Ad senatus consultum Turpillianum et de abolitionibus criminum
(Concerning the Turpillian Decree of the Senate and the Dismissal of Charges.)
1 Marcianus libro singulari ad senatus consultum Turpillianum. Accusatorum temeritas tribus modis detegitur et tribus poenis subicitur: aut enim calumniantur aut praevaricantur aut tergiversantur. 1Calumniari est falsa crimina intendere, praevaricari vera crimina abscondere, tergiversari in universum ab accusatione desistere. 2Calumniatoribus poena lege remmia irrogatur. 3Sed non utique qui non probat quod intendit protinus calumniari videtur: nam eius rei inquisitio arbitrio cognoscentis committitur, qui reo absoluto de accusatoris incipit consilio quaerere, qua mente ductus ad accusationem processit, et si quidem iustum eius errorem reppererit, absolvit eum, si vero in evidenti calumnia eum deprehenderit, legitimam poenam ei irrogat. 4Quorum alterutrum ipsis verbis pronuntiationis manifestatur. nam si quidem ita pronuntiaverit ‘non probasti’, pepercit ei: sin autem pronuntiavit ‘calumniatus es’, condemnavit eum. et quamvis nihil de poena subiecerit, tamen legis potestas adversus eum exercebitur: nam, ut Papinianus respondit, facti quidem quaestio in arbitrio est iudicantis, poenae vero persecutio non eius voluntati mandatur, sed legis auctoritati reservatur. 5Quaeri possit, si ita fuerit interlocutus: ‘Lucius Titius temere accusasse videtur’, an calumniatorem pronuntiasse videatur. et Papinianus temeritatem facilitatis veniam continere et inconsultum calorem calumniae vitio carere et ob id hunc nullam poenam subire oportere. 6Praevaricatorem eum esse ostendimus, qui colludit cum reo et translaticie munere accusandi defungitur, eo quod proprias quidem probationes dissimularet, falsas vero rei excusationes admitteret. 7Si quis autem ab accusatione citra abolitionem destiterit, punitur. 8Abolitio privatim a praesidibus postulari ac impetrari solet, item pro tribunali, non de plano: nec praesens hanc cognitionem alteri demandare potest. 9Si plura crimina idem eidem intulit, singulorum debet abolitionem petere: alioquin prout quid admiserit, eius nomine senatus consulti poenam patietur. 10Accusationem is intulit, qui praescriptione summoveri poterat, ut quilibet adulterii masculo post quinque annos continuos ex die commissi adulterii vel feminae post sex menses utiles ex die divortii: an, si destiterit, hoc senatus consulto plecti debet, belle dubitatur. movet, quod paene nulla erit accusatio, quam temporis spatium aut personae vitium omnimodo removeret reoque securitatem timoris ac periculi promitteret. contra movet, quod qualiscumque accusatio illata cognoscentis auctoritate, non accusantis voluntate aboleri debet maioreque odio dignus existimaretur, qui temere ad tam improbam accusationem processisset. ergo verius est eum quoque de quo loquimur in senatus consultum incidere oportere. adquin Papinianus respondit mulierem, quae idcirco ad falsi accusationem non admitteretur, quod suam suorumve iniuriam non persequeretur, desistentem senatus consulto Turpilliano non plecti. num ergo et in ceteris idem responsurus sit? quid enim interest, propter sexus infirmitatem an propter status turpitudinem temporisve finem ad accusationem aliquam non admittatur? multoque magis excludendi sunt, quod mulieris quidem accusatio vel propter proprium eius dolorem effectum habere potuit, illorum vero accusatio voce dumtaxat tenus intervenit. adquin idem alias scribit non posse aliquem duos eodem tempore adulterii accusare, marem et feminam, et tamen, si utrique simul denuntiaverit, in utriusque persona abolitionem eum petere debere, ne in hoc senatus consulto incidat. quid porro refert, propter causas supra scriptas accusatio non valuerit an propter numerum personarum non tenuerit? an haec intersint, plenam habuerit aliquis accusandi facultatem, sed propter personarum coniunctionem ab accusatione summoveatur, an vero stricta ratione quibusdam accusandi facultas non competat? merito itaque dicendum est omnes excepta muliere et minore nisi abolitionem petierint, in hoc senatus consulto incidere. 11Suspecti tutoris accusatio pro tribunali tantum examinari potest, et nullus alius de huiusmodi quaestione quam praeses pronuntiare potest: et tamen qui ab ea destitit, senatus consulto non tenetur. 12Item si dicat aliquis in senatus consultum incidisse Turpillianum, praesidis est super ea re notio: et tamen contra desertorem senatus consulti non intervenit coercitio: qui autem dicit quem in hoc senatus consulto incidisse, accusator non est. 13Incidit in hoc senatus consulto et qui accusatorem summittit aut instigat, aut qui mandat alicui et instruit eum ad accusationem capitalem dando probationes, allegando accusationes: et merito: nam diffidendo crimini quod movet et eximendo se periculo calumniae vel desertionis merito calumniantis et desistentis poenae subdi debuit, nisi subornatus accusator probaverit crimen quod intendere suscepit. nec interest, per se mandavit accusationem an per alium: verum hunc, qui hoc ministerio usus est ad mandandam accusationem, non ex verbis, sed ex sententia senatus consulti puniri Papinianus respondit. summissus enim accusator similiter eodem senatus consulto plectitur, id est propter hoc solum punitur, quod ministerium alieni timoris recepit. 14Reus condemnatus provocavit, deinde accusator destitit: an in hoc senatus consulto incidit? prope est, ut incidisse videatur, quia provocationis remedio condemnationis extinguitur pronuntiatio.
1 Marcianus, On the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. The recklessness of accusers is detected in three ways, and is punished by three penalties; for they either calumniate, prevaricate, or withdraw. 1To calumniate is to bring false accusations. To prevaricate is to conceal true crimes. To withdraw is to entirely abandon a charge. 2Punishment is inflicted upon calumniators by the Remmian Law. 3He who does not prove what he alleges is not immediately considered to be a calumniator, for the investigation of the offence is left to the judge, having jurisdiction of the case; who, if the defendant is acquitted, begins to inquire into the intention of the accuser, and why he was induced to bring the accusation; and if he finds this was due to a just mistake, he must discharge him. If, however, he should ascertain that he evidently has been guilty of calumny, he must inflict upon him the penalty of the law. 4The decision of either of these points is disclosed by the words of the judgment. For if it is as follows, “You have not proved your allegations,” he spares the defendant; but ff he says, “You are guilty of calumny,” he condemns him; and even though he may add nothing with reference to the penalty, still the power of the law will be enforced against him. For (as Papinianus held), the question of fact depends upon the discretion of the court, but the infliction of the punishment is not left to his will, but is reserved for the authority of the law. 5It may be asked, if the judge should make the following statement, “Lucius Titius appears to have brought a rash accusation,” should he be considered to have pronounced him a calumniator? Papinianus says that rashness affords a ground for pardon, and that unrestrained anger lacks the vice of calumny, and on this account no penalty need be incurred. 6We have shown him to be a prevaricator who is in collusion with the defendant, and who relinquishes his post as accuser, in order that he may conceal his evidence, and permit the false excuses of the defendant to be advanced. 7If, however, anyone desists from prosecuting the accusation without having it dismissed, he is punished. 8The dismissal of a case is usually asked for, and granted by the Governors of provinces. The application for it is made to the magistrate while presiding in court, and not elsewhere; and if he is present he cannot leave the investigation to another. 9If one person has accused the same individual of several offences, he should apply for the dismissal of each of them, otherwise he will suffer the penalty prescribed by the Decree of the Senate for each offence omitted. 10He who brings an accusation which can be barred by prescription, as, for instance, that of adultery, when five continuous years have elapsed since its commission by the man, or after six available months from the day of the divorce, in case of the woman; can there be any doubt whatever that, if he desists, he should be punished under this Decree of the Senate? A difficulty arises here for the reason that this accusation almost becomes of no effect when a period of time, or some defect in the person exists, which will render the defendant secure from fear and danger. On the other hand, when an accusation has once been brought, it cannot be dismissed at the wish of the accuser, but this must be done by the authority of the magistrate having cognizance of the case, and he is considered to be more worthy of odium who rashly brings such a disgraceful charge. Therefore, the better opinion is that he, also, of whom we spoke, should come within the terms of the Decree of the Senate. Papinianus, however, gives it as his opinion that if a woman who was not competent to bring an accusation of forgery, because she was not prosecuting an injury inflicted upon herself, or her family, should desist, she ought not be punished under the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. Would he have given the same opinion in other cases? For what difference does it make if an accusation is not permitted to be brought on account of the weakness of sex; the baseness of one’s condition; or the lapse of time? There is much more reason that persons should be exempt from punishment under such circumstances, because the accusation of the woman can at least be effective on account of her own injury, while the accusation of the others is nothing but the sound of a voice. However, the same authority has stated elsewhere that no one can accuse both persons, that is the man and the woman, of adultery at the same time; and still, if he did accuse both of them simultaneously, he should ask for the dismissal of the case against both, in order to avoid becoming liable under this Decree of the Senate. Moreover, what difference will it make if the accusation should prove to be void, for the reasons above mentioned, or if it could not stand on account of the number accused? Or if there is some distinction to be made where anyone has full power to bring an accusation, but is prevented from doing so because of the joinder of the two individuals; or he is not qualified to accuse them according to the strict construction of the law? Hence it is reasonable to hold that all persons (with the exception of women and minors), when they do not ask for a dismissal of the case, will come within the scope of this Decree of the Senate. 11The accusation of a suspected guardian can only be heard in open court, and no one but the Governor of the province can render a decision in such a case; and, nevertheless, anyone who desists from prosecution will not incur the penalty of the Decree of the Senate. 12Likewise, where anyone is accused of having incurred the penalty of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate, it is the duty of the Governor of the province to take cognizance of the matter; and the penalty of the Decree of the Senate will not be enforced against the party who abandons the charge, for he who says that someone has incurred the penalty of this Decree of the Senate is not an accuser. 13He comes within the terms of this decree who provides an accuser, or instigates, directs, or induces anyone to bring a capital accusation, by furnishing evidence, and by formulating charges. This is reasonable, for by failing to prove the accusation which he was instrumental in having brought, and by attempting to free himself from the danger of calumny by abandoning the case, he should certainly be subjected to punishment for those offences; unless the accuser, who had been suborned, can prove the crime which he undertook to establish. Nor does it make any difference whether he brought the charge himself, or directed it to be brought by another. Papinianus gave it as his opinion that if it was true that anyone had used means of this kind for the bringing of an accusation, he should be punished, not according to the letter, but according to the spirit of the law; for the accuser who took the place of the person who employed him is liable under the same Decree of the Senate; that is to say, he is punished for that alone which he did as the agent of another, who himself was afraid to act. 14A defendant who had been convicted, appealed, and his accuser afterwards desisted; did he come within the terms of the Decree of the Senate? He seems to have very nearly done so, because by the remedy of the appeal the decision of conviction was extinguished.
2 Paulus libro singulari de poenis omnium legum. Qui destiterit, agere amplius et accusare prohibetur.
2 Paulus, On the Penalties of All Laws. Anyone who desists from prosecuting a crime is prevented from subsequently bringing an accusation.
3 Idem libro primo sententiarum. Et in privatis et in extraordinariis criminibus omnes calumniosi extra ordinem pro qualitate admissi plectuntur.
3 The Same, Sentences, Book I. And even in the cases of accusation for private and ordinary breaches of the law, all calumniators are arbitrarily punished in proportion to the gravity of the offences committed.
4 Papinianus libro quinto decimo responsorum. Mulier, quae falsi crimen iniuriae propriae post interpositam denuntiationem desistens omisit, ex senatus consulto Turpilliano teneri non videtur. 1Post abolitionem idem crimen ab eodem in eundem instaurari non potest.
4 Papinianus, Opinions, Book XV. A woman who institutes a prosecution for forgery, as an injury to herself, and, having desisted, abandons it, is not considered to have incurred the penalty of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. 1After a case has been dismissed, the same charge cannot again be brought by the same accuser against the same defendant.
5 Paulus libro secundo responsorum. Quaesitum est, an is, qui libello principi dato falsum se obiecturum minatus est, si non obiecisset, Turpilliano senatus consulto tenetur. Paulus respondit verbis senatus consulti Turpilliani eum de quo quaeritur non contineri.
5 Paulus, Opinions, Book II. Where a man presented a petition to the Emperor and threatened to bring an accusation for forgery, but did not do so, the question arose whether he was liable to the penalty imposed by the Turpillian Decree of the Senate? Paulus answered that the party in question was not included in the terms of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate.
6 Idem libro primo sententiarum. Ab accusatione destitit, qui cum adversario suo de compositione eius criminis quod intendebat fuerit locutus. 1Animo ab accusatione destitit, qui affectum et animum accusandi deposuit. 2Destitisse videtur, qui intra praefinitum accusationis a praeside tempus reum suum non peregit. 3Nuntiatores, qui per notoriam indicia produnt, notoriis suis adsistere iubentur. 4Calumniae causa puniuntur, qui in fraudem alicuius librum vel testimonium aliudve quid conquisisse vel scripsisse vel in iudicium protulisse dicuntur.
6 The Same, Sentences, Book I. He has desisted from the accusation who has spoken with his adversary with reference to the disposal of the criminal charge which he had attempted to prosecute. 1He intentionally abandons an accusation who renounces the desire and intention of bringing it. 2He is held to have desisted, who does not prosecute the defendant within the time prescribed by the Governor to prove the charge. 3Those who serve notice in writing of their intention to prosecute are ordered to substantiate their allegations by the production of the notices. 4Those are punished for false accusations who, for the purpose of injuring another, are alleged to have searched for, written, or produced in court any book or other evidence to his prejudice.
7 Ulpianus libro octavo disputationum. Si quis repetere velit crimen publica abolitione interveniente, eo iure repetit, quo accusabat: neque enim possunt praescriptiones ei obici, quae ante reorum abolitionem non sunt obiectae. et ita divus Hadrianus rescripsit. 1Si stellionatum quis obiecerit vel expilatae hereditatis crimen et destitit, poenam senatus consulti Turpilliani non subibit, nec si furti vel iniuriarum: sed officio iudicis culpa eius coercebitur.
7 Ulpianus, Disputations, Book VIII. If anyone should wish to revive a criminal accusation after it has been publicly dismissed, he can do so with the same right which he had when he first brought it; for prescriptions cannot legally be pleaded against him which were not pleaded before the discharge of the defendants. This the Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript. 1Where anyone brings an accusation for stellionatus, or for the crime of plundering an estate, and then desists, he will not be subjected to the penalty of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate, even if theft or injury is involved, but his fault will be punished by the judge.
8 Papinianus libro secundo de adulteriis. Abolitio aut publice fit ob diem insignem aut publicam gratulationem
8 Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. The dismissal of a criminal case is either made publicly on account of some memorable occasion, or because of some public rejoicing,
9 Macer libro secundo publicorum. vel ob rem prospere gestam
9 Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. Or by reason of the fortunate result of some transaction,
10 Papinianus libro secundo de adulteriis. aut privatim actore postulante. tertio genere fit ex lege abolitio accusatore mortuo vel ex iusta causa impedito, quo minus accusare possit. 1Abolitione autem publice facta non retractabitur in iudicio repetendo de mariti iure. 2Triginta dies repetendi rei divus Traianus utiles esse interpretatus est, ex die scilicet, quo feriae finitae sunt. et senatus censuit eas dies cedere, quibus quisque reum suum repetere possit. hoc autem repetendi rei tempus non aliter cedit, quam si accusator quoque potuit adire.
10 Papinianus, On Adultery, Book II. Or privately, at the request of the accuser. There is a third kind of dismissal made in accordance with law, that is, when the accuser dies, or is prevented by some good reason from bringing the accusation. 1When a dismissal is made in accordance with a public decree, the husband, in bringing the charge a second time, will not forfeit any of his rights. 2The Divine Hadrian stated that the thirty days prescribed for reviving an accusation should be understood to be available days, that is to say they should be computed from the date on which the festivals terminated. The Senate decreed that these days began at the time when anyone could resume the prosecution of the defendant. This time to revive the case does not begin to run except where the accuser can institute proceedings.
11 Idem libro singulari de adulteris. Quaerebatur, an hi, qui ab accusatione tempore exclusi essent, in senatus consultum Turpillianum inciderunt. respondit non oportere dubitari calumnia non puniri eos, qui praescriptione temporis exclusi causam adulterii perferre non potuerunt.
11 The Same, On Adultery. The question was asked whether those who had been excluded from bringing an accusation by lapse of time come within the scope of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. The answer was that there is no doubt that persons who are prevented by prescription from bringing a charge of adultery can be punished for calumny.
12 Ulpianus libro secundo de adulteriis. Si interveniente publica abolitione ex senatus consulto, ut fieri adsolet, vel ob laetitiam aliquam vel honorem domus divinae vel ex aliqua causa, ex qua senatus censuit abolitionem reorum fieri, nec intra dies praestitutos reum repetierit: dicendum est cessare Turpillianum senatus consultum. nec enim videtur desistere, qui exemptum reum non defert: eximitur autem reorum abolitione interveniente.
12 Ulpianus, On Adultery, Book II. Where a public dismissal of a criminal case has occurred under the Decree of the Senate, as ordinarily happens; or on account of some public rejoicing; or to honor the Imperial House; or for some reason for. which the Senate decreed that the defendants should be discharged, and the accuser did not renew the accusation within the prescribed time, it must be said that the Turpillian Decree of the Senate does not apply, for he is not held to desist who does not accuse a person that is exempt from criminal liability. He, however, becomes exempt from prosecution by the discharge of the defendants.
13 Paulus libro tertio de adulteris. Destitisse eum accipiemus, qui in totum animum agendi deposuit, non qui distulit accusationem. 1Sed qui permissu imperatoris ab accusatione destitit, impunitus est.
14 Ulpianus libro septimo de officio proconsulis. Divus Hadrianus Salvio Caro proconsuli Cretae rescripsit tutorem, qui pupilli causa instituerat accusationem, defuncto pupillo, cuius causa accusare coeperat, non esse cogendum accusationem implere.
14 Ulpianus, On the Duties of Proconsul, Book VII. The Divine Hadrian stated in a Rescript addressed to Salvius Carus, Proconsul of Crete, that where a guardian had filed an accusation in the name of his ward, and the latter, in whose behalf he had filed it, had died, he should not be compelled to proceed with the accusation.
15 Macer libro secundo publicorum. In senatus consultum Turpillianum incidunt, qui subiecissent accusatores, aut subiecti postulassent nec peregissent reos, aut aliter quam abolitione facta destitissent: quique chirographum ob accusandum dedissent pactionemve aliquam interposuissent. hoc autem verbum ‘nec peregissent’ ad universos supra scriptos pertinere dicendum est. 1An ad eos, qui hodie de iudiciis publicis extra ordinem cognoscunt, senatus consultum pertineat, quaeritur: sed iam hoc iure ex sacris constitutionibus utimur, ut pertineat ita ex singulis causis singulae poenae irrogentur. 2Eos, de quorum calumnia agi non permittitur, si destiterint, non incidere in poenam huius senatus consulti constitutionibus cavetur. 3Si propter mortem rei accusator destiterit, non potest hoc senatus consulto teneri, quia morte rei iudicium solvitur, nisi tale crimen fuit, cuius actio et adversus heredes durat, veluti maiestatis. idem in accusatione repetundarum est, quia haec quoque morte non solvitur. 4Ceterum si, postea quam accusator destitit, reus decesserit, non ideo magis delictum accusatoris relevatur. nam eum qui semel destitit, si postea accusare paratus sit, non esse audiendum Severus et Antoninus statuerunt. 5Qui post inscriptionem ante litem contestatam anno vel biennio agere non potuerint variis praesidum occupationibus vel etiam civilium officiorum necessitatibus districti, in senatus consultum non incident. 6Quamquam prius reum quis detulerat, et si post abolitionem, antequam reus repeteretur, alia abolitio supervenerit: non ex superiore, sed ex secunda abolitione dies triginta computantur.
15 Macer, Public Prosecutions, Book II. Those come within the scope of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate who substitute accusers in their places; or who, having done so, bring the accusation without prosecuting the defendants; or desist from the prosecution in some other manner than by the dismissal of the case, as well as such as have filed some written document, or have entered into some agreement for the purpose of accusing another. It must be said that these words, “Bring the accusation without prosecuting the defendants,” are applicable to all the persons above mentioned. 1The question arises whether the Decree of the Senate applies to those who, at present, have extraordinary jurisdiction of public offences. The present law, based upon the Imperial Constitutions, is that it does apply; hence each penalty will be imposed in each individual case. 2If those who are not permitted to bring an accusation for calumny desist, they will not be liable to the penalty of this Decree of the Senate. This has been provided by the Constitutions. 3If, on account of the death of the defendant, the accuser should desist, he cannot be held liable under this Decree of the Senate; because the prosecution is extinguished by the death of the accused, unless the crime is such that its prosecution can be continued against the heirs, as, for instance, that of high treason. The same rule applies where an accusation is brought for extortion, because this also is not extinguished by death. 4Moreover, if the defendant should die after the accuser has desisted from the prosecution, the offence of the accuser will not, for this reason, be lessened. For if he who has once desisted should afterwards be ready to renew the accusation, Severus and Antoninus have decreed that he shall not be heard. 5Those who, after having filed a written accusation, have permitted one or two years to elapse, for the reason that they could not prosecute on account of their various occupations as Governors, or because they were prevented by the requirements of civil office, do not come within the terms of the Decree of the Senate. 6If anyone has accused a person in the first place, and, after the case has been dismissed, but before the defendant is again accused, a second dismissal should occur, the thirty days should be computed, not from the first, but from the second dismissal of the case.
16 Paulus libro singulari de adulteris. Domitianus rescripsit, quod de feriis et abolendis reis dicitur, non pertinere ad servos, qui accusati in vinculis esse iubentur, ne iudicium finiatur.
16 Paulus, On Adultery. Domitian stated in a Rescript that what is provided with reference to festivals, and the discharge of defendants, does not apply to slaves who, having been accused, are ordered to be placed in chains until the case is decided.
17 Modestinus libro septimo decimo responsorum. Lucius Titius Seium reum falsi fecit et priusquam persequeretur, indulgentia reorum crimina abolita sunt. quaero, si postea eum iterato reum non fecerit, an in Turpillianum senatus consultum inciderit. Herennius Modestinus respondit abolitionem reorum, quae publice indulgetur, ad hoc genus criminis non pertinere.
17 Modestinus, Opinions, Book XVII. Lucius Titius accused Seius of forgery, and before he prosecuted him, the accusations of all defendants were dismissed by the indulgence of the Emperor. I ask, if the prosecution should not afterwards be resumed whether the accuser would be subject to the penalty of the Turpillian Decree of the Senate. Herennius Modestinus answered that the discharge of defendants, granted by public favor, does not apply to this kind of crime.
18 Papirius Iustus libro primo de constitutionibus. Imperatores Antoninus et Verus Augusti Iulio vero rescripserunt, cum satis diu litem traxisse dicetur, invito adversario non posse eum abolitionem accipere. 1Item rescripserunt, nisi evidenter probetur consentire adversarium, abolitionem non dari. 2Item rescripserunt, cum in crimine capitali abolitionem ut in re pecuniaria petitam esse diceret, restaurandam esse nihilo minus cognitionem, ita ut, si non probasset hoc quod proponeret, non impune eum laturum.
18 Papirius Justus, On the Constitutions, Book I. The Emperors Antoninus and Verus stated in a Rescript to Julius Verus that, as the case had been continued for a considerable time, the latter could not obtain its dismissal against the consent of his adversaries. 1They also stated in a Rescript that, unless it was clearly proved that the adversary had given his consent, dismissal should not be granted. 2They also stated in a Rescript that, where the dismissal of an accusation for a capital crime had been applied for, as in a case involving a sum of money, the prosecution might, nevertheless, be renewed; so that if the complainant could not prove what he alleged he should not go unpunished.