunt ob­iec­tae. et ita di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus re­scrip­sit. 1Si stel­lio­na­tum quis ob­ie­ce­rit vel ex­pi­la­tae he­redi­ta­tis cri­men et de­sti­tit, poe­nam se­na­tus con­sul­ti Tur­pil­lia­ni non sub­ibit, nec si fur­ti vel in­iu­ria­rum: sed of­fi­cio iu­di­cis cul­pa eius co­er­ce­bi­tur.

7Ulpianus, Disputations, Book VIII. If anyone should wish to revive a criminal accusation after it has been publicly dismissed, he can do so with the same right which he had when he first brought it; for prescriptions cannot legally be pleaded against him which were not pleaded before the discharge of the defendants. This the Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript. 1Where anyone brings an accusation for stellionatus, or for the crime of plundering an estate, and then desists, he will not be subjected to the penalty of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate, even if theft or injury is involved, but his fault will be punished by the judge.

8Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­riis. Ab­oli­tio aut pu­bli­ce fit ob diem in­sig­nem aut pu­bli­cam gra­tu­la­tio­nem

8Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. The dismissal of a criminal case is either made publicly on account of some memorable occasion, or because of some public rejoicing,

9Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum. vel ob rem pro­spe­re ges­tam

9Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. Or by reason of the fortunate result of some transaction,

10Pa­pi­nia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­riis. aut pri­va­tim ac­to­re pos­tu­lan­te. ter­tio ge­ne­re fit ex le­ge ab­oli­tio ac­cu­sa­to­re mor­tuo vel ex ius­ta cau­sa im­pe­di­to, quo mi­nus ac­cu­sa­re pos­sit. 1Ab­oli­tio­ne au­tem pu­bli­ce fac­ta non re­trac­ta­bi­tur in iu­di­cio re­pe­ten­do de ma­ri­ti iu­re. 2Tri­gin­ta dies re­pe­ten­di rei di­vus Tra­ia­nus uti­les es­se in­ter­pre­ta­tus est, ex die sci­li­cet, quo fe­riae fi­ni­tae sunt. et se­na­tus cen­suit eas dies ce­de­re, qui­bus quis­que reum suum re­pe­te­re pos­sit. hoc au­tem re­pe­ten­di rei tem­pus non ali­ter ce­dit, quam si ac­cu­sa­tor quo­que po­tuit ad­ire.

10Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. Or privately, at the request of the accuser. There is a third kind of dismissal made in accordance with law, that is, when the accuser dies, or is prevented by some good reason from bringing the accusation. 1When a dismissal is made in accordance with a public decree, the husband, in bringing the charge a second time, will not forfeit any of his rights. 2The Divine Hadrian stated that the thirty days prescribed for reviving an accusation should be understood to be available days, that is to say they should be computed from the date on which the festivals terminated. The Senate decreed that these days began at the time when anyone could resume the prosecution of the defendant. This time to revive the case does not begin to run except where the accuser can institute proceedings.

11Idem li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de ad­ul­te­ris. Quae­re­ba­tur, an hi, qui ab ac­cu­sa­tio­ne tem­po­re ex­clu­si es­sent, in se­na­tus con­sul­tum Tur­pil­lia­num in­ci­de­runt. re­spon­dit non opor­te­re du­bi­ta­ri ca­lum­nia non pu­ni­ri eos, qui prae­scrip­tio­ne tem­po­ris ex­clu­si cau­sam ad­ul­te­rii per­fer­re non po­tue­runt.

11The Same, On Adultery. The question was asked whether those who had been excluded from bringing an accusation by lapse of time come within the scope of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. The answer was that there is no doubt that persons who are prevented by prescription from bringing a charge of adultery can be punished for calumny.

12Ul­pia­nus li­bro se­cun­do de ad­ul­te­riis. Si in­ter­ve­nien­te pu­bli­ca ab­oli­tio­ne ex se­na­tus con­sul­to, ut fie­ri ad­so­let, vel ob lae­ti­tiam ali­quam vel ho­no­rem do­mus di­vi­nae vel ex ali­qua cau­sa, ex qua se­na­tus cen­suit ab­oli­tio­nem reo­rum fie­ri, nec in­tra dies prae­sti­tu­tos reum re­pe­tie­rit: di­cen­dum est ces­sa­re Tur­pil­lia­num se­na­tus con­sul­tum. nec enim vi­de­tur de­sis­te­re, qui ex­emp­tum reum non de­fert: ex­imi­tur au­tem reo­rum ab­oli­tio­ne in­ter­ve­nien­te.

12Ulpianus, On Adultery, Book II. Where a public dismissal of a criminal case has occurred under the Decree of the Senate, as ordinarily happens; or on account of some public rejoicing; or to honor the Imperial House; or for some reason for. which the Senate decreed that the defendants should be discharged, and the accuser did not renew the accusation within the prescribed time, it must be said that the Turpillian Decree of the Senate does not apply, for he is not held to desist who does not accuse a person that is exempt from criminal liability. He, however, becomes exempt from prosecution by the discharge of the defendants.

13Pau­lus li­bro ter­tio de ad­ul­te­ris. De­sti­tis­se eum ac­ci­pie­mus, qui in to­tum ani­mum agen­di de­po­suit, non qui dis­tu­lit ac­cu­sa­tio­nem. 1Sed qui per­mis­su im­pe­ra­to­ris ab ac­cu­sa­tio­ne de­sti­tit, im­pu­ni­tus est.

13Paulus, On Adultery, Book III. We understand a person to have desisted who has entirely abandoned the intention of prosecuting, and not he who has only postponed the accusation. 1Anyone who, by permission of the Emperor, desists from prosecuting a criminal charge, is not liable to punishment.

14Ul­pia­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo de of­fi­cio pro­con­su­lis. Di­vus Ha­d­ria­nus Sal­vio Ca­ro pro­con­su­li Cre­tae re­scrip­sit tu­to­rem, qui pu­pil­li cau­sa in­sti­tue­rat ac­cu­sa­tio­nem, de­func­to pu­pil­lo, cu­ius cau­sa ac­cu­sa­re coe­pe­rat, non es­se co­gen­dum ac­cu­sa­tio­nem im­ple­re.

14Ulpianus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book VII. The Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript addressed to Salvius Carus, Proconsul of Crete, that where a guardian had filed an accusation in the name of his ward, and the latter, in whose behalf he had filed it, had died, he should not be compelled to proceed with the accusation.

15Ma­cer li­bro se­cun­do pu­bli­co­rum. In se­na­tus con­sul­tum Tur­pil­lia­num in­ci­dunt, qui sub­ie­cis­sent ac­cu­sa­to­res, aut sub­iec­ti pos­tu­las­sent nec per­egis­sent reos, aut ali­ter quam ab­oli­tio­ne fac­ta de­sti­tis­sent: qui­que chi­ro­gra­phum ob ac­cu­san­dum de­dis­sent pac­tio­nem­ve ali­quam in­ter­po­suis­sent. hoc au­tem ver­bum ‘nec per­egis­sent’ ad uni­ver­sos su­pra scrip­tos per­ti­ne­re di­cen­dum est. 1An ad eos, qui ho­die de iu­di­ciis pu­bli­cis ex­tra or­di­nem co­gnos­cunt, se­na­tus con­sul­tum per­ti­neat, quae­ri­tur: sed iam hoc iu­re ex sa­cris con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus uti­mur, ut per­ti­neat ita ex sin­gu­lis cau­sis sin­gu­lae poe­nae ir­ro­gen­tur. 2Eos, de quo­rum ca­lum­nia agi non per­mit­ti­tur, si de­sti­te­rint, non in­ci­de­re in poe­nam hu­ius se­na­tus con­sul­ti con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus ca­ve­tur. 3Si prop­ter mor­tem rei ac­cu­sa­tor de­sti­te­rit, non pot­est hoc se­na­tus con­sul­to te­ne­ri, quia mor­te rei iu­di­cium sol­vi­tur, ni­si ta­le cri­men fuit, cu­ius ac­tio et ad­ver­sus he­redes du­rat, vel­uti ma­ies­ta­tis. idem in ac­cu­sa­tio­ne re­pe­tun­da­rum est, quia haec quo­que mor­te non sol­vi­tur. 4Ce­te­rum si, post­ea quam ac­cu­sa­tor de­sti­tit, reus de­ces­se­rit, non id­eo ma­gis de­lic­tum ac­cu­sa­to­ris rele­va­tur. nam eum qui se­mel de­sti­tit, si post­ea ac­cu­sa­re pa­ra­tus sit, non es­se au­dien­dum Se­ve­rus et An­to­ni­nus sta­tue­runt. 5Qui post in­scrip­tio­nem an­te li­tem con­tes­ta­tam an­no vel bi­en­nio age­re non po­tue­rint va­riis prae­si­dum oc­cu­pa­tio­ni­bus vel et­iam ci­vi­lium of­fi­cio­rum ne­ces­si­ta­ti­bus di­stric­ti, in se­na­tus con­sul­tum non in­ci­dent. 6Quam­quam prius reum quis de­tu­le­rat, et si post ab­oli­tio­nem, an­te­quam reus re­pe­te­re­tur, alia ab­oli­tio su­per­ve­ne­rit: non ex su­pe­rio­re, sed ex se­cun­da ab­oli­tio­ne dies tri­gin­ta com­pu­tan­tur.

15Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. Those come within the scope of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate who substitute accusers in their places; or who, having done so, bring the accusation without prosecuting the defendants; or desist from the prosecution in some other manner than by the dismissal of the case, as well as such as have filed some written document, or have entered into some agreement for the purpose of accusing another. It must be said that these words, “Bring the accusation without prosecuting the defendants,” are applicable to all the persons above mentioned. 1The question arises whether the Decree of the Senate applies to those who, at present, have extraordinary jurisdiction of public offences. The present law, based upon the Imperial Constitutions, is that it does apply; hence each penalty will be imposed in each individual case. 2If those who are not permitted to bring an accusation for calumny desist, they will not be liable to the penalty of this Decree of the Senate. This has been provided by the Constitutions. 3If, on account of the death of the defendant, the accuser should desist, he cannot be held liable under this Decree of the Senate; because the prosecution is extinguished by the death of the accused, unless the crime is such that its prosecution can be continued against the heirs, as, for instance, that of high treason. The same rule applies where an accusation is brought for extortion, because this also is not extinguished by death. 4Moreover, if the defendant should die after the accuser has desisted from the prosecution, the offence of the accuser will not, for this reason, be lessened. For if he who has once desisted should afterwards be ready to renew the accusation, Severus and Antoninus have decreed that he shall not be heard. 5Those who, after having filed a written accusation, have permitted one or two years to elapse, for the reason that they could not prosecute on account of their various occupations as Governors, or because they were prevented by the requirements of civil office, do not come within the terms of the Decree of the Senate. 6If anyone has accused a person in the first place, and, after the case has been dismissed, but before the defendant is again accused, a second dismissal should occur, the thirty days should be computed, not from the first, but from the second dismissal of the case.

16Pau­lus li­bro sin­gu­la­ri de ad­ul­te­ris. Do­mi­tia­nus re­scrip­sit, quod de fe­riis et ab­olen­dis reis di­ci­tur, non per­ti­ne­re ad ser­vos, qui ac­cu­sa­ti in vin­cu­lis es­se iu­ben­tur, ne iu­di­cium fi­nia­tur.

16Paulus, On Adultery. Domitian stated in a Rescript that what is provided with reference to festivals, and the discharge of defendants, does not apply to slaves who, having been accused, are ordered to be placed in chains until the case is decided.

17Mo­des­ti­nus li­bro sep­ti­mo de­ci­mo re­spon­so­rum. Lu­cius Ti­tius Se­ium reum fal­si fe­cit et prius­quam per­se­que­re­tur, in­dul­gen­tia reo­rum cri­mi­na ab­oli­ta sunt. quae­ro, si post­ea eum ite­ra­to reum non fe­ce­rit, an in Tur­pil­lia­num se­na­tus con­sul­tum in­ci­de­rit. He­ren­nius Mo­des­ti­nus re­spon­dit ab­oli­tio­nem reo­rum, quae pu­bli­ce in­dul­ge­tur, ad hoc ge­nus cri­mi­nis non per­ti­ne­re.

17Modestinus, Opinions, Book XVII. Lucius Titius accused Seius of forgery, and before he prosecuted him, the accusations of all defendants were dismissed by the indulgence of the Emperor. I ask, if the prosecution should not afterwards be resumed whether the accuser would be subject to the penalty of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. Herennius Modestinus answered that the discharge of defendants, granted by public favor, does not apply to this kind of crime.

18Pa­pi­rius Ius­tus li­bro pri­mo de con­sti­tu­tio­ni­bus. Im­pe­ra­to­res An­to­ni­nus et Ve­rus Au­gus­ti Iu­lio ve­ro re­scrip­se­runt, cum sa­tis diu li­tem tra­xis­se di­ce­tur, in­vi­to ad­ver­sa­rio non pos­se eum ab­oli­tio­nem ac­ci­pe­re. 1Item re­scrip­se­runt, ni­si evi­den­ter pro­be­tur con­sen­ti­re ad­ver­sa­rium, ab­oli­tio­nem non da­ri. 2Item re­scrip­se­runt, cum in cri­mi­ne ca­pi­ta­li ab­oli­tio­nem ut in re pe­cu­nia­ria pe­ti­tam es­se di­ce­ret, re­stau­ran­dam es­se ni­hi­lo mi­nus co­gni­tio­nem, ita ut, si non pro­bas­set hoc quod pro­po­ne­ret, non im­pu­ne eum la­tu­rum.

18Papirius Justus, On the Constitutions, Book I. The Emperors Antoninus and Verus stated in a Rescript to Julius Verus that, as the case had been continued for a considerable time, the latter could not obtain its dismissal against the consent of his adversaries. 1They also stated in a Rescript that, unless it was clearly proved that the adversary had given his consent, dismissal should not be granted. 2They also stated in a Rescript that, where the dismissal of an accusation for a capital crime had been applied for, as in a case involving a sum of money, the prosecution might, nevertheless, be renewed; so that if the complainant could not prove what he alleged he should not go unpunished.